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THE DETERMINANTS OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE : 
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis deals with the means whereby a firm can gain 
a competitive advantage over its rivals. After considering 
how this issue is dealt with in the management literature, 
the thesis focuses on two possible routes to competitive 
advantage. The first is largely internal to the firm, and 
concerns the design of managerial contracts to provide 
managers with the incentives to act in the best interests of 
shareholders. The second route is external, involving 
strategic market moves in relation to rival firms. These two 
possible routes to competitive advantage are appraised in 
light of recent theoretical developments in 1principal-agent 
analysis the internal route, and the new industrial 
economics the external route. The final section of the 
thesis is empirical and deals with the share price 
experience of the top 100 U. K. companies since 1970. The 
econometric notion of cointegration is employed to test for 
the existence of sustained competitive advantage. The 
tentative conclusion reached is that while companies may be 
able to achieve a sustained competitive advantage, the 
compensation contracts employed have not been a successful 
means of obtaining such advantage. The suggestion is that 
external routes to competitive advantage might be more 
effective. 
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PART I- INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I 
AN OVERVI EW 
This thesis examines the concept of competitive 
advantage and its determinants. It provides a review of the 
literature as well as an empirical investigation into the 
ability of firms to sustain a competitive advantage. The 
issue of competitive advantage is complex and requires a 
structured framework from which to gain meaningful insights 
into such questions such as Why is one firm more 
successful than another firm?, and how can a firm 
consistently earn super-normal profits over time? 
The thesis is divided into five parts: 
PART I 
Part I, the introduction, contains a review of the more 
important work dealing with Competitive Advantage in the 
business strategy literature. Chapter 2 discusses primarily 
the work of Porter, arguably the best known writer on the 
subject. His investigation of the determinants of 
competitive advantage relies on the concept of a "value 
chain", the complete set of activities undertaken by a firm 
to produce and sell its outputs. He maintains that 
competitive advantage can be gained by applying one, and 
only one of the following three generic strategies : cost 
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leadership, differentiation, and focus. After critical 
evaluation of this proposition it is concluded that, 
although the business strategy literature can provide useful 
insights for managers seeking competitive advantage, it 
falls well short of providing an all-embracing formula for 
gaining competitive advantage. 
PART II 
Part II of the thesis presents an outline of the theory 
of the principal and agent. The background is set in 
Chapter 3 where an attempt is made to move away from the 
traditional neo-classical analysis of the firm, which treats 
the firm as a "Black Box", an agency existing solely to 
organise the production process to achieve certain 
objectives. The ideas of Coase, who sees the firm as an 
institutional response to market failure, are taken as the 
point of departure. It is suggested that the work of Coase 
and others could hold a clue as to how firms might generate 
and sustain a competitive advantage: the presence of bounded 
rationality, opportunistic behaviour and asset specificity 
opens up the possibility that the market is no longer the 
best governance mechanism. The obvious alternative of 
government by management requires arrangements involving 
more than price - quantity - quality stipulations. 
The formal analysis of optimal contracts between 
Principals and Agents is discussed in Chapter 4. The aim of 
2 
agency theory is to provide a characterisation of the 
optimal contract, ie. the contract which maximises the 
utility of the principal while ensuring that the agent 
achieves the reservation level of utility. This is an 
important area of analysis, since a common area of 
application is one in which company shareholders 
(principals) delegate decision making responsibility to a 
senior executive (agent). The problem then becomes one of 
designing an optimal contract that will induce the executive 
to exert the effort required to align his or her objectives 
with those of the shareholders, given various states of the 
world. 
Having discussed Principal-Agent theory, Chapter 5 
examines how compensation contracts have been designed in 
practice. A central issue in this chapter is whether in 
reality compensation plans have been designed to induce 
effort or avoid tax. Given that Principal - Agent analysis 
suggests that the optimal contract is likely to be extremely 
complex, it seem reasonable to assume that firms will forego 
strict optimality in the interests of practicality. This 
raises the question as to whether companies really do 
address the problem of providing executives with appropriate 
incentives. An examination of the most commonly employed 
compensation schemes and their incentive properties suggests 
that it is extremely difficult to disentangle incentive and 
tax considerations. 
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Chapter 6 provides a survey of studies of the empirical 
relationship between executive compensation and performance. 
Taken at face value the studies suggest a positive and 
significant relationship between pay and performance. 
However, there are difficulties with interpreting the 
results, specifically with regard to the issue of causality 
and the cross - sectional nature of the studies. The 
available empirical evidence does not provide conclusive 
answers to the question of whether compensation packages 
provide the appropriate managerial incentives for greater 
effort, and thus generate an improvement in corporate 
performance; or whether causality works in the opposite 
direction, improvements in corporate performance arising 
from reasons independent of managerial effort, with 
opportunistic managers exploiting the opportunities for 
higher compensatiqn levels. 
PART III* 
Part III of the thesis investigates the external 
aspects, such as market strategy, whereby a firm might 
achieve a competitive advantage. The way in which the 
external environment affects the competitiveness of a 
business has been the chief concern of Structure - Conduct - 
Performance (SCP) models. These are discussed in Chapter 7. 
The SCP approach attempts to establish causal links between 
market conditions, and the adoption of different strategies 
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which may allow a firm to gain a competitive advantage in 
the market place. However, the SCP paradigm is unable to 
provide a clear and unambiguous theoretical foundation for 
the investigation of firm - industry relationships. Some 
sort of positive association between concentration, barriers 
to entry and performance emerges from most empirical 
studies, but it is by no means clear that the relationship 
reflects the causal process specified in the SCP paradigm. 
Furthermore, the paradigm is ambivalent on whether the 
structure variables which affect performance are part of 
some "state of nature" over which firms have little or no 
control, or whether structure is susceptible to manipulation 
by firms. 
The scope for such manipulative or strategic moves is 
the subject of Chapter 8. The discussion highlights the 
point that in markets which satisfy the conditions for 
contestability, there is little scope for strategic moves. 
In practice, however, few if any markets meet the strict 
requirements of contestability: the implication is that 
there is considerable scope for strategic moves designed to 
gain a competitive edge over rivals. 
The major emphasis of Chapter 9 is on the nature of 
strategic choices. For a strategic move to be successful it 
must influence other firms, expected payoffs from the 
various courses of action open to them. One way is for the 
strategic move to influence, in a lasting way, cost or 
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demand conditions. Investment in capacity, R&D and 
advertising are the main strategic weapons considered. 
Strategic use of expenditure on these items is possible 
because of the nature of the associated costs - they are, at 
least to a degree, "sunk" costs,, and hence require an 
irreversible commitment by the firms that use them. Various 
possible commitments by the firms are considered and it is 
concluded that the scope for strategic use of these weapons 
is a function of the nature of market competition (whether 
it is price sensitive) and the nature of the investments 
themselves (whether they project an aggressive or non - 
aggressive image). 
The second way for a strategic move to succeed is for it 
to influence the beliefs of those whose behaviour it is 
designed to affect, even if it does not influence actual 
cost and demand conditions. With asymmetric information 
between market participants, the less informed firms will 
make inferences from the behaviour of more informed rivals. 
This theme is examined with reference to the vexed question 
of predatory pricing. The conclusion to emerge is that 
because in a world of uncertainty, it is appearance rather 
than reality is what counts, firms may well engage in 
predatory practices to gain a reputation for toughness. This 
is designed to influence the beliefs of other firms in the 
market, and those who might contemplate entry. 
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PART IV 
The discussion in Parts II and III of this thesis 
suggests that it might be illuminating to try new methods of 
testing for possible internal and external routes to 
competitive advantage. This is the concern of Part IV. 
Cross - Section methods have not been conspicuously 
successful in casting light on the issues involved, so it is 
useful to consider what could be achieved by time series 
methods. 
The major point of departure here is the use of time 
series cointegration techniques to test for the existence of 
the equilibrium relationships suggested earlier in the 
thesis. In particular, two questions are posed : 
Is there any tendency for a company's share price to 
converge onto an equilibrium relationship with that of the 
industry within which it operates or with that of the market 
as a whole? 
Is there any tendency for executive compensation to 
converge onto an equilibrium relationship with the share 
price of the parent firm? 
The cointegration technique is explained in Chapter 10. 
The approach has its roots in two bodies of literature : the 
statistical literature on testing for unit roots and 
stationarity in time series; and the econometric literature 
on distinguishing actual from spurious relationships between 
variables. 
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The relationship between the firm's share price and that 
of the industry or market is the subject of Chapter 11. The 
existence of cointegration between these variables might be 
seen as constituting prima facie evidence that there is no 
scope for sustained competitive advantage. Cointegration 
tests on the top 100 U. K. companies by market capitalisation 
between 1970 and 1987, however, suggest that cointegration 
relationships do not exist, the implication being that there 
do exist opportunities to sustain competitive advantage. 
Chapter 12 investigates the ability of firms to sustain 
a competitive advantage through the use of compensation 
contracts. Unfortunately, a shortage of observations, due to 
executive compensation only having been reported annually 
over the past nine years, renders the results reported in 
this chapter at best tentative. The motivation for 
conducting these tests, however, was more one of 
demonstrating a method which could be less tentatively 
employed when or should more data become available. The 
existence of a cointegration relationship between executive 
compensation and parent company share price would suggest 
that a stable, non - spurious relationship between the two 
variables does exist. The tests, however, provide tentative 
evidence to the contrary. Of course, the tests say nothing 
about the optimality of the compensation contracts, but 
the implication is that while companies may be able to 
achieve a sustained competitive advantage, the compensation 
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contracts employed have not been a successful means of 
obtaining such an advantage. The suggestion is that external 
routes to competitive advantage might be more effective. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
2.1 THE ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE BUSINESS 
STRATEGY LITERATURE 
It is primarily thewriters on business strategy who 
popularised the concept of competitive advantage. This is 
hardly surprising given the audience these writers address. 
Both practising and prospective managers will be expected to 
listen attentively to advice on how to improve corporate 
performance, particularly if this advice is coined in an 
idiom to which they are accustomed. 
The aim of this section is to characterise and evaluate 
the type of analysis employed in the literature. Arguably, 
the topic of competitive advantage as viewed by business 
strategists received a most systematic and at the same time 
methodologically representative treatment in the work of 
Michael E. Porter (1980 and 1985). A large proportion of 
this section, therefore, will be devoted to the examination 
of his ideas. In addition, a small but roughly 
representative sample of the other contributions to the 
topic will be surveyed briefly. 
Competitive advantage essentially amounts to achievement 
of supernormal profits which can be viewed as rent. They can 
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be sought through a variety of avenues. A major part of 
Porter's effort is directed to producing a classification of 
these avenues which would be both exhaustive and 
illuminating for businessmen. In Competitive Strategy 
(1980, p. XIX-XX, p. 40-41t p. 64-67) we find lengthy lists, 
with many sub-headings, of points to consider when 
formulating the competitive strategy, organisational 
arrangements and skills required for different ways of 
achieving competitive advantage, and factors to be taken 
into account when analysing the strength of a competitor. 
The last list contains sixty-four factors grouped under 
eighteen different sub-headings. In a similar manner Porter 
(1980, p. 3-33) investigates the effect on profitability of, 
what he terms, the five competitive forces. These are : 
bargaining powers of buyers and sellers, threats posed by 
potential entrants and substitute products, and rivalry 
amongst the incumbents. A large part of the 1980 book 
outlines how the relative importance of the factors 
affecting profitability varies between emerging, mature and 
declining industries and then between what are termed 
fragmented and global industries. 
In the 1985 book Porter simplifies his classification 
schemes by introducing the concept of a value chain. This 
concept refers to a complete set of activities undertaken by 
a firm to produce and market its output. All primary 
activities are said to fall into one of the five classes : 
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inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing 
and sales, and services. Similarly all support activities 
fall into one of the four classes : procurement, technology 
development, human resource management, and firm 
infrastructure. The last class includes such activities as 
general management planning, finance, accounting and legal 
work. Porter (1985, p. 39) claims that when searching for the 
avenues leading to competitive advantage itý is much more 
productive to analyse the value chain rather than value 
added. According to Porter, the value added analysis 
"incorrectly distinguishes" between raw materials and other 
purchased inputs into a firm's activities. It is not 
conducive to a simultaneous examination of the cost 
behaviour of activities and the cost of inputs required to 
carry them out. Porter also asserts that value added 
analysis "fails to highlight" the potential linkages between 
a firm and its suppliers that can raise profitability. 
From the perspective of this thesis it is-not imperative 
to establish how superior, if at all, the value chain 
analysis is to other techniques of surveying the totality of 
a firm's activities. To be useful, all these techniques must 
be flexible enough to accommodate highly diverse 
circumstances under which firms operate. It should be 
apparent that what is crucial in a businessman's search for 
competitive advantage is not a division of primary and 
support activities into respectively five and four broad 
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classes. His success is much more dependent on how 
perceptive and innovative he will be in sub-dividing these 
broad activities into narrower categories and finding his 
way through a complex set of interrelationships between 
them. Such a set, in most cases, is highly specific for 
individual firms. 
The question arises as to how useful can this advice on 
the best way of constructing a detailed value chain be. Not 
all types of knowledge can be fully articulated. Frequently, 
to remain relevant for decision-taking, knowledge must be 
conveyed quickly. However, the cost of accelerating the 
process of articulation may be so high as to be prohibitive. 
Some knowledge is necessarily, as Polanyi (1967) calls it, 
tacit. It can be argued that the analytical skills of a 
manager in pinpointing crucial interrelationships between 
activities of the firm he manages are based on knowledge 
which is essentially tacit. Clearly his skills can improve 
as a result of learning by doing. Management education 
involving an in depth discussion of numerous case studies 
has a potential to be useful. However, if we accept that 
managers in their problem solving rely on tacit knowledge, 
then an insightful presentation of a case study must be 
based on research carried out by an outsider. Are there many 
such outsiders who can gain access to the relevant 
info=ation? 
The point at issue can be elucidated further by 
13 
considering the knowledge of an athlete and his coach about 
ingredients of the athlete's successful performance. it 
is the coach rather than the athlete who usually finds it 
opportune to articulate this knowledge. Given their close 
working relationship the information at his disposal is 
extensive . Will those who are able to observe at close 
quarters a successful businessman in action have an 
incentive to articulate and then publicise what allowed him 
to reconfigure the value chain of his firm? 
Tacitness of economic agents' knowledge has often been 
recognised by economists. A particularly apt and succinct 
formulation can be found in the 1946 article by Fritz 
Machlup : "The business man who equates marginal net revenue 
productivity and marginal factor cost when he decides how 
many to employ need not engage in higher mathematics, 
geometry, or-clairvoyance. ordinarily he would not even 
consult with his accountant or efficiency expert in order to 
arrive at his decision; he would not make any tests or 
formal calculations; he would simply rely on his sense or 
his "feel" of the situation. There is nothing very exact. 
about this sort of estimate. On the basis of hundreds of 
previous experiences of a similar nature the businessman 
would "Just know", in a vague and rough way, whether or not 
it would pay him to hire more men". (1946, p. 355). 
The principle Machlup is referring to (to maximise 
profits equate marginal net revenue productivity to factor 
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cost) is much more specific than the principle enunciated by 
Porter (to gain competitive advantage think in terms of nine 
broad classes of activity and then subdivide them further 
taking into account the circumstances under which your firm 
operates). It would therefore appear that if successful 
businessmen can apply the first principle without being 
conscious about it the application of the second principle 
in the same fashion would present even less of a difficulty. 
Porter (1980, p. 34-46 and 1985, p. 11-26) also proposes a 
complementary formula for gaining competitive advantage. The 
formula is very concise : given the three generic strategies 
- cost leadership, differentiation and focus - choose one, 
and not more than one, of them. The cost leadership allows 
the firm to earn a higher rate of return than its 
competitors. A successful differentiation leads to 
monopolistic profits. It is well known that the dynamic 
process outlined by Chamberlin erodes these profits. 
Consequently to maintain competitive advantage, 
differentiation must be continuous. The focus strategy 
involves pursuing either cost leadership or differentiation 
in a segment of the market. 
The argument rationalizing the formula can be found in 
Caves (1984). The choice of one strategy presupposes an 
adoption of an appropriate organisational framework and 
incentive system. An advantageous environment thus created 
for the pursuit of one strategy must necessarily be less 
is 
advantageous for the pursuit of another. An attempt to 
create two different environments for different parts of a 
business unit is likely to be frustrated in view of a 
limited coordinating capacity of its managerial personnel. 
Caves maintains that "a firm's managerial cadre may hope to 
beat its median-ability competitor along one dimension, but 
not along every dimension" (1984, p. 127). 
The validity of the view that strategy choices are 
exclusive can perhaps be established by a carefully 
conceived empirical research. This is, however, not to be 
found in Porter's published work. Instead, he offers a 
wealth of essentially anecdotal evidence. According to 
Porter (1980, p43) a striking example of a firm that 
achieved success via differentiation strategy is provided by 
Mercedes. Referring to this example, Karhani (1984, 
p. 377-378) raises several points which undermine Porter's 
formula. They can be paraphrased as follows: Why is it 
Mercedes rather than Rolls-Royce that achieved success 
through differentiation? Could it be that the high 
profitability of Mercedes is due to high differentiation of 
its products relative to its cost position? If so then what 
is crucial for gaining competitive advantage is not the 
pursuit of a single strategy but rather an appropriate 
combination of activities directed both at securing a low 
cost position and differentiation. In many industries one 
strategy is likely to bring higher returns or can be more 
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easily executed than the other. If an industry is 
characterised by increasing returns to scale then a firm's 
low cost position, regardless of scale, will facilitate its 
expansion. In this way the benefits obtainable from the 
cost leadership strategy will be magnified. Low 
cross-elasticities between outputs of the firms in an 
industry will make differentiation an unattractive option. 
Porter emphasises that the successful implementation of 
a differentiation strategy depends on controlling unit costs 
of output (1985, p. 127-130, p. 161). The question arises, 
however, as to whether this control will be effective enough 
under a unidimensional strategic thrust. If not then 
Porter's formula must be re-drafted to read for each 
strategic option equate the marginal benefit and the 
marginal cost of its articulation and implementation. The 
relevant cost should include the opportunity cost of a 
reduction in time which the managers devote to the pursuit 
of other strategic options. Once the formula is clothed in 
the marginalist garb it is easier to realise the 
difficulties inherent in its application. 
Porter's analysis of competitive advantage extends to 
various aspects of rivalry between incumbent firms and 
between incumbents and entrants. He strongly advocates 
achieving accommodation with "good competitors" and taking 
steps to arrive at the optimal competitor configuration 
(1985, p. 201-228). Good competitors can help in adjusting to 
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fluctuations in demand and, by serving as a standard of 
comparison, facilitate differentiation. They can supply the 
less attractive segments of a market where, for instance, a 
strong bargaining power of buyers forces the price/cost 
margin down. By serving these segments they make it more 
difficult for an entrant attempting to gain access to the 
more profitable segments of the market to establish a 
bridgehead. The presence of a less profitable competitor can 
moderate the wage claims made by trade unions with 
membership covering the whole industry. An advantageous 
competitive configuration can result in a degree of 
standardisation of technology which signals to the buyers 
that the industry's products are unlikely to become outdated 
in the near future. More generally, it can lead to sharing 
the costs of market development. 
According to Porter, "a good competitor, while seeking 
to earn attractive profits, is typically satisfied with its 
current returns and knows that improving them is -not 
feasible" (1985, p. 215). Is Porter not asking too much of 
him? It can be argued along the lines of Simon (1959) that. 
firms stop searching for improvements in their performance 
as soon as a "satisfactory" result is achieved. on those 
grounds an aggressive stance towards good competitors should 
be avoided : once their position is gravely undermined they 
may-embrace strategies which reduce profitability of the 
whole industry. The argument that firms satisfice rather 
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than maximise, however, sits uneasily alongside the 
presumption that they aim to gain competitive advantage. 
It is noted that to sustain competitive advantage a firm 
needs to forgo some of its short term profit (Porter 1985, 
p. 482). This, in most cases, involves making an investment 
to defend its present market position. Chapter 14 of the 
1985 book (p. 482-512) outlines three categories of possible 
defensive moves. Those falling under the first category 
raise structural barriers to entry. With a high level of 
advertising in an industry, a challenger whose scale of 
output will be lower than that of the industry's, leader, 
will face the prospect of higher unit costs. The same 
prospect can be created by a high spending on R&D to raise 
the rate of product innovation in the industry. Providing 
dealers and buyers with finance on favourable terms will 
raise the minimum capital requirements for competing with 
the incumbent. The second category of moves increases 
expected retaliation. For example, excess capacity signals 
ability to wage a price war. Signing a host of long-term 
supply contracts for large quantities of inputs signals a 
determination to maintain the present market share. Finally, 
the incumbent can aim to lower the inducement for entry. To 
achieve this, highly ambitious profit targets should be 
avoided or an effort should be made to communicate to 
potential competitors a realistic assessment of the 
industry's future profitability. 
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It can be seen that once again Porter offers a 
relatively comprehensive classification of factors behind an 
important aspect of competitive advantage. However the 
classification as such does not substantially help an 
individual firm to decide what combination of the defense 
moves is optimal. Such a combination is likely to vary 
greatly depending on the circumstances under which a firm 
operates. A contrast can be drawn between Porter's approach 
to defense strategy and that found in closed-loop models of 
rivalry to be discussed in chapter 9 of this thesis. The 
models aim to determine the optimal sequence of moves to be 
chosen from a specified small set. They also aim to identify 
what constitutes a credible commitment on the part of an 
incumbent to defend his position. Porter's aim is to draw a 
comprehensive list of defensive moves in an ordered form and 
then to indicate which of them are preferable under certain 
broad conditions. As can be expected he is left with a 
number of loose ends in his analysis. It is hard to see how 
they can be tied without imposing the type of restrictions 
specified in the simplified assumptions of the closed-loop 
models. 
An analysis similar to Porter's analysis of defensive 
moves is presented by MacMillan (1983). What is itressed in 
this article is the importance of seizing strategic 
initiative for gaining competitive advantage. Seizing 
initiative amounts to forcing the competitors to take a 
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reactive rather than proactive role. This apparently can be 
achieved on the basis of a thorough understanding of entry 
and exit barriers, factors which determine how fast the 
competitors respond to a strategic move (inertia barriers), 
intelligence systems, the nature of pre-emptive moves, a 
wider market environment required to make a product 
profitable, opportunity costs of strategic decisions, 
factors determining what business units in the firm's 
portfolio ought to contract or expand, and finally the 
background situation which allows firms to identify the 
prime targets of the strategic move. (MacMillan 1983, p. 
43-49). 
This already formidable list is further extended by 
Schuler and MacMillan (1984) to include human resource 
management practices. Their understanding should lead to 
appropriate selection and motivation of employees. Schuler 
and MacMillan claim that companies achieve success largely 
by effective use of their human resources. To establish this 
claim they consider it sufficient to point to individual 
personnel management practices applied in some successful 
companies. Thus, for instance, it is stated that Lincoln 
Electric, a leader in small motors and arc welders, has a 
compensation system strongly tied to the company's profits; 
The American Productivity Center in Houston hires 
consultants who are the generalists and promotes a 
multi-disciplinary approach to consulting engagements; 
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I. B. M. and Procter & Gamble carefully screen their job 
applicants and then programme the assignments for new 
employees with the aim to socialize them into the corporate 
culture; Delco-Remy, a supplier of car batteries to Honda, 
trains its employees in participative management (Schuler 
and MacMillan 1984, p. 244-251). 
To evaluate the above approach the following question 
needs to be asked. Is the statement that a large number of 
firm's activities are crucial for gaining competitive 
advantage much different from the one asserting that it is 
the totality of activities which is important? Perhaps the 
difference would be more pronounced if the first statement 
was modified to read : There is a small number of specific 
activities which are not crucial for gaining competitive 
advantage. Moreover, the authors in question rely 
excessively on exemplification to support the argument. 
Gluck, Kaufman and Walleck (1980) maintain that 
competitive advantage is gained if strategic planning is 
linked in a thorough way to operational decision making. In 
their view, to accomplish this it is necessary to adopt a 
planning framework that cuts across divisional boundaries, 
encourages entrepreneurial thinking and modifies a corporate 
value system to generate full commitment of managers to the 
firm's strategy (1980, p. 158-161). Gluck et al see this type 
of planning as a progression from its more rudimentary 
types. The line of progression is traced to run from basic 
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financial planning to forecast-based planning, where the 
length of the time horizon is extended and more 
sophisticated tools of forecasting employed, and then to 
externally oriented planning, where different scenarios are 
examined and attempts are made to shift companies activities 
to the most profitable segments of the emerging markets. To 
support their contention that competitive advantage is 
gained by closely linking strategic planning and operational 
decision making, Gluck et al rely on the evidence they 
collected during a two year study of 120 large companies. 
Inevitably questions arise about the quality of the 
evidence which can be obtained from the study. How 
accurately can the commitment of managers to the firm's 
strategy be measured? How can the organisational 
arrangements which promote entrepreneurial thinking be 
weighted against those which discourage it? Would it be 
appropriate to form an idea about the extent of integration 
between strategic planning and operational decision making 
on the basis of the extent to which strategic objectives 
were achieved? Would it not be difficult to avoid 
considering some indicator of a successful firm's 
performance as a direct manifestation of entrepreneurial 
thinking? Given these questions it appears that the evidence 
Gluck et al are referring to can only be of a suggestive 
nature. 
Yet another perspective on the sources of competitive 
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advantage to be found in the business strategy literature 
locates them in the superior quality of assets that some 
firms happen to have at their disposal. Implicitly it is 
assumed that other firms can only employ personnel and 
capital of lowe r quality. The basic flaw inherent in the 
perspective is pointed out by Caves (1984, p. 131). To 
establish that sustained competitive advantage is due to 
superior assets employed by the firm it is necessary to 
explain why these assets do not command rents on account of 
their differential productivity or attract offers of higher 
remuneration from other firms. Apparently the writers on 
business strategy do not address these issues. 
in conclusion it can be said that the business strategy 
literature presents a number of classifications of firms, 
activities that could produce valuable insights for a 
manager who searches for competitive advantage. It does not, 
however, present him with much more than that. A bold 
attempt by Porter to establish that superior performance is 
achieved by pursuing exclusively one of the three generic 
strategies cannot be judged to be successful. The exclusive 
pursuit of cost leadership or differentiation or one of both 
in a segment of the market could make limited sense only if 
the cost and differentiation were highly discrete variables. 
Only then could a profit-maximising firm find itself in the 
situation where the marginal products of its resources 
devoted to cost reduction and differentiation were not the 
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same. A firm can be seen as pursuing, say, cost leadership 
strategy if marginal product of resources employed to this 
end is lower than those employed to other ends. In general, 
however, it cannot be assumed that over the time horizon 
typically considered by corporate strategists costs are 




ADVANTAGE AND MICROECONOMIC THEORY 
It is natural to ask what contribution have the theories 
of the firm and market rivalry, as developed by the 
mainstream economists, made to our understanding of 
competitive advantage. The static theory of the firm puts 
forth two conditions for profit maximisation : marginal cost 
must equal marginal revenue and marginal cost of factor 
inputs must be equal to their marginal revenue product. It 
follows that firms where the two conditions are met have a 
competitive advantage over firms where they are not. 
Meeting the conditions for profit maximisation requires, 
first of all, calculation of marginal figures. The standard 
accounting information is in the form of total and average 
rather then marginal figures. However it is possible to 
derive from standard accounts approximate marginal values of 
the key variables. Falling average cost over a certain 
period of time indicates that it is above marginal cost. 
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Changes in total revenue allow us to estimate marginal 
revenue. Separate accounts for different plants makes it 
easy to find the values for the broad margin of the 
variables. On the other hand it is clear that more exact 
marginal figures are costly to produce. A complex parallel 
system of accounts may be required for this purpose. To 
calculate marginal products of individual inputs when their 
quantities change simultaneously requires careful analysis 
of time series data. Better marginal figures should lead to 
an increase in profit, but the cost of obtaining them may 
easily exceed the amount of this increase. 
Extending marginal accounting from a static to a dynamic 
framework is a difficult task. Consider, for instance, 
uncertainty regarding future values of the cost variables. 
To predict broad changes in average cost the knowledge of 
new technological developments and future prices of inputs 
may be sufficient. To form an idea about the magnitude of 
the marginal cost changes, the knowledge of the above 
normally needs to be supplemented by an informed guess about 
the future state of demand. By their very nature marginal 
concepts are better suited for an analysis of small rather 
than large changes. 
It can therefore be argued that the performance of a 
firm may not be much affected by the presence'or absence of 
its formal commitment to equalizing marginal cost and 
marginal revenue over some lengthy time horizon. It is 
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rather the quality of its predictions regarding the 
environment in which it will operate in the future that 
counts. Given scanty information about the future, the 
problem is much more how best to use this information to 
generate forecasts of marginal revenue and costs rather than 
how to adjust productive capacity to equate the two. 
Mainstream microeconomic theory has always been subject 
to criticism on account of its assumption that economic 
agents optimise. For this criticism to be constructive it 
must be demonstrated that some alternative theorising, where 
the assumption of optimisation is discarded, is capable of 
generating hypotheses which can withstand repeated empirical 
testing. A blueprint for such a theorising under the name of 
evolutionary theory was drafted by Nelson and Winter (1982). 
It so happens that this blueprint provides us with a new 
perspective on competitive advantage. It will therefore be 
useful to outline the main steps in Nelson and Winter's 
argument. 
They view the firm as an organisation where the 
activities of employees are highly routinised. The specific 
forms of the routines which are followed have emerged in an 
evolutionary manner over the lifetime of the organisation. 
These forms are difficult to change because they represent a 
truce between groups of employees with conflicting interests 
: it is always costly in terms of time and resources to 
arrive at a new truce in a -complex organisation. 
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Paradoxically, even innovation activities are highly 
routinised. They are undertaken when problems arise in 
accomplishing the standard tasks allocated to individual 
divisions within the firm or when the signs appear that the 
firm's position in the market place is undermined. Usually 
" specialised personnel is employed to produce remedies for 
" crisis situation. Nelson and Winter argue that the 
reliance is on well established routines in searching for 
the remedies. They acknowledge that they, in effect, adopt 
the Schumpeterian view that in the capitalist economies the 
innovation process has gradually become more and more 
institutionalised. It is also noted that frequently an 
innovation consists of forming a new combination of the 
components of well tried routines. 
Given the above, the Nelson and Winter assertion that 
"... highly flexible adaption to change is not likely to 
characterise the behaviour of individual firms" (1982, 
p. 135) is fully justified. It further follows that firms can 
perform excellently in terms of profitability when their 
specific routines suit well the environment in which they 
operate. The firms will perform well for long periods if the 
environment remains unchanged : their routines will normally 
take a long time to be replicated by competitors. It is not 
so much the production technology as the pattern of 
interrelationships between employees which is difficult to 
replicate. To achieve the second more fundamental 
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restructuring of individual employees, skills is usually 
required. Consequently Nelson and Winter's theorising leads 
to the view that competitive advantage is essentially a 
matter of luck. The credence of this view will depend on the 
degree of corroboration which the evolutionary models will 
obtain from the industry level empirical data. 
Over the last two decades the optimisation models of 
mainstream microeconomics have increasingly allowed for 
imperfection of information and pervasiveness of moral 
hazard. It can be expected that their results will be of 
more direct use to businessmen than those of the models 
which assume away the uncertainty. The new optimisation 
models focus primarily on the relationship between 
principals and agents and market rivalry. A firm can offer 
its executives contracts that reduce the possibility of 
shirking and adverse selection. Considerable benefits can 
also be gained from analysing potential moves and 
countermoves of the competitors in an explicitly optimising 
framework. Clearly the new models explore two particular 
avenues for gaining competitive advantage. 
In modelling the relationship between principals 
(shareholders) and agents (executives), economists assume 
that both maximise their utility and that the former are 
free to select employment contracts for the later. Much has 
been learned about the nature of the optimal contract in a 
single period framework. However, if the principal and 
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agent theory is to produce specific prescriptions about, the 
form of managerial incentive schemes that will secure 
competitive advantage for the firm, more work needs to be 
done on its extension in two directions. First, a fuller 
characterisation of the optimal contract in the multi-period 
framework needs to be obtained. Second, the question of 
suitability of alternative incentive schemes for firms and 
industries operating under different conditions should be 
addressed in a more comprehensive manner. 
To analyse market rivalry economists employ 
non-cooperative game theory. Their more sophisticated models 
of rivalry are set firmly in a dynamic framework where the 
selection of particular moves during a game reveals valuable 
information to the other players. However, these models are 
unlikely to produce a complete characterisation of the 
optimal sequence of moves against the rivals. Essentially 
this is due to the fact that the optimal play should take 
advantage of the mistakes made by the opponents (Binmore 
1987, p205-206). Some degree of arbitrariness is inevitable 
in modelling these mistakes. Consequently the economists 
employ a variety of alternative equilibrium notions in their 
models of rivalry. Nevertheless, it can be expected that 
empirical testing of these models will eventually allow us 
to form an idea about the appropriateness of different sets 
of assumptions for modelling rivalry in particular 
industries. 
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The discussion of approaches to competitive advantage in 
the business strategy literature and that implicit in the 
theory of the firm under certainty established that both 
strands of literature suffer from serious limitations. It is 
the contention of this thesis that Principal-Agent theory 
and the non-cooperative game theory of market rivalry are 
capable of offering prescriptions for achieving competitive 
advantage which would be of a more specific nature. 
Consequently the main body of the thesis will discuss the 
major developments within these theories. 
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PART 11 : INTERNAL ASPECTS : CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS 
CHAPTER 3 
MARKETS VERSUS NON-MARKET GOVERNANCE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the primitive stages of economic development, 
production can be carried out by individuals working for 
themselves with tools fashioned by themselves for the task 
at hand. The case of the stone-age hunter springs to mind. 
Indeed, even in "developed" nations, some goods and services 
are still produced much in this way. The writing of a book, 
or the giving of a haircut are two examples, but even here, 
the capital equipment (pens and scissors) will usually be 
produced by other individuals. The fact is that the 
overwhelming majority of today's goods and services are 
produced by groups of cooperating individuals in conditions 
far removed from those of our stone-age hunter. 
Why do such groups of cooperating individuals exist in a 
market economy, and what is the precise nature of the 
cooperative behaviour of these groups of individuals? To 
some extent, this question was ignored in conventional 
neoclassical analysis of the firm - the firm was conceived 
32 
of purely as a "black-box"; an acfency assumed to exist to 
organize the production process to achieve certain 
objectives. Why it existed, or what motives there might be 
to set up such an institution was first formally analysed by 
Coase (1937). According to Coase, the firm is a particular 
institutional response to market failure. 
This basic insight will form the basis for the 
discussion in section I, where it is argued that the 
insights of Coase, together with those of other economists 
who have developed his level of thinking notably Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1975)), give a vital clue 
to the question of how modern firms might be able to sustain 
a competitive advantage over their rivals: the firm is an 
institutional response to market failure; this response 
reduces transactions costs; might it not be the case that 
particular institutional arrangements and contracts among 
employees will be more efficient than others? 
A formal answer to this question will be attempted in 
section 4. The framework used is that of Principal-Agent 
analysis, a framework which seems to be particularly suited 
to the analysis of the problem of designing optimal 
production arrangements within the firm. This is so 
primarily because, in stark contrast to the conventional 
theory of the firm, the firm is no longer purely a 
"black-box". As will be seen, the Principal-Agent analysis 
can get to grips with the important issues of the internal 
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organisation of economic activity within the firm, focusing 
on such important issues as the divorce of ownership and 
control, the hierarchical structure of employees and 
imperfect and incomplete information. Under such conditions 
it is possible to define "optimal" contracts between agents 
under certain circumstances; unfortunately such contracts 
are liable to be extremely complex, imperfect instruments 
for their stated objectives, and particularly sensitive to 
the economic environment. Thus while in principle the route 
to competitive advantage via devising optimal contracts 
within the firm seems attractive, this chapter concludes, 
pessimistically perhaps, that the scope for such contractual 
arrangements in today's business conditions is, arguably, 
limited. 
3.2 INSIDE THE BLACK BOX 
Coase (1937) may be credited as the founder of the 
modern theory of the firm. As opposed to the "black-box" 
firm of conventional neoclassical theory, he focused on the 
more important structural characteristics of modern business 
enterprise, the most important of which include: 
(1). the ownership structure: a firm may be owned either 
individually or collectively, with each owner liable 
for the debts of the firm to the full extent of his 
wealth. Alternatively, the firm may be owned by either 
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a few or many people or indeed other organisations with 
the liability of each limited only to the value of his 
ownership shares, which may be exchangeable on a stock 
market. 
(2). the control structure: where the firm is owned by one 
individual, or small group of people, overall control 
will most probably be exercised by someone with a 
considerable ownership share. However, where ownership 
is widely dispersed, control is exercised by a "board 
of directors", comprising of senior executives and 
other outside directors acting as agents of the owners. 
( This delegation of choice from owners to employees 
will play a crucial part in the subsequent analysis ). 
(3). the organisational structure: a hierarchical structure 
will exist between those who carry out basic productive 
activities, and those monitoring productive 
performance. This structure is intended to fulfil 
various objectives including the'translation of broad 
policy objectives formulated at the executive level 
into specific plans, to coordinate the separate 
activities at lower levels, to monitor performance, and 
to transmit information back to senior executives which 
will become an input into future policy objectives. 
The basic approach which Coase adopted was to question 
why such complex institutional arrangements exist for the 
production of goods and services. His answer relies, at 
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least in part, on a simple observation. In a free 
competitive economy a firm can exist only if it performs 
some function that market prices, and the process of 
competition cannot. Coase observed that as well as benefits, 
there were costs involved in using the price system to 
allocate resources in an economy. The benefits include, of 
course, the flow of information among agents and sectors of 
the economy; the costs however are often non-trivial. The 
major costs involved in effecting transactions via the 
market mechanism are those of acquiring information about 
prices and the terms of trade; the costs associated with 
negotiating and concluding contracts; and the uncertainty 
which may exist about the conditions of markets in the 
future. In some cases, these costs may be minor, in others 
they could greatly exceed the costs of organising production 
within a firm, in which case Coase would predict the latter 
to dominate. 
In essence then, Coase views the firm as a particular 
institutional response to "market failure" at the most micro 
level of the economy. Thus the firm is "an island of 
conscious power" embedded in an external system of market 
forces which condition in part its operations. Coase's work 
offers a persuasive conceptual foundation for most of the 
recent work in the theory of the firm. 
The work of those who have built upon Coase's theory may 
be grouped into two broad categories: contributions of 
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authors who focus on the costs inherent in the price system, 
deriving insights about the failure of markets (see for 
example Arrow and Hahnr 1971); and contributions of authors 
who have directed their analysis to the specific benefits to 
the firm. It is the latter contributions which are important 
to an understanding of the optimal contract issue; amongst 
the more important contributions are Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) and Williamson (1972; 1979). 
Williamson's analysis builds directly on the insights of 
Coase. The analysis proceeds as follows: (1) markets and 
firms are alternative instruments for completing a related 
set of transactions; (2) whether a set of transactions ought 
to be executed across markets or within a firm depends on 
the relative efficiency of each mode; (3) the costs of 
writing and executing complex contracts across a market vary 
on the one hand with the characteristics of the human 
decision makers involved with the transaction, and with the 
objective properties of the market on the other; and (4) 
although the human and environmental factors that impede 
exchanges between firms (across a market) manifest 
themselves somewhat differently within the firm, the same 
set of factors apply to both. 
In brief, in Williamson's account, market failure, and 
the consequent replacement of the market by the firm results 
from a particular configuration of human and environmental 
factors in a given market setting. The most important 
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environmental factors include the degree of uncertainty, and 
the number of decision makers. The most important human 
characteristics, according to Williamson, are those 
associated with "bounded rationality", or the inability of 
humans to undertake complex calculations in the world as we 
know (or do not know) it. Thus, for Williamson, the 
important point is to investigate the characteristics of 
organisations that tend to ameliorate the consequence of 
bounded rationality in the presence of uncertainty or 
complexity. The extent to which this is possible will be the 
theme of section 2 in this chapter. 
Before that, however, it is worthwhile considering the 
contribution of Alchian and Demsetz to our understanding of 
the modern business organisation. Their point of departure 
is the above account of why firms exist: Alchian and Demsetz 
offer a persuasive account of why the predominant kind of 
firm is the so-called "entrepreneurial firm" as opposed to 
other species such as the workers' cooperatives. Their 
answer is as follows: Production is usefully viewed as a 
team effort. The essence of team production is that several 
types of resource are used, the product is not the sum of 
the separable outputs of the competing resources, and not 
all resources are contributed by one person. This 
immediately leads to a problem. When the producing group 
works as a team, there is the obvious problem of measuring 
and rewarding each member's effort in such a way as to 
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reward high productivity and penalize shirking. The problem 
is like the "free-rider" problem in public sector economics. 
In the absence of a proper system of rewards and 
punishments, it is in- an individual's self-interest to 
minimize his contribution to the team output, since the 
costs of doing so, in terms of reduced output, are spread 
over the whole team. Conversely, the rewards of increased 
effort will not accrue to the individual but will be spread 
over his team-mates. All kinds of problems can arise in such 
cases. For example, a new member of a team may misrepresent 
his abilities and ask for higher - rewards than his 
productivity warrants, and then account for his poor 
performance by blaming his team-mates. Alchian and Demsetz 
argue that an efficient escape from this impasse involves 
the appointment. of a monitor to apportion rewards. However, 
to give the monitor the proper incentive to perform this 
task, a claim to the residual income (or profit) accruing to 
team performance must be set aside for the monitor. Thus, 
the monitor would be responsible for his own self 
discipline. In the "classical" entrepreneurial firm the 
monitor is the entrepreneur himself. He makes contracts with 
the team members and has the right to terminate them. He is 
the residual claimant of the surplus of the firm after all 
team members, and other creditors have been paid. In the 
modern entrepreneurial firm, however, the monitoring role is 
delegated, at least in part, by shareholders to senior 
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executives. This leads directly to a hierarchical structure 
within the firm. Shareholders have the problem of trying to 
give executives the correct incentives to maximize the 
residual income accruing to production, while executives 
themselves may well need to devise means of encouraging high 
productivity at the lower level of the organisation if their 
own fate is linked in any way to the overall performance of 
the company. 
Let us consolidate the argument thus far. The 
conventional "black-box" approach to the firm, prevalent in 
undergraduate economic textbooks, whilst arguably useful for 
certain purposes, fails to come to grips with many important 
aspects of the modern business organisation. The firm is, in 
fact, a complex institutional response induced by market 
failure at the micro-micro level of the economy. It has been 
argued that a system of command (ie. the firm) may well be 
able to perform certain tasks more efficiently than the 
market mechanism. To achieve this reqliires that the firm can 
ameliorate some of the problems associated with the 
operation of markets under certain conditions. These 
problems largely relate to uncertainty and the attendant 
costs of gathering information, and concern also the 
strategic interaction between individuals. In practice, the 
firm attempts to ease some of these problems by a system of 
contracts between the various individuals comprising the 
organisation. The question naturally arises as to whether 
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there might be a well - defined "optimal" set of contracts 
between individuals and the firm, and, if so, whether a firm 
might sustain a competitive advantage over its rivals by 
implementing these contracts. 
3.3 WILLIAMSON AND THE TRANSACTIONS COST APPROACH 
Oliver Williamson's magnum opust The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism (1985), provides a useful point 
of departure for discussion of what is usually known as the 
"transactions cost" approach to explaining non-market forms 
of economic organisation. Traditional neoclassical theory 
deals with market forms of economic organisation, and 11 .... 
is distinguished by two features : first, no one relies on 
someone else for directions about what to do; market price 
alone directs production and exchange .... second, 
production results from cooperative teamwork or cooperative 
production leaving no role for contracts or any other 
constraints (such as rigid prices) on the options of 
cooperating parties .... yet in a wide array of economic 
activities people rely on and follow the administrative 
directions of other people, and both explicit and implicit 
agreements restrict options .... in other words "firms" or 
organised and managed "coalitions" exist. Why? " (Alchian and 
Woodward, 1988, p. 66) The general answer to this question 
offered by Williamson is that the economic 
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institutions of capitalism have the main purpose and effect 
of economising on transactions costs (Williamson 1985, 
p. 17) 
Williamson's more specific answer to the question 
outlines two sets of conditions under which market 
mechanisms will not solve production and allocation problems 
efficiently. The first set is made up of the well known 
sufficient conditions for market failure : in the presence 
of externalities, and in particular the free rider problem, 
the market mechanism will not solve the production and 
allocation problem, as in the case of public goods, for 
example. The second set constitutes Williamson's distinctive 
contribution to the analysis of circumstances in which the 
market mechanism will not work, or at least not work 
efficiently, and is made up of three necessary conditions 
which taken together, in the absence of externalities, make 
it likely that a marriage of the market mechanism and 
contractual relationships will not generate efficient 
solutions to the production and allocation problems. The 
three joint requirements for Williamson's transaction cost 
analysis to be relevant are asset specificity, in the 
sense of inanimate or human capital not 
_being 
perfectly 
transferable from one activity to another; bounded 
rationalitV, in the form of limits to information available 
to individuals, or limits to their powers of calculation; 
and. opportunism, implying that individuals are not merely 
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pursuing their self interest but are willing to profit at 
the expense of others. 
3.4 BOUNDED RATIONALITY, OPPORTUNISM AND ASSET SPECIFICITY 
Williamson illustrates why all the three requirements 
for market-cum-contract mechanism failure need to hold 
simultaneously by considering what happens when only two of 
the requirements are present. The following table, extracted 
from Williamson (1985, p. 31), illustrates four possible 
cases. 
TA13LE 3.1 







I No Yes Yes Planning 
if Yes No Yes Promise 
III Yes Yes No Competition 
IV Yes Yes Yes Governance 
In Case I assets are specific, individuals are 
opportunistic but blessed with unbounded rationality. 
Planning contracts, as discussed in the mechanism design 
literature (e. g. Harris and Townsend 1981), can in this case 
deal efficiently with the production and allocation problem. 
The presence of opportunism requires that contracts respect 
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private information, to deal with the incentive alignment 
problem, but all relevant contractual issues are settled ex 
ante. This comprehensive contract allows for appropriate 
changes to be made in response to any possible set of 
publicly observable contingencies, the changes in question 
taking account of the degree of asset specificity. Thus the 
presence of unbounded rationality permits a contingent 
contractual means of dealing with the presence of 
opportunistic behaviour and asset specificity. 
In Case II opportunistic behaviour is absent, so 
individuals honour commitments 11 .... the agent is as good as 
his bond ..... (Williamson, p. 31), and asset specificity is 
present. Given that agents fulfil their promises, an 
arrangement whereby individuals promise to fulfil the terms 
of the contract efficiently, maximise joint profits and seek 
only "fair" individual rewards will exclude strategic 
behaviour. Thus the transactions based on specific human and 
non-human assets can proceed on the basis of self-enforcing 
promises. 
In Case III individuals are opportunistic and subject to 
bounded rationality, but assets are not specific to 
particular activities. Here, although individuals are not 
"as good as their bonds", and a complete set of ex ante 
contingent contracts is ruled out, contracts can be 
formulated and re-formulated at discrete intervals, the 
full contestability of the market (the terminology here 
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is due to Baumol, Panzer and Willig, 1982) permitting entry 
or franchise bidding to deal with monopoly power, with 
contract fraud being subject to legal action, at least in 
principle. 
Finally, in Case IV the simultaneous presence of bounded 
rationality, opportunism and asset specificity rules out an 
efficient market-cum-contract distribution problem. The 
ability to plan for contingent future events is absent due 
to the boundedness of rationality; promises are not 
necessarily adhered to in the presence of opportunistic 
behaviour; and the degree of asset specificity makes an 
important difference in that the absence of contestability 
implies the pairings of asset owners in transactions will 
affect the efficiency of the outcome in a manner that cannot 
be dealt with by recourse to legal process in contract 
enforcement. "This is the world within which transaction 
cost economics is concerned .... the organisational 
imperative that emerges in such circumstances is .... 
organise transactions so as to economise on bounded 
rationality while simultaneously safeguarding them against 
the hazards of opportunism - such a statement supports a 
different and larger conception of the economic problem than 
does the imperative "maximise profitsll"' (Williamson 1985, 
p. 32) 
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3.5 NON-MARKET GOVERNANCE 
The presence of bounded rationality, opportunistic 
behaviour and asset specificity implies that 
market-cum-contract mechanisms will not be efficient, so 
opening up the distinct possibility that non-market forms of 
governance may be more efficient : 11 .... the market, with 
all its warts and blemishes, may still turn out to be the 
best governance mechanism but this is no longer certain and 
is certainly not universally true .... in such conditions 
alternative governance mechanisms must be considered and may 
often prove preferable" (Baumol 1986, p. 280). The obvious 
alternatives involve government by management, whereby the 
market mechanism is avoided by management direction in the 
form of hierarchical control, decentralised control in which 
divisions are granted a degree of autonomy, or some 
combination thereof; and heterodox contractual arrangements 
which involve more than price-quantity-quality stipulations, 
examples of which may be found in supervision arrangements 
by franchisers, resale price controls, free maintenance 
deals and a wide variety of implicit or explicit agreements 
which lie outside the remit of the market mechanism. 
3.6 MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION CONTRACTS 
In relation to management compensation contracts, the 
market mechanism works through what Williamson terms 
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"high-power incentives" : executives, as decision takers, 
would reap the benefit from "correct" decisions as if they 
owned the assets of the company, and conversely would bear 
the losses arising from "incorrect" decisions. In the 
presence of bounded rationality on the part of shareholders 
and executives, and opportunistic behaviour by the two 
groups, contestability could ensure that a set of conditions 
re-negotiated at discrete time intervals would be efficient 
only if the physical assets of the firm, and the human 
capital of the executives, were not specific to the 
particular set of activities pursued by the firm (Case III 
above). In the presence of asset specificity and bounded 
rationality, "high-powered incentive" compensation contracts 
could be efficient only in the absence of opportunistic 
behaviour by managers or shareholders (Case II above). Asset 
specificity and opportunistic behaviour would not rule out 
efficiency in compensation contracts provided that unbounded 
rationality on the part of executives and shareholders 
permitted the formulation of an ex ante compensation 
contract which could deal with all possible future 
contingencies (Case I above). If asset specificity, 
boundedness in rationality and opportunistic behaviour are 
likely to be present jointly (Case IV above), the clear 
implication to be drawn from Williamson's analytical 
framework is that compensation contracts between 
shareholders and executives which attempt to ape the market 
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mechanism ( as is the case within the neoclassical treatment 
of principal-agent contracts to be discussed in the next 
chapter) cannot be efficient. 
Williamson's work does not yield any clear guidelines as 
to how non-market forms of governing shareholder-executive 
transactions may be devised to generate more efficient 
outcomes than "high-powered incentive" contracts. There are, 
however, several insights. A key problem is one of 
organising transactions so that executives will be motivated 
to acquire sufficient specific human capital, and apply this 
expertise without slacking, without exposing the shareholder 
to the problems arising from managerial opportunism, and 
without making infeasible demands on the information 
processing or calculating powers of both parties. The 
suggestion made by Williamson in his "hostage" model 
involves contractual devices which are self-enforcing. In 
this context the hostage could be a "golden parachute" 
payment to the executive in the event of premature 
dismissal. The standard difficulty here is that an 
opportunistic executive, given a sufficiently golden 
parachute, could arrange for the firm to be taken over by a 
buyer who will dismiss the previous management group. 
Williamson offers a solution to this problem : the 
solution, which may work in some cases, (involves) the 
parable of the ugly princess .... a king who has two 
daughters, one beautiful, one ugly, whom he loves equally, 
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should offer the ugly princess when a hostage is required 
.... for she will then serve as an effective guarantee that 
her father will meet his commitments, but, at the same time, 
the king's enemies who hold her hostage will not be tempted 
to keep her" (Baumol 1986, p. 282). 
3.7 SOME DIFFICULTIES 
A major difficulty with Williamson's analysis is the 
lack of operational framework for formal analysis and 
deduction. The analytical framework yields many insights, is 
capable of illuminating many aspects of economic 
organisation neglected by neoclassical analyses of the 
market-cum-contract mechanism, yields testable hypotheses, 
and has proved useful in case studies. 
Economists in, or close, to, the mainstream of 
neoclassical analysis have suggested that Williamson's 
contribution could be encompassed in the mainstream by 
generalising the neoclassical concepts of production cost 
functions to include governance expenses a la Williamson : 
perhaps the most promising (avenue) .... may be a cost 
function in which both types of costs are explicitly 
included, with efficiency requiring minimisation of the sum 
of the production and governance costs incurred in supplying 
any given volume of outputs.... " (Baumol 1986, p. 285). 
On the other hand economists who see neoclassical 
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economics as having led the profession down a blind alley, 
yielding little or no institutional content, tend to see the 
deficiencies of transactions cost economics a la Williamson 
as deriving from the market bias of the approach. Kay (1987) 
argues that 11 .... the contracting basis of transaction costs 
economics leads to an emphasis on markets, external and 
internal, .... (which) leads to a negative or distortion of 
hierarchy and its effects .... in fact, markets are very 
rare and occasional devices, most resource allocation being 
decided under condition of autonomy or fiat .... it is 
disappointing that much of the analysis so far has argued 
that opening the Russian doll of internal markets only 
reveals the Russian doll of internal markets .... the 
analysis of decision-taking also goes by default, efficiency 
considerations being presumed to win out without sufficient 
analysis of how this will be achieved" (Kay 1987, pp. 43-45). 
Kay argues that transaction costs economics could avoid the 
"trap" of being encompassed within the neoclassical 
framework by focussing on 11 firstly .... the firm as a 
combination of resources rather than as an aggregation of 
products .... secondly, processes of decision making should 
be explicitly incorporated .... and thirdly, the role of 
hierarchy, organisation and structure should be developed in 
the analysis" (Kay 1987, pp. 45-46). 
so 
CHAPTER 4 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND OPTIMAL CONTRACTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Situations in which one individual (the agent), in 
return for certain rewards, is given the authority to take 
decisions on behalf of another individual (the principal), 
abound in economics. The specific context in which many 
features of the principal-agent problem were first explored 
was in the economic analysis of insurance: if an individual 
takes out full insurance coverage, under which he will be 
paid the full amount of the loss if the accident occurs, he 
loses the incentive to take (costly) action to reduce the 
probability of the accident occurring. This is the 
phenomenon known as moral hazard. Lately the basic model has 
been directed to many areas in economics and applies to any 
situation which has the following structure the agent 
chooses from a number of alternative actions; the choice 
determines an outcome in conjunction with the state of the 
world revealed at the time; this outcome yields utility to 
the principal, who must reward the agent for his services. 
The main purpose of principal-agent theory is to 
characterise the optimal form of this payment under various 
assumptions regarding the information available to the 
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principal. 
A case of particular interest is one in which the 
shareholders of a firm delegate decision-taking 
responsibility to a senior executive. The problem 
fundamental to the design of an appropriate principal-agent 
contract is one of providing the right incentives for the 
executive when the shareholder cannot observe the action 
taken. This incentive problem raises the issue of the 
attainability of Pareto efficient contracts. The message 
that emerges from the principal-agent literature is that 
optimal contracts are likely to be highly complex. An 
obvious problem here is that actual contracts tend to be 
characterised by simple linear reward functions, which pay 
executives a fixed salary plus some fixed share of realised 
profits. There is no particularly good reason in the 
principal-agent literature, however, to expect optimal 
contracts to be linear. It is plausible to suggest that real 
world incentive mechanisms have to depart from strict 
optimality to be practicable. 
Much of agency literature analyses the principal-agent 
problem in the context of a single principal, single agent, 
one period model. The principal and agent have strategies 
which are not binding, and engage in little or no 
communication before their "game", so the basic structure of 
the analysis can be seen as that of a non-cooperative game. 
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4.2 THE BASIC MODEL 
The shareholder of the firm has a utility function, U(n 
- Y) which depends on the profit of the company (n ) net of 
the payment (Y) made to the executive for servic. es 
rendered. This utility function satisfies the standard 
assumptions which ensure that every outcome (completeness) 
can be put into one indifference set (reflexivity) and no 
more than one indifference set (transitivity). This means 
that the shareholder can rank all outcomes, these 
preferences being represented by the utility function. To 
ensure mathematical tractability we take the case of 
non-satiation, so avoiding inequality constraints requiring 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and take the indifference set to be 
continuous and strictly convex. It is assumed that UI>O, so 
that an increase in income always improves shareholder 
well-being, and that U11: 5 0, which rules out risk-attracted 
behaviour. The shareholder derives utility only from income 
received. 
The executive has a utility function with similar 
properties, V (Y, e) which depends positively on the payment 
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received (Y) so that V,. >0 and negatively on the amount of 
effort (e) that must be expended V. <O . The utility 
function has the further properties that V..,.: 50, so that once 
again we rule out risk-attracted behaviour and V.. >O, so 
that utility falls at an increasing rate the more effort the 
executive expends. 
The profit n(e, S) accruing to the firm depends on the 
effort expended by the executive (e) and on the revealed 
state of the world (S). If it were not for the presence of 
uncertainty the principal-agent problem would be trivial, 
because although the shareholder may not be able to observe 
directly the level of managerial effort, he would be able to 
infer the level of effort from the amount of profit 
forthcoming. Note that n. is the marginal product of 
effort, which is assumed to be non-negative n. ; -> 0. allowing 
for some stage at which extra effort would cease to increase 
profits. It is also assumed that u ..: 50. For convenience we 
specify n. >O: higher values of S, represent more favourable 
states of the world. Without loss of generality, we assume 
that the set of states of the world is contained within the. 
interval [0,1]. A substantive assumption is that 
shareholders and the executives have the same beliefs 
concerning the likelihood of each state of the world, which 
can be specified by a probability density function f(S). 
This is a rather restrictive assumption. In reality we might 
expect the executive to be better informed than the 
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shareholder concerning the probability of each state of the 
world. This will be the subject matter of a later part of 
this chapter, in which the basic model is extended to allow 
for the situation in which the executive has superior 
information. At this stage we limit ourselves to the case in 
which the executive makes his decision concerning the level 
of effort to supply before the state of the world is 
revealed and has the same probability beliefs concerning the 
state of the world as the shareholder. 
The central problem for the shareholder is to choose an 
appropriate payment schedule for the executive which depends 
only on variables observable to both parties. If the 
shareholder could observe the level of effort of the 
executive, the executive could be forced to supply a 
specified level of effort in return for the optimal 
risk-sharing payment. A potential source of conflict arises, 
however, when the shareholder cannot observe the amount of 
effort expended by the executive: the shareholder only cares 
about effort insofar as it affects the level of profit 
received, whereas effort yields direct disutility to the 
executive. If the shareholder cannot observe effort, then he 
has no direct means of inducing the executive to supply the 
required amount; given the disutility associated with 
effort, the executive requires an inducement to supply a 
level of effort appropriate to maximising shareholder 
utility. 
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The resolution of the principal-agent dilemma entails 
optimal risk-sharing, and providing executives with 
incentives to supply the level of effort at which their 
expected monetary reward for the marginal unit of effort 
loses the principal the same amount of utility as he gains 
from the consequent increase in the expected profit. We 
will deal with these two aspects in turn. 
(i) OPTIMAL RISK - SHARING 
The issue of risk - sharing can be isolated from the 
incentive problem by assuming that effort and/or the state 
of the world can be directly and costlessly observed, and 
that e is arbitrarily set at e=e-, so- that the fee schedule 
(Y) depends only on the state of the world (S). 
The shareholder's optimisation problem is then to choose 
the risk-sharing payment Yý(S) which maximises his expected 
utility subject to the constraint that the executive reaches 
some minimum level of utility. This reservation utility 
constraint may be alternatively labelled the "participation 
constraint". The fee schedule is constrained by competition 
for the senior agents, who have alternative uses for their 
time. Thus, the contract offered to the executive must 
entail for him at least as much utility as he could attain 
in alternative employment. 
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Formally stated, the problem is: 
fm-JL 
Max U (TE(e-, S) - Y(S)]f(S)ds with respect to Y(S) 
M-4m 
m-X 
subject to V [e-, Y(S)]f(S)ds 2: V- 
fm-cý 
(1) 
If alternative employment opportunities available to the 
agent are known to the principal the participation 
constraint may be written as a strict equality and so the 
Lagrangian function may be formulated: 
L=U [Tr(e-, Y) -Y(S)]f(S)ds + -; D V(e-, Y(S))f(S)ds-V-] (2) 
IM-0 
M-0 
The solution to this maximisation subject to a constraint 
problem is found by differentiating with respect to Y(S) for 
all S. This yields the first order condition : 
-UP (TE - (3) 
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which characterises the optimal payment schedule Y-(S) 
offered to the executive in each state of the world. 
-(ii) 
DIAGRAMMATIC INTERPRETATION 
This solution is uninteresting in itself unless it can 
be given an intuitive interpretation. Suppose only two 
possible states of the world can occur (S. % and S2). Then, 
given that (3) is a condition which needs to be met in each 
state of the world, we can write: 
U" (SX) / UF (S2) = V3F(SX) / V3r(S2) 
consequently the optimal risk sharing contract is one in 
which the shareholder's marginal rate of substitution 
between incomes in the two states of the world is equated 
with that of the executive. The solution for the optimal 
contract depends on the risk-attitudes of the two parties. 
Consider two special cases. In the first the shareholder 
is risk-neutral while the executive is risk averse. Then 






which is only satisfied if the executive receives the same 
salary in both states of the world. This, implies that the 
optimal risk-sharing contract -in the presence of a 
risk-neutral shareholder and risk-averse executive is one 
which fully insures the executive, paying him a fixed salary 
whatever profit the company makes. 
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In the second case the executive is risk neutral while 
the shareholder of the firm is risk-averse. V,,.,, =0 so that 
V3r(S3. ) = V-w(S2) =a constant, implying that the optimal 
condition is: 
U, (S3. ) = UI(S2) 
which is only satisfied if the shareholder receives a fixed 
payment and the executive keeps the residual of profits and 
bears all the risk. 
The above analysis can also be undertaken in the 
framework of an Edgeworth - Bowley box diagram (see 
Ricketts, 1986). The income received by each if Sm occurs is 
measured on the horizontal axes, and income if S2 occurs is 
measured on the vertical axes. The shareholder's profit is 
measured from 0. and the payment received by the executive 
from the shareholder is measured from 0... Lines at 45* which 
begin at 0. and 0. represent lines of certain income. The 
indifference curves representing different levels of utility- 
show how income in one state of the world is traded for 
income in the other. Their slope at the intersection with 
the 45- line is equal to the probability ratio f(SX)/f(S2). 
The nature of the solution depends on the attitudes to 
risk which are reflected in the shape the indifference 
curves of each party: risk-aversion implies that 
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indifference curves are convex to the origin. Let the 
indifference curve V- correspond to the executive's 
reservation utility. Then the optimal solution will be at a 
point such as A where one of the shareholder's indifference 
curves is tangent to V-. Given that both parties are 
risk-averse this will lie somewhere between the two 
certainty lines with risk being shared in proportion to the 
degree of risk-aversion. If Sx occurs the shareholder 
receives nx and the executive receives Yx, if S2 occurs then 
the shareholder receives H2 and the executive Y2. If an 
individual is risk-neutral then his indifference curves are 
given by straight lines with slope equal to the probability 
ratio f(SM)/f(S2). This means that if the shareholder is 
risk-neutral and the executive risk-averse, the tangency 
point between V- and one of the shareholder's indifference 
curves will be located on the 45- line: the executive will 
receive a certain income no matter what the state of the 
world. Conversely, if the executive is risk-neutral and the 
shareholder risk-averse the tangency solution will imply 
that the shareholder is receiving a fixed payment and the. 
executive is bearing all the risk. 
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(Iii) GENERALISATION 
The above analysis can be generalised to examine the 
possible forms of the optimal payment schedule when multiple 
states of the world occur. Differentiating the first order 
condition with respect to S and rearranging we obtain: 
dy- /ds = 
[(U"sx/sy) 
/ (U"- ;D Vm--V)l (7) 
It is helpful at this stage to introduce the Arrow - 
Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion: following Pratt 
(1964) it may be interpreted as indicating the amount of the 
expected income an individual would be willing to forego to 
receive a certain income. The relationship is as follows 
-U"/ U' , -VwwIV3e- 
which are greater than or equal to zero according to whether 
the individual is risk-averse or risk-neutral. Substituting 
these into (7) and noting that from (3) ýD -UI/ Výr, 
yields: 
dyý/ds = R. /(R. +R. ) dn/ds (9) 
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which demonstrates how the optimal payment varies as profit 
changes with the state of the world. The optimal fee 
schedule is obtained by integrating (9) over S. 
Y-= R. / (R. +R. )n +C 
Such a schedule is linear under not very appealing 
conditions: both individuals exhibit constant absolute risk 
aversion so that the ratio R. /(Rr, +Pm) is constant. The 
results established earlier clearly still follow: if the 
shareholder is risk-neutral R. =O so that Y-=n+C ; if the 
executive is risk-neutral R. =O so that Y'=n-C, (where C is 
obviously negative and represents some fixed payment to the 
shareholder). 
Empirical observation, however, suggests that 
individuals exhibit diminishing absolute risk-aversion, 
implying that the optimal contract will be non-linear, 
depending on the relative changes in the shareholder and 
executive willingness to risk some fixed amount of income. 
This suggests that optimal contracts will be complex in the 
sense of being non-linear even in the absence of the 
incentive problem. 
The next sub-section addresses the question; how does 
the nature of the optimal contract change when the effort of 
the executive is allowed to vary? 
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(iv) THE INCENTIVE PROBLEM 
It is helpful to consider the incentive problem in two 
stages. In the first case effort is allowed to vary, but the 
shareholder can observe the level of effort expended. There 
is no incentive problem as such - the executive can be 
forced to supply the optimal level of effort. 
The problem is essentially the same as that of optimally 
sharing the risk of a venture, except that this time the 
shareholder maximises his expected utility with respect to 
effort as well as the payment. 





subject to V[e, Y(S)] f(S)ds 2: V- 
M-0 
This yields the two first order conditions 
'D v3r = 
E [U'Tt. + 4) V.. ] = 
Where E is the expectation operator. 
Note that (12) is identical to (3): the first-best risk 
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sharing optimum is still tenable, but now an optimal level 
of effort e- is associated with each Y-(S), chosen by the 
shareholder according to relation (13). Following Rees 
(1985) this may be interpreted as the expected net marginal 
value product of effort, being set equal to zero. 
The incentive problem does not arise when the 
shareholder can costlessly observe effort because the 
contract can specify a payment schedule contingent on the 
executive supplying e- and containing a "forcing clause,, 
whereby the executive receives Y(S) < Y-(S) if e< eý. The 
punishment can be made sufficiently unattractive so as to 
ensure that the executive supplies e'. 
The real incentive problem arises, however, when the 
shareholder cannot observe managerial effort. This means 
that the optimal payment schedule must take account of the 
fact that, given a particular payment schedule, the 
executive will choose an effort level which maximises his 
expected utility. The model is formally written as follows. 
The executive will maximise: 
IM-3. 
V [y-(tr (e, S», e] f(S) ds (14) 
M-o 
Differentiating with respect to e gives: 
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E [V3r (dyý/du Tr. + V., /Vr) ]=0 (15) 
There is no guarantee that for any given payment 
schedule, the executives will choose the level of effort the 
shareholder would like him to supply. Furthermore, the 
shareholder can no longer force him to supply that level, 
because he cannot observe effort. The key issue is how to 
induce the executive to supply an appropriate level of 
effort. This is achieved at the expense of the risk sharing 
optimum. 
It was suggested above that the conflict between the 
shareholder and executive arose from the fact that the 
shareholder is only interested in effort insofar as it 
affects profitability, whereas effort yields direct 
disutility to the executive. While the level of effort 
chosen by the executive is determined by equation (15), the 
level of effort which the shareholder wants him to expend is 
determined by equation (13). Remembering that U1/V3-1 
(13) may be written: 
E [U'(Ti. + V. /V3r)] = 
Comparing (15) with (16) it should be noted that the 
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income accruing to the executive from the last unit of his 
effort (dy-/dn) n. is not equal to the marginal product of 
effort (n. ). Hence a different level of e is implied by 
these two equations. Suppose the shareholder was risk 
neutral and offered the manager the optimal risk sharing 
contract Y-=C. Why should the executive expend any effort 
at all if he will receive C anyway? 
Solving the incentive problem, however, is not as simple 
as it first appears. Mirrlees (1975) shows that an optimal 
solution may well not exist if the incentive constraint is 
added to the participation constraint and expected utility 
maximised as before. Mirrlees (1974,1975) has suggested an 
alternative approach, developed further by Holmstrom (1979). 
Mirrlees and Holmstrom eliminate S from the problem by 
regarding n itself as the basic random variable. This 
modification of the problem is a result of the assumption 
that for every level of e there exists a profit level 
associated with each state of the world. Each level of 
profit occurs with probability given by f(S). An increase in 
e shifts the distribution of n to the right with the proviso. 
that the upper and lower limits are unaffected by e. This 
implies that an increase in effort improves the likelihood 
of higher profit levels and reduces the probability of lower 
profits. 
However Mirrlees and Holmstrom's approach does not 
guarantee a uniqueness of the solution. It turns out that 
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for the unique global solution to 
executive's utility function to be 
(Rees, 1985, p. 18). Mirrlees (1975) 
this may not be the case. 
The problem is illustrated in 
taken from Grossman and Hart (1983, ] 
A 
a 
exist we require the 
strictly concave in e 
argues plausibly that 
the following diagram 
?. 8). 
68 
Let Y be a payment schedule ranked in order of the 
shareholder's preference from left to right (different 
schedules generate different sets of contingent incomes to 
the shareholder). The function e(Y) shows the level of 
effort, e, which satisfies (15) for each schedule. The 
function may take more than one value for each Y in a 
certain interval. For the executive, the points on the solid 
line (AB DE) dominate all others because he/she will always 
prefer less e to more. uc3,, Ux, represent the shareholder's 
indifference sets. The optimum for the shareholder is at C, 
since at this point his utility is higher than at any other 
point where the executive's first order condition is 
satisfied. The feasible optimum, however, is at a point such 
as B, where the shareholder can be certain that he can 
actually induce the executive to choose the appropriate 
level of e. 
The only way to circumvent this problem is to make one 
further simplifying assumption. This was the strategy 
adopted by Mirrlees and Holmstrom. 
They assumed that the executive's utility function is 
additively separable in income and effort ie. V(w,. ) = Vx(Y) 
- V2(e). The usefulness of the separability condition can be 
seen in the simplicity of the first order condition for the 
maximisation of utility on the part of the executive. The 
new random variable is n whose density function, i$(u, e), is 
obtained from n(e, S) and f(S). The executive maximand may 
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now be written as : 
V. 3- [ Y(TE)] 4ý(lxe) dTE - V2(e) 
T, " 
Taking the first derivative of (17) with respect to e and 






(Tr) (TE, e) dTr - V. 21 (e) 
where Y(Tt) is any given fee schedule. 
The shareholder now maximises his expected utility: 
Tr-u 
CTE - Y(TE)] (ý(n, e) dn 
f T", 
with respect to Y(n) and e. 
Subject to the participation constraint (PC) : 
IT'C'V. L 
i. [ Y(Tr) ] 4ý(u, e) dn - V2(e) 2: V- (20) 
and to the incentive constraint (IC): 
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rE 3L 
ViL ( Y(Tc) ] (ý. (TE, e) dn = V2'(e) 
TE,::, 
The conditions which the solution of this problem must 
satisfy are: 











Where P and g are the multipliers associated respectively 
with PC and IC. From (18) the middle expression in (23) is 
zero. (22) and (23) may be written as: 
U, /V3. = -p + m). 4 (24) 
and 
U4). )=- pE ( d2V/de 2) (25) 
It is immediately apparent that the first-best 
risk-sharing optimum is no longer available [ compare (23) 
with (3)]. The optimal contract must take account of the 
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need to influence the executive's choice of effort. 
Moreover, the simplicity of the earlier results is now lost 
: the optimal contract depends not only on risk attitudes of 
the two parties, but also on how 4ý. and 4) vary with n. In 
particular, a risk-neutral shareholder would not pay the 
risk-averse executive a fixed sum, because the executive 
would have no incentive to supply any effort. 
Holmstrom (1979) demonstrated that the only rule of 
thumb that can be applied when the incentive problem is 
presented is to offer the executive a higher payment when 
the company makes high profits, and a lower payment when the 
company makes low profits as compared to the payment 
resulting from the optimal risk-sharing contract. Obviously 
this rule of thumb is valid only if an increased effort on 
the part of the executive increases the likelihood of high 
profits and decreases that of low profits. 
There are two situations however, in which the incentive 
problem does not arise. If the executive is risk-neutral it 
does not matter that the shareholder cannot observe effort, 
because in demanding a fixed payment and letting the. 
executive bear all the risk the shareholder ensures that the 
solution to the executive's optimisation process is the risk 
sharing optimum itself. In other words the incentive 
constraint does not bind. 
The second case arises whent although e cannot be 
observed perfectly, it is observed only with some random 
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error Ex which is independent of the state of the world. If 
E has zero mean and is normally distributed, the shareholder 
can simply threaten to pay an arbitrarily low Y if he 
observes e< e- + E.. In selecting the value of E. the 
shareholder must weigh up the consequences of wrongly 
rejecting e= e- (a type one error) and paying the executive 
a low salary against wrongly accepting e= e- (a type two 
error) and paying him too much. 
A final issue addressed in much of the agency literature 
is the possibility of monitoring. If the shareholder can 
costlessly acquire certain information about effort in 
addition to that given by profit, should the shareholder use 
this information in devising the optimal payment schedule? 
It can be shown, as in Rees (1985), that it is always 
optimal to incorporate into a contract any variable which 
costlessly provides information about effort, except when 
executives are risk neutral. The importance of the 
additional information is that it reduces the probability of 
incorrectly rewarding low e and penalizing high e. This 
improves the incentive properties of the contract. To come 
to grips with this issue it is necessary to move from the 
one-period structure of the preceding analysis to a 
multi-period analysis of principal-agent relationships. 
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4.3 SEAREHOLDER - EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIPS IN A MULTI-PERIOD 
CONTEXT 
The preceding discussion of shareholder - executive 
relationships has been based on an analytical structure 
which involves a one-period, non-cooperative game. The two 
basic steps involved in a game of this type are : the 
executive obtains a sample of information on the random 
"state of nature" affecting the firm and chooses a course of 
action in the form of a specific level of effort; and the 
shareholder, who can observe the outcome of the executive's 
action (in the form of, say, the profits earned) but not the 
agent's level of effort or the "state of nature", pays the 
executive according to a pre-determined contract in- which 
rewards depends purely on the outcomes observed (say, the 
level of profits), and not on the level of executive effort 
or the environment ("state of nature") affecting the firm. 
The predicted outcome is usually taken to be a 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium pinned down by the 
attitudes to risk of the executive and shareholder. 
A fundamental question begged by this method of 
analysing shareholder - executive relationships is why the 
two parties do not exploit the possibility of cooperation. 
In general terms it has been argued that in theories of 
games, the extent to which behaviour emerges as cooperative 
or non-cooperative should be determined within the theory 
(see Binmore, 1987). The specific question is one of what 
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determines the degree of cooperation between shareholders 
and agents. The conventional wisdom here is that 
cooperation is less likely - or less stable - the more 
players there are, or the greater the difficulty of 
communication among the players ... (and) more likely 
(stable) if there are mechanisms whereby the players make 
binding commitments" (Radner, 1981, p. 1127). It is clearly 
likely that Nash equilibria will not be Pareto optimal in 
the sense that solutions to cooperative games can exist 
which will yield at least the same level of expected utility 
to one party, and a higher level of expected utility to the 
other than in the non-cooperative case. 
The possibilities of cooperation in shareholder 
executive relationships have been analysed by Radner 
(1981,1985) using the theory of repeated games or 
"supergames". Here the general case of shareholder - 
executive relationships whých are sustained for more than 
one time period is introduced, with the actions of the 
shareholder and executive now depending on the history of 
the previous sequences in the relationship. The fact that- 
the game is repeated provides the shareholder with the 
Opportunity to observe the executive's action over a number 
of periods. This accumulation of information opens up the 
Possibility that the shareholder can use the observations of 
the executive's past actions to draw statistical inferences 
as to whether the executive's actions have been appropriate 
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: the executive's effort level remains unobservable, but the 
shareholder can now use statistical means of drawing 
indirect inferences regarding the level of executive effort. 
The further possibility opened up by the repetition of the 
game is that the shareholder can punish the executive for 
what can be inferred to be departures from appropriate 
actions or effort levels. Thus there are now two phases to 
the game :a review phase in which the shareholder evaluates 
the cumulative performance of the executive since the last 
review, and pays the executive according to a Pareto 
efficient contract designed on the presumption of 
cooperation; and a penalty phase, arising after an 
unsatisfactory termination of a review sequence, in which 
the shareholder punishes the executive for what are inferred 
to have been inappropriate past actions, and the players 
revert to a non-cooperative game and a contract which is not 
likely to be Pareto efficient. Of crucial importance here is 
the degree of myopia or hypermetropia : 11 .... since the 
accumulation of reliable statistical evidence takes time, 
the threat of future punishment would be less effective 
deterrent the more the agent discounts future utility" 
(Radner 1985, p. 1174). 
At the time of writing, the "new" approach to game 
theory, in which such crucial factors as the degree of 
cooperation and pre-commitment in strategies are determined 
during the sequences over which the game is played, is 
76 
developing rapidly (see Binmore, 1987 and Binmore and 
Dasgupta eds 1987, for example). Such developments promise 
to provide a more satisfactory account of how contractual 
relationships between shareholders and executives develop 
during sustained, multi-period relationships which provide 
the shareholder with the possibility of drawing indirect 
inferences about the executive's level of effort. This 
literature has served to highlight several important points 
germane to the design of optimal contracts. First, there is 
the question of what type of statistical rule should be used 
by shareholders to draw the inferences about executive's 
action (eg. effort levels) from observation of outcomes 
(eg. profit levels). Secondly, the rate at which executives 
discount future utility plays a key role, a high rate of 
discount weakening the impact of future punishments 
threatened by the shareholder for inappropriate actions (eg. 
effort levels). Third, there is a clear indication that 
efficient contracts are likely to involve a contingency for 
punishment (eg. threat of termination) should a sequence of 
review phases yield evidence damning to the agent. 
Fourthly, efficient contracts are likely to be characterised 
by distinct phases, some characterised by cooperation or 
adherence to a pre-determined reward schedule, others by 
non-cooperation and lack of pre-commitment. Fifthly, the 
issue of who moves first is important : does the executive 
choose a course of action (eg. effort level) before the 
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shareholder announces the reward schedule, or is the latter 
pre-determined? (see Radner, 1985, for discussion of the 
above points). 
Thus an efficient contract, when set in the realistic 
context of a repeated game between shareholder and 
executive, is likely to be even more complex than the 
one-period non-cooperative Nash equilibrium analysis would 
suggest. The literature has begun to grapple with the 
difficult issues involved in the design of shareholder - 
executive contracts in a multi-period setting, but has not 
to date produced a general account of optimal contracts 
which are efficient in the sense that they Pareto-dominate 
others. This work, however, has served to highlight features 
which are likely to be present in optimal contracts. 
78 
CHAPTER 5 
ARE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLANS DESIGNED 
TO INDUCE EFFORT OR AVOID TAX? 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The stated aim of executive compensation contracts is to 
align the objectives of executives more closely with those 
of the shareholder. Several conunentators have suggested 
however, that such plans are adopted for tax rather than 
incentive reasons. 
Principal-Agent analysis suggests that the optimal 
incentive contract is likely to be extremely complex, except 
under certain highly restrictive conditions, (see Arrow, 
1985; Fama, 1980; Grossman & Hart, 1983; Hart & Holmstrom, 
1986; Holmstrom, 1979; Rees, 1985 ]. It is reasonable to 
suggest that companies will tend to forego strict optimality 
in the design of compensation contracts in the interests of 
practicality. This raises the question as to whether 
-companies really 
do address the problem of providing 
executives with the appropriate incentives. In what follows, 
the incentive properties of several commonly adopted 
compensation plans will be considered. 
Most of the literature on the tax treatment of 
compensation plans relates to the United States. The 
following is not intended as an exhaustive discussion of the 
tax treatment of executive compensation, but simply aims to 
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provide enough information to demonstrate the tax advantages 
of the various schemes considered. 
Analysis of the properties of the various schemes might 
provide hints concerning whether the rationale for the 
plans is derived from tax avoidance or incentive 
considerations. There have been, broadly speaking, two 
approaches to the problem of distinguishing between these 
two rationales. Miller and Scholes (1980) assess a plan for 
tax advantages by setting the plan up in such a way that the 
plan does not affect corporate taxes vis-aý-vis an 
equivalent salary payment, and then investigate the 
implications of the plan for the individual executive's tax 
liability. An alternative approach adopted by Hite and Long 
(1982) places the problem in an historical context. They 
attempt to explain the shift in the early 1970's from 
qualified to non-qualified plans by assessing the impact of 
changes in the tax law on the total of corporate and 
executive tax liability. The assumption is that the shift 
took place because the tax treatment changed from favouring 
qualified to non-qualified plans. The same exercise can be- 
carried out for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 although, 
unfortunately, not enough time has elapsed to assess the 
full impact of this reform. 
It will be argued that neither of these approaches can 
provide a conclusive answer to the question. While a 
tax-disadvantageous or tax-neutral plan presumably suggests 
80 
that its adoption was due to incentive considerations, we 
cannot conclude that incentive considerations are absent 
merely because a scheme is tax advantageous. The 
fundamental problem is to establish whether tax efficiency 
is being placed above incentive considerations: the vast 
majority of schemes considered appear to be 
tax-advantageous, exacerbating the problem of distinguishing 
between the two motives. 
5.2 COMPONENTS OF COMPENSATION : INCENTIVE EFFICIENCY 
There are in general five basic elements in compensation 
packages: salary, short-term incentive payments, long-term 
incentive payments, benefits in kind, and perquisites (see, 
Ellig, 1982; Crystal, 1984). At the lower end of the pay 
spectrum only salary and benefits usually appear, whereas at 
the executive level all five components are present. Each 
component will be considered in an attempt to discern the 
incentive implications and assess whether incentive 
considerations are paramount in the form of compensation. 
[A]. Salary 
The most common component of executive compensation is a 
pre-specified salary. The objective of the salary element is 
to reflect the extent of experience and performance required 
for a job at a particular level in the organisation. 
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It has been argued that salary renegotiation together 
with other market control mechanisms provide enough 
incentives to ensure that executives act optimally (Smith & 
Watts, 1982). The salary can tie executive compensation to 
the performance value of the firm if it is renegotiated on 
the basis of the previous year's reported profits or rate of 
return on capital. The extent to which top management can 
neglect maximising the market value of the firm is limited 
by managerial labour market considerations. If executives 
perform badly, the only factor preventing their removal from 
office is the cost of that removal, which is finite. 
Appraisal 
Nevertheless, neither labour market forces nor salary 
renegotiation can completely eliminate opportunistic 
behaviour. The reasons are threefold: first, without an 
incentive programme risk averse managers will tend to avoid 
risky projects. They are reluctant to compromise their 
current situation. A fixed salary contract offers little 
reward for taking risks to improve shareholder's wealth. It 
may even encourage the executive to undertake some 
investment projects which actually reduce the value of the 
firm. Executives can be induced to take risks if 
compensation plans are tied directly to the return on 
riskier investments. 
Second is the "time - horizon" problem. Executives are 
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only concerned with the performance of the company during 
their period of tenure, whereas the company is, at least 
potentially, infinitely - lived. Executives may therefore 
pursue strategies which are in the short-term interest of 
the company but which may be detrimental to long-term 
profitability. 
Finally, it is in the interest of executives to retain a 
large proportion of company profits to cover their fixed 
salary payments. This is in direct conflict with the 
interests of shareholders, who would prefer larger dividend 
pay-outs, or the retention of profits within the company to 
finance projects which would increase the net worth of the 
company. 
The principal-agent literature attempts to provide a 
theoretical solution to the incentive problem. In this 
section we wish to examine the extent to which the 
compensation schemes employed came to grips with the 
incentive problem. 
rB1. Short-Term Incentive Schemes : Bonus Plans 
Short-term incentive plans are designed to reward 
executives on the basis of recent corporate performance: the 
most common type of scheme is the bonus plan. Typically a 
bonus plan involves the executive being rewarded at year end 
on the basis of the year's performance: performance is 
measured variously as a function of profits, return on 
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investment, or more specifically, earnings per share, return 
on stockholders equity, return on capital employed, return 
on assets, although some plans allow executives to defer 
payment until they retire. Such plans normally specify a 
minimum level of profits, or return on investment, which 
must be reached before a bonus can be awarded. There are 
also plans which specify a maximum level of bonuses in 
relation to dividends paid-out. 
Appraisal 
The incentive properties of short-term incentive plans 
are evident : they attack the problem of risk-aversion to 
some degree by formally rewarding executives for increased 
profitability. The schemes which tie bonuses to dividend 
payments also reduce any incentive executives may have to 
retain large profits. The horizon problem, however, is 
exacerbated by such schemes, since they focus the 
executive's attention on short-term measures of performance. 
This problem is ameliorated by the few plans which require 
bonus awards to be paid in installments over several years. 
rC1- Lonq-Term Incentive Schemes 
While short-term plans typically have a time span of one 
year, long-term schemes usually refer to a period of three 
to five years, and in some cases beyond. There is 
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occasionally evidence of a medium term, three to five year 
restricted stock and performance unit plan for example, as 
well as a long-term plan, stock options and stock 
appreciation rights beyond the five year. The present 
discussion will combine these two categories. There are wide 
variations among long-term incentive schemes: the following 
discussion deals with the more common plans. 
ji). Stock Options : Qualified and Non-Oualified 
A stock option is the right to purchase a stated number 
of shares in a company at a pre-stated price, within a 
stated period of time. The difference in status between a 
qualified and non-qualified stock option derives from their 
tax treatment. The most common type of qualified stock 
option is the incentive stock option (ISO). To "qualify" for 
I. S. O. status a plan must satisfy certain minimum 
requirements: the option price must be not less than 100% of 
fair market value at time of issue; the period of the option 
must be not more than five years; and stock acquired by 
exercising the option must be retained for longer than three 
years. It used to be the case that a qualified option could 
not be exercised while a previously granted option at a 
higher price was outstanding, but this requirement has since 
been relaxed. 
Non-qualified options, on the other hand, tend to have 
few legal requirements: the option price can be set at less 
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than the fair market value; and there is no legally binding 
holding period, although most involve a few months to avoid 
insider trading problems. 
-Lj-i). 
Stock Appreciation Riqhts 
Recently the issue of stock options is frequently 
accompanied by Stock Appreciation Rights (S. A. R's) which, 
upon exercise, entitle the executive to receive the 
difference between the market value of the stock and the 
option price in cash and / or stock. The purpose of such 
rights is to enable the holder of the options to realize the 
increase in market value of the stock without the need to 
borrow, sell securities, or otherwise deal in capital. The 
rights also reduce transaction costs. S. A. R's may be issued 
in connection with the granting of non-qualified or 
incentive stock options, but if granted in connection with 
an incentive stock option they come under the stricter 
requirements of such options. 
(iii). Restricted Stock Plans 
Under a restricted stock plan the company awards shares 
to executives conditional upon the achievement of a certain 
standard of performance, subject to restrictions on sale. 
The shares may be allocated free of charge or for a nominal 
price. The executive's right to ownership of some or all of 
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the shares in question (vesting) is generally made 
contingent on the executive remaining in employment for a 
certain period though occasionally other restrictions are 
imposed. The plan typically requires forfeiture of unvested 
shares if the executive leaves during the restriction 
period, though vested shares may also be forfeited. The 
stock may vest (lose its restriction) ratably or non-ratably 
according to a prearranged schedule. 
-(iv). 
Phantom Stock Plans 
Phantom stock plans are to restricted stock plans what 
stock appreciation rights are to stock options, but they are 
based on "phantom" rather than real shares of company stock. 
Conceptually, the term " phantom stock" can describe any 
form of long-term incentive plan using units that are 
equivalent to but not actual shares in the company. For the 
purpose of this discussion, we will focus on the more 
traditional definition of the term, which is quite similar 
in most respects to stock appreciation rights. 
Instead of being awarded shares received when restricted 
stock becomes vested, the executive is merely credited with 
units analogous to the company shares, and at the end of the 
restricted period is paid the cash value of the shares. 
Dividend equivalents are also sometimes paid or accrued on 
phantom stock, which means that the executive receives or 
has allotted to him / her a sum equal to the dividends paid 
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on the imaginary stock. 
(y). Dividend Units 
Dividend unit schemes are similar to phantom stock 
plans: the executive is awarded a number of dividend units 
instead of phantom stock shares. Instead of being 
compensated in terms of the appreciation of the stock price 
at the end of the award period, the executive is compensated 
on the basis of dividends paid to shareholders. 
-(vi). 
Performance Unit and Performance Share Plans 
All the plans discussed above, with the exception of 
dividend units, rely on share price to determine the actual 
compensation received by the executive. Compensation under 
performance unit or performance share plans however, depends 
on the degree to which prescribed goals are met. The goals 
are formulated in terms of accounting measures, earnings per 
share, growth in earnings per share, rate of return on 
assets, for example, at the beginning of an award period,. 
which usually ranges from four to five years. 
A performance unit programme differs from a performance 
share programme only in that the former involves the credit 
of a given number of units of fixed money value, whereas the 
latter involves a credit of units whose value is geared to 
that of the company stock. In both cases the executive's 
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compensation is determined by the number of units or shares 
he or she has "earned" multiplied by either the fixed value 
of those units or the price of the company stock. 
Appraisal 
. What are the incentive properties of these plans? It has 
become apparent that the aim of all the above programmes is 
to tie the executive's compensation to the long-term 
performance of the company. In other words, they are 
designed to overcome the time horizon and risk inducement 
problems. This is accomplished either by allocating a 
potential equity interest in the company to the executive, 
thereby providing an incentive for the executive to promote 
the growth or profitability of the company; or by rewarding 
him for attainment of other long-term goals. 
Several important considerations make the attainability 
of this objective questionable. While most plans stipulate 
forfeiture of options on termination of employment, this 
being legally binding, many companies waive this requirement 
under pretexts which can be flimsy. For example, they often 
award "severance pay" or a "consulting contract" even when 
the forfeiture provisions are invoked. 
With the exception of performance unit and share 
programmes, all the plans considered are non-goal 
orientated: the company does not have to prescribe certain 
goals which must be achieved in order that payments be made. 
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Whilst in some respects this may be an advantage, in others 
it may not, since it can make the link between compensation 
and performance very tenuous indeed. The reason for this is 
that "share prices are influenced by three broad factors: 
(1) the general performance of the economy, including 
changes in interest rates, inflation, and real economic 
growth; (2) the performance of the given industry; and (3) 
the quality of management within a specific firm". (Putnam & 
Zimmer, 1987, p. 41) In essence, a highly competent 
management team which expends an optimal amount of effort 
"would determine only about half of the company's 
value"(Putnam & Zimmer, 1987, p42). Macroeconomic factors 
have a large impact on the overall executive compensation. 
In a "Bull Market", executives can expect to receive above 
average compensation-for mediocre performances. Conversely, 
in a "Bear Market" superior performance may be penalized 
because of poor overall market conditions. 
A way of overcoming this problem would be to reward 
executives on the basis of an inter-firm comparison of 
share-performance. This would remove the influence on 
rewards of market and industry conditions which are beyond 
the control of executives. Some companies have begun to do 
this, but by no means the majority. 
Finally, some have argued (see Ellig, 1982) that options 
simply motivate the recipients to attempt to manipulate the 
price of the stock, rather than improve company performance. 
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TD1. Perquisites and Benefit - Related Devices 
Perquisites (Perks) are essentially employee benefits 
which are designed to apply only to executives. In some 
instances they merely supplement employee benefit coverage; 
in others they provide a coverage absent from the employee 
benefit programme. For this reason we consider both 
perquisites and benefits under the same heading. 
It would be impossible to discuss the wide variety of 
benefit related schemes here: instead we will deal with some 
of the more controversial schemes, examining the incentive 
properties and shortcomings. 
-(i). 
Deferred Compensation Plans 
Deferred compensation arrangements are designed as a 
means of allowing executives to forego current income, and 
therefore current taxation, until retirement or some other 
later date, when they will enjoy the benefits of a lower 
income tax bracket. Although some plans provide for a 
deferral of salaried income, the most common arrangements 
involve deferral of a portion of bonus income. The most 
popular form of deferred payment is in cash, which is 
credited with an interest factor under a predetermined 
formula. 
Deferred compensation plans can provide incentives in 
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several ways: they can augment any tendency of the basic 
compensation package to tie senior management to the 
company; they can act as a pension supplement to attract key 
employees who might otherwise suffer a reduction in benefits 
as a result of a mid-career employment change; and they may 
provide an important form of incentive compensation in 
companies with a narrow shareholder base which do not wish 
to dilute their share-ownership. 
The main drawback of such plans, however, is the 
insecurity of the promise to pay, but in some senses this is 
precisely what is desired. If executives perform badly after 
earning deferred bonuses, the company may fall into 
liquidation and be unable to pay. 
-(ii). 
Life - Insurance 
Any review of the fringe benefit programmes that a 
company may provide for its executives must give 
consideration to life insurance. Benefits of this nature can 
take many forms: the most basic is whole life insurance, 
which denotes the period of protection. However, it is 
typically a group insurance scheme which provides the basic 
insurance benefits that the company is willing to offer its 
executives. The group covers a set of eligible employees and 
typically provides insurance coverage until the employee 
leaves or the contract expires, the contract usually being 
renewed annually. In addition, business travel protection, 
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dependant coverage and post-retirement coverage, to name but 
a few, may be negotiated as an extension to the basic 
scheme. 
A currently popular variant in the design of life 
insurance schemes is the so-called "split-dollar insurance 
policy". As the name implies the premium costs and death 
benefits are shared between the firm and the employee. In 
the simplest version, the corporation pays each year a 
proportion of the level premium equal to the annual increase 
in cash value, the balance being paid by the employee. 
Since employer cost is tied to the increase in cash value of 
the contract, the policy must by definition be permanent 
rather than term in nature, since the latter has no cash 
value. 
one major benefit of insurance coverage is that it" can 
act as a "golden handcuff", especially to executives 
reaching retirement age. For older executives the cost of 
replacing insurance if they leave the company may be 
prohibitive. 
(iii). Low or No-Interest Loans 
A popular trend in executive compensation has been to 
introduce a low or no-interest loan scheme for key 
executives. These loans can be tied directly to executive 
performance with clauses which state that the loan 
obligation will be reduced or eventually forgiven, if 
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I 
specific objectives are achieved. Such loans are often also 
tied indirectly to company performance, because they are 
awarded in connection with stock option plans: executives 
are loaned the funds to enable them to exercise their option 
in the company stock. 
In addition to the obvious benefits of executive access 
to "cheap funds", low or no-interest loans can serve as 
effective incentives when meaningful and achievable 
performance, standards are used as conditions for loan 
forgiveness. They may also form an effective "golden 
handcuff" if the executive is obliged to repay the loan on 
termination of employment. Conversely, such loans may prove 
to be detrimental to the relationship between executive and 
shareholders: a large body of such loans obviously reduces 
the funds available for dividend pay outs or new investment 
projects. 
(iv). Golden Parachutes 
Another advantage of special compensation packages can 
be seen by considering the merger problem. Following a 
successful merger it is common practice to reorganise the 
structure of the newly acquired company. This often involves 
a management reshuffle, making it necessary for shareholders 
to compensate managers for any loss of status or income, in 
order to minimise resistance to economically efficient bids. 
This is achieved by offering executives what have now come 
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to be known as "golden parachutes". Such agreements provide 
executives with the option of "pulling the rip-cord" if they 
do not fit in with the new management structure (Cochran & 
Wartick, 1984; Lambert & Larcker, 1985). The term "golden 
parachute" is apt: it refers essentially to a safety device 
for the executive, guaranteeing his financial security in 
the event of a merger; 'it provides severance pay if the 
executive contract is terminated following a change of 
control; it is golden because it is often very lucrative for 
the executive. 
Companies advance a variety of reasons for employing 
golden parachutes: senior management is less likely to "Jump 
ship" in the uncertain environment created when a company is 
a likely takeover candidate; the executives will focus their 
attention upon managing the company, not seeking other 
employment; accordingly they will negotiate for the best 
financial terms for the company in a merger that appears 
inevitable and will not use their energies to block the 
tender offer; and it is often necessary but difficult to 
recruit senior executives into troubled companies. 
The incentive properties of golden parachutes appear 
numerous. Nevertheless, one must be wary of the motives 
underlying the implementation of such agreements. Are 
golden parachutes employed to provide executive protection, 
or used to thwart unfriendly suitors? Severance pay may 
prove too costly to the suitor company. How vulnerable is 
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senior management to redundancy in a merger situation? If 
there is little probability of redundancy, then golden 
parachutes are inappropriate. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that "golden parachutes" 
have a poor public image. (Weinstein, 1985). They are viewed 
as nothing more than lucrative "cozy relationships" between 
company directors and their top executives. If golden 
parachutes are legitimately beneficial to all parties then 
companies need to explain this rationale to shareholders. 
5.3 TREATMENT OF INCENTIVE PAYMENTS IN THE U. S. TAX SYSTEM 
It is unnecessary to give a complete account of the tax 
treatment of executive compensation (for a comprehensive 
account, see Business Lawyer, 1984). The purpose of this 
section is to indicate the salient features of the U. S. tax 
system in order to help categorize each plan according to 
whether it is tax-advantageous or otherwise. The aim is to 
distinguish between tax and incentive considerations which 
lead to the adoption of particular plans. 
Compensation plans affect the taxes of both the 
executive and the company, so both tax effects must be 
considered when assessing the tax advantages of any type of 
plan. 
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Taxation of Executives 
As far as the executive is concerned, the general rule 
of thumb is that he is obliged to pay income tax on amounts 
received as compensation. In the case of straight salary for 
example, the salary constitutes taxable income to the 
executive in the year it is paid to him [Internal Revenue 
Code 1954]. 
There are, however, two aspects of the tax system 
relating to executive compensation which can provide the 
executive with more favourable tax treatment. 
The first relates to capital gains tax. If the executive 
can arrange to receive compensation in such a way that it is 
subject to capital gains rather than income tax, then the 
tax burden will be reduced commensurately. The extent of 
this reduction will depend on the difference between the 
capital gains tax rate and the income tax rate. 
The second aspect of the tax system which provides the 
executive with favourable tax treatment is the opportunity 
to postpone income tax liability. In general it is true to 
say that the executive is not liable for tax until he 
actually receives the income or stock. 
The primary obstacles to be overcome if the executive is 
to receive favourable income tax treatment are encapsulated 
in two related doctrines: constructive receipt and the 
economic benefit doctrine (see section 451 of the I. R. S. 
Code of 1954, as amended 61,1982). These doctrines can be 
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used by the Internal Revenue Service (I. R. S. ) to argue that 
the executive should be currently taxable on deferred 
compensation. 
The doctrine of constructive receipt has been applied, 
usually unsuccessfully, to challenge various forms of 
compensation deferral. It says that all items of income 
should be included in gross income when they are actually or 
constructively received. Income is deemed to be 
constructively received by the executive if it is received 
"in the taxable year during which it is credited to his 
account, set apart for him or otherwise made available so 
that he may draw upon it at any time, or so that he could 
have drawn upon it during the taxable year if notice of 
intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is 
not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its 
receipt is subject to substantial limitations or 
restrictions" (Shultz 1984, p. 223) 
Similarly, the application of the economic benefit 
doctrine mandates the inclusion within the executive's 
taxable income of "any economic or financial benefit. 
conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form 
or mode by which it is effected"(Shultz, 1984, p. 224). 
The two doctrines are now encapsulated in one code which 
states that property transferred to an executive in 
connection with the performance of services becomes taxable 
to the extent of the differencebetween fair market value 
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and the amount paid, if any, for the property when it is 
"transferable", or no longer subject to "substantial risk of 
forfeiture". A substantial risk of forfeiture "exists where 
rights in property that are transferred are conditional... 
upon the future performance... of substantial service by any 
person.. "(Shultz, 1984, p. 225; also see, Treas. Reg. 1.83 - 
3[c][1]1978). Thus, "Conditional Transferability" and 
"substantial risk of forfeiture" are key elements which 
enable compensation plans to qualify for tax 
deferral. [I. R. C. 83(a)] 
Taxation of Companies 
The main issues of interest in the tax treatment of 
companies are whether the compensation paid by the company 
is deductible from corporate tax liability, and how such 
deductions may be timed. The principal requirements for 
compensation to be deductible are that the expense must be 
"ordinary and necessary", and that in the case of executive 
compensation, it is "reasonable": "There shall be allowed as 
a deduction all the ordinarv and necessary expense paid or 
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business, including -a reasonable allowance for salaries or 
other compensation for personal services actually 
rendered ..... " (I. R. C. 162(a][1]1982). 
Straight salary payments easily meet the "ordinary and 
necessary" and "reasonable" tests, but executive incentive 
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programmes must be carefully scrutinized for the 
"reasonableness" of the compensation. 
In addition to the issue of deductibility, the timing of 
the deduction is important. A general rule of thumb is that 
if the compensation is includable in the gross income of the 
executives and, therefore, subject to income tax, it 
constitutes a deductible expense to the company in the year 
in which it is included in the executive's income. 
(i). Bonus Plans.: for income tax purposes, an executive 
is normally taxed on his annual award in the year of receipt 
on the same basis as if it were salary. If the annual award 
is paid in the form of unrestricted stock, the executive 
will have to pay ordinary income tax on the full market 
value of that stock; if payment is in the form of restricted 
stock, however, it will be treated as such for tax purposes 
(see infra). The tax treatment of deferred bonus 
compensation will also be discussed later. 
(ii). Qualified Stock options : qualified stock options 
"qualify" for capital gains tax treatment, the most common 
of which is the incentive stock option discussed above. if 
all the requirements are met for the plan to be treated as 
an incentive stock option, the executive is not liable to 
income tax at the time of grant or at the time of exercise, 
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but only upon sale of the shares. This means, however, that 
incentive stock options are not deductible to the company 
because they are not subject to income tax. 
(iii). Non-Oualified Stock Options : in the case of 
non-qualified stock options, that is, options which do not 
satisfy one or more of the exemption conditions enumerated 
above, the executive is subject to ordinary income tax. 
This tax will usually be imposed on the difference between 
the fair market value of the stock at the time of exercise 
and the exercise price. Non-qualified stock options do not 
ordinarily result in taxable income at the time of grant 
unless the option is immediately transferable, not subject 
to "substantial risk of forfeiture" or has a "readily 
ascertainable market value", which will be the case if the 
plan is funded. In addition, any difference between the 
fair market value at time of exercise and the price obtained 
upon eventual sale of the stock may be subject to capital 
gains tax. If, on the other hand, the sale price is less 
than the exercise price, no amount will be included in the 
optionee's income as compensation, and a capital loss will 
be recognised. The company is allowed a business expense 
deduction at the same time as the compensation is recognised 
as gross income to the executive. 
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(iv). Stock Appreciation Rights: upon exercise of such 
rights, irrespective of whether they are granted in 
connection with an incentive stock option, the executive is 
subject to income tax on any cash received, or on the fair 
market value of any shares received. If, however, the 
shares received are nontransferable or subject to 
substantial risk of forfeiture, they are treated as 
restricted stock and taxed accordingly (see infra). The 
company is once again entitled to a tax deduction at the 
time and to the extent of the executive's taxable 
compensation, so that if the executive receives restricted 
stock the company is not entitled to a deduction until such 
shares become taxable to the executive. 
(y). Restricted Stock Plans: the executive must include 
in gross income the excess of the then fair market value of 
the restricted stock over the price paid , if any, in the 
first year in which the restrictions lapse; this makes the 
stock transferable and no longer subject to substantial risk 
of forfeiture. This usually occurs when the executive can 
sell or otherwise transfer the stock: at this juncture the 
compensation becomes deductible to the company. 
(vi). Phantom Stock Plans: these are treated 




become taxable to the executive, and deductible to the 
company, at the time the awards are eventually settled in 
stock, cash or both. 
(vii). Performance Unit and Performance Share 
Programmes: a performance unit or share programme made 
contingent on the attainment of specified goals over a 
period of years is not normally subject to income tax until 
the completion of the programme, even though the goal may be 
reached in earlier years of the programme. The reason for 
this is that the goal cannot properly be considered as 
attained until the programme has been completed: the last 
fiscal year of the programme could conceivably eliminate the 
goals attained during preceding years. Hence a substantial 
risk of forfeiture remains. For the company, a deduction in 
connection with such programmes will be given in the year in 
which the award is included in the executive's gross income. 
(viii). Deferred Compensation Plans: the attraction of 
deferred compensation arrangements is the ability to 
postpone taxation until a period in the executive's life in 
which he is enjoying a lower tax rate, such as during 
retirement. It should be stressed, however, that the 
postponement of taxation is allowed only if the promise to 
pay is unsecured and unfunded, so that it is subject to 
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"substantial risk of forfeiture". Furthermore, companies 
must be careful to avoid the pitfalls of the constructive 
receipt and economic benefit doctrines outlined above. As a 
result of the tax benefits to the executive, however, the 
company will not be allowed to deduct such compensation 
expenses until the taxable year in which the deferred amount 
is included in the executive's compensation. 
(ix). Life Insurance: in the case of a group term life 
insurance plan, the executive must include in his gross 
income the cost of company-provided life insurance yielding 
benefits in excess of $50,000 dollars. The proceeds are 
non-taxable to the beneficiary and if the executive 
transfers "incidents of ownership" to the intended 
beneficiaries, he can avoid taxation on the proceeds of his 
estate. The premia paid by the company are fully tax 
deductible. In the case of individual life insurance 
arrangements, the potential tax impact depends on who owns 
the policy and who pays the premia. If the employee 4owns 
the policy and the company pays the premia, the premia are 
additional income to the employee and deductible to the 
firm. If the company owns the policy and pays the premia, 
the premia are not deductible, but neither are they included 
in the executive's income. It is a little difficult, 
therefore, to define the precise tax consequences, of 
"split-dollar insurance" because costs and benefits are 
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shared between the firm and the executive in a variety of 
ways. It suffices to say that they are likely to give rise 
to taxable income but at a lower rate. 
(x). Low or No-Interest Loans: interest-free or 
below-market rate loans are treated for tax purposes as if 
they involve an actual payment of interest from the borrower 
to the lender at rate of interest specified by the Treasury. 
Such interest payments are deductible to the executive. The 
difference between this imputed interest and the interest, 
if any, actually paid by the executive, however, is treated 
as additional compensation and taxed accordingly. This means 
that the executive's outlay in interest payments can offset 
the compensation income which is attributed as a result of 
the interest-free or below-market rate loan. If the loan is 
forgiven then it becomes subject to ordinary income tax in 
the year in which it is forgiven. The company must wait 
until the executive receives loan forgiveness before it can 
claim tax deduction, which means that the company cannot 
make a deduction for the "bargain" element of the loan. The 
I. R. S. has been trying for years to argue that the 
recipients of such loans should be taxed on the value of 
this benefit, but has been largely unsuccessful until 
recently. The Tax Reform Act 1986, however, has dealt a 
significant blow to the benefits of low or no-interest 
loans. It limits the deductions for interest payments to 
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those incurred in connection with trade, business or those 
related to residential mortgage loans. Hence, the all 
important question is going to be the category within which 
the use of funds falls. 
(xi). Golden Parachutes: Public criticism of golden 
parachutes is reflected in their tax treatment (Sections 
28OG & 4999 of the Tax Reform Act 1984). The 1984 Act 
prohibits the deduction by the company of parachute payments 
if (1) the payments are made to an officer, director or 
highly compensated executive of the company; (2) if the 
payments are contingent on a change of control and (3) if 
the payments exceed three times the executive's base salary. 
Futhermore, any payment received by the executive in excess 
of his base salary is liable to a 20% excise tax in addition 
to ordinary income tax. 
5.4 TAX AVOIDANCE VERSUS INCENTIVE CONTRACTS 
We now turn to the problem of identifying the motivation. 
underlying compensation plans. The question can be posed in 
terms of why the company does not award the executive a 
straight cash payment for the performance of , services. In 
the first section we outlined some convincing arguments to 
suggest why compensation plans may be implemented for 
incentive reasons. The second section, however, pointed to 
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the tax reasons why such non-basic plans may be introduced. 
In the literature there have been two main approaches to 
the problem of distinguishing, between the incentive and 
taxation motives. The approach adopted by Hite & Long(1982) 
places the problem in an historical perspective. They 
attempt to explain the shift in the early 1970's from 
qualified to non-qualified plans by assessing the impact of 
the changes in tax law contained in the Tax Reform Act, 
1969; Hite and Long focus on the combined tax liability of 
the company and its executives. 
In the 1960's qualified stock options were the 
predominant form of long-term incentive plan in the United 
States. In the early 1970's firms replaced these plans with 
non-qualified stock options. Hite & Long (1982) suggest 
several hypotheses which could explain this shift, but argue 
that although "these competing explanations cannot be 
rejected a priori they are deficient in one crucial respect: 
they do not explain the timing of the switch" (p. 6 They 
conclude that "the tax hypothesis based on the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 provides an explanation consistent with the form. 
and timing of the switch"(p. 6 ). 
The 1969 legislation contained special provisions in 
terms of treatment of capital gains for qualified stock 
options. Prior to 1969, the tax advantages to the executive 
of qualified stock options far outweighed the lack of 
deductibility for the company, this was no longer the case 
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post 1969. The 1969 Tax Reform Act served to lower the 
standard income tax rate from 70% to 50% by 1972, so that 
the corporate tax savings with non-qualified plans swamped 
the personal tax advantage of the qualified plans. 
Consequently, compensation plans were modified to take 
advantage of this tax saving. 
This exercise could be carried out for all tax reforms, 
observing the consequent shift, if any, in compensation 
plans adopted. For example, the 1986 Tax Reform Act has 
reduced income tax from a maximum rate of 50% in 1986 to 28% 
in 1988; has increased the maximum capital gains tax to 28% 
by 1987; and lowered corporate tax rates, although corporate 
tax rates for the first time will be higher than the rates 
applicable to individuals. Thus we would expect to observe a 
shift away from plans which do not permit corporation tax 
deductions. Since an employer can rarely receive a deduction 
when an employee is liable to capital gains -, tax, we would 
expect a shift away from techniques that generate capital 
gains (see, Walter, 1987; Weinstein, 1985). 
Nevertheless, the usefulness of this exercise is 
questionable. The only point it highlights is that companies 
take the tax consequences of their compensation plans 
seriously. It says nothing about incentive considerations. 
In order to demonstrate that companies were placing 
tax-efficiency above incentive considerations it would be 
necessary to show that companies adopt compensation plans 
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with inferior incentive properties in response to tax 
changes. This, however, is easier said than done. One has to 
ask whether differences in tax treatment apart, there are 
good grounds for preferring one plan to another. Miller 
(1977) has suggested that the wide variation in plans may 
simply represent "... neutral mutations that serve no 
function, but do harm"(p. 265). others have argued (see, 
Brickley, Bhaghat & Lease, 1985; Tehranian & Waegelein, 
1985) that it is extremely difficult to demonstrate the 
superiority of one plan over another because the plans 
represent a response to differing corporate needs. Hence 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in non-qualified 
compensation arrangements, which receive similar tax 
treatment, may prove to be a fruitful area for future 
research. 
An alternative approach to distinguishing between tax 
and incentive motivations adopted by Miller & Scholes(1980) 
and Smith & Watts(1982) categorises plans according to 
whether they are tax-neutral, tax-advantageous or 
tax-disadvantageous. Any scheme whose tax consequences are 
equivalent to what they would have been had the individual 
received the payment in cash and invested it himself is said 
to be tax-neutral; and tax-disadvantageous or advantageous 
if higher or lower tax payments are involved. 
The rationale behind this approach is that "the absence 
of clear tax benefits -creates the presumption that the 
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schemes must have compensation incentive benefits to justify 
their use" (Miller & Scholes, 1980, p. 184). However, where 
the plans are tax-advantageous, which is often the case, 
there is an identification problem. The presence of tax 
advantages does not preclude the possibility that the scheme 
is an incentive plan which has incidental tax benefits. 
Compensation plans affect the taxes of both the company 
and the executive, but to avoid the problem of comparing 
disadvantages to the company with advantages to the 
executive and vice-versa, the Miller & Scholes(1980) 
approach sets each plan up in such away as to make it 
tax-neutral to the company. 
On first inspection the advantages of restricted stock 
plans, phantom stock plans and performance share programmes 
appear ambiguous. If the company stock price rises between 
the time of grant and the date the restrictions lapse then 
participation in the scheme is superior to purchasing the 
company stock with after-tax current salary, no capital 
gains tax being paid on the subsequent increase in share 
price. If, however, the share price falls, the blow is. 
cushioned for the non-participant by the capital loss 
deduction. 
This ambiguity may seem to support the presumption that 
restricted and phantom stock plans are popular because of 
their incentive properties. But Miller & Scholes(1980) 
demonstrate that a trade of some deferred wages which yields 
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a mixed portfolio will lead restricted and phantom stock 
plans to dominate the purchase of company shares with the 
after-tax proceeds of current salary. The authors therefore 
conclude "with minor qualifications" that such plans are 
tax-advantageous. This qualification relates to the 
exemption from'capital gains tax of assets held until death 
(TRA 1976): if the executive does not sell the shares before 
death, the combination of stock, plus current or deferred 
wages, may not be the dominant compensation plan in all 
circumstances. 
The advantage of non-qualified stock options and stock 
appreciation rights are analogous to those of restricted 
stock or phantom stock relative to direct stock purchase: 
there is no capital gains tax payable on any appreciation 
over the life of the option; and the seeming advantage of 
capital loss deduction under direct, purchase in the event of 
a fall in the firm's share price can be offset by a package 
combining non-qualified options and current (or deferred) 
salary. Note that we do not, - consider qualified options 
because under the present tax regime such plans are- 
considerably inferior to non-qualified options. 
Stock. purchase plans, on the other hand, in which the 
company lends the executive the funds with which to purchase 
the company's shares, are shown to have no tax consequences. 
This is true even if the-interest charged on the loan is 
considerably below the going rate for comparable risks 
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because the value of the interest subsidy does not have to 
be declared by the recipient, and it cannot be deducted from 
corporate tax liability. Positive taxes may be payable if 
the share price falls so that stock purchase plans can be 
tax-disadvantageous. Thus interest free loans carry no tax 
advantages. This leads to the conclusion that whatever the 
objectives of stock purchase plans may be, reaping tax gains 
is not one of them. 
In a similar fashion Miller and Scholes (1981) have 
demonstrated that bonus and profit - sharing plans tied to 
internal accounting measures are tax-advantageous. Since 
profit-sharing and bonus plans call for payments when 
earnings are positive, they are equivalent to options on a 
hypothetical stock. The tax consequences are, therefore, 
exactly the same as they are for a stock plan. 
The advantages of straight cash deferral derive from 
differences between corporate and personal tax rates. If the 
two rates are the same a simple deferred salary arrangement 
can easily be seen to be tax-neutral to both parties: the 
executive who does not participate in the scheme can invest. 
in a risk-less bond and receive the same return as the 
individual who participates in the plan, assuming a constant 
marginal rate. Similarly the plan is tax-neutral to the 
company because it can hedge its commitment to the executive 
by investing the foregone salary payments in risk-less 
bonds. The picture changes, however, when marginal tax 
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rates differ between the two parties. If the executive's tax 
rate exceeds that of the company, which has been the case 
for top executives until recently, ihen deferred 
compensation schemes can be shown 'to be tax-advantageous. 
The reason for this is that the interest paid to the 
executive on the foregone salary will only been taxed at the 
corporate rather than personal rate. The potential gain 
increases if the executive's tax rate falls on retirement. 
By similar reasoning, if the corporate exceeds the personal 
tax rate, deferred compensation schemes are tax 
disadvantageous. 
Until the recent movement to corporate marginal tax 
rates in excess of personal tax rates it was not difficult 
to find a tax avoidance rationale for the adoption of 
deferred compensation schemes. With the new tax structure it 
might be thought that the continued adoption of such plans 
would provide evidence in support of the incentive 
hypothesis. This argument, however, does not necessarily 
follow since the benefits of deferring compensation until 
the lower tax rate encountered by retirement may outweigh 
the disadvantages of the corporate rate exceeding the 
present personal tax rate. 
Life insurance plans on the surface would appear to be 
tax-advantageous since life insurance policies are subject 
to favourable tax treatment: the proceeds of life insurance 
policies are not taxed as income to the beneficiary, and the 
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earnings on the savings portion of the policy accumulate at 
the before-tax riskless rate of return. In the present 
context, however, such plans are essentially tax-neutral 
since the tax-advantages are no greater than the individual 
could obtain by buying insurance directly with after-tax 
current salary. There are, however, two exceptions. 
The first is the case of group life insurance. This is 
tax-advantageous because the company can deduct the full 
premium whereas the executive is obliged only to include in 
taxable income the cost of coverage in excess of $50,000. 
In turn the liability for tax is deferred using a uniform 
premium profile, the values of which are substantially below 
those obtained from ordinary commercial sources. 
The second exception is the split-dollar plan, which on 
the surface seems to be tax-neutral. Closer inspection, 
however, reveals more subtle tax-advantages. Some executives 
may find that they wish to have more life coverage at some 
stage in their career than they can actually afford. One 
way to do this would be to borrow the money, but the tax law 
prohibits interest deductions if a loan is used to pay more. 
than three of the first seven premia on an insurance scheme. 
Split-dollar plans avoid this problem by allowing the 
executive to acquire the whole policy only in return payment 
of the value of the firm's share in the policy. 
On balance the conclusion is that deferred compensation 
schemes involving life insurance are never worse than 
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tax-neutral and can be tax-advantageous particularly in the 
case of the currently popular group and split-dollar plans, 
tax-advantageous when the full set Of tax and market 




Most of the compensation schemes considered turn out to 
be tax-advantageous, which means that we cannot be sure 
whether the plans are really designed to share the 
efficiency gains arising from incentive contracts, to 
transfer some of the salary burden to the Treasury, or both. 
The essential difficulty is that tax-efficiency is desirable 
even when compensation plans are adopted for predominantly 
incentive reasons. The evidence reviewed above cannot 
distinguish between tax and incentive motivations, 
especially when plans are tax-advantageous. 
Certain intuitive arguments, however, can be employed to 
question the explanatory power of the hypothesis that 
compensation schemes are merely tax avoidance vehicles. 
First, the examples used to demonstrate the tax advantages 
of incentive provisions suggest that the same tax advantages 
could be obtained without establishing a formal plan tying 
compensation to performance, that is, without having an 
incentive plan. For example, basic salary compensation 
allied with salary deferral can yield the same tax 
advantages as basic salary allied with share options. Hence 
why, if incentive considerations are not important, should 
companies offer compensation plans involving shares in the 
company? 
A second argument relates to straight salary deferral. 
Deferral is likely to be tax disadvantageous when 
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executives' personal tax rates are less than the corporate 
tax rate. Yet it is typically lower level managers facing, 
if anything, lower marginal tax rates on personal income, 
who receive compensation in the form of deferred salary. 
A third consideration is the strictness of the 
conditions attached to compensation plans: to the extent to 
which such strictness is not required for tax avoidance 
purposes, support is provided for the incentive hypothesis. 
It has been argued that tax considerations cannot explain 
the differences in the nature of performance measures across 
compensation plans. If the plans were designed to provide 
individual managers with incentives to make decisions in the 
shareholders, interests, one would expect compensation to be 
tied to a measure of performance which most reflects 
executive effort. Measures of overall company performance 
such as share value and total profits may be appropriate in 
relation to the efforts of senior executives, but it makes 
more sense for divisional executives to be evaluated on the 
basis of divisional measures of performance. Smith and 
Watts(1982) cite-evidence to the effect that performance is. 
evaluated using disaggregated yardsticks, though bonuses are 
rarely paid if overall corporate performance does not reach 
some minimum standard. 
Finally, it was observed above that incentive plans can 
be designed to tackle the inducement to risk problem. if 
this is the case we would expect incentive plans to be more 
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prevalent in unregulated industries where it is easier to 
alter the risk profile of investment. Again Smith and 
Watts(1982, p. 155) provide evidence to this effect. 
According to Principal-Agent analysis the optimal 
incentive contract is likely to have a high degree of 
complexity. Such a contract would be almost impossible to 
implement, which raises the question as to how companies can 
best design second-best contracts to deal with the incentive 
problem. In Section II we examined the most commonly adopted 
schemes and discussed their incentive properties. A central 
problem here is as follows: if firms are seriously concerned 
about incentives, why do they tie compensation to the 
company's share price, a variable which is influenced by a 
wide set of factors as well as managerial effort? A commonly 
expressed view is that the real motivation for implementing 
such compensation plans is to reduce the tax liability of 
the company and its executives, not to encourage managers to 
maximize the net worth of the firm. It is extremely 
difficult to disentangle incentive from tax motivations. The 
two approaches used in the literature are unable to provide. 
a conclusive answer. An appeal to intuitive argument lends 
some support to the incentive hypothesis, but could not 
convince the unconvinced. Given this we must remain agnostic 
on the issue of whether tax rather than incentive 
considerations dominate the design of compensation 
contracts. Some searching questions, however, do need to be 
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asked in view of the understandable fear of shareholders 
that the schemes used are designed purely to maximise 
managerial incomes net of tax. 
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Chapter 6 
ALIGNING MANAGERIAL AND SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS: 
A SURVEY OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years a popular view has been that executives 
are overpaid and that " compensation policies are irrational 
and ignore the needs of shareholders 11 (Murphy 1986,, p. 125). 
Underlying this argument is the belief that executive 
remuneration is based not on indicators of companv 
performance, but on the self-serving interests of managers. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that there is little correlation 
between executive turnover and company performance: 
executives do not lose their jobs for poor performance. 
Typical of the prevailing views is Augustine's (1982) 
conclusion: There are many highly successful organisations 
in the United States. There are also many highly paid 
executives. The policy is not to intermingle the two. 
These views are usually supported by anecdotal evidence 
to the effect that there is no concrete relationship between 
corporate performance and executive compensation. Loomis 
(1982), for example, reports compensation received by Rand 
V. Araskog, Chairman of I. T. T. of $1,150,000 in 1981 
compared to the compensation received by Thomas L. Phillips, 
Chairman of Raytheon of $635,000. Yet Raytheon 
significantly outperformed I. T. T.. Such comparisons have 
120 
their uses and may even be valuable in identifying abuse of 
the compensation system. Howeverr such evidence does not 
constitute a compelling case against compensation policies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to survey the literature 
which offers a formal analysis of the empirical relationship 
between executive compensation and performance. 
At a conference held at the University of Rochester in 
1984 entitled "Management Compensation and the Management 
Labour Market", a wide range of papers provided direct and 
indirect evidence on the incentive effects of executive 
compensation packages. The broad conclusions were as 
follows: executive compensation is positively related to 
share price performance; poor firm performance is associated 
with increased executive turnover; and the adoption of new 
short-term and long-term executive compensation plans and 
golden parachutes is associated with a positive share price 
reaction. Thus, according to Jensen and Zimmerman (1985) 
"these finding are interpreted as generally supporting the 
view that executive compensation packages help align 
manager's and shareholders, interests" (p. 3). In what 
follows we will review the arguments presented at the 
conference (published in the Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 7,1985), since they serve to highlight the 
problems encountered in examining the incentive effects of 
executive compensation packages. 
The last section in the chapter asks whether, in light 
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of the empirical evidence reviewed, there are grounds for 
preferring any specific type of compensation package. 
6.2 THE RELATION BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE 
A simple test of the validity of the self-serving 
ranagement hypothesis involves the sign of the relationship 
between executive compensation and corporate performance: a 
positive and significant relationship would lend support to 
the hypothesis that executives work in the interests of 
their shareholders, as opposed to the self-serving 
management alternative. 
Efforts to identify such a relationship, however, have 
produced mixed results. Periodicals such as "Fortune" and 
"The Wall Street Journal" have repeatedly reported the 
apparent lack of correlation between managerial earnings and 
various measures of corporate performance (see, Loomis 1982, 
Drucker 1984). Other empirical studies such as McGuire, 
Chiu and Elbing (1962), Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), Masson 
(1971), Cosh (1975), Meeks and Whittington (1975), and 
Hirschey and Pappas (1981) have also produced results which 
are inconclusive. 
A problem with such studies, however, is that they look 
at the level of executive compensation across companies at a 
particular point in time instead of considering the extent 
to which compensation varies over time with performance: 
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they use cross-section rather than time series data (see, 
Murphy 1985). Given that inter-firm and inter-industry 
differences are likely to be key variables in explaining 
differences in salary levels, a key issue in cross-section 
studies is whether adequate allowance has been made for such 
factors. Consider the omission of company size in a 
cross-section study on compensation and performance. 
Empirical evidence indicates a positive relationship between 
sales and compensation and a negative relationship between 
company size and the average rate of return on shares. In 
other words large companies have more generous compensation 
packages and on average worse share performance than small 
companies, who in turn have less generous compensation 
packages, but better share performance (Roberts, 1959, 
Agarwal, 1981) (see diagram 6.1). The use of cross-section 
data without consideration of company size is likely to 
suggest a spurious negative relationship between share 










from "pooled" data 
Stock 
Performance 
Scatter plots and regression lines portraying the relationship between compensation and stock market 
performance for two hypothetical executives. Executive A. whose observations are denoted by 0. is a 
highly paid executive in a large. low-performance firm. Executive 0. whose observations are denoted by X. 
Is a lower-paid executive in a small. high-performance firm. Separate time-series regressions (solid 
lines) indicated a positive relationship between compensation and performance. However. in a pooled 
cross-sectional regression (dashed line). which ignores the size differences between firms. the estimated 
relationship between compensation and performance Is negative. 
From figure 1. Murphy (1985). 0 Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration". 
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A second problem with many of the cross-section studies 
relates to the measure of compensation used (see Murphy 
1985). Many studies have concentrated only on the most 
visible aspect of remuneration - the sum of salary and bonus 
- and omitted potentially performance-sensitive compensation 
components such as stock options, deferred compensation and 
stock awards. This is all the more important because in 
recent years'salary and bonus has declined as a proportion 
of total compensation. Since shareholders are considered to 
be the principals in principal-agent theories, it seems 
reasonable to define performance in terms of the returns 
realised by the firm's common shareholders rather than in 
terms of accounting profits, which some studies have used 
(Cosh, 1975, Hirshey and Pappas, 1981, Llewellen and 
Huntsman, 1970, Masson, 1971; McGuire, Chiu and Elbing, 
1962, and Meeks and Whittington, 1975). However, since this 
raw rate of return realised by shareholders depends not only 
on managerial productivity , but also on industry and market 
factors, it becomes necessary to modify this measure. The 
Industry-Relative performance index measures firm. 
performance relative to other firms in the same industry; 
the Abnormal Performance Index measures firm performance 
relative to other firms in the same "risk class". Raw stock 
returns emerge as the best predictors of changes in 
aggregate measures of remuneration (salary + bonus and total 
compensation),, industry relative rates of return as the best 
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predictors of bonuses and deferred compensation. 
Murphy 
Murphy (1985) examines the relationship between firm 
performance and managerial pay using data that focuses on 
individual executives over time. He estimates the following 
relationship: 
Comp, L, t-- = aiL +b Perf onn. Lt_ +eLt- (1) 
where comp., L., - 
is the compensation received by executive i at 
time t and separate regressions are run for Salary, Bonus, 
Salary + Bonus, Deferred Compensation and Stock Options 
(Stock Options are valued using the Black-Scholes (1973) 
valuation formula); Perform., L., - 
is the performance of the i-'% 
executive's company at time t. 
Murphy's tests involve several assumptions. First, it is 
assumed that, while an executive's compensation is likely to 
depend on certain individual specific factors such as age, 
education, training, ability, firm size and so on, these 
factors will be constant for each executive over time and 
will therefore be captured in the intercept term. This 
provides a potential source of omitted variable bias. 
Second, in order to overcome the problem of data deficiency 
( it would be pointless running 461 regressions for 461 
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executives with only an average of 10 observations for each 
executive ), it is assumed that the sensitivity of pay to 
performance is the same for all executives (bjL=b) even 
though the intercept term varies across executives. It turns 
out, however, that such an assumption is only strictly valid 
for total compensation and bonus payments. 
Murphy's time series results suggest a pronounced 
positive effect of performance on all aspects of 
compensation except stock options (see table 1). Murphy 
suggests that the negative relationship between performance 
and option values may arise because boards of directors are 
more likely to award options during periods of poor 
performance and will often reissue previously granted 
options at a lower exercise price. The latter may be the 
case, the former is certainly not, as evidenced by the 
dramatic increase in stock option awards in the first half 
of the 1980's period of buoyant profits and share prices. 
Nevertheless, Murphy's results certainly provide evidence 





09 STOCK MARKET 
REGRESSIONS OF COMPENSATION 
PERFORMANCE 
PANEL A: TrME-SERIES ESTIMATES 
Dependent Variable (in logarithms) 
Independent Variable 
TOTAL' SALARY BONUS SALARY DEFERRED OPTION 
+ BONUS VALUE 




. 1786 . 4926 -. 3600 
(18.6) (5.5) (8.3) (20.4) (4.9) (-2.1) 











(-2 9) . . . . . . 




. 4490 . 0810 0 (28.5) (21.4) (2.4) (37.0) (2.4) (0.3) 
01 President . 3668 . 2929 . 2796 . 3598. . 4238 .0 35 (18.8) (14.9) (1.0) (24.1) (2.5) (0.3) 
Sample Size 4500 2067 2067 4500 4500 4500 
Number of 













F 304.9 129.4 18.9 468.3 9.5 4.1 
PANEL B: CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIKATES 
Dependent Variable (in logarithms) 
Independent Variable 
TOTAL SALARY BONUS SALARY DEFERRED OPTION 
+ BONUS VALUE 
Ln(Stock Index) -. 0470 -. 1215 . 6895 -. 1085 1.721 14 31 
(2.4) 
. (-3.1) (5.6) (-0.6) 
0 
V Chairman -. 
0098 
. 
1926 -2.777 . 1049 -1.871 -3.028 
(2.1) (-3.8) (1.3) (-2.7) 














. 4617 . 6973 1013 1 1.436 
(8.2) (5.5) (0.6) (8.0) 0.1) 
ý 
(2.2) 




R2 . 294 . 
312 
. 
089 . 293 . 096 . 
044 
F 47.4 31.2 6.7 47.2 12.1 7.8 
Estimated coefficients from time-series regression models using data from the 1964-1981 sample of 461 
executives In 72 manufacturing corporations. The performance variable. Stock Index. Is based on the rate 
of return realized by shareholders. The t-statistic is Indicated in parentheses. F-statistic tests joint 
significance of In( Stock Index ) and the three position dummies. An F-statistic greater than 3.3 is 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
From table 5. Murphy (1985). 'Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration'. 
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Couqhlan and Schmidt 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) overcome the problem of 
inter-firm and inter-industry differences in the 
pay-performance relationship by regressing the rate of 
change in compensation on abnormal stock returns. Their 
investigation, however, involves only salary plus bonus in 
order to avoid the systematic relationship between other 
components of remuneration and company performance. Their 
rationale for doing so is that: "because these other 
components explicitly relate compensation to stock 
performance, a significant relation between salary and bonus 
and stock price performance is not necessary for a 
conclusion that board of directors construct executive 
compensation plans that increase shareholder wealth. A 
significant positive relation between salary plus bonus and 
stock price performance, however, strengthens [the] argument 
that board of directors purposefully set discretionary pay 
components to induce the executive to increase shareholder 
wealth". (Coughlan & Schmidt 1985, p. 54) 
The regression model is : 
(deflated Salary + Bonus), L, *- 
Ln ---------------------------- a+ A(Ab. Stock Returns)a. *'+e. L*- (deflated Salary + Bonus)&, *--x 
which is estimated using survey data 
officers (CEO's) in "Forbes" Magazine 
on chief executive 
for 1978,1979 and 
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1980. The data set is also divided into two groups: group A 
contains C. E. O. 's who are younger than 64 years of age and 
group B includes all C. E. O. 's who are at least 64 years old. 
This is to avoid problems of mandatory retirement with its 
associated compensation effects. 
The coefficient on Abnormal Stock returns is 
positive and significant in all regressions for the under 64 
age group (see table 2). The results are mixed for 64 years 
plus group, reflecting probably "the effect of 
retirement-related events on changes in compensation" 
(Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985, p. 55). 
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Table 2 
Panel A: Age 64 
















(1-13) (1-34) (0-21) (1-59) (I-d2) 
Cumulative residual 
from market model 
for year t 0.153 0.119 0.144 0.137 0.136 
(2-73) (3-17) (2-17) (5-22) (5-12) 
Deflated sales 
growth in year t 0.017 
- -- --- --- -- -- ---- -- ----------- ---------- - ----- 
(0-27) 
- --------- 
Sample size 158 165 159 482 482 
Number of firms 158 165, 159 218 213 
R-squared 0.046 0.058 0.053 0.054 0.054 
f-ratio 7.46 10-08 0.82 27-27 13-64 







- ---- - --- 
Panel B: Age 63 




-- - ------- 
(4) 
----- - ---------- ---------- 
Constant 0.014 0.042 , -0-055 0.007 -0-001 
(0-50) (1-26) (-1.43) (0-36) (-0.06) 
Cumulative residual 
trot market model 
for year t 0.06 0.157 0.022 0.122 0.096 
(0-64) (1-38) (0-18) (1-19) (1-46) 
Deflated sales 
growth in year t - 0.252 
-- --- ---- ---- - -- - -- ----------- -- - 
(1-10) 
-- - ------ 
Sample size 37 41 37 
- 
115 115 
Number of fires 37 41 37 58 58 
R-squared 0.012 0.047 0.001 0.034 0.044 
F-ratio 0.41 1.91 0.03 3.9s 2.58 
Prob I >F 1 0.5282 0.1748 0.8576 0.0493 0.0802 
Estimated coefficients from regression of the deflated percentage change In salary plus bonus from year 
(t-1) to t on the deflated cumulative residual from the market model In year t and deflated percentage 
sales growth from year (t-1) to year t, for 249 firms in the period 1978-1980. The regressions are 
numbered I through 5. The 'Combined sample' regressions use pooled data from the three subsamples where t 
equals 1978.1979, and 1980.218 firms are represented in the sample of CEO's at least 64 years old. 249 
distinct f Irms are considered In total (since a CEO of one f Irm Pay become 64 years old In our sample 
Period. and thus some firms appear in both age categories). The t-statistics are In parentheses. 




Benston (1985) investigates the self-serving management 
hypothesis by examining the personal financial gains and 
losses achieved and absorbed by senior managers who hold a 
significant amount of shares in their employing company, and 
so gain or lose personal wealth in line with, other 
shareholders. Changes in wealth resulting from changes in 
the value of stock holdings amount to as much as five times 
the value of the other forms of remuneration. This 
corroborates the finding of Lewellen (1971), and is 
inconsistent with the self-serving management hypothesis: 
"unless one subscribes to a rather peculiar version of this 
hypothesis - i. e., that such is the desire to govern huge 
groups that a manager is willing to make a monetary loss for 
this psychic gain", Benston (1985, p. 82). This lends support 
to the notion that executives are rewarded/punished for 
taking action that benefits/harms their shareholders. 
Some Difficulties 
There are several fundamental difficulties with the 
empirical studies discussed above (see Kerr and Bettis, 
1987). First, "all three studies erroneously measure a CEO's 
compensation as the sum of salary payments and bonus awards 
distributed in a given year" (p. 648). The aim of including 
the salary element is to reflect the extent of experience 
and performance required to fulfil an executive function at 
a particular level in the organisation. In order to align 
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effectively the salary component to the performance value of 
the firm it would need to be renegotiated on the basis of 
past performance, whereas bonus awards are designed to 
compensate the executive on the basis of recent (year-end 
(t)) corporate performance. Both Benston (1985) and 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) lump salary and bonus into a 
single figure thus obscuring the performance-reward 
relationship. 
Second, the empirical studies involve an inconsistent 
definition of stock performance. Benston (1985) used raw 
stock returns; Murphy (1985) used raw returns and returns 
adjusted for risk classes; and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) 
used returns adjusted for overall market performance. The 
last two studies used "definitions of abnormal returns 
(which] are based on entirely different constructs and are 
virtually nonconparable" (Kerr and Bettis 1987, p. 648). This 
inconsistency is highlighted by the contrast between the 
findings: in Murphy (1985) there is a positive relationship 
between performance and compensation; Benston (1985) has no 
relationship; and Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) established- 
only a weak relationship between annual compensation and 
firm performance. 
A third major problem concerns the relationship between 
executive compensation and firm size. The evidence (see for 
example Fox 1982) indicates that the compensation of top 
management is positively related to firm size. High 
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compensation for the management of large firms may be 
necessary because managing those firms involves more complex 
and demanding tasks. Organisations will try to maintain pay 
differentials between levels of management: therefore top 
executives in larger firms will receive higher compensation 
as the number of layers of bureaucracy increase, Simon 
(1957). This is consistent with both "Span of Control" 
theory and the strong correlation between firm size and the 
number of executive levels, Blau (1970), Child (1973). 
Both Murphy (1985) and Coughlan & Schmidt (1985), report 
a positive relation between changes in executive 
compensation and the real rate of growth of firm sales. An 
explanation of this finding can be given in terms of the 
following argument. It is not appropriate to base 
remuneration exclusively on stock performance because of the 
existence of windfall gains and losses caused by factors 
outside the executive's control. The inclusion of sales 
growth as an additional determinant of executive 
compensation allows firms to reward executives on the basis 
of a perhaps less imperfect measure of managerial effort.. 
This line of reasoning finds some support in the empirical 
findings of Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), where both stock* 
price performance and sales growth have significant effects 
on executive compensation. 
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6.3 THE RELATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE TURNOVER AND CORPORATE 
PERFORMANCE 
The extent to which executive compensation contracts 
overcome the principal-agent dilemma may be examined further 
by investigating the relationship between executive turnover 
and corporate performance. If boards of directors discipline 
managers for actions or results that reduce shareholder 
utility, stock price performance can trigger changes in 
management. The expectation is that poor performance will 
increase the probability that top managers lose their jobs. 
Attempts to identify such a relationship empirically, 
however, are likely to be complicated by several factors. 
There exist many possible reasons for a change in top 
management : successful executives may move to more 
lucrative positions in other firms; normal retirement; 
death, and so on. Furthermore, poor performance can arise 
from a variety of causes, many of which do not reflect 
incompetence on the part of top management and, therefore, 
should not warrant dismissal. Moreover, even if a board of 
directors is convinced that an executive is in some way 
responsible for poor stock performance, it may not effect a 
change in management within the performance year, because 
replacing an executive requires considerable deliberation. 
These problems aside, some negative relationship between 
executive turnover and corporate performance should still 
exist. Indeed, both Coughlan & Schmidt (1985) and Benston 
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(1985) report results consistent with this hypothesis. In a 
logit regression using executive turnover as the discrete 
dependent variable, Coughlan & Schmidt find that an 
executive whose firm is ranked in the bottom one percent of 
the distribution of abnormal stock returns is seven times 
more likely to leave the firm than an executive employed by 
a firm in the top percentile (see Table 3). In a similar 
regression for executives aged 64 and over, the relationship 
is insignificant, reflecting problems of mandatory 
retirement. Benston (1985) compares the geometric mean of 
share price returns in the year an executive leaves his 
present employment and the two previous years with similarly 
measured returns for the other conglomerates in his sample. 
He found that executives tend to leave after their 
shareholders experience significantly greater losses than 
ýhose experienced in the conglomerates where the senior 
management did not change -a result consistent with the 
hypothesis that poor performance increases the likelihood 




rank in Cumulative Probability 
stock return residual of CEO 
distribution for year t turnover 
1% -0.807 0.213 
10% -0.377 0.126 
20% -0.231 0.105 
50% 0.000 0.077 
80% 0.209 0.058 
90% 0.317 0.050 
99% 0.655 0.031 
Probability of management change by stock price performance for AGE - 57 and a zero percentage difference 
between actual and estimated compensation In year t[ estimated probabilities are obtained from logit 
regressions with AGE . 64]. For example, a 57-year-old CEO who is paid what Is predicted by the model 
and who Is in the bottom first percentile of the stock return distribution in the sample faces a 21.3 
percent chance of leaving the company In the next year. 
From table 5, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985). "Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm 
Perfomance*. 
6.4 STOCK PRICE REACTION TO EXECUTIVE CONTRACT CHANGES 
The studies discussed in section II of this chapter 
provide evidence that compensation is contingent on 
performance. It is, however, very difficult to infer from 
these studies the direction of causality : is the change in 
firm performance caused by changes in management. 
compensation or vice-versa? 
Two major studies in this area have produced evidence 
which appears to support the hypothesis that causality runs 
from changes in compensation plans to firm performance. 
Brickley, Bhagat & Lease(1985) and Tehranian & Waegelain 
(1985) both examine stock price performance at the time 
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firms adopt management incentive plans, the former dealing 
with 175 long-term plans adopted between 1979 - 1982, the 
latter with 42 short-term plans adopted between 1971 - 1980. 
The results suggest a positive stock price reaction to 
incentive plan adoption (see Table 4). For the 83 firms for 
whom suitable data was available, Brickley et al estimate an 
average abnormal stock performance of plus 2.4% in the 
period from the initial approval of the board of directors 
through to the day after Stock Exchange Commission (S. E. C. ) 
approval of the plans. They also report a plus 1% abnormal 
stock performance during the period of two days from the 
S. E. C. stamp date to the subsequent shareholder's meeting. 
Tehranian & Waegelain find stronger evidence of abnormal 
performance during the period of seven months prior to the 
proxy statement date. They report a cumulative abnormal 
stock price performance of plus 22.3%. A plausible reason 
for the strength of this result compared to that of Brickley 
et al, is that the former considered only new plans, whereas 
the latter also considered changes in existing plans which 




Sample abnormal stock 
Paper size Observation period price performance Z-value 
Brickley. Bhagat 83 Board meeting date 2.41% 2.18 
and Lease through day after 
receipt of proxy 
statement by the 
Securities and Ex- 
change Commission 
(mean length - 
58.4 trading days) 
Two days after the 1.0% 1.09 
SEC stamp date 
through the shareholders 
meeting date 
(mean length - 
22.3 trading days) 
Tehranian and 42 Months -3 through 0 11.3% 3.03 
Waegelein relative to proxy 
statement date 
Months -7 though -4 11.0% 4.32 
relative to proxy 
statement date 
Summary of stock price performance around the time of management incentive plan adoption. 
From table 5. Brickley. Bhagat and Lease (1985). OThe Impact of Long-range Managerial Compensation Plans 
on Shareholder Wealth'. 
From table 1, Tehranian and Waegelein (1985). 'Market Reaction to Short-term Executive Compensation Plan 
Adoption". 
There are, however, problems of interpretation with 
these two studies do the results really lend support to 
the hypothesis that executive compensation contracts help 
align managerial and shareholder interests? There are at 
least three reasons why the adoption or modification of an 
incentive plan may be associated with a positive reaction in 
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the share price. The first is that compensation plans have 
incentive effects and so help produce a symbiosis between 
managerial and shareholder interests. In a second scenario, 
however, managers are instrumental in instigating the 
introduction of compensation plans when they believe that 
the share price is going to increase for reasons which have 
nothing to do with incentive effects: they may, for example, 
have obtained some kind of insider knowledge to the effect 
that share price is undervalued and compensation schemes are 
used as a device to signal this to the market. This implies 
that compensation packages do not improve performance but 
rather the reverse: improved performance encourages the 
adoption of compensation plans, thus increasing pay, with no 
corresponding increase in managerial effort - managers hang 
on the coat-tails of successful companies. In a third 
scenario the positive share price effect is associated more 
with tax than incentive effects. In our discussion in the 
preceding chapter we attempted unsuccessfully to distinguish 
between tax and incentive effects, although it is by no 
means clear that tax effects can explain the whole of the. 
share price reaction : one investigator, for example, felt 
"uneasy about attributing a large positive stock price 
effect solely to tax effects" because not all plans are tax 
advantageous, and suggests that "better data would allow us 
to partition the samples according to the expected sign of 
tax effects, and to estimate a priori the magnitudes of the 
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implied stock price reaction" (Warner 1985, p. 147). 
In an attempt to discriminate between the incentive and 
signalling hypotheses, Bhagat, Brickley and Lease (1985) 
examined the stock market reaction to stock purchase plans. 
These plans fall into compensation categories which Miller & 
Scholes (1982) argue do not have tax advantages and may 
therefore be assumed to have been adopted for either 
incentive or signalling reasons. Their results suggest that 
compensation schemes have a positive effect on shareholder 
wealth for reasons other than tax reduction. They report a 
cumulative return on the firm's common stock of plus 5.47% 
between days -20 and +20 relative to the announcement of the 
plans in proxy statements. 
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Table 5 
Event day Mean return (%) Cunulative return 
-20 0.09 0.09 
-19 -0.26 -0.17 
-18 -0.38 -0.55 
-17 -0.72 -1.27 
-16 -0.51 -1.78 
-15 -0.06 -1.84 
-14 -0.45 -2.29 
-13 -0.23 -2.52 
-12 0.12 -2.40 
-11 1.16 -1.24 
-10 0.46 -0.75 
-9 0.67 -0.09 
-8 0.13 0.05 
-7 -0.07 -0.03 
-6 0.41 0.38 
-5 0.34 0.72 
-4 0.59 1.31 
-3 0.32 1.63 
-2 -0.83 0.80 
-1 0.53 1.33 
0 1.81 3.13 
1 1.62 4.75 
2 -0.01 4.74 
3 -0.04 4.70 
4 -0.23 4.47 
5 -0.74 3.73 
6 -1.04 2.69 
7 0.39 3.08 
8 0.67 3.75 
9 0.64 4.39 
10 -0.18 4.21 
11 0.43 4.64 
12 0.24 4.88 
13 0.42 4.45 
14 0.67 5.12 
15 -0.05 5.07 
16 -0.84 4.23 
17 0.75 4.98 
18 0.63 5.61 
19 0.01 5.62 
20 -0.14 5.47 
Commn stock rates of return over 41 - trading-day period around the proxy mail ing date for the 19 stock 
purchase plans over the period 1970 through 1982. From table 4. Bhagat. Brickley and Lease (1985). 
'Incentive Effects of Stock Purchase Plans% 
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This positive market reaction to stock purchase plans 
could arise from incentive or signalling reasons. Once 
again, however, distinguishing between the two explanations 
is difficult because the major predictions of each 
hypothesis are virtually equivalent. Nevertheless, Bhagat, 
Brickely and Lease argue that three types of evidence 
provide "at least weak support that incentive effects are 
present in stock purchase plans above and beyond any pure 
signalling effects" (Bhagat et al, 1985, p. 207). The first 
concerns the stated motive for the adoption of compensation 
plans: they find that in 17 out of the 19 cases examined the 
board stated that the plan adopted was designed to improve 
managerial incentives. The second type of evidence involves 
the stock purchase plans of privately-held firms. While a 
privately-held firm may wish to signal profit potential to 
its creditors, it is unlikely to wish to transmit such a 
signal to the stock market in general. The finding is that 
stock purchase plans exist in 21.2% of their sample of 
privately-held companies: the mere existence of such a 
sizeable proportion is seen as providing evidence of 
incentive effects, given the relative infrequency of stock 
purchase plans among listed companies. The third type of 
evidence is derived from a re-estimation of Cone's (1984) 
model of financial signalling: the Cone model predicts that 
management will only find it profitable to signal after a 
period of poor performance when they are in danger of losing 
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their job. The finding is that there is no significant 
deterioration in performance evident in the period prior to 
the announcement of the plans. In view of Tehranian and 
Waegelein's observation that firms tend to adopt plans after 
a period of good performance, however, this finding does not 
constitute decisive evidence of the presence of incentive 
effects. 
Two Remaininq Problems 
There are at least two further problems which arise in 
testing stock market reaction to the adoption of 
compensation schemes. A first is that the introduction of 
compensation plans is often closely preceeded or followed by 
the release of information regarding profits and basic 
salaries this raises the distinct possibility that 
improved performance may be attributed to incentive plans 
when it is in fact due to the announcement of increased 
profits or basic salaries. The papers discussed above do not 
address this problem. Controlling for such factors is 
clearly important to our understanding of the extent to 
which higher stock prices lead to plan adoption or 
vice-versa. 
A second problem concerns the type of compensation 
package adopted. If incentive effects are important, we 
would expect that certain packages, those which have a 
longer time dimension for example, should dominate others in 
the sense that they have, and are perceived to have, more 
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potent effects on incentives. Brickley, Bhagat and Lease 
(1985), however, find no appreciable difference in stock 
market reaction to different packages. The absence of any 
noticeable difference in share price reaction to different 
packages obviously raises doubt as to the importance of 
incentive effects. 
6.5 STRATEGIC DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PACKAGES 
In the literature dealt with so far in this chapter no 
attempt is made to explain the precise characteristics of 
executive compensation contracts. It is implicitly 
assumed that a compensation scheme which is "optimal" in 
view of the firm's environment has been implemented. There 
is no discussion of why a specific scheme might be the best 
motivational device for a given environment, or of why the 
specifications of "optimal" contracts might differ- across 
firms and industries. 
. 
Berg (1969,1973) suggests that differences in the 
design of reward systems reflect differences in the level of. 
autonomy granted to the divisions of conglomerates or large 
diversified firms. Subsequent research (Lorsch -& Allen, 
1973; Pitts, 1974; Salter, 1973) revealed that the more 
diversified a company, the higher the probability that 
managers would be rewarded on the basis of objective or 
quantitative measures of performance rather than on the 
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basis of subjective or qualitative criteria. Furthermore, 
the quantitative measures of performance used tend to be 
based on the results of the operating unit and not the 
corporation as a whole. The key factor underlying these 
variations was the degree of autonomy greater 
diversification meant greater divisional independence, which 
necessitated different reward strategies. These studies, 
however, consider only two diversification strategies at a 
time. 
F The most comprehensive study in this area is that of 
Kerr (1985), who deals with a wide range of diversification 
strategies and reward systems. He classifies firms according 
to two stylisations of diversification: Rumelt's (1974, 
1977) typology of diversification; and the process by which 
diversification is achieved (Pitts, 1974; Leontiades, 1980). 
The Rumelt classification deals with product type 
(single-product, dominant-product, related-product, 
unrelated-product), and with the pattern of linkages between 
units (vertical, constrained, linked, multi-business, 
portfolio). A major problem with this classification scheme 
is that it is essentially static. Leontiades (1980) attempts 
to deal with this problem by distinguishing between 
steady-state and evolutionary strategies, a distinction that 
rests on differences in the process of diversification. 
Evolutionary firms are externally oriented, growing 
primarily through acquisitive diversification, and are 
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diversification, and are active prospectors of new markets. 
In contrast steady-state firms are internally orientated, 
growing through increasing penetration of existing markets, 
or by way of internally generated diversification. 
The Kerr classification of compensation schemes was 
obtained by interview-derived information on 35 aspects of 
reward systems (see Table 6). From this information Kerr 
distinguished three basic types of reward system. Companies 
of the first type employ a "hierarchy-based" system : 
evaluation depends on the perceptions and evaluations of 
superiors, the distribution of rewards being based on the 
position in the hierarchy. Performance is defined in terms 
of subjective, qualitative measures; potential bonuses are 
determined by corporate performance and position within the 
hierarchy; salary increments are based on performance and 
length of tenure; share awards are made only to those in 
executive grades. Companies in the second type employ a 
"performance-based" reward system: performance and rewards 
are highly linked in these firms. Bonuses are based almost 
entirely on performance of the manager's operational unit; 
salary increments and share awards are determined on the 
basis of objective, quantitative measures of performance. 
Finally, Kerr identifies a "mixed" system which falls 
between the two polar extremes: for some purposes firms 
evaluate performance objectively, for other purposes 
subjective means of evaluation are employed. (For a 
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comprehenvive description of each cluster see Kerr (1985)). 
Table 6 
1. Quantitative vs. qualitative performance criteria 
2. Subjective vs. objective weighting of performance criteria 
3. Linkage between specific criteria and specific rewards 
4. Current vs. future-oriented performance criteria 
5. Operating vs. financial performance criteria 
6. Performance defined by strategic mission 
7. Subjective vs. objective performance evaluation 
8. Who carries out evaluation process? 
9. Time frame of evaluation process 
10. Frequency of formal feedback sessions 
11. Dependency on superior-subordinate interaction 
13. Evaluative vs. developmental emphasis in feedback process 
14. Basis for inclusion in bonus plan 
15. Major determinants of bonus amount (in order of importance) 
16. Bonus determination process (objectivity) 
17. Potential range of bonus as % of salary 
18. Basis of bonus pool (corporate vs. division performance) 
19. Major determinants of salary increase amount (in order of importance) 
20. Determination of salary increase amount (objectivity) 
21. Potential range of salary increase as a A; of salary 
22. Actual range of increases in use as % of salary 
23. Basis for inclusion in stock plan(s) 
24. Major determinants of potential stock award amounts 
25. Major determinants of actual stock award amounts (in order of Importance) 
26. Determination of stock award amounts (objectivity) 
27. Potential range of stock award as a% of salary 
28. Time frame for payout of stock awards 
29. Degree of enforcement of perquisite system 
30. Emphasis on status differences as expressed in the perquisite system 
31. Primary motive for promotion or transfer 
32. Primary determinants of promotion or transfer 
33. General frequency of promotion or transfer 
34. Promotion norm 1: promotion from within 
35. Promotion norm 2: cross-divisional or cross-functional movement 
Variables Examined In Stuctured Interviews 
From table 2. Kerr (1985). "Diversification Strategies and Managerial Rewards : An Empirical Study". 
The central conclusion to emerge from Kerr's analysis 
was that the difference in reward systems could not be 
explained by reference to Rumelt's typology of 
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diversification or pattern of linkage, but could be 
explained by the steady-state / evolutionary classification 
of diversification used by Leontiades (See Table 7). 
"Hierarchy-based" reward systems were employed primarily by 
firms whose expansion paths involved growth in current areas 
of activity or through internally generated diversification 
ie. in firms of the "steady-state" types. 
"Performance-based" reward systems were used by firms 
pursuing growth through acquisitions and mergers, ie. in 
firms of the "evolutionary" type. "Mixed" reward systems 
were used by two types of firm: the first were in transition 
state regarding level of diversification; the second were 
attempting to manage a highly diversified set of activities. 
Kerr (1985) concludes that "the process by which 
diversification had been achieved was a greater influence on 
the design of managerial reward systems than was the 




Cluster A Cluster 8 Cluster C 
(Hierarchy-based) (Performance-based) (Mixed-System) 
Allied SGL/VER/SS Home DOM/LIK/EV Alaska DOM/PFO/EV 
Intern. SGL/VER/SS Jones REL/CON/SS Smith DOM/LINK/EV 
Kelly DON/CON/SS Alpha UNR/MUL/EV Most DOM/CON/SS 
NaChem REL/CON/SS Consol UNR/MUL/EV Kasper UNR/MUL/SS 
World REL/LNK/SS General UNR/MUL/EV PMI UNR/MUL/SS 
Best REL/CON/SS Leisur UNR/MUL/EV 
Companies by Cluster and Strategy Clasifications 
From table 5, Kerr (1985), Diversification Strategies and Managerial Rewards : An Empirical Study 
A further distinction is drawn by Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and 
Hinkin (1987) and concerns the distinction between 
owner-controlled and management-controlled firms. The 
central argument is that executive pay is more responsive to 
performance in owner-controlled firms with a dominant 
stockholder. This has important implications for the studies 
analysed in section II of this chapter, suggesting that the 
structure of ownership is an important determinant of the 
relationship between pay and performance. When ownership is 
spread across a wide number of stockholders, power of 
shareholders to control managers can become diluted. 
Consequently, managers can have more freedom to place their 
own interests above those of shareholders when designing 
compensation systems. Gomez-Mejia et al present evidence 
that management-controlled firms are more likely to display 
risk-aversion and use scale as a major determinant of 
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managerial compensation, whereas the 
compensation-performance link is stronger in companies with 
dominant stockholders. 
They established the importance of ownership structure 
by analysing survey data from Business Week (1980-83) on 71 
American firms, randomly selected from the largest 400 
manufacturing firms for the years 1979 to 1982. Only 
performance was statistically significant as a explanatory 
variable for the compensation measures in the "owner - 
controlled" group. In the "management-controlled" group, on 
the other hand, sales was the only significant explanatory 
variable for base salaries, and the main source of variation 
in bonuses and total compensation - although performance did 
have a significant effect on long-term compensation. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
The first attempts at a comprehensive empirical 
assessment of the relationship between corporate performance 
and managerial remuneration packages have emerged in recent 
years. Taken at face value, the studies suggest a positive 
and significant relationship between pay and performance; a 
negative relationship between performance and executive 
turnover; a positive stock market reaction to the 
announcement of executive contract changes; and that 
diversification strategies and ownership structure are 
important determinants of compensation packages; and so on. 
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Virtually all the studies, however, are plagued by 
difficulties of interpretation. A central problem here is 
the issue of causality: do the compensation packages 
employed provide the appropriate managerial incentives for 
greater effort, and thus generate an improvement in 
corporate performance? ; or does causality work in the 
opposite direction, improvements in corporate performance 
arising from reasons independent of managerial. effort 
leading self-serving managers to arrogate higher levels of 
compensation to themselves? The available empirical evidence 
does not permit a conclusive answer to the question. Like 
sighting of the Yeti, incentive effects arising from 




PART III. EXTERMAL ASPECTS : MARKET STRATEGY. 
Chapter 7 
THE STRUCTURE - CONDUCT - PERFORMANCE APPROACH 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The way in which the external environment affects the 
competitiveness of a business has been the chief concern of 
structure - conduct - performance (SCP) models. The essence 
of this approach is to establish causal links between 
structure, conduct and performance: how do different 
structural characteristics, determined by exogenous basic 
conditions, lead to the adoption of different strategies 
which can allow a firm to gain a competitive edge over its 
rivals? 
The SCP approach has been enormously influential in the 
analysis of industry throughout the world, probably because 
it was arguably the first formal model to integrate four 
separate disciplines - organisational theory, ' industrial 
economics, business strategy and finance - yet requires no 
more than the standard devices of neoclassical microeconomic 
theory. Furthermore, policy prescriptions are arrived at 
using the only widely acceptable criteria, the Pareto 
optimality criteria. 
Nevertheless, the SCP approach has received considerable 
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criticism. In particular, people have suggested that the 
relationships between structure# conduct and performance are 
more complex than originally envisaged and others have 
disputed the relevance of neoclassical microeconomics to the 
study of industry. The basic objection is that the SCP 
approach gives too limited a perspective on the operations 
of markets. These criticisms are certainly justified insofar 
as they relate to the simplistic exposition of the approach 
given most attention in the literature. In defense, it could 
be said that the SCP approach has provided a framework 
within which to examine more complicated relationships. 
The rest of this chapter will examine the basic 
relationships underlying the SCP paradigm and the evolution 
of this approach, the criticisms of this framework and how 
the traditional exposition can be extended. 
7.2. THE STRUCTURE - CONDUCT - PERFORMMCE PARADIGM 
The SCP paradigm suggests that exogenous basic 
conditions determine market structure and that there is a 
unidirectional flow of causation from structure via conduct- 
to performance. 
The linkage between structure, conduct and performance 
turns to the question of "matching" the structural 
characteristics against models of perfect competition, 
monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly. The broad 
descriptive model of these relationships was first conceived 
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by Edward S. Mason at Harvard during the 1930's and has been 
extended by numerous scholars (Bain, 1951t 1956,1968; 
Bloch, 1974; Brozen, 1970,1971; Caves, 1972; Clark, 1961; 
Comanor and Wilson, 1974; Demsetz, 1973,1974; Mann, 1966; 
Qualls, 1974; Peltzman, 1977; Schmalensee, 1972; Weiss, 
1974). Mason's seminal work provided a challenge to those 
interested in problems of public policy. He argued that "if 
economics is to put itself in a position to contribute to 
the formulation of public policy, .... it must conceive the 
monopoly problem in a more intensive way than is at present 
customary. It is not enough to find evidence of the 
existence of market controls, nor is it sufficient to 
conduct purely analytical and descriptive studies of various 
types of control situations. While this is important, the 
formulation of public policy requires a distinction between 
situations and practices which are in the public interest 
and those which are not .... A further study of different 
types of industrial markets and business practices and of 
the effects on prices, outputs, investment and employment 
designed to indicate means of distinguishing between 
socially desirable and undesirable situations ... is ... the 
only way in which economics can contribute directly to the 
shaping of public policy. " (Mason 1937, p. 49) 
The policy implications, which need not detain us here, 
"sparked off new efforts to understand and analyse economic 
activities that did not conform very well to the models of 
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the market then available and to develop a larger body of 
factual knowledge about industry and markets" (McKie 1970, 
p. 3). The "different types of market" incorporated in 
Mason's original research came to be classified within the 
general heading of market structure; "business practices" 
were specified under the caption market conduct; and the 
"effect on price, outputs" and so forth, were placed under 
the umbrella of market performance. 
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The simplest version of the SCP framework is revealed in 



















Number of Sellers and Buyers 
Product Differentiation 






Product Strategy and Advertising 




Production and Allocation Efficiency 
Technical Full Employment 
Equity 
157 
Market Structure is determined by the basic conditions 
prevailing in the environment in which the firm is to be 
located. On the supply-side, basic conditions include the 
location and ownership of essential raw materials; the 
character of the available technology; the degree of work 
force unionisation; the durability of the product; the time 
pattern of production (whether goods are produced to order 
or delivered from inventory); the legal, ethical and 
political framework within which business activity takes 
place; and so on. On the demand-side, basic conditions 
include price elasticity of demand; availability of (and 
cross elasticity of demand for) substitutes; the trend of 
market growth; cyclical and seasonal aspects; purchasing 
habits of customers; and marketing characteristics of the 
product sold. 
These characteristics will determine the number and size 
distribution of sellers and buyers (ie. the degree of 
concentration); the extent of differentiation among 
competing products; the presence or absence of barriers to 
entry facing potential entrants; the degree to which firms 
are vertically integrated from raw material production to 
retail distribution. 
In turn the external structure of the environment in 
which the firm operates will influence the choice of 
corporate strategies. Conventionally one looks at: how price 
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is set; the way in which the volume, quality and the range 
of products are determined; advertising and marketing 
strategies; research and development planning and 
implementation; and legal tactics. 
The choice of strategy will ultimately determine the 
performance of the company. Performance is obviously an 
elusive concept and depends in part on the task in hand. A 
typical list of performance measures includes allocative 
efficiency, X-efficiency, rate of return on equity, 
employment creation, technological progressiveness and 
quality of output. For our purposes, to assess firm 
competitiveness, we would look at the divergence of the 
firm's rate of profit from the industry average. 
Even this cursory glimpse of the SCP framework reveals 
the potential richness of the approach. However, much of the 
early literature confined itself to a very limited number of 
variables, and was firmly grounded in the neoclassical 
tradition. 
7.3 MARKET STRUCTURE 
The structure of a market can be described by 
considering the number of firms, the extent of product 
differentiation, entry conditions, and the degree of 
integration. Typically, the only structural characteristic 
considered, or at least the one to receive the greatest 
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attention, has been the degree of concentration with respect 
to sellers. Concentration of sellers concerns the extent to 
which an economic activity is confined to a few large firms. 
Where a single firm has obtained a major share of the total 
market, it is faced by a downward sloping demand curve, 
opening up the possibility of acquiring above normal profits 
by charging the price for a specific good or service which 
equates marginal revenue and marginal cost but lies above 
average cost. The smaller the number of firms and / or the 
moree disparate their sizes, the more concentrated and less 
competitive the market. "The hypothesis in brief is that the 
average profit rate of firms in oligopolistic industries of 
a high concentration will tend to be significantly larger 
than that of firms in less concentrated oligopolies or in 
industries of atomistic structure" (Bain 1951, p. 294). 
A simple way of expressing this hypothesis is by a 
relationship of the form 
r= f(C, e) fl> 0 
where r=n/K, u being profit and Ka measure of capital. 
C is a measure of concentration, which will be discussed in. 
the next sub-section; and e is an error term covering a host 
of unmeasured and or random influences. An interesting 
feature of this hypothesis, the structure-performance 
relationship, is the deliberate and significant omission of 
the "conduct" term. If C is a benchmark measure of 
concentration relevant to some welfare ideal, then r-=f(C)- 
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is a benchmark rate of profit. Typically 0<C<1 is a 
property of a concentration index, and C0 being the 
atomistic competition value of the index, and C1 being 
its value under monopoly. Thus r- = f(O) is a possibility, 
implying that f(O) 0. The argument embodied in the 
equation r f(C) is as follows. First, concentration 
causally determines profitability. This is expressed by 
choosing r as the dependent variable and C as the 
independent variable. Second, concentration above the 
benchmark level (C >C-) raises profitability above the 
benchmark level (r >r-). Formally, profitability is 
increasing in concentration (dr/dC > 0). 
7.4 CONDUCT 
No account has been taken in this simple framework 
however, of conduct. It was left to Cowling (1976) and 
Scherer (1980) to argue that explicit behavioural 
assumptions should be adopted. In principle a multitude of 
strategies are open to a firm, but more often than not , 
conduct is assumed to take a simple form such as profit 
maximisation. A number of profit maximisation models have 
been examined in line with standard neoclassical analvsis. 
In what follows we shall discuss a few such models, which 
fall naturally into two categories : one in which firms do 
not collude; and the other in which they do. 
Both the Cournot and Stackelberg models fall into the 
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former category and have much in common. Both apply to a 
situation in which firms play a game in which they must 
choose the level of output to produce a variant on the 
game would be to choose the price level, as in the Bertrand 
model). The payoffs from the game are profits, which depend 
upon the choice of strategy of the other players. 
The Cournot model assumes that each firm acts on the 
assumption that its competitors will not change their output 
decision in response to the other firms choice of output. 
Thus they choose their output level so as to maximise 
profits. Equilibrium is achieved when no single- player can 
improve his payoff by adopting a different strategy given 
the choice of strategy of his rivals. In the case of 
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A's reaction function is traced out by the highest point on 
its isoprofit curves (I. X, I. 2... ). An isoprofit curve for 
firm A is the locus of points defined by different levels of 
output of A and rival B which yield to A the same level of 
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profit. Thus each reaction function shows the profit 
maximising level of output for the firm given the choice of 
output of its competitor. Cournot's equilibrium is 
determined by the intersection of the two reaction curves. 
To see this, suppose A decides to produce quantity Am. Firm 
B will react by producing Bx, given the Cournot assumption 
that firm A will keep its quantity fixed at Am. However, A 
reacts by producing a higher quantity A2 on the assumption B 
will stay at level Bx. Now firm B reacts by reducing its 
quantity to B2. This adjustment will continue until point E 
is reached. 
Note, however, that while at E each firm is maximising 
its own profits, industry profits (joint profits) are not 
maximised. In fact both firms could achieve higher profits 
if they ceased to act independently (see later models of 
collusive behaviour). This can be seen from a curve similar 
to Edgeworth's contract curve which traces out points of 
tangency of the two firms isoprofit curves. 
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Points on the contract curve a-b are optimal in that they 
imply higher profits for either one or both firms, that is, 
higher industry profits. The reason the suboptimal point E 
is chosen is that the Cournot pattern of behaviour implies 
that firms do not learn from past experience: neither firm 
realises that the other firm behaves on the same assumption. 
In the Stackelberg model it is assumed that one 
duopolist is sufficiently sophisticated to recognise that 
his competitor acts on the Cournot assumption. This allows 
the sophisticated duopolist to determine the reaction curve 
of his rival and incorporate it in his profit maximising 
decision. The Stackelberg conduct assumption yields 
different solutions depending on which firm acts as leader. 
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If A is the sophisticated oligopolist, then he will choose 
to produce at point "a" which is the maximum profit he can 
achieve given B's reaction curve: profits are greater, the 
closer the isoprofit curve to the firms' respective axes. 
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This is where one of A's isoprofit curves is just tangent to 
B's reaction function. Conversely, if B is the sophisticated 
oligopolist, equilibrium will be achieved at point b which 
represents the highest level of profit B can achieve given 
A's reaction function. Note that in the Stackelberg model 
the sophisticated player is better-off, and the naive player 
worse-off, compared with the Cournot equilibrium. if, 
however, both firms are sophisticated the market situation 
becomes unstable: the result will either be a price war, 
until one of the firms surrenders and agrees to act as 
follower; or collusion with both firms abandoning their 
naive reaction curves yielding higher profits. 
one type of collusive behaviour would be to form a 
cartel aimed at maximising joint profits. The firms appoint 
a central agency, to which they delegate the authority to 
decide not only the total quantity and the price at which to 
sell, but also the allocation of production among the 
members of the cartel and the distribution of the profits. 
In practice a more common form of collusion is one in 
which firms agree to share the market, because it gives them 
more freedom in determining the style of their output, 
selling activities and other decisions. There are two basic 
methods of sharing the market : non-price competition and 
quotas. In non-price competition, firms agree on a common 
price at which each of them can sell the quantity demanded. 
The price is set by bargaining, with the more 
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cost-competitive firms pressing for lower prices. The second 
method of sharing the market is to agree on quotas, that is 
the amount each member may sell at an agreed price. If all 
firms had the same cost structures, equilibrium would be 
achieved with the market being shared equally among member 
firms. Since this is rarely the case quota-shares are 
determined by bargaining. The final quota of each firm will 
depend on the level of its costs as well as on its 
bargaining skills. 
Cartels are, however, inherently unstable, because of 
the uncertainty surrounding the behaviour of new entrants. A 
new firm may enter the market. Indeed, if the profits of the 
cartel members are lucrative and attract new firms, the 
newcomer has a strong incentive not to join the cartel, 
because by charging a slightly lower price he can secure a 
considerable share of the market. of course, the cartel can 
either set a price so as to make entry unattractive, or 
threaten a price war if the newcomer undercuts them. 
Nevertheless, the entrant may still survive depending on his 
cost advantage and financial strength. 
Another form of collusion is price leadership. one firm 
sets the price and the others follow, either because it is 
advantageous for them to do so, or because this reduces 
uncertainty about their competitors' reactions, even if it 
means diverging from profit maximisation. In most cases such 
behaviour is tacit because it is illegal in most countries. 
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Price leadership is more common than cartels, because it 
allows complete freedom regarding production and selling 
activities. It tends to take one of three forms : the leader 
can be the firm with the lowest costs, the largest 
(dominant) firm in the industry, or the firm which has the 
best knowledge of prevailing conditions in the market and is 
most able to forecast future developments (the barometric 
firm). The case of the dominant - firm price leader can be 
examined in the following diagram. 
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It is assumed that the dominant firm knows the market demand 
schedule DD and also the MC curves of the smaller firms 
which it can add horizontally to find the total supply by 
the small firms at each price. From this the dominant firm 
can work out its own demand schedule which will be that part 
of total demand not supplied by the small firms. For 
example, at price P, demand for the leader's product will be 
zero, because the total quantity demanded Dx is supplied by 
the smaller firms. As the price falls below P, the demand 
167 
for the leader's product increases. Given this demand curve 
and his MC curve the dominant firm will set the price at 
which MR=MC and his output is OX, that is price P and he 
will supply BC=OX and the smaller firms will supply PB. 
Of course, there are many more conduct assumptions which may 
be examined. Above we have outlined but a few. Nevertheless, 
despite Cowling's (1976) extension to take explicit account 
of conduct, the SCP framework has come under criticism on 
several accounts. 
7.5 CRITICISMS OF THE TRADITIONAL SCP PARADIGM 
Two of the more popular criticisms of the SCP approach 
concern the limited number of variables considered, the 
restrictive nature of the conduct assumptions, and the issue 
of causality. 
In its traditional form the SCP approach assumes that 
basic exogenous conditions determine the degree of 
concentration in an industry: given a particular choice of 
strategy, the higher the level of concentration, the more 
profitable the business. Concentration, however, is not the 
only element of structure. 
STRUCTURE 
The effects of concentration of sellers, and collusion 
between oligopolists, depends upon existence of barriers to 
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entry. Bain (1956) suggests that the relevant ease with 
which a potential entrant can enter a given industry will 
affect the rate of profit within that industry. The height 
of the entry barrier determines the magnitude of profits. 
The higher the barrier to entry, the higher the "price - 
cost" margin, which is defined by Bain as : "the extent to 
which, in the long run, established firms can elevate their 
selling price above the minimal average costs of production 
and distribution without inducing potential entrants to 
enter (an] industry" (1968,, p. 252). Bain (1956) identifies 
three sources of barriers to entry. First, the dominant 
firm's unit costs may be lower because of scale economies in 
production, purchasing, capital raising, physical 
distribution, or advertising not attainable by smaller 
rivals. Therefore, the proportion of output of the industry 
which a potential entrant must supply in order to be 
reasonably efficient may constitute a barrier. Second, 
product differentiation barriers may exist because of 
long-established preferences of buyers for existing products 
- consumer loyalty : the problem is one of enticing away. 
customers who are to some extent loyal to incumbent firms. 
Third, incumbent firms might have an absolute cost advantage 
over potential entrants in terms of lower input prices, 
operating at points on technology learning curves, and so 
on. In the absence of high entry barriers, the prices which 
can be charged by oligopolists will be limited by the 
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likelihood that beyond a certain point new entrants will be 
attracted by excessive profits. By their very nature, the 
impact of barriers to entry on profitability may be expected 
to be non-linear. When entry barriers are not so high as to 
seriously deter entry, no effect may be expected, but when 
they are sufficiently high, seller concentration becomes an 
important factor (see Bain, 1951). (A fuller discussion of 
barriers to entry, and of how the threat of hit and run 
entry can influence a company's monopolistic power, is 
provided in the later chapter on contestable markets). 
Other structural characteristics, as suggested earlier, 
would include the extent of vertical integration. It would 
be assumed that the degree to which a firm can control the 
source of its inputs and the destination of its outputs 
would influence profitability. Similarly, profitability 
would be affected by whether a firm Produces homogeneous or 
differentiated products. 
Omission of these characteristics can'lead to mistaken 
conclusions, for, as Caves and Porter (1978) have argued, 
oligopolistic collusion may break down because exogenous 
variables change the demand or cost conditions. They 
suggest, for instance, that secular growth in industry 
demand, seasonal or cyclical variations in such demand, and 
innovations in products or technology emanating from high 
R&D expenditure can together break collusion, leading to 
price, quality, or promotional competition and instability 
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in market share. 
7.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE CONDUCT ASSUMPTION 
As far as conduct is concerned, two aspects need to be 
discussed. First, even if we assume the firm's aim is to 
maximise profits, the level of output is not the only choice 
variable. For example, the firm must also determine the 
level of advertising and research and development 
expenditure required to achieve this aim. This said, 
however, it is a relatively simple step to give a much more 
general treatment of the profit maximisation problem with 
respect to a whole set of action variables (see Varian, 
1984). 
Nevertheless, this extended version of the neoclassical 
framework still falls far short of generating a full 
repertoire of possible conducts, mainly because it is so 
unconvincing in a behavioural sense. The assumption that 
economic agents possess perfect knowledge of all aspects 
relevant to their decisions has long been rejected by the. 
Austrian and other schools of thought. They prefer to assume 
that knowledge is incomplete. For instance, consumers can be 
aware of their own tastes but may be unaware of all the 
consumption possibilities available. Producers may know the 
costs associated with current processes but may be unaware 
of the costs of alternative production techniques. 
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Likewise,, they could well have a hazy notion of the true 
nature of demand for their product. The critics would argue 
that satisficing and bounded rationality are more 
appropriate assumptions to describe behaviour. 
7.7 PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY 
A third criticism of the SCP paradigm has been that it 
assumes a unidirectional flow of causality from structure 
through conduct to performance. Clearly, reverse causality 
is also possible in many of the relationships. For example, 
an oligopolist might direct his conduct at attempting to 
achieve greater market share, ie. a change in structure. 
This could be achieved by aggressive advertising, harassment 
in courts, or other steps to force rivals out of the market 
and thus promote an increase in concentration. 
Alternatively, research and development outlay can be used 
to change the structure of technology in an industry, and 
hence cost conditions and or the degree of product 
differentiation. 
In defense of the SCP approach, however, few exponents 
of the paradigm claim that the causality is strictly one 
way. The aim is simply to establish the main thrust of 
causation. It is facile to argue that everything determines 
everything else. The objective of model building is to 
identify major causal connections. Nevertheless, with the 
advance of econometric techniques, it would be more 
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convincing if studies were to test explicitly for causality. 
The problem is essentially one of simultaneity. Because each 
relationship is part of a much larger system, estimating one 
relationship (eg. the concentration / profit relationship) 
in isolation produces biased results. This is the well 
known problem of simultaneous equation bias. 
7.8 APPRAISAL 
This chapter has outlined one of the most influential 
approaches to examining the way in which external conditions 
can affect the performance of a business. In its primitive 
form the analysis is a rigid and implausible exposition of 
the factors which affect corporate performance. Proponents 
of the approach have attempted to deflect such criticism by 
amending the component parts of the paradigm in a piecemeal 
manner, but have not succeeded in dispelling doubt about the 
usefulness of the framework as a whole. 
7.9 THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
The task of converting the theoretical concepts of the 
SCP paradigm into empirically testable hypotheses presents 
major difficulties. It is perhaps not surprising that the 
large number of empirical studies of the relationship 
between-market structure and profitability to emerge since 
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Bain's seminal work have triggered a certain amount of 
disputation. In what follows a brief review of the 
literature is provided, though the account is inevitably 
more one of the problems and limitations of the studies in 
question. Nevertheless, the "conventional wisdom" gained 
from the empirical work still seems to suggest that a 
positive relationship between industrial concentration and 
profitability does exist, particularly when concentration 
exceeds some critical limit and when there are substantial 
barriers to entry. 
7.10 A GENERAL MODEL 
The most general formulation, more or less common to all 
studies of the SCP paradigm holds that: 
Tr =f (C, B, OS, D) 
profit is some function of market concentration, C, a set of 
entry barriers, B, a set of other structure variables, OS, 
and D denotes the level (or rate of change) in market. 
demand. 
A wide set of possibilities, however, arise from this 
framework. As Scherer (1980) points out, "market structure, 
as characterized by the concentration ratio may not be a 
true independent variable. It may itself be influenced by 
the pricing polices sellers choose, taking into account 
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entry barriers" (p. 268). Not only may profit be a function 
of concentration, but conversely concentration may itself be 
a function of profit. This leads Scherer to conclude that 
"some means of capturing the simultaneous working of [the] 
relationships .... must be found, especially when n variable 
is defined, as it was in Bain's original study, over a time 
interval sufficient for appreciable structural changes to 
occur" (p. 268). There are several further problems in 
finding an appropriate statistical representation for the 
paradigm. We consider first the more basic problems of 
choosing appropriate measures for the variables employed in 
the approach. 
7.11 MEASURING PROFIT 
The u variable is typically measured by either the 
price-cost margin (Lerner Index) method, or by the rate of 
return method. Theory suggests that firms with greater 
market share are likely to be able to hold prices above the 
levels that would prevail under competition, that is, charge. 
a price greater than marginal cost. The Lerner Index (1934) 
is defined as follows: 
Lerner Index = (Price - Marginal Cost) / Price 
A Lerner Index of zero would be recorded by a perfectly 
competitive firm; the closer the index is to one, the 
greater the market power. Apart from this being more a 
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measure of potential rather than actual profit 
opportunities, a major problem arises in that it is 
difficult to obtain systematic data on business firms, 
marginal costs or the ratio of marginal costs to prices. As 
a surrogate measure, Scherer (1980) suggests the use of the 
ratio of price less average production cost per unit to 
price, but of course, this falls far short of the economic 
concept of the markup of price over marginal cost, that is, 
of a measure of monopoly power. 
The data required to measure n as a rate of return on 
capital are easier to gather. Some studies look at the 
return on stockholders, equity, defined as: 
Tc = (Accounting Profit Attributable to Stockholders) 
/ (Accounting Book Value of Stockholders' Equity) 
Others look at the rate of return on capital: 
Tr = (Accounting Profit + Interest Payments) / Total Assets 
Serious questions have to be asked, however, about the 
consistency of the data used in the numerator and. 
denominator in both measures. Difficulties arise because of 
diverse accounting policies across companies. For instance, 
the way in which companies value their assets is likely to 
pose a number of potential problems. Suppose the acquisition 
of one firm by another enhances the acquiring firm, s 
monopoly power. It is then likely to pay a higher price for 
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the acquisition than if no such monopoly potential were 
present. After the merger, the value of assets may be 
written up so much that profit returns appear only "normal". 
This is more likely if the acquiring firm uses purchase 
accounting methods, bringing the firm's assets onto its 
books at market value, than if it uses pooling of interest 
accounting, incorporating the acquired firm's assets at 
their book value. Other problems include the fact that 
assets may have been revalued more recently in some 
companies than others. Diverse depreciation methods across 
companies may make the comparison between profit rates after 
depreciation precarious. Research and development 
expenditure and brand names may be capitalised in some 
companies but not others. "Window dressing" may lead to the 
transfer of sales and profits between consecutive years. 
Profit measures can also reflect major differences that are 
due entirely to different levels of gearing. Finally, where 
profit is measured post-tax, vagaries of the tax system may 
further complicate comparisons. These problems have been 
explored by Singh and Whittington (1968), Whittington 
(1971), Meek (1977), and Foster (1978) among others. 
Of course the problems are not entirely insurmountable. 
On the other hand they do suggest the need for a very 
careful scrutiny of the financial reports of companies 
before encoding data. Furthermore, there are both a priori 
and empirical grounds for expecting many differences in 
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accounting practice to be industry-specific (see Lev (1969), 
Taffler (1976), Foster (1978)): thus use of more homogeneous 
sets of data should reduce distortions. At the very least 
the above arguments do suggest that the person analysing 
structure - performance relationships must be sensitive to 
the possible intrusion of biases so that their direction and 
probable magnitude can be acknowledged. 
7.12 RECONCILING INDUSTRY AND FIRM DATA 
When studying organisational behaviour the most natural 
context of analysis is the industry. However, raw 
performance data are almost always only available at the 
firm level. The problem is to reconcile firms' profit data 
with industry structure variables. 
One solution to the problem is to identify the firm's 
primary industry, the industry in which it has the largest 
single share of its sales or assets, and add all relevant 
accounting variables to that industry's total. Besides the 
fact that data is often not available for all firms in an 
industry a more serious difficulty arises. For diversified 
companies, a large amount of irrelevant activity will be 
included in its primary industry. Since companies have 
become increasingly diversified, the contamination problem 
is likely to have grown more complex. 
An alternative approach is not to aggregate firms into 
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industries, but to focus instead on individual firms and 
compute weighted market structure indices for each firms 
particular situation. Scherer (1980, p. 270) gives the 
example of a firm's with half its sales in an industry whose 
concentration ratio is 63, thirty percent of its sales in an 
industry, whose concentration ratio is 17 and the remainder 
in an industry whose concentration ratio is 96. The weighted 
average concentration ratio would be: 
[(63xO. 5)+(17xO. 3)+(96xO. 2)1=55.8. 
Dalton and Penn (1971) show that using this method 
reveals a statistically significant relationship between 
profits and concentration, which was insignificant when the 
primary industry method was used. The problem with the 
weighted average method, however, is that it compresses 
especially high and low structural index values towards the 
mean for all industries and this weakens the power of 
regression analysis to detect systematic structure - 
performance relationships. The ideal solution would be to 
obtain disaggregated data on profits of each firm in 
separate industries. Such data is available in some cases, 
for example the data from the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board in the United States. The problem with the data, 
however, is that companies have broad discretion to define 
the break-down by activity as they please, so that industry 
segments are not comparable from firm to firm. 
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7.13 MEASURING CONCENTRATION 
The attraction of concentration as a measure of market 
structure is easily understood, because differences in the 
number and size distribution of firms are key factors 
distinguishing the theoretical models of perfect 
competition, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. 
Furthermore, market concentration is easily estimated since 
data on the number and size distribution of firms are 
generally available, whereas for other structural variables, 
information is difficult to obtain. Ferguson (1988) has 
argued, however, that "at best, market concentration 
provides a limited guide to the structure of a market" 
(p. 23). To understand his argument, it is necessary to 
consider more carefully the construction of these measures 
and their theoretical properties. 
Measures of market concentration can be divided into two 
broad categories, absolute and relative measures. 
ABSOLUTE MEASURES 
Simple concentration ratios are the most popular 
measures of concentration in empirical work and are 
derived directly from a concentration curve. This is 
formulated by ranking the top N firms within an 
industry in declining order of size (defined as the 
percentage of total industry sales, or capacity, or 
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employment, or value added, or physical output) and 
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In general then, 
, CR,, ý = ES. -L 
where CR. = the proportion of output attributable to 
the top N firms in the industry. 
&L = the percentage of market share of the ith firm. 
In fact, by far the most frequently used measure is 
the four firm concentration ratio. 
The Hirschman - Herfindahl Index (HHI) (Hirschman 
1964) is given by the formula: 
HHI = ES ýL2 
where SL is the market share of the ith firm, measured 
as the output of the ith firm divided by the total 
output. When an industry is occupied by only one firm 
(a pure monopolist), the index attains its maximum 
value of one, and will be close to zero when there are 
a large number of equal sized firms. By squaring 
market share, the HHI index weights more heavily the 
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values for large firms than for small. This index is 
often expressed as a "number equivalent" measure of 
concentration. For example, taking the reciprocal of 
HHI value of 0.2 would indicate that the market is 
comprised of five equal size firms. 
(3). The Hannah and Kay (1977) index is similar to the HHI 
index except that market shares are raised to a power 
alpha, the choice of which is left to the 
investigator. Hannah and Kay suggest that an alpha in 
the range of 0.6-2.5 yields the most sensible results. 
The measure is calculated as: 
= (E S.. L- )OL/(JL-cx) 
Thus it can be seen that the Hirschman - Herfindahl 
index is a special case of the Hannah and Kay index, 
where &L is the market share of the ith firm, and 
alpha is an elasticity parameter, the value of which 
determines the weight given to the large firms 
relative to small ones. 
The Entropy Index (Jacquemin and de Jong (1977), 
Marfels (1971), Horowitz (1971)) is defined as: 
E= ES&. log(1/S. L) 
This index weights market share by the logarithm of 
market share. When market shares are equal, its value 
reduces to log N, being zero under pure monopoly and 
rising non-linearly as the number of firms increases. 
1S2 
The advantage of this measure is that it can be 
decomposed to show how different sub-groups contribute 
to the overall level of concentration. 
RELATIVE MEASURES 
Relative measures of concentration, on the other 
hand, focus on the difference in firm size, and 
effectively ignore the number of firms competing 
within an industry. The more unequal the size 
distribution of firms, the more concentrated and less 
competitive the market. 
Figure 7.7 
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Gini Coefficients are derived from the Lorenz curve, a 
graphic technique which ranks firms by size and is 
cumulated from smallest to largest as a percentage of 
the number of firms in the market. This is plotted 
against the cumulative percentage of market output. 
The Gini measure summarises how far an observed Lorenz 
curve actually observed is located from a curve that 
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would appear if all firms had equal market share or 
sales (line of absolute equality); the greater the 
deviation, the greater the inequality in firm size. 
(2). Variance of the Logarithms of Firm Size, (Hart and 
Prais (1956), Utton (1971)): 
V= 1/n E(log S. L)2 - 1/n2 ( ElogS,. )2 
measures the frequency distribution of a stochastic 
process over time. As with the entropy index, this can 
be decomposed, and its value tends to zero if all 
firms are identical in size. 
"Many industrial economists believe that, despite being 
a little crude and frequently somewhat ad hoc, concentration 
indices can be useful in assessing the state of 
competitiveness in markets" (Doivsimoni et al 1984, p. 419). 
To assess this claim, we must consider more carefully -some 
of the assumptions and limitations of the concentration 
index approach. 
According to Neoclassical theory, competitiveness is a 
function of the number and size distribution of firms within 
a market. Any measure of concentration, therefore, should 
seek to capture these two elements. The relative 
concentration measures do not take account of the number of 
firms. For example, the variance of logarithms measure 
converges on zero when the firms are the same size. We would 
obviously expect economic performance to differ if there 
were two, as opposed to two hundred, equal-sized firms 
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within a market. This problem is overcome using the entropy 
measure, where the maximum value is dependent upon the 
number of firms competing. 
Concentration ratios are also flawed because they 
consider only partially these two elements. -They neglect all 
except the top N firms. For example, two industries could 
both have a five firm ratio of say, 60%, but one industry 
comprising 10 small firms and the other, 100 small firms. As 
a result, the same concentration ratio would describe a 
competitive market where there are N similar-sized firms or 
a situation close to monopoly where one firm dominates. A 
further criticism is that concentration ratios are 
arbitrarily chosen from a concentration curve, so the 
ranking of an industry depends critically on the point 
chosen. In Figure 7.1, on the basis of a four firm 
concentration ratio, industries B and C are identical. For 
measures of more than four firms, B is more concentrated 
than C. Furthermore there is no theoretical underpinning for 
preferring a four firm ratio to a higher or lower ratio. 
The Hirschman - Herfindahl index is theoretically 
elegant. It includes all firms, and squares their respective 
market shares giving greater weight to larger firms. However 
problems arise with interpreting the reciprocal of the 
index, the number equivalent value. This measure does not 
correspond to a unique size distribution of firms within the 
industry. Rather it indicates a value that would be obtained 
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if the market were comprised of that number of equal-sized 
firms. This defect also mars the Hannah and Kay measure. 
Both measures are faced with the lack of theoretical 
guidance when choosing the size of alpha. 
Hannah and Kay (1977) have suggested a number of other 
desirable attributes that a concentration measure should 
have. First is the concentration curve ranking criterion. 
Referring to figure 7.1, concentration measures which are 
situated above another should rank their respective markets 
as more concentrated, i. e. market A is more concentrated 
than market B. The variance of logarithms measure does not 
adhere to this criterion. 
Second, the sales transfer principle stipulates that if 
customers switch from smaller to larger firms then the 
concentration ratio should increase, and vice-versa. The 
concentration ratio will meet this criterion only if the 
transfer is between the N largest firms and those outside 
the largest N firms. If the transfer is between the N 
largest firms the index will not change. 
Third, if the new firms enter, gaining market share 
below the average firm, the measure of concentration should 
fall. Gini and variance of logarithms measures do not 
satisfy this axiom. In the case of the concentration ratio, 
the problem is that entry of new firms outside the N largest 
firms is unlikely to alter the market share of these firms. 
Fourth, Hannah and Kay suggest that mergers should lead 
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to an increase in the measure of concentration. Again the 
concentration ratio, Gini, and variance of logarithms 
measures do not always satisfy this axiom. If the merged 
firms are within the largest N firms, or the merger is 
between a firm in the largest N and one outside the group, 
the ensuing result will be a higher concentration ratio. 
However if the merger is between two or more firms outside 
the N largest firms, the concentration ratio will be 
unchanged. ' 
The analysis so far has outlined the different ways in 
which studies of the concentration - performance 
relationship have attempted to measure concentration and the 
shortcomings of the various measures. Some have argued, 
however, that concentration is not the best indicator of 
market power. A major deficiency is that market 
concentration fails to recognise linkages between firms. 
Profitability could differ from concentration predictions if 
firms share the same distribution channels, or if they 
engage in joint market and production agreements, and so on. 
The existence of collusive behaviour would distort the 
concentration-performance relationship, leaving 
concentration measures as misleading guides to the 
kaleidoscope of market structure. 
A further major problem is that measures of market 
concentration fail to identify companies within industries. 
Empirical studies may suggest that in 1985 the four-firm 
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concentration ratio, say, is 70% for industry X and remains 
unchanged three years later. Interpreting these results 
would imply that competition remained unchanged and that 
competitive forces are weak. However this may not be the 
case; rather the four largest firms may have been replaced 
by four new firms by 1988, and may be completely different 
animals. 
7.14 MEASURING BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
Bain (1956) was initially responsible for the inclusion 
of barriers to entry as a variable in the 
concentration-profit relationship. Concentration may be 
conducive to tacit or explicit collusion, high prices, and 
high profits, but unless there are appreciable barriers to 
entry, high profits will tend to attract new entrants. 
However, there are still problems in that barriers to entry 
alone are not sufficient to ensure the existence of long run 
profits. If the number of firms in an industry reaches some 
appreciable number, rivalry among incumbent firms could 
overshadow the threat of potential entry. This suggests 
that the barriers to entry variable will be significant only 
for industries with a few firms. This problem is rarely 
taken into consideration in the empirical studies. 
Barriers to entry have been included in studies of 
concentration-profit relationships in three forms. 
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Advertising-sales ratios (A/S) are commonly employed as 
explanatory variables when problems with data collection can 
be overcome: the basic difficulty is the absence of 
comprehensive, consistent, ý industry-by-industry information 
on full promotional, as opposed to selective media 
expenditures. There is also a conceptual problem in that the 
advertising variable on its own may be a better predictor of 
monopolistic power (Kelly and Cowling, 1973). 
The second measure used to describe barriers to entry, 
and one that is frequently used in conjunction with the A/S 
ratio, is the capital-output ratio (C/O) for the industry. A 
major difficulty here is that the capital requirements for 
entry into an industry operating efficiently may be low: the 
C/o ratio however, may be high, and vice versa. 
A third measure is one of the minimum efficienct scale 
of plant (MES), expressed in terms of investment or 
employment requirements. This measure is easier to identify 
within the paradigm, but is unfortunately rarely available. 
As proxies for MES, average capital or employment per 
establishment in an industry are sometimes used. 
7.15 THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
6 Having reviewed the measurement problems which arise 
in 
studies of the structure-performance relationship, we turn 
now to outline the main results to emerge from these 
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studies. The objective is to reveal the main conclusions to 
emerge rather than attempt a comprehensive review of the 
literature. 
A most influential study was the 1951 article by Bain, 
"Relation of Profit Rates to Industrial Concentration". He 
found that in industries with eight-firm sales concentration 
ratios of 70% or higher, the average after-tax return on 
shareholder equity was 12.1%, compared to 6.9% for 
industries with concentration ratios below 70%. 
Furthermore, this difference was highly significant. In a 
later book Bain (1956) attempted to take into account the 
effects of entry barriers as well as concentration on firm 
performance. His results, along with those of Mann (1966), 
found that, as hypothesised, highly concentrated industries 
with very high entry barriers had higher rates of return 
than other highly concentrated industries with lower entry 
barriers. 
These results have been criticised on a number of 
grounds. Some have criticised the subjective nature of the 
way in which Bain classified entry barriers: he defined very 
high entry barriers in terms of the ability to hold prices 
10% or more above minimum unit costs without inducing 
significant new entry, and substantial barriers as the 
ability to hold prices 5 to 9 percent above costs. 
A second criticism concerns the way industries are 
classified as having a high, medium or low degree of 
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concentration : Singer (1970), taking a peculiarly broad 
definition of the car industry, was able to reclassify it as 
of a medium degree of concentration, and found that this was 
sufficient to eliminate the profitability differences 
between industries of high and moderate concentration. A 
third problem with the Bain and Mann studies was the small 
size of the samples analysed: this relates to the problem 
mentioned earlier of defining an industry. Bain and Mann 
attempted to limit their attention to well-defined 
industries for which adequate profitability data could be 
obtained when companies were assigned to industries 
according to the primary industry criterion. Brozen (1971) 
showed that when larger and less discriminating industrial 
samples are used, the positive association between 
profitability and concentration deteriorates. This is hardly 
surprising, since it is much more difficult to detect 
systematic relationships when the independent variables are 
badly measured. Collins and Peston (1969) have shown that 
the problem of obtaining large enough samples, in which 
performance data are correctly matched to structural data, 
can be overcome if other limitations. are accepted. Using 
price-cost margin statistics, and correcting for poorly 
defined markets by including a geographic dispersion index, 
they find a modest but significant relationship between 
price-cost margins and four-firm concentration ratios. 
One could discuss at length the results of these and 
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many other studies relating some kind of index of 
profitability to concentration, entry barriers and other 
variables, but as Scherer points out, "despite sometimes 
formidable mismeasurement, there is a rather robust tendency 
for a positive association to emerge between seller 
concentration and profitability" (1980, p. 278). 
There has been less success, however, in determining the 
exact nature of the relationship. To determine whether the 
relationship is linear or not, studies have attempted to 
test whether the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index or the simple 
concentration ratio is the more appropriate. The results, 
however, are ambiguous: in some cases the HHI index 
exhibited greater explanatory power. In others the four-firm 
concentration ratio did better (see Stigler (1964), Weiss 
(1971), Jones, Laudadio and Percy (1973), McFetridge (1973), 
Kwoka (1979)). 
On the issue of continuity, that is, whether profit 
rates increase steadily as concentration increases, more 
extensive research has been undertaken (see Kilpatrick 
(1971), Rhoades (1973), Rhoades and Cleaver (1973), Meeham' 
and Duchesnean (1973), Datton and Penn (1976) , and White 
(1976) among others). The conclusion is almost unanimous. 
Virtually all studies show a significant increase in profit 
rates as the four-firm concentration ratio passes through a 
range between 45 and 59%. 
However, once some sort of consensus appeared to have 
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been reached- concerning the relationship between market 
concentration and profitability, the debate moved on to a 
fundamental problem neglected earlier. It was long 'assumed 
that the degree of concentration affected firm performance 
because of the power it gave firms to raise prices. Demsetz 
(1973), however, pointed to a completely different 
interpretation. He suggested that industries become 
concentrated because one or more firms have a strong 
efficiency advantage over their competitors. It is this 
greater efficiency which leads to industry concentration and 
thus greater profitability. If the efficiency explanation is 
right, a positive relationship between profitability and 
market share of firms would be expected, because as Demsetz 
argues, "if efficiency is associated with concentration, 
there should be a positive association between concentration 
and the difference between the rate of return earned by 
large firms and that earned by small firms" (1973, p. 5). On 
the other hand, if the monopoly power hypothesis is correct, 
higher prices should benefit all firms equally and so there 
should be little or no differences in the profitability of 
firms of different size within an industry. Empirical work 
by Demsetz and also by Carter (1978) has tended to support 
this hypothesis. 
Scherer (1980), however, has suggested that the matter 
is not easily resolved. He argues that if firms in an 
industry operate according to a production function 
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exhibiting economies of scale, there would be a natural 
tendency over time for the larger firms to be more 
successful and for the industry to become more concentrated. 
Higher industry profitability could arise solely from the 
larger firms operating at lower points on long run cost 
functions. The problem then is one of distinguishing the 
effects of scale economies from the entry barriers and / or 
concentration effects. In both cases industry profitability 
is higher in concentrated industries and, within these, 
higher among large firms. Furthermore, Bond and Greenburg 
(1976) show another possibility which would fit these 
observations. They suggest that product differentiation 
advantages would allow firms to charge higher prices, 
without necessarily having a cost advantage. Scherer (1980) 
also suggested that the recent increases in concentration in 
the U. S. had come about through successful advertising 
campaigns in conjunction with scale economies. This 
relationship, he argues, following Comanor and Wilson 
(1967), reflects the ability of sellers to hold prices of 
strongly differentiated products above costs, and has led' 
many to include an advertising sales ratio as an explanatory 
variable. 
The essential point of the above discussion is that the 
profit differences associated with market share are 
significantly more complex than first envisaged by Demsetz, 
embodying a complex mixture of scale economies, cost, price 
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and production differentiation advantages. Both Clarke, 
Davies and Waterson (1984) and more recently Harris (1988) 
attempt to take account of all these factors. The results 
of Clarke et al. suggest that "both efficiency and market 
power effects are at work" (1984, p. 448), whereas the work 
of Harris lends more support to the innovative leading firm 
alternative suggested by Demsetz. Neither study, however, is 
able to reject the product differentiation hypothesis in 
favour of that of leading firm efficiency. That is, there is 
no certainty that larger firms will achieve higher profit 
rates in industries without collusion, as suggested by 
Demsetz. 
Some of the other results to have emerged from the many 
statistical studies of structure-profitability relationships 
are worth mentioning. Financial theory suggests that the 
degree of profit risk perceived by investors will influence 
a firm's equilibrium profit rate. Higher risk raises the 
required rate of return on equity, thereby raising the 
critical rate for firms, investment projects. Thus one 
would expect profits to be higher in industries that 
involve, in some sense more risky activities. A study by 
Harris (1986) which incorporates risk in the form of the 
well known beta coefficient supports this hypothesis, but 
other evidence from Bothwell, Cooley and Hall (1984) finds 
no such relationship. Scherer (1980) has also attempted to 
discover whether concentration and risk could conceivably be 
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related by way of a tendency for concentrated industries to 
oscillate between episodes of collusion and price warfare, 
again the evidence is ambiguous. 
An issue addressed by some studies is the appropriate 
unit for analysis. We have already mentioned that the notion 
of the "industry" becomes problematic when firms are highly 
diversified or goods differentiated. Cubbin and Geroski 
(1987) have also demonstrated that considerable 
heterogeneities exist within industries: they argue that, 
because of this, analysis at the industry level is not only 
uninteresting but misleading. 
7.16, CONCLUSION 
The SCP paradigm continues to dominate the industrial 
economics literature. Even its most vehement proponents, 
however, would be hard put to claim that the paradigm 
provides a clear, unambiguous theoretical foundation for the 
study of firm-industry relationships. Some sort of positive 
association between concentration and barriers to entry and. 
performance emerges from most of the empirical studies, but 
it is by no means clear that the relationship reflect the 
causal processes specified in the SCP paradigm. Further, the 
paradigm is ambivalent on the precise scope for firms 
gaining a competitive advantage over market rivals - in 
particular there is no clear analysis of the extent to which 
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"barriers to entry" can be affected by dominant firms as 
opposed to being part of an inherent and immutable set of 
market conditions. 
Baumol (1982) has added a new perspective to the 
relationship between structure, conduct and performance. His 
idea of contestable markets implies that a particular market 
structure does not necessarily translate into a particular 
type of performance. What is more, it is this analysis which 
in fact has subsequently helped to clarify the exact scope 
for strategic market moves by firms. It is to these issues 
that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONTESTABLE MARKETS THEORY 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we considered the 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm, in which the key to 
improved performance is taken to involve a change in market 
structure in the form of, for example, the erection of 
barriers to entry. This paradigm is ambivalent on whether 
the structural variables which affect performance are part 
of some "state of nature" over which firms have little or no 
control, or whether market structure is susceptible to 
manipulation by firms. In this chapter we consider the 
latter alternative, and examine the possible routes whereby 
a firm might gain competitive advantage by means of 
strategic market moves. In Section 8.2, we examine the 
nature of markets in which such moves are not Dossible. 
This may seem a strange way to advance the argument - but, 
as we shall see, an examination of the precise market 
conditions which make strategic interaction impossible ( the 
so-called 7contestable" market conditions ) serves to 
clarify the market conditions necessary for the possibility 
of strategic moves by firms. With these conditions defined, 
we proceed to examine the scope of the contestable markets 
paradigm. The conclusion to emerge is that many markets are 
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likely to be non-contestable and hence open to strategic 
manipulation. 
8.2, CONTESTABLE MARKETS 
It is clear that highly competitive markets leave little 
or no scope for strategic behaviour between firms. A 
perfectly competitive industry is one characterized by 
increasing marginal production costs, costless exit and 
entry, and undifferentiated products. These products are 
sold exclusively on the basis of market - determined prices. 
In such an industry, each firm produces at the point where 
price equals marginal cost. Any excess returns to capital 
available at this point quickly attract new entrants to the 
market, and the additional capacity quickly drives the 
market price down to a level where supernormal returns are 
completely eroded. 
The theory of perfectly contestable markets is a 
generalization of this notion of a perfectly competitive 
market, and serves to clarify a general set of market 
conditions which leave no scope for strategic interaction 
between firms. The precise characterization of a perfectly 
contestable market necessitates the introduction of some 
terminology and definitions as follows. 
Consider a vector of products N= (1,2,3 .... nj, which is 
a subset of all the goods in an economy. The prices of these 
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products are represented by price vector p, and the prices 
of other goods are assumed to be exogenous and are 
suppressed from the notation. Q(p) is the vector valued 
market demand function for the products in N. For any output 
vector y, C(y) is the cost of producing y at exogenously 
fixed factor prices when production is efficient. The 
underlying technology summarized in this cost function is 
assumed to be freely available to all incumbent firms and to 
all potential entrants. 
DEFINITION I 
A feasible industry configuration is composed of M firms 
producing output vectors yx .... ym at price p such that 
markets clear, 
ie. E YJL Q (p) 
and that each firm at least breaks even, 
ie. P*Y. L - C(YýL) k 0. 
In other words, 11 industry configuration" refers to the 
degree of concentration on the sellers' side of the market: 
with M=1, for example , the structure is monopolistic, while 
"feasibility" refers to the requirements that each firm 
involved chooses an output vector that permits its 
production costs to be covered at quoted market prices and 
that the sum of the outputs of the M firms satisfies market 
demand at those prices. 
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DEFINITION 2 
A feasible industry configuration over M, with prices p 
and firms, outputs yx .... ym is sustainable 
if p. y,, --ýc(y,., 
) for 
all P. and y. such that p,.,: 5p and y. --5Q(p. 
). 
The interpretation of this definition is that a 
sustainable configuration affords no profitable 
opportunities for entry by potential entrants who regard 
incumbents' prices as fixed. Here, a feasible marketing plan 
for a potential entrant is comprised of prices, p., that do 
not exceed the incumbents, quoted prices, p, and quantity 
vectors y., that do not exceed market demand at the 
entrants' prices, Q(p. ). The configuration is sustainable if 
no such marketing plan for an entrant offers a positive 
profit flow. 
With these two definitions, we may now proceed to define 
a perfectly contestable market as follows: 
DEFINITION 3 
A perfectly contestable market is one in which a 
necessary condition for an industry configuration to be in 
equilibrium is that it is sustainable. 
A perfectly contestable market so defined may be 
interpreted, heuristically, as a market subject to potential 
entry by firms who have no disadvantage relative to 
incumbents, and who can assess the profitability of entry. 
Then, since one requirement of equilibrium is the absence of 
new entry, an equilibrium configuration in a perfectly 
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contestable market must offer no inducement to entry, ie. it 
must be sustainable. Dixit (1982) has neatly summarized 
these requirements for a perfectly contestable market as 
follows: 
[1]. all producers have access to the same technology; 
(2]. this technology may exhibit non convexities, but costs 
must not be sunk (see below); 
(3]. consumers respond instantly to price changes announced 
by firms; 
[4]. firms do respond instantly to price changes announced 
by rivals. 
To Dixit's definition, we should perhaps add: 
[5]. there is perfect information available costlessly to 
all agents in the market. 
Sunk costs play a key role here. A cost is sunk if there 
is a degree of irreversibility attached to it. This is most 
likely to be the case with certain capital expenditures 
where there is no active re-sale market, nor any possibility 
for the capital to be transferred from one production 
opportunity to others. Let us then focus attention on the 
five conditions above which define a perfectly contestable 
market. There would have been little point in developing the 
contestable market model but for the fact that there are 
striking implications for the behaviour of firms in such 
markets. A full catalogue of these implications can be found 
in Baumol (1982). For our purposes, let us focus on those 
202 
implications which relate directly to the issue of strategic 
interaction between firms. 
PROPOSITION I- there is no scope for price competition in a 
perfectly contestable market. 
Proof : To prove this proposition we need to be able to show 
that a firm will be unable to survive if it prices at less 
than marginal cost (this is the conventional definition of 
predatory pricing - see, for example Sharkey, 1985). If an 
incumbent firm sells q units of output at a price p that is 
less than marginal cost, and makes total profits n in the 
process, then it is possible for a rival firm to sell q-1 
units of output which must yield profits of greater than n 
(since a marginally unprofitable unit of output has been 
removed from the production process). The rival firm can use 
this marginal increase in profits to undercut the incumbent 
firm which under assumptions (3) and (4) above will lead to 
the incumbent being eliminated from the market. Hence 
predatory pricing (p: 5MC) is impossible in a contestable 
market. 
PROPOSITION 2- there is no scope for non-price competition 
in a contestable market. 
Proof : To prove this proposition we need to be able to show 
that any firm which attempts to produce with any sort of 
inefficiency (such as excess capital) will be eliminated 
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from the market. The demonstration of this is quite 
straightforward. Any form of inefficiency, be it in 
allocation of inputs, or X inefficiency etc, constitutes an 
invitation to entry. By removing the inefficiency, the 
entrant can increase profits relative to those of the 
incumbent, permitting the entrant to lower prices which must 
eliminate the incumbent from the market. 
Thus, as we have seen, a perfectly contestable market 
rules out the possibility of strategic interaction between 
firms. The theory of contestable markets outlined above 
initially seems to offer an exciting new approach to the 
analysis of oligopolistic markets and strategic advantage. 
The argument, in brief, is that competitive advantage is 
unsustainable in contestable markets, prices being quickly 
driven down to levels reflecting the marginal costs of 
production. There is no room for structure or conduct 
variables to create a competitive advantage in a contestable 
market. Further, the approach was motivated in good part by 
the belief that many markets are contestable, exhibiting 
such characteristics empirically. 
It needs to be pointed out that only in the case of 
constant returns to scale perfect contestability implies 
that the equilibrium price is equal to both marginal and 
average cost. When we have the case of increasing returns to 
scale perfect contestability implies that the equilibrium 
price is equal to the average cost, the latter being above 
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the marginal cost. 
In what follows we will consider whether there is any 
evidence to support the contention that the threat of 
potential entry does in fact drive prices down closer to 
levels reflecting marginal costs, ie. competitive advantage 
is unsustainable in a contestable market; and whether the 
conditions for a market to be classified as contestable are 
met in reality. 
8.3 IS COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE UNSUSTAINABLE IN A CONTESTABLE 
MARKET? 
The contestable markets literature provides a convincing 
theoretical argument for the proposition that the threat of 
potential entry should limit a firm's ability to exert 
monopolistic powers. The next question of importance, 
however, is whether this argument is important empirically. 
A number of empirical studies have used experimental 
simulation of market behaviour as a means of investigating 
contestability issues. This work used human subjects, real 
money payoffs and experimental rules to restrict cost 
functions and other pertinent parameters. The object is to 
compare the solution predicted by theory with the actual 
behaviour of the experimental subject. One such study was 
undertaken by Coursey, Isaac and Smith (1984). Their aim was 
to determine whether complete freedom of entry and exit, ie. 
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zero sunk costs, in a market which could most cheaply be 
served by one firm, would yield prices close to the 
competitive level, the "weak" contestable markets 
hypothesis, or whether the prices would actually be equal to 
the competitive level, the "strong" contestable market 
hypothesis. The procedure was to provide two participants 
with a certain sum of money which they were required to 
spend in accordance with a strictly decreasing and known 
marginal cost function, their costs depending on how much 
they "produced". The consumer's demand function was also 
given but not known by the seller. Both sellers were 
required to reveal their price and quantity offers at the 
same time and the successful seller was the one who offered 
the lower price. The authors concluded that "the .... 
experiments strongly support the contestable markets 
hypothesis, namely, that to observe approximately 
competitive behaviour by a single producing firm with 
substantially decreasing costs, it is sufficient that (a) 
sunk costs are zero and (b) there are two contesting firms 
acting non-cooperatively in the sense that there is no 
explicit non-price communication between them that leads to 
excessive restriction of supply" (1984, p. 69). 
Harrison and McKee (1985), however, found that their 
results supported only'the "weak" version of the contestable 
markets hypothesis. In numerous replications of the above 
experiment they found that while some of the simulation did 
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yield the M=O value expected of perfect contestability 
(where M is a index of monopoly effectiveness), this value 
occurred in only 29% of the simulations. Thus they concluded 
that "clearly, we can reject the strong form of the CMH 
(contestable markets hypothesis)" (1985, p. 13). 
In a further test, however, Harrison did find support 
for the strong version of the contestable markets 
hypothesis. He tests the effects of assuming that entrants 
take the incumbent's price to be given (the Bertrand-Nash 
assumption), a premise widely associated with 
contestability. This was achieved by letting all 
participants offer prices simultaneously in the first 
period. The, next period's incumbent was determined as the 
one posting the lowest price, who was then obliged to 
announce a price before the others. The author concludes 
that satisfaction ofýthe Bertrand-Nash assumption is 
associated with a dramatic decline in (M) .... moreover, we 
find support .... for a strong form of the (contestable 
markets hypothesis) that claims that observed prices will 
converge to and attain competitive predictions" (1985, 
p. 37). 
It appears, therefore, that simulation evidence provides 
support for the contestable markets hypothesis. There are, 
however, major doubts as to whether behaviour in artificial 
experiments has any clear relationship to behaviour in 
actual markets. Given such doubts, it is necessary to assess 
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the contestable markets theory in terms of whether the 
conditions for contestability hold empirically. 
8.4 DO THE CONDITIONS FOR CONTESTABILITY HOLD? 
As Baumol and Willig (1986) point out, "the real 
question .... is not whether competitive results will emerge 
under perfect contestable conditions but how often such 
conditions are likely to exist" (p. 17). Studies in this area 
have usually-found that markets which a priori might. have 
been thought to be contestable, have not in fact met the 
rigorous criteria of contestability under close examination. 
, Let us take for example, the case of air-transport, to 
which the contestable markets paradigm was initially applied 
with much enthusiasm. A priori, it might have been thought 
that the air transport market was contestable - "capital", 
in the form of aeroplanes, is available to all potential 
carriers at the same cost, and furthermore investment in 
aeroplanes by airlines does not incur "sunk" costs, since 
the capital can literally be flown to other domestic or 
international markets, should exit from any particular 
market prove necessary. Furthermore, while consumers can 
respond almost immediately to price cuts, airlines are, at 
least over some period, committed to published prices and 
hence cannot respond instantly to price changes by market 
competitors. Thus on all counts, the airline market fulfils 
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the conditions of contestability detailed in section 8.2 
above, and it was these sorts of conditions which added 
considerable intellectual weight to the argument for 
deregulation of the airline industry in the U. S., since it 
was hoped that contestability would ensure marginal cost 
pricing as is required for "first-best" Pareto optimality. 
In fact, post deregulation experience in the airline 
industry has revealed several elements of the structure of 
demand and supply conditions which conflict significantly 
with the conditions necessary for the pure theory and 
results of contestable markets to apply. 
on the supply side, "sunk" costs have, on close 
examination proved a considerable barrier to entry. This has 
been the case largely because markets are vertically 
integrated in subtle ways. Take for example the case of 
People's Express as a potential aggressive entrant 
threatening the profits of established airlines. The 
shortage of gates and landing slots prevented the airline 
from acquiring even a single gate of its own at Denver's 
Stapleton International Airport, so it was forced to lease 
gates at non-competitive prices and at non-competitive times 
from other carriers. Such subtle sunk costs significantly 
limit the scope for potential competitors in airline markets 
(see Baumol and Willig (1986) for further details of this 
and related "sunk" costs in the airline market). 
on the demand side, considerable effort has been made by 
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established carriers to commit passengers to established 
carriers, both directly and via cornering sectors of the 
travel-agent market, and indirectly with huge advertising 
campaigns aimed at reputation building. We shall be 
examining these themes more closely in later chapters but 
for the moment we need only note that, to the extent that 
they work, they make price competition by entrants less 
effective, and the threat of entry a less effective 
discipline on incumbents behaviour. 
Perhaps the most thorough examination of the effect of 
these issues was conducted by Bailey (1986). She subjected 
some of the testable implications of the contestable market 
theory to severe testing. In particular, she examined the 
situation that has emerged in the aftermath of deregulation 
in light of specific predictions of the theory a variety 
of products will emerge, ' each of which will yield zero 
economic profit; the revenues from any subset of the 
products must exceed the incremental costs of those 
products, so that no cross - subsidy can exist; prices for 
each product will equal marginal costs; and an equilibrium 
market structure will minimize costs of the industry. Her 
evidence was not clear-cut - in some market segments 
(notably the long haul market), deregulation does appear to 
have brought with it cost efficiency and non-monopolistic 
pricing structure; nevertheless, in other market segments, 
notably short-haul national and regional routes, no such 
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benefits were found. 
In light of this, it is unsurprising that specific 
econometric studies have confirmed the imperfections of 
contestability of airline markets. Call and Keller (1984) 
show that there remains a significant positive correlation 
between profits and concentration in airline markets. 
Graham, Kaplan and Silbey (1983) find that, on average, 
prices deviate from costs by over ten percent on routes 
which use the major slot - constrained airports in New York, 
Chicago and Washington D. C.. 
These and related results in other transport markets 
suggest that, even in markets where the contestability 
assumption might appear to apply (which is a very limited 
sub-set of markets in the first place), closer examination 
reveals that deviations from the contestability assumptions 
occur which lead to refutations of the theory's prediction. 
This is not to deny that important differences in degree of 
contestability exist: Froeb and Geweke (1984) find that the 
aluminium industry approximates more closely to 
contestability than might have been expected; the work of 
Davies (1986) for the Canadian Transport Commission 
concludes that contestability theory may offer an 
interesting model for the liner shipping industry, given the 
transferability and resaleability of capital in ocean 
shipping. This suggests that the contestable markets theory, 
although not successful in justifying a grand presumption 
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that forces of competition predominate, has succeeded in the 
more modest task of providing some insight into the working 
of competitive processes. 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of this review is that there may be 
limited scope for applying the strict version of the 
contestable markets hypothesis: few, if any markets meet the 
strict requirements of contestability. If most markets 
exhibit some degree of non-contestability there is 
considerable scope for strategic moves designed to gain a 
competitive edge over rivals. We examine these possibilities 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9 
STRATEGIC MOVES IN NON-CONTESTABLE MARKETS 
9.1 
In this chapter we move from the contestable market 
assumptions and consider more complex market structures. In 
particular we examine markets where technology may be 
specific to certain firms and where additional expenditure 
on technology may involve costs for the firm which are sunk 
over some part of the production cycle. In addition we now 
assume markets where information is less than perfect, and 
indeed this information may be asymmetrically distributed 
between economic agents. 
Having defined under Section 9.2 exactly what we mean by 
a "strategic" move under such market conditions, using as 
our starting point the work of Schelling (1960), we go on to 
apply this definition to specific examples of strategic 
moves by firms which are taken with a view to gaining a 
competitive market advantage. Section 9.3 discusses the 
importance of sunk costs in this process, while Sections 9.4 
and 9.5 examine how, by committing resources to productive 
capacity, advertising, and research and development, firms 
may be able to alter competitive conditions to their 
advantage. In some cases the power of these strategic 
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weapons may be such as to ensure complete market dominance 
by eliminating all competition; in other cases while these 
weapons cannot guarantee complete market dominance, they can 
still ensure a competitive advantage over market rivals. 
Section 9.6 further complicates the analysis by introducing 
uncertainty into the picture. 
The focus of Sections 9.3 to 9.6 is on the single 
product firm operating in a homogeneous, but non-contestable 
market. In Section 9.7 and 9.8 we examine the nature of 
strategic moves open to the multiple product firms. Section 
9.9 explores how firms can use the legal and regulatory 
framework to sustain their competitive advantage. We 
conclude that, in stark contrast to the discussion in 
Chapter 8, there are a host of strategic moves open to the 
individual firm when market conditions are non-contestable. 
9.2 THE NATURE OF A STRATEGIC MOVE 
The formal analysis of strategic moves in Economics has 
its foundations in research into the theory of rational 
choice in complex decision making situations. The basic 
neoclassical theory of consumer choice was designed to 
explain those decisions where the consumer could be 
considered to have a well-defined set of preferences and to 
be subject to well defined market constraints. By the late 
1950's, economists had realised that there were a wide 
variety of choice situations in which the above paradigm 
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seemed to be inappropriate. On the one hand some economists, 
for instance Simon (1959), thought the theory assumed "too 
much" of the average economic agent, and this line of 
reasoning led to what we now call theories of "bounded" 
rationality which we have already encountered in 
Williamson's work on markets and hierarchies. On the other 
hand some economists, for instance Elyster (1979), thought 
the theory assumed "too little" of the economic agent and 
that there were many situations where agents might behave 
much more subtly than the theory suggests. This line of 
reasoning lead to what we now call theories of "binding" 
rationality. The nature of a strategic move has its roots in 
this latter theory of economic behaviour. 
The theory of "binding" rationality is designed to come 
to grips with the phenomenon that a person in evident 
possession of his faculties, and knowing what he is talking 
about, will, in some circumstances, seek to prevent, to 
compel, or to alter his own later behaviour - to restrict 
his own options in violation of what he knows will be his 
preferences at the time the behavior is to take place. The 
mythical case of such a problem is well illustrated by 
Ulysses and his encounter with the Sirens - it will be 
remembered that, in the myth, Ulysses takes a deliberate 
self-denying move (tying himself to the ship's mast), as a 
means to avoid being lured (willingly) to his death by the 
sound of the Sirens. There are many modern-day analogies to 
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the problem faced and solved by Ulysses - the person who 
relinquishes authority of his car keys to another person 
before he goes drinking is one obvious example. 
The key feature of this class of problem seems to be the 
interaction within the individual of alternating sets of 
preferences but where only one set of preferences appears to 
be the authentic representation of his values. The way the 
"straight" self imposes itself on the "wayward" self is 
through a policy of self-denying actions. Such actions are 
termed strategic moves in the theory of binding consumer 
choice. Another way of putting this would be to say that the 
individual treats himself both as principal and agent ( to 
use the terminology of Chapter 4), recognizing that he 
occasionally may be a servant who might misbehave - as 
principal, he undertakes strategic moves designed to alter 
the behaviour of himself as agent. 
Shelling (1960) extended this theory of strategic 
interaction amongst sets of preferences to situations 
involving interactions between different individuals. In 
such a context, Shelling defines a strategic move between 
two individuals as an action "that influences the other 
person's expectations of how one's self will behave". The 
success of a strategic move in such circumstances will 
depend not just on communicating how one intends to behave, 
but on persuading the other party that this really is how 
one will behave in future circumstances. One of Shelling's 
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key insights was to realize that the solution to this 
problem of persuasion was similar to the problem faced by 
Ulysses: "Other people are more easily persuaded if one has 
already undertaken an irrevocable commitment which makes the 
threatened behaviour coincide with the action that best 
promotes one's own interest, were the specified situation to 
occur. The essence of these tactics is some voluntary but 
irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice. They rest on a 
paradox that the power to constrain an adversary may depend 
on the power to bind one's self; that, in bargaining, 
weakness is often a strength, freedom may be a freedom to 
capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may suffice to 
undo an opponent" (Shelling 1960, p. 22). 
The paradox here is highly subtle, an irrevocable 
pre-commitment leaves one with no other rational choice than 
to carry out one's threat if the specified situation occurs, 
even though, given these circumstances, one might now regret 
having made the pre-commitment. Shelling's book discusses a 
wide variety of political and economic applications of this 
principle. For our purposes, we are interested in ways to 
gain a competitive advantage over market rivals. Many 
suggestions have been made in the economic literature as to 
how this might be done: investment in productive capacity, 
advertising, brand proliferation, product and process 
innovation, to name but a few. We will examine the 
efficiency of these actions in the following sections. 
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9.3 SUNK COSTS AND COMMITMENT 
We saw in Chapter 8 that the problem for a firm wishing 
to sustain a competitive advantage in a contestable market 
is that its behaviour may be replicated by a potential 
entrant. Strategic behaviour designed to sustain a 
competitive advantage is, in essence, behaviour which makes 
such replication either impossible or undesirable. When the 
contestable market assumptions break down, such strategic 
behaviour becomes very plausible as we shall now examine. 
In order to bring out most clearly the underlying logic 
behind strategic behaviour, it will be useful to analyse 
carefully a simplified theoretical model first brought into 
the industrial economics literature by Dixit (1982). His 
particular concern was to examine the antitrust implications 
of non-contestable markets. our concern is rather different 
as we focus on the competitive advantage implications of 
non-contestability. 
Assume an incumbent monopolist presently earns monopoly 
profits n. in a market, but is threatened with the 
possibility of entry. If entry occurs, one of two things 
will happen. Either the two will subsequently collude and 
divide the monopoly profits between each other, each earning 
u., or they will fight a price war with disastrous results 
for both. Figure 9.1 captures the dynamics and payoffs of 
this simple game, assuming n. >na>O>n& 
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How can the monopolist sustain his market advantage in 
this framework? Possibly he could communicate his 
willingness to fight should the entrant decide to enter the 
market. The entrant might think the following: if I stay out 
of the market, I will earn zero profits; whereas if I enter 
the market, I will earn negative profits; so my best 
strategy is to remain out of the market and leave the 
incumbent with his market dominance. 
Notice that the strategy pair (Do not enter, Fight if 
entry) constitutes a Vash non-cooperative equilibrium for 
the game (a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium is defined as 
an equilibrium where each individual game player is taking 
an optimal strategy for himself given the set of strategies 
of the other player in the game). In our case, given the 
strategy of the monopolist, the best thing for the entrant 
to do is to abstain from entry; and given the strategy of 
the entrant, the monopolist can happily threaten a price war 
0 
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he is never actually going to carry out. 
However, does the Nash equilibrium above provide a 
convincing account as to the likely evolution of the game? 
The answer surely is no. For the entrant to believe the 
monopolist's threat to fight would involve the entrant 
attaching credibility to a threat which the monopolist has 
no incentive to implement: if the bluff is called the 
optimal strategy of the monopolist must be to share market 
profits, as indicated in Figure 9.1 The threat "Fight if 
entry" is not a credible threat in this game. 
In the language of game theory, the strategy pair (Do 
not enter, Fight if entry) is not a perfect equilibrium for 
the game. A perfect equilibrium requires that a strategy 
chosen by any player must be optimal if that stage of the 
game is actually reached. Thus a perfect equilibrium rules 
out non-credible threat s. If we insist that any proposed 
solution to the game above must constitute a perfect 
equilibrium, it follows that the only solution must be 
(Enter, Accommodate). 
Thus, as the model stands, there is apparently nothing 
the monopolist can do to maintain his market advantage. 
However, 'the model is unduly simplistic and restrictive 
because the incumbent is given no means by which the entrant 
can be influenced prior to entry. Let us assume instead that 
the market in which the incumbent enjoys his market power is 
non-contestable : specifically, let us assume that there are 
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sunk costs involved in production. Remember a sunk cost is 
one which is not instantly reversible or transferable to 
another market. 
FIGURE 9.2 
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In Figure 9.2 we have augmented the game in Figure 9.3.1 
to allow the monopolist, if he so wishes, to , commit- 
himself to a strategy of investing in excess sunk capacity, 
in readiness to fight a price war. Intuitively we can think 
of this as our monopolist producing an output which involves 
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leaving part of his capacity idle. Assume that our potential 
entrant can see this and will thus know that, in the event 
of entry, the monopolist has the machinery at hand to enable 
him to increase market output quickly and hence drive market 
prices down. What will our entrant do now? Let us solve for 
the perfect equilibrium. 
Go first of all to stage 3 of the game. If the incumbent 
has not previously committed himself to the excess capacity 
strategy and entry has occurred, the optimal choice for the 
monopolist is to accommodate. If, however, the monopolist 
has previously committed himself to the excess sunk capital 
expenditure, and the potential entrant has subsequently 
entered, the incumbent will accommodate only if n. &-c>n&. 
Otherwise he will fight. Thus, at stage 3, an uncommitted 
incumbent will accommodate, whereas a committed incumbent 
will fight if nd-c<nr. 
Now go back to stage 2 of the game. Will the entrant 
enter the market? Once again, applying the logic of a 
perfect equilibrium, the potential entrant will enter if 
either the monopolist is uncommitted or if the monopolist, is 
committed and na-c>ur. However, if the monopolist is 
committed and u., -c<ur, the entrant will not enter the 
market, preferring zero to negative profits. Finally, let us 
go back to stage I of the game. Will the incumbent commit 
himself to the strategy of excess investment? The incumbent 
has the choice of remaining passive, in which case he will 
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observe entry and subsequently earn profits na; or if 
committing himself, in which case, if na-c<ne, he can enjoy 
profits of n. -c. Again applying the logic of the perfect 
equilibrium, he will commit -if n. - c> nt. Thus 
if 
Tt. -TE, a> C> TE,, i-T1, E the monopolist can commit himself to an 
aggressive excess capacity strategy which successfully 
deters entry. The monopolist's threat of a price war is now 
a credible threat. 
9.4 FURTHER ASPECTS TO COMMITMENT 
The previous section outlined, in simple game theoretic 
terms, the possible role for a commitment instrument as a 
means to gaining a competitive edge over potential rivals. 
The approach, however, did not really come to grips with the 
economics of the issue - the incumbent firm merely faces a 
dichotomous choice of whether or not to commit resources to 
an entry-deterence strategy. In practice, the firm has a 
wide range of possible levels of commitment in one or more 
strategic instruments, and post-entry interaction can assume 
a wide variety of forms, from complete collusion to complete 
price warfare. The question naturally arises as to the 
nature of strategic commitment to gain a market advantage in 
this more complex world. 
Once again, we owe it to Dixit (1980) that these issues 
are addressed in a rigorous theoretical manner. The approach 
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has been developed by, among others, Dixon (1985). To 
illustrate the complex issues involved, consider the 
reaction curve diagram pertaining to a post-entry duopoly 
that is Cournot in nature (for a definition of Cournot 
equilibrium, see Chapter 7). That is, the reaction curve 
for each firm plots its optimal output given the rival's 
output on the assumption that, as one firm changes its 
output, the other firm maintains its existing output 






One key point to note about Figure 9.3 is that, in 
contrast to the simple Cournot approach to oligopoly where 
the reaction functions are continuous, the reaction 
functions drawn here are discontinuous. The reason for this 
is that economies of scale dictate that if, for example, 
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Firm A (the incumbent) produces an output greater than OB, 
the entrant's expected profits (under the Cournot 
assumption) are zero or negative. 
In the absence of sunk costs, the entrant will 
rationally expect the post entry oligopoly equilibrium to be 
at point C, and entry will not be deterred. Imagine now, 
however, that there are sunk costs of production in this 
duopolistic market. The incumbent, may well be able to 
commit himself in such a way that his effective post entry 
marginal costs are lowered. The effect of doing this in 
terms of figure 9.3 is to shift the incumbent's reaction 
curve to the right, as is illustrated in figure 9.4 below. 
The intuition behind this shift is that, for any given level 
of expected marginal revenue, the lower marginal cost 
encourages a higher output (since profit maximisation 
dictates that output is expanded until marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue). Now, faced with this reaction function, 
if the incumbent chooses to invest in capacity sufficient to 
produce output OB, the entrant will no longer expect to be 
able to make profits in the event of entry. The strategic 
investment effectively impedes entry, as there is no Cournot 









The key issue of the Dixit (1980) model is that it 
reveals clearly that, as he put it, "the role of an 
irrevocable commitment of investment in entry deterrence is 
to alter the initial conditions of the post entry game to 
the advantage of the established firm, for any fixed rule 
under which that game is to be played " (1980, p. 106). The 
exposition above has illustrated the extreme case where the 
investment is sufficient to deter entry completely. The 
monopolist would have the incentive to carry out this 
investment in sunk capacity if the profits from so doing 
(the profits associated with output OB), exceed those from 
Cournot duopoly. Even if this is not the case, however, the 
monopolist may very well have the incentive to undertake 
some strategic investment. By means of irreversible 
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investments, the incumbent can sink some of his marginal 
costs prior to an entry threat, and so reduce his effective 
marginal costs relative to an entrant's (thus shifting his 
reaction function to the right). Even if the strategy does 
not fully deter entry, since in most oligopoly models firms 
with lower marginal costs end up with higher market shares, 
the ability to act strategically is a clear route to gaining 
and maintaining a competitive advantage. In terms of figure 
9.4, the monopolist clearly has the incentive to sink some 
of his marginal costs and thus shift the reaction function 
to the right so long as the marginal net benefit of so doing 
is positive (the increase in profit from so doing, relative 
to the no strategic investment Cournot equilibrium at C) 
exceeds the investment cost of the strategic investment. A 
plausible equilibrium would be at point C, as in figure 9.5, 








Notice in Figure 9.5 that the monopolist is not 
investing in excess capacity as an entry deterrent strategy: 
rather he is investing in capacity which he is actually 
using to produce output. Only if the post entry game is so 
competitive that the incumbent is expected to increase 
output in the event of entry will excess capacity be a 
sensible strategy. To emphasize the point again, however, 
this does not mean there is no room for strategic investment 
where the post entry game involves some reduction in output 
by the incumbent (as in Cournot oligopoly or collusive 
oligopoly) the difference in these cases is, however, that 
the strategic sunk cost investment is designed not 
necessarily as an entry deterrent, but as a means to gaining 
a competitive advantage in the post-entry market, by 
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reducing post entry marginal costs relative to those of 
competitors. 
To conclude then, investment in capacity might be an 
instrument of strategic importance to firms. If the rival 
were to enter the market currently dominated by the 
incumbent, a duopolistic equilibrium would result. The 
nature of that equilibrium would depend partly on the 
incumbent's cost curve - and hence the investment, in 
capacity - that the incumbent makes prior to the rivals 
entry decision. The larger his investment, the less 
attractive is the prospective duopolistic equilibrium for 
the rival. The argument here has been conducted in terms of 
investment in productive capacity, but the argument is 
equally as valid for the case of strategic investment in 
research and development, as is detailed by Brander and 
Spencer (1983). Further Salop and Scheffman (1983) show that 
rather than lowering his costs relative to an opponent's as 
a means towards gaining competitive advantage, a viable 
alternative may be to raise a rival's 'cost - the classic 
case of this would be where the incumbent can deny a rival 
interconnection to his (ie. the incumbent's) network on fair 
terms, an argument that, for example, Mercury has used about 
its competitive dealings with British Telecom. Furthermore, 
though we have concentrated on the manipulation of costs as 
a means towards gaining competitive advantage, firms may 
well be able to manipulate demand conditions to the same 
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effect. Heavy advertising by an incumbent has the effect of 
creating a stock of goodwill for the advertiser shifting his 
demand curve out to the right and thus increasing his sales 
(and decreasing those of a rival) for any given industry 
price. This stock of goodwill is a sunk commitment which 
will depreciate only slowly over time, thus again 
advertising can act as a strategic weapon this time, 
altering future demand conditions in the industry. However, 
the subtleties of advertising raise difficult questions when 
considering competitive advantage, and it is to these and 
related issues that we turn in the, next section. 
9.5 THE FAT CAT EFFECT, THE PUPPY-DOG PLOY, AND THE MAN 
AND HUNGRY LOOK 
The strategic moves analysed so far have emphasized 
over-investment compared with that which would take place 
were the incumbent not threatened by actual or potential 
rivals in the market place. However, this need not always be 
the case - Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) present a taxonomy of 
strategic investment possibilities using a zoological 
analogy. This taxonomy places the strategic investments made 
by firms into four categories. 
The example of overinvestment we have examined in 9.3 
and 9.4 above are referred to by Fudenberg and Tirole as 
"Top Dog Tricks" - overinvestment makes the incumbent 
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tougher in the post entry game, reducing the potential 
entrant's expected payoff and so reducing the entry threat. 
The "top dog" is always willing to fight to defend his 
market position. As we analysed in 9.4 the crucial role of 
the irrevocable excess capacity is to alter the initial 
conditions of the post entry game to the advantage of the 
established firm, for any rule under which the game is to be 
played. In 9.4 we assumed that the rule in question was 
Cournot in nature - this gave us the backward sloping 
reaction curves of Figure 9.4 
However, Cournot competition is a special, and arguably 
unlikely oligopolistic interaction. Other forms of rivalry, 
such as some forms of price competition, lead to quite the 
opposite reaction such that, for example, a lower price by 
one firm induces rivals also to lower their prices. In such 
cases, reaction functions slope upwards and if entry cannot 
be prevented, a policy of high investment would lead to an 
aggressive entry by market rivals to everyone's 
disadvantage. In fact, rather than excess investment being 
the optimal strategic policy for the incumbent, a deliberate 
policy of under investment may be the appropriate strategic 
choice, by reducing the vigour of the inevitable post-entry 
competition. Such strategic underinvestment is referred to 
as a "puppy-dog ploy" by Fudenberg and Tirole. 
We can illustrate the puppy-dog ploy using conventional 
reaction functions, which we now assume to be upwardly 
231 
sloping as in Figure 9.4 because, 
conditions are price-competitive. 
FIGURE 9.6 / Pf" 
Entrants 
Output 
for example, post-entry 
Incumbents 
Output 
Underinvestment shifts the incumbent's reaction function 
to the left and is shown to reduce the output of both firms 
nearerý to the joint profit maximising level. As a 
consequence, both firms earn higher profits than if 
aggressive price competition dominated the post entry game. 
Of course, it must be emphasized that, to be convincing, 
such underinvestment must be credible in the sense that it 
must not be easy to increase investment at a later date a: nd 
so get drawn into a price war. This is perhaps easier to 
imagine where there are long lags associated with any 
investment policy. This strategy of minimizing the damage of 
entry by turning the incumbent into a "small, friendly, 
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non-aggressive puppy-dog" is desirable if investment makes 
the incumbent look tougher, and the post entry reaction 
curves slope upwards. The puppy-dog understands the danger 
of fighting and prefers to minimize the potential damage. 
When we examine more carefully the various types of 
strategic weapons available to firms, as opposed to the 
physical quantity of investment in any one weapon, further 
strategic possibilities emerge. In all the examples 
discussed to date, extra investment makes the incumbent look 
tough, that is to say that high levels of investment make 
the incumbent more likely to act competitively post entry, 
while low levels of investment lead, other things being 
equal, to less competition. The most obvious practical 
example of this, as we have emphasized, is investment in 
sunk capacity. However, as Schmalensee (1983) has 
emphasized, there are other types of investment, such as 
advertising (and possibly R&D), which make the incumbent 
"soft", meaning by this that high levels of advertising can 
make the incumbent less likely to act vigorously post-entry, 
while low levels of advertising may make him hungrier for 
competition. 
In Schmalensee's model, a customer can buy from a firm 
only if he is aware of its existence. To inform consumers, 
firms in the market place advertisements in newspapers. An 
advertisement that is read informs the customer both of the 
existence of the firm and of the price charged by the firm 
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for the good in question. In the first period, only the 
incumbent is in the market; in the second period the entrant 
may enter. The crucial assumption made by Schmalensee is 
that, because of inconvenience -costs, some customers who 
have read the advertisement issued by the incumbent will not 
take the trouble to look at further adverts in the second 
period, and therefore buy only from the incumbent. In 
essence, by investing in the first period, the incumbent 
accumulates goodwill in the form of a captive market for his 
product. 
In this environment, advertising affects actual and 
expected profits of the incumbent in subtle ways. There is 
obviously the direct effect that an increase in advertising 
has on the size of the captive market and hence on first and 
second profits. Less obvious, however, is the fact that the 
larger the incumbent makes his market share through 
advertising, the greater to him is the cost 'of price 
competition if entry occurs; and hence, if he expects 
post-entry competition to be price sensitive, high degrees 
of advertising lowers his credibility in issuing price 
threats to deter entry. Thus, low advertising can increase 
the credibility of a price and so help to deter entry. 
Schmalensee shows that, in quite plausible cases, the 
strategic effect of low advertising that raises the threat 
of a price war can outweigh the direct effect of low 
advertising increasing the entrant's expected marketý share. 
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Overall, the entrant's expected profitability may be reduced 
by the incumbent remaining "lean and hungry". Thus, what, 
Fudenberg and Tirole refer to as the "lean and hungry look" 
of underinvesting in advertising can lead to credible entry 
deterrence. Fudenberg and Tirole also show that a similar 
strategy may be available with technological competition. 
Even now we have not yet exhausted the taxonomy of 
strategic initiatives open to the firm in complex market 
conditions. The final category of strategic investment 
analysed by Fudenberg and Tirole is referred to as "Fat Cat 
Effects". Continuing with the advertising example, let us 
now assume that the nature of the second period reaction 
function is such that entry is inevitable. In this case, the 
incumbent no longer has a strategic incentive to signal that 
pure competition will be fierce, since the inevitable price 
war will benefit no one. Here the incumbent has the 
incentive to signal the opposite, that he is a cuddly, 
pacifistic "fat cat" who does not want to fight a price war. 
Thus, when entry is inevitable, both the direct effect that 
an increase in advertising has on the captive market and the 
indirect strategic effect of reducing the incentive for a 
price war argue for over-investment in advertising to 
cushion the blow of entry. 
To summarize, this taxonomy of strategic moves 
illustrates some of the complexities of economic life - 
though in the next section we shall have to make things even 
I 
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more complexI We have highlighted three important factors in 
determining the nature of strategic investment. First, it 
can make a significant difference to a firm's behaviour 
whether or not it believes that a rival can be deterred from 
entering the market (for example, compare the incentive for 
"lean and hungry look" and "fat cat" strategies). Secondly, 
the nature of post entry competition, especially with regard 
to the likely degree of price competition, can alter the 
incentives for aggressive strategic investment (for example, 
compare the arguments for "top dog trick" as opposed to 
"puppy-dog ploys"). Thirdly, certain types of investment 
(eg. physical capacity) make a firm tough (more aggressive) 
when it comes to price competition, whilst other investments 
(eg. advertising) can make a firm soft (less aggressive) in 
the same circumstances. These conditions help to emphasize 
the subtleties of strategic behaviour designed to maintain a 
competitive advantage. 
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9.6 REPUTATION AND UNCERTAINTY 
The discussion so far has implicitly assumed that each 
firm has perfect knowledge not just about its own costs, but 
also about those of its rival", and about market demand 
conditions. Further, to date we have considered only 
once-for-all strategic moves, and have not addressed those 
situations where there is scope for a sequence of strategic 
moves over time. In the language of game theory, we have not 
yet analysed the scope for strategic moves in a repeated 
game framework under conditions of uncertainty. As we shall 
see, when we do consider such a game framework, there are 
new possibilities for strategic moves designed to gain and 
maintain a competitive advantage over market rivals. 
These issues were first formally addressed in an 
economic context by Kreps and Wilson (1982), and Milgrom. and 
Roberts (1982). The key insight of these authors can best 
be understood by considering a game with a similar structure 
to that in section 9.3 of this chapter - only now we allow 
both for the possibility that the game will be repeated and 
for the possibility of imperfect information flows between 
the market participants. Imagine a situation where a market 
leader has a series of chain stores in different towns 
within a country. Assume that in each town, he faces 
potential competition from one local store. In this 
situation, the competitive interaction. between the chain 
store and the local store in one town might be expected to 
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affect the subsequent competitive interaction between the 
chain store and the other local stores in different parts of 
the country. To clarify this intuition, consider the 
specific game in Figure 9.7 below. One monopolist (the chain 
store) interacts with N local traders sequentially over N 
time periods. At each play of the game, one of the local 
stores must decide whether or not to challenge the chain 
store in the local market, and the chain store must decide 
what to do about such competition if it actually occurs. The 
precise payoffs are outlined in figure 9.7 
FIGURE 9.7 
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Monopo 11 st -f 
Entrant -f 
Local Market 2 Entrant2 -- as before 
Local Market N Entrantm -- as before 
Note: f can be co: ýidered as a fixed cost with 0<f<1. It can be seen that this game structure resembles 
that of section 9.3. with monopolistic profits arising if there is no competition, with positive duopolistic 
profits arising if there is accommodation. duopoly, and with negative profits arising if there is price-war 
duopoly. 
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How will this game evolve if the various economic agents 
interact rationally? In particular we are interested in 
knowing if by strategically acting in a certain way in one 
local market, the chain store can affect subsequent 
behaviour in other local markets to his own advantage. 
Again we address this issue using the perfect equilibrium 
concept, developed in section 9.3. 
Suppose first of all that the game is played a fixed, 
finite number of times, with full information on the 
pay-offs of the game available to each player. In this case, 
the perfect equilibrium will have entry and accommodation at 
each play of the game. The proof of this surprising result 
is as follows. At the last play of the game between the 
chain, store and local store N, entry and accommodation is 
optimal for the reasons outlined in Section 9.3, and so the 
perfect equilibrium must involve this strategy pair. Going 
back to the penultimate play of the game, with the chain 
store and local store N-1 both knowing how the last play of 
the game will in fact evolve, the perfect equilibrium must 
again involve entry and accommodation - there is no 
incentive for either to pursue any other strategy. By 
induction we can repeat this argument right back to the 
first play of the game, and so can conclude that entry and 
accommodation must characterise each step of this 
multi-period game. This game theory result was first 
obtained by Seller (1975) and goes contrary to intuition 
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which might have suggested that the monopolistic chain store 
would fight in early plays of the game to gain an aggressive 
reputation which might deter future local stores from 
entering their local markets. However, as we shall see, the 
insight of Kreps and Wilson (1982) was to point out that 
when the above game is played under conditions of 
uncertainty, there is scope for the chain store to 
strategically operate in some local markets to gain a 
reputation which will deter other rivals in other markets. 
There are several ways we might introduce lack of 
perfect information into the above game. We might, for 
example, simply assume that local stores do -not have full 
information about the chain store payoffs under the various 
possible outcomes of the game and / or vice versa. However, 
the easiest way to introduce uncertainty into the above game 
is simply to assume that the series of potential entrants 
are unsure at the start of the game if the chain store is 
game theory rational (and hence will choose his strategy 
using the notion of perfect equilibrium) or is a "thug", 
preferring to fight wherever he gets the chance (whether or 
not this is game theory rational), perhaps in deference to 
some self-imposed market share goal. The essence of the 
perfect equilibrium in this game can be grasped by 
collapsing the number of plays to two, and thus considering 
the situation of a chain store playing the game outlined in 
Figure 9.7 in two different local towns against two local 
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businessmen. Assume that, before the game evolves, each of 
the two businessmen attaches a prior probability 0 to the 
possibility that the chain store is a "thug",, and thus will 
always fight entry. We can construct the perfect equilibrium 
by considering the optimal strategy for each agent of the 
game under the various possible situations which might 
arise, again solving the game "backwards". 
I Consider now the dilemma faced by the second local 
merchant (leader) whether or not to enter the second local 
market. This second entrant will have observed the evolution 
of the first play of'the game, and this first play will 
crucially affect the decision of the second entrant. We can 
see that three things might have been observed by the second 
entrant at the first play of the game - the first entrant 
may simply have stayed out, there may have been entry and 
accommodation, and finally there may have been entry 
followed by a price war. 
If there has been no entry at stage 1, the second 
entrant can infer nothing about the behaviour of the chain 
store. He is left with his prior probability 0 that the 
chain store is a "thug". Assuming, the second entrant is risk 
neutral he will enter his local market if the expected 
profit from so doing exceed the profits from staying out of 
the market, i. e. he will enter if: - 
-fQ + (1-f)(1-0) >0 
i. e if 9 <1-f 
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If this condition is not fulfilled, he will prefer to stay 
out of the local market. 
However, if there has been entry followed by 
accommodation at stage 1 of the game, the second entrant's 
behaviour will be governed by different considerations. The 
observation that there has been accommodation at stage 1 of 
the game immediately alerts the second entrant to the fact 
that the chain store cannot be a thug (because the thug 
always fights). Knowing this, the second entrant realizes 
that if he enters the local market, the chain store will 
respond by accommodating, which will ensure positive profits 
for the local businessman. Hence, in the case where the 
second entrant observes accommodation at the first play of 
the game, he will respond by entering at the second stage. 
Finally, the second entrant may have observed entry 
followed by fighting at the first stage of the game. What 
should he do in this case? He knows that this fighting may 
have taken place because-the chain store is- a thug, or 
because a game theory rational chain store was trying to 
bluff him into thinking the chain store is a thug, or at 
least re-assess the probability that this is in fact the 
case. If the second entrant is rational, he will reassess 
the probability that the chain store is a thug using Bayes 
Theorem. Using F to denote "fighting", S to denote the 
strong monopolist, and W to denote the "weak" game theory 
rational chain store we have : 
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P(S/F) = [P(F/S) P(S)] / [P(F/S)P(S)+P(F/W)P(W)] = 
[1*9] / [1*9 + (1-Q)X] where X= P(F/W) (Bayes Theorem) 
When the second entrant has calculated this probability, 
he simply re-calculates the expected profits from entry 
using this revised probability, and, if these expected 
profits are positive, he will take the gamble that a weak 
monopolist has been trying to bluff him and so will call the 
weak monopolist's bluff by entering the second local market. 
We can see that one element in this calculation is 
P(F/W). Let us go back one stage in the game now and 
consider the chain store's discussion whether or not to 
fight at stage 1 of the game. obviously, if the chain store 
is a thug, it will fight regardless. The game theory 
rational chain store must, however, calculate the optimal 
value of X=P(F/W) before it can decide whether or not to try 
to bluff the second entrant by fighting first. 
The calculation of this optimal X is, in reality, a 
complex task, but we can build up a solution heuristically 
as follows. What we do is to consider a weak monopolist's 
expected returns from an X which deters entry, and an X 
which does not. Consider first an X which does not 
successfully deter entry. From above we have : 
if X> Qf / [(1-0)(1-f)] then entry 
which will give expected returns of : 
-f(X) + (1-X)(1-f) + (1-f) = 2(1-f) -X 
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The explanation of this expression which is a decreasing 
function of X is that in the first play the monopolist 
fights with probability X and hence has expected returns 
from stage 1 of -f(X) + (1-X)(1-f). However, this strategy 
does not deter the second entrant who enters, in response to 
which the weak monopolist must accommodate, earning profits 
of (1-f). 
Consider now an X which does successfully deter entry. 
We know that if : 
X< f2f / [(1-9)(1-f)] then no entry will occur 
which will give expected returns of 
-f(X) + (1-X)(1-f) + X(3-f) + (1-X)(1-f) = 2(1-f) +X 
The explanation of this expression which is an increasing 
function of X is that, as before, in the first play, the 
monopolist fights with some probability X and hence has 
expected returns from stage 1 of -f(X) + (1-X)(1-f). Now, 
however, this strategy does deter entry in stage 2, in those 
cases where the random strategy dictates fighting at stage 
1. Thus, second period expected profits are X(3-f) + 
(1-X)(1-f) , 
Below we graph the expected returns earned by the 
monopolist from fighting as a function of X. We can see that 
over some range this function is increasing, while over 
another range it is decreasing. The optimal X occurs at the 
point of discontinuity. 
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ER 
0 X- =1 X=P(F/W) 
Thus the optimal strategy for the weak monopolist at stage 1 
is to randomize his strategy (subjecting his decision, say, 
to the roll of a die) and then to take the strategy which 
chance dictates. An intuitive explanation of this difficult 
result is as follows. If the weak monopolist fights with too 
low a probability (in the limit 0), the probability is that 
he accommodates, in which case the second entrant will know 
he is not a thug and will thus enter the market. If however, 
the weak monopolist fights with too high a probability (in 
the limit 1), then the second entrant will simply discount 
the information he observes in the first market (knowing 
that the "weak" monopolist is simply trying to bluff him, 
the second entrant will take his chance and call the weak 
monopolist's bluff). What the "weak" monopolist-must do is 
to choose the probability with which he fights to balance 
these two opposite tendencies. If he chooses this 
probability optimally, he will deter the second entrant from 
entering the market on those occasions where "chance" in 
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fact dictates that he fights the first entrant. 
To see the strategic power of this random strategy 
equilibrium, consider finally the decision of the first 
entrant of whether or not he should enter local market 1. 
Clearly this entrant is concerned about the probability of 
fighting should he enter the market. From the axioms of 
probability we know: 
P(F) = P(F/S)P(S) + P(F/W)P(W) 
+ [9 f(I-9)] /=a/ 1-f 
The first entrant will use this probability in calculating 
his expected profits from entry, and hence will not enter 
the market if 9> (I-f)2. Since O<f<l, we can see from this 
expression that even a small degree of uncertainty may well 
dissuade the first, and hence the second entrant from taking 
on the chain store. 
This result is an important extension of the argument in 
this Chapter to date. To summarize, we saw in Section 9.3 
that in a world of complete certainty, strategic threats 
were only credible if the threat was the optimal ex-post 
response to the situation, where the agent being threatened 
calls the bluff of the agent making the threat. Now we have 
a more general result. In repeated play situations with 
imperfect information, it is the appearance rather than the 
reality of ex-post optimal prediction which is important. 
Now we have a convincing account of why firms make it an 
important aspect of their competitive strategy to keep 
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information secret, and at times to deliberately misinform 
market rivals. By so doing, they may well be increasing 
their ability subsequently to make threats which, in the 
absence of full information, seem more convincing than they 
would do if market rivals had access to this information. 
9.7 BRAND PROLIFERATION AND DIVERSIFICATION AS STRATEGIC 
MARKET WEAPONS 
In practice, we observe a variety of products of the 
same general "type" being sold in markets. One can, for 
example, buy different sorts of shoes, electric kettles, 
golf clubs and so on. Part of this product diversity no 
doubt relates to the saturation of the differing needs of 
consumers in a market economy. In this section, however we 
examine how firms may use product differentiation as a 
strategic weapon against other firms. Before, attempting, it 
is useful to distinguish two types of product 
differentiation - horizontal and vertical. The difference is 
as follows: If two horizontally differentiated products were 
offered at the same price, some customers would prefer one 
of the brands, others would prefer the other brand. If two 
vertically differentiated products were offered at the same 
price, one of the two products would be preferred by all. In 
other words, vertical product differentiation relates' to 
quality differences between goods, , whereas horizontal 
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product differentiation relates to different preferences 
between individuals for different brands when overall 
quality is the same. Below, we illustrate how horizontal 
product differentiation might be used by firms as a 
strategic weapon designed to gain competitive advantage, 
although the example can easily be generalized to the 
vertical product differentiation case as well. 
Let us then take the case of horizontal product 
differentiation. The basic idea here is that, by 
proliferating brands, a firm may be able to fill up the 
product space in such a way that there are no remaining 
slots for profitable entry. To examine this issue, we need a 
suitable conceptual framework. The usual framework in which 
these issues are examined is due to Hotelling (1929). He 
imagined a Main Street, with consumers uniformly distributed 
along it, and with firms producing a physically identical 
product but situating themselves at different points along 
the street. It may be easy to think of Hotelling's main 
street as a beach with various ice cream sellers situated at 
different points along it. The crucial point to notice in 
this context is that because of transportation costs, the 
apparently identical good will in fact be differentiated in 
the eyes of the various consumers - consumers will prefer 
the good that is located nearest to them. Further, if there 
are several active sellers, and if consumers take account 
not just of market prices but also of the distance they have 
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to travel to purchase the good, then a small change in the 
price of one of the "brands" will only affect the demand for 
those brands in the immediate vicinity of the brand whose 
price has just been changed. This is the phenomenon of 
location competition in differentiated product markets. 
With this background, we can now examine the issue of 
the strategic use of brand proliferation by firms, using the 
model of Schmalensee (1978), which itself is a simple 
extension of the Hotelling framework. Schmalensee (1978) 
makes several key assumptions in his analysis. First, he 
assumes that for individual brands, at least at low levels 
of output, the unit cost of production falls with increases 
in output. Without such a range of increasing returns, each 
consumer in the country would be able to purchase at 
reasonable cost a brand of the good in question tailored 
exactlV to his tastes. Secondly, he makes a Hotelling type 
assumption that small changes in a brand's price are felt 
only by its two closest neighbours on the line. However, in 
slight contrast to Hotelling, Schmalensee (1978) imagines 
his buyers to be uniformly distributed around a circle of 
unit circumference (as we shall see, this simplifies the 
mathematics of the problem). Finally, Schmalensee assumes 
that changes in location are not costless in the sense that 
it is not generally costless to change brands, -locations in 
the space of consumer perceptions of attributes provided. 
The existence of such repositioning costs is well documented 
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in the marketing literature. 
With these three assumptions of increasing returns, 
localized competition, and relative immobility, consider a 
solution where there are N established brands located 
distances IIN apart around a circle, all commanding, the 
same price p. For simplicity, suppose all potential 
entrants face expected kinked demand curves at this price - 
that is they feel that established rivals would, not match 
prices above p. On the other hand, they expect prices below 
p to be rendered unattractive by drastic retaliatory price 
cuts by established brands. Any new entrant would thus 
charge p. 
As in the Hotelling model, with each brand selling at 
the same price, buyers patronize the "closest" brand. Under 
the above assumptions, each brand is closest for buyers 
located at all, distances from it less than or equal to 1/2N, 
i. e. half the distance to its rivals on either side. With 
these assumptions we can write the demand curve for each 
brand as : 
q=q (P, N) 
That is, the demand for each brand will be a function of the 
brands price-(local competition effect) and the overall 
number of brands (market size effect). As an individual 
seller lowers the price of his good, the-demand for it will 
increase as customers are attracted away from neighbouring 
sellers. on the other hand, as the total number of sellers 
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increase, the demand for an existing seller's good will 
decrease as some marginal customers (the ones located 
furthest from the existing seller) are attracted to the 
easier location of the new entrant. Profits of a typical 
brand can be simply written as: 
u= pq(P, N) -c 
Fix p and let R be the solution of n(pR)=O, i. e. if the 
number of sellers in the market increases sufficiently, 
there will eventually be a market saturation effect and the 
profitability of each seller will be driven to zero. This 
saturation level of sellers is R. Established brands are 
thus profitable so long as N<R. 
An entrant must locate somewhere between two established 
brands and will in fact do best by locating exactly in the 
middle of any open interval between two existing sets of 
brands. Such an entrant's sales will be made only a distance 
1/4N to the left, and 1/4N to the right - halfway to the 
nearest rival brands. If the rivals are immobile, sales at 
that level must rationally be expected to persist. The new 
brand's profit will then be n(p, 2N). It follows that the 
entrants profits will be positive only if N< 9/2. Hence, as 
long as 9/2 <N<9, all existing brands earn positive 
profits, but any entrant would suffer losses. 
To illustrate a simple case, see Figure 9.9 below. In 
the first circle we illustrate a market as above with- 9=4, 
and the four brands situated symmetrically around the 
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circle. Each brand attracts one quarter of the customer base 
which just ensures zero profitability. Consider a monopolist 
that produces three brands in this market, positioned 
symmetrically as in the second circle. in this case a new 
entrant can at most capture one sixth of the customer base 







Fj =4 but now existing brands are positioned differently 
The detailed features of this example obviously depend 
on some strong simplifying assumptions, but the general 
principles it illustrates do not. What we have in fact 
examined here is a more complex analysis of the "commitment" 
analysis in Section 9.3 and 9.4. The crucial feature of the 
analysis is that brand selection involves irreversible costs 
which persuade the entrant that one's existing product mix 
is there to stay. If the entrant thought that, by entering, 
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he could quickly persuade the incumbent to reposition his 
brands so that the entrant could avoid losses (say he 
thought that by entering the market in the case of Figure 
9.10 B, he could persuade the incumbent to "move" his brands 
2 and 3 up to position 2 and 4 in figure 9.10 A, then he 
would have every incentive to enter the market. With sunk 
costs in brand selection however, the entrant cannot rely on 
this and must in fact realize that in the case above, all 
the incumbent has to do is to "stick his ground" and let 
losses drive the entrant back out of the market. Thus, given 
the sunk costs in brand selection, product diversity can be 
an effective strategy to maintain a competitive advantage. 
It is easy to generalize the above discussion to cases 
where, rather than being concerned about product 
proliferation, we concentrate instead on diversification by 
firms. Consider, for example, the simple "horizontal" 
diversification strategy of setting up a chain of retail 
pharmacies diversified across locations. Assume away for the 
moment any possible economies of such things as bulk 
purchasing and concentrate on the advantages of optimal 
location. Again, we can use Hotelling's Main Street to 
discuss this issue. The closer pharmacies are located 
together, the fewer customers each will attract and the 
lower will be their profits. By locating further apart, 
profits will be increased but if too large a gap is left in 
the market, this will attract entry and profits will fall 
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again. The trick for the chain is to spread out its shops 
far enough to make handsome profits yet close enough such 
that there are no gaps in the market which are profitable 
enough to attract entry (see _Hay 
(1976) for a detailed 
model). The argument is exactly analogous to the Schmalensee 
argument of the previous section. 
Once again of particular interest to our concern is the 
role that sunk costs play in the above argument. This can be 
brought out by considering why potential entrants in the 
above example, do not try to enter next door to an existing 
shop in the expectation that the latter will feel crowded 
and shift itself further away. As we explained in the 
previous section, such an expectation might be quite 
reasonable if "moving stop" was as easy as moving an ice 
cream van further along the beach. However, with a chemists 
shop, there will undoubtedly be location specific sunk costs 
such as the stock of goodwill built up over time from a 
known customer base overtime. Such sunk costs are not 
recoverable if the pharmacy has to move location and serve 
as a credible signal to potential entrants that the 
incumbent intends to remain in the local market. It is the 
non-salvagable nature of assets such as customer goodwill 
that makes the threat not to move so credible. 
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9.8 VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
The strategic advantages and disadvantages of vertical 
integration has always been a much disputed topic in the 
field of Industrial Economics. For example, Comanor (1967) 
has argued that, by raising the capital requirement of 
entry, vertical integration can be an effective strategic 
weapon of entry deterrence if the cost of raising finance in 
the capital market is an increasing function of the sum 
raised. On the other hand it can be pointed out that if 
indeed vertical integration does permit higher profits for 
incumbents in the short run, this will constitute a signal 
to other firms and the capital market, which will inexorably 
attract new entry. It is not our intention to review their 
arguments in any detail, but to focus instead on the light 
our analysis throws on the vertical integration issue. We 
would argue that the strateqic motives for vertical 
integration must relate to the exploitation of sunk costs 
and / or reputation effects by firms - otherwise the 
strategy is almost bound to lack credibility. 
It is possible to envisage many reasons within our 
framework why vertical integration might constitute an 
attractive strategic market move. For example, to pick up 
the theme of section 9.7, integration may be a means to 
increase the product differentiation barrier. It will be 
remembered from that section that careful #selection of 
market brands may effectively deter entry. Since integrated 
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firms manufacture their own inputs, they have increased 
opportunities to vary the specification of inputs which may 
be necessary to offering desired range of differentiated 
products in the final goods a market. 
More subtly, consider an incumbent with market power in 
industry A who sells a quantity of his output into a related 
market B. Lacking the means to commit in industry A, perhaps 
because the technology does not allow irreversible 
investment decisions, or lacking the desire to overcommit 
too heavily in A because if there is entry, the incumbent 
would rather be a "puppy dog" (to use the terminology of 
Section 9.5), the incumbent may still be able to signal his 
commitment to the industry by making an irrevocable 
commitment in the market B. This may be sufficient either 
to deter entry or reduce the number of entrants who now 
realize the incumbent is committed to the industry. A good 
example of this might be an airline (industry A) which 
invests heavily in a local market network (industry B) and 
commits funds to promote his own name. The airline industry 
may be highly contestable (capital can easily be transferred 
to other air-routes), while the local marketing network may 
be non-contestable because of, for example, goodwill and 
reputation effects. Without commitment of funds to the 
marketing network by the incumbent, an aggressive entrant 
would have a much better chance of dislodging the incumbent 
from the air-carrier market. 
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9.9 LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES - THE PATENT SYSTEM 
In our discussion of strategic market moves so far, we 
have considered many ways in which firms might -act 
strategically to shut the door on the possibility of 
competition. As a final important contribution to the 
discussion, let us remember that transactions and 
interactions across markets by firms must be set against the 
background of a complex legal system of entitlement and 
enforcement designed to ensure that markets do not 
degenerate into a state of anarchy. It has long been 
realized by economists that firm's may attempt to 
strategically manipulate the legal framework upon which they 
depend for orderly transactions across markets, in order to 
gain a competitive advantage over market rivals, potential 
or actual. This is not quite the same thing as manipulating 
the individuals who police any given regulatory environment 
- the case of "regulator capture" is well documented and is 
not our concern here. What is at issue is the arguably more 
complex problem of a firm manipulating the regulatory 
framework per se to its own advantage. There have been 
several examples of this proposed in the literature, but the 
most famous and contentious issues revolve around the 
patenting system and the questions of whether patents act as 
a catalyst or a deterrent to invention. 
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This issue can best be discussed in reference to a model 
due to Gilbert and Newbery (1982). They imagine a market 
currently dominated by one incumbent monopolist and where 
entry into the industry can only take place through the 
invention and patenting of a single patentable substitute 
for the monopolist's product. Assume there is a competitive 
environment for this single patentable substitute. In 
reality the mechanics of the patent race between the various 
competitors for the patent is likely to be extremely complex 
(see, for example, Harris and Vickers, 1985). To simplify 
matters, however, Gilbert and Newbery assume that the patent 
race can be modelled as an auction, with the winner of the 
race being the agent who submits the highest bid for the 
patent, and with the losers incurring no irrecoverable costs 
by submitting losing bids. This is clearly an unsatisfactory 
modeling assumption, but does have the advantage of 
clarifying important issues, as will be demonstrated below. 




n.., = profits per firm under duopolistic production. 
n. = profits occurring to any single firm under monopoly. 
a= the extra cost an inefficient incumbent must incur to 
beat the most efficient potential entrant in the patent race 
(if there is no such inefficiency a= 0) 
a... = the excess of industry profits with monopoly over 
industry profits with duopoly (if there is perfect collusion 
a.... = 0. More generally a... n. - 2na > 0). 
There will, of course be an incentive for the 
incumbent monopolist to pre-emptively patent the substitute 
product if the profits from pre-emption exceed the profits 
from losing the patent race and subsequently earning duopoly 
profits. What will the monopolist "bid" in the patent race 
in these circumstances and how will this bid compare with 
the highest "bid" of the potential rivals for the substitute 
product? We know that in the competitive scramble amongst 
the potential entrants, they will bid up to njL to gain the 
patent (any bid up to this price will ensure subsequent 
profitability). Further, we know that in the event of entry 
the current incumbent will earn ný&, whereas if he pre-empts 
the bids from his rivals for the substitute product, he must 
spend a more than u., and thus will earn post-patent race 
profits n. - [a + n<, ]. Thus the incumbent has an incentive 
to pre-emptively patent the substitute product if: 
Trm -(a+ ma ]> TE., 
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i. e. if: Tr. - 2n,, >a 
In many cases this may well be the case - so long as the 
monopolist's inefficiency in Research and Development does 
not exceed the difference between monopoly and total duopoly 
profits (which might very well happen, especially if the 
post-patent race game was likely to be non-cooperative), the 
incumbent has an incentive to pre-empt competition for the 
substitute product, even if, having won the patent race, the 
monopolist decides not to produce the substitute product, 
but instead to let the patent sleep. 
This Gilbert and Newbery argument has'been subjected to 
some criticism. Salant (1984), for example, has pointed out 
that the result is valid only if one assumes the sale of 
patented technology is impossible. Such a situation can 
arise if, for instance, the cost of bargaining about the 
terms of the sale is high. Nevertheless, under the Gilbert 
and Newbery assumptions, the result is valid, and the 
argument demonstrates clearly the possibility that the legal 
system itself (in this case the patent system) may give-rise 
to strategic moves by firms designed to exploit this legal 
framework to their own advantage. 
9.10 CONCLUSION 
We by defining exactly what we mean by "strategic". It 
is a word that is perhaps used too much, but Schelling's 
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(1960) definition clarifies the concept -a strategic move 
is a move designed to alter the behaviour of others. We 
proceeded to apply this notion to the question of actual and 
potential competition between firms. For a strategic move 
to be successful, it must influence other firms' expected 
payoffs from the various courses of action open to them. We 
examined two ways in which this can happen. 
The first is for the strategic move to influence, in a 
lasting way cost or demand conditions. Investments in 
capacity, R&D and advertising have been the major 
strategic weapons to be examined. Strategic use of 
expenditure on these items is possible because of the nature 
of the costs associated with them - they are, at least to a 
degree, "sunk" costs, and hence require an irreversible 
commitment by the firms that use them. We examined a verity 
of possible commitments by firms and concluded that the 
scope for strategic use of these weapons was a function of 
the nature of market competition (in particular whether it 
was price sensitive), and the nature of the investments 
themselves - certain types of investment expenditure (eg. 
physical capacity) make a firm more aggressive when it comes 
to price competition, while other investments (eg. 
advertising) can make a firm less aggressive in the same 
environment. 
The second way for a strategic move to succeed is for it 
to influence the beliefs of those whose behaviour it is 
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designed to affect, even if it does not affect actual cost 
and demand conditions at all. 'With asymmetric information 
between market participants, the less informed firms will 
make inferences from the behaviour of more informed rivals. 
We examined this theme with reference to the vexed question 
of predatory pricing and concluded that, because in a world 
of uncertainty, appearance rather than reality is what 
counts, firms may well engage in predatory practices to gain 
a reputation for toughness which is designed to influence 
the beliefs of other firms in-the market, and those that 
might be contemplating entry. - 
We broadened the discussion introducing the complexities 
of multi-product firms operating in multi-product markets 
and those arising from the existence of the legal and 
regulatory framework. In this environment, the 
possibilities for strategic moves designed to influence a 
firm's competitive position are even more manifold. 
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PART V- EMPIRICAL TESTS 
CHAPTER 10 
TESTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
10.1 THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 
In earlier parts of this thesis we have examined the 
analytical and empirical literature concerning internal and 
external aspects of competitive advantage. 
As far as the internal aspects are concerned, the main 
focus has been on the pay. / performance relationship, the 
conjecture being that a company might gain a competitive 
advantage over its market rivals by employing some 
approximation to optimal managerial contracts. The 
conjecture has been tested almost exclusively on- cross - 
section data. Given that inter-firm and inter-industry 
differences are likely to be key variables in explaining 
differences in compensation levels, the use of executive 
remuneration data across companies at a particular point in 
time (rather than considering the extent to which 
compensation varies over time with performance) casts doubt 
on the robustness of the results. This problem is compounded 
further by the general inconclusiveness of the findings. 
Virtually all the studies are plagued with the issue of 
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causation : does improved corporate performance arise from 
appropriate managerial incentives for greater effort; or 
does improved performance arise for other reasons, higher 
managerial compensation merely reflecting the improvement in 
performance? 
A rather similar conclusion emerges from the empirical 
literature concerning the external aspects of competitive 
advantage, particularly the empirical work within the 
framework of the structure - conduct - performance paradigm. 
The use of both cross-sectional data and time series pooled 
data-has lead to a host of conflicting arguments with regard 
to the exact nature of the relationship between seller 
concentration and profitability., Furthermore, much debate 
has focused on the -fundamental issue as to whether the 
degree of concentration affecting firm performance is due in 
part to the market power of the firm to raise prices, or 
whether any SCP effect is due to one or more firms having 
greater efficiency and lower costs. The issues become even 
more complex when long run cost factors are introduced. Are 
the large firms operating at a lower point on this function- 
and thus leading to industries becoming more concentrated?; 
or is the problem one of distinguishing between the effects 
of scale economies and entry barriers and or other 
concentration effects? Many of the empirical tests are also 
ambiguous : for example, the hypothesis of a possible 
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positive relationship between industries in high risk 
classes, as measured by beta values, and performance has 
found support; but several studies have found no 
relationship. An issue addressed by some studies is the 
appropriate unit for analysis. The notion of an industry as 
a unit for analysis becomes problematic when firms are 
highly diversified, or goods differentiated. Therefore, the 
analysis at the industry level could not only be 
uninteresting, but misleading. 
The foregoing considerations suggest that it might be 
illuminating to investigate new methods of testing for 
possible internal and external routes to competitive 
advantage. Cross - section methods have not been 
conspicuously successful in throwing light on the issues 
involved, so it is useful to consider what can be achieved 
by time series methods. In what follows we will examine what 
cointegration methods of time series analysis have to offer. 
10.2 COINTEGRATION 
The Cointegration approach to time series analysis 
interprets equilibrium relationships as being statistical 
properties of time series for which tests can, and should, 
be conducted. The approach has its roots in two bodies of 
literature : the statistical literature on testing for unit 
roots and stationarity in time series, and the econometrics 
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literature on distinguishing actual from spurious 
relationships between variables. The concept of 
cointegration was coined in the 19801s, the seminal -paper 
usually being taken to be Granger (1983, eventually 
published in 1986). As far as we are aware, the approach has 
not been applied to the topic of competitive advantage. The 
empirical work reported later in this section can be seen as 
a modest, preliminary attempt to discover whether the notion 
of cointegration can shed light on the possibilities for 
gaining competitive advantage by way of the routes discussed 
in Parts II and III of this thesis. In particular, we will 
use the cointegration approach to ask two questions is 
there a tendency for an individual firm's share price to 
converge onto an equilibrium relationship with share prices 
in the market or economy as a whole? ; and is there a 
similar tendency to converge onto an equilibrium 
relationship between executive pay and the parent firm's 
share price? At the outset it must be stressed that the 
motivation for the empirical work was more one of exploring 
the possibilities of applying cointegration to the issue of 
competitive advantage than one of expecting cointegration 
tests to provide a clear means of arbitrating between the 
theories under consideration : as might be expected, the 
results of the cointegration tests are open to more than-one 
interpretation. 
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On a more positive note, the cointegration approach at 
least offers a time series perspective on the problem of 
competitive advantage, as opposed to the cross-section 
perspective which predominates in empirical work in this 
area. Given the inconclusive nature of much of the existing 
empirical work on competitive advantage, it would seem to be 
worthwhile to see if an alternative framework for empirical 
tests might be any more successful. 
The general problem which the cointegration approach 
addresses is that of distinguishing spurious from 
non-spurious systematic co-movements of time series 
variables in economics (for a discussion which sets 
cointegration in the context of the spurious correlation 
problem, see Hendry, 1986). It is not difficult to find 
correlations between the time series representations of the 
variables with which economics deals. The conventional 
approach to ruling out spurious relationships involves 
little more than requiring that there must be some 
theoretical reason for expecting a relationship to exist : 
thus, for example, a correlation between the competitive. 
performance of a firm and the cumulative incidence of 
dysentery in Scotland would be regarded as spurious given 
that there is no theoretical story as to why the two 
phenomena should be linked. The cointegration approach 
imposes more stringent requirements for relationships to be 
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deemed non-spurious : the variables involved need to be 
integrated of the same order, i. e. the same degree of 
differencing is required to induce stationarity and the 
implied tendency to return to a mean value. In addition, 
there has to exist a cointegrating vector of coefficients 
linking the variables such that the system tends to converge 
onto the equilibrium postulated (see Granger, 1986). 
The point of departure is that time series for the 
variables which, in this context, might affect competitive 
advantage are non-stationary and require differencing to 
induce stationarity. Consider the following expression: 
X-t-- =a+ bX*--. x + E*_ [11.1] 
The most basic example of non-stationarity is the random 
walk without drift case, gained by setting a=O and b=l in 
[11.1]. In this case (11.1] can be re - written as: 
Xt- = E_-L-xE-t-__& given X. =O [11.2] 
where E is an independently, normally distributed innovation 
with zero mean and constant variance. This process is 
non-stationary, there being no tendency to return to a mean 
value : the moments of the distribution of X estimated over. 
any given time interval will not tend to converge on the 
moments of the population distribution - the variance of X, 
for example, increases as ta2a (see Dickey and Fuller, 
1979). The series has an indefinitely long memory, each past 
innovation having an equal impact on the current realisation 
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of X, as contrasted with the stationary case O<b<l where 
past innovations decay in importance over time, and the 
explosive case, b>1, where past innovations increase in 
importance over time. In this random walk case, first 
differencing will clearly induce stationarity, X having the 
same properties as E. In order that there be a non-spurious 
relationship between a set of variables, X3., ' X2 .... Xr% it is 
necessary that the same degree of differencing is required 
to induce stationarity, otherwise the variables will show no 
tendency to cohere together over time. 
For the variables under consideration to tend to 
converge on some equilibrium configuration it is necessary, 
but not sufficient, that they are integrated of the same 
order : the latter condition does not rule out the case 
where the relationship between the variables is 
characterised by a residual which is non-stationary, 
implying that there is no tendency to converge onto the 
equilibrium relationship postulated. A further consideration 
necessary for cointegration, then, is that there exists a 
cointegration relationship: 
X3L, 
I-- (X3. +(y2X2, *-+(X3X3, t 
Z*- [11o3l 
such that Zt--I(O), i. e. that the Z residual is stationary, 
where 1(0) indicates "integrated of order zero", I(1) 
indicates "integrated of order one", and so on. The Z 
residual is usually specified as IN (o, a2. ), i. e. as an 
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independently, normally distributed innovation with, 
accordingly, a zero mean and constant variance. If the null 
hypothesis that Z, -I(l), i. e. that Z, _ 
has a unit -root, 
cannot be rejected, the implication is that the time path of 
the X variables in relation to the equilibrium postulated is 
random : the co-movements of the X variables are misleading, 
there being no tendency for the variables to cohere in a 
relationship which, for want of a better term, might be 
thought of as an equilibrium. 
In the empirical work reported in Chapter 11 we will be 
concerned with the bi-variate case of cointegration, the 
variables in question being pair-wise combinations of share 
prices for individual firms, share prices in the rest of the 
market or economy, and executive compensation. Central to 
the empirical work will be tests for unit roots in these 
variables. The presence of a unit root implies that a 
variable can take on any value with non-zero probability. 
This is clearly implausible for the variables- under 
consideration, share prices, for example, being bounded from 
below by asset scrap values, and from above by the finite 
nature of wealth. In an attempt to deal with this problem 
the analysis will be couched in terms of the (natural) 
logarithms. This is an imperfect solution because, of 
course, logarithms themselves are not bounded : lnX, for 
example, has no superior limit as X approaches w. Given that 
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the first derivative of lnX, X-1, does have a bound, 
approaching zero as X approaches c*, the use of logarithms 
comes. closer to natural numbers in respecting' the 
boundedness of the time series in question. 
The cointegration tests reported in the next chapter 
deal with two questions : is the share price of an 
individual company cointegrated with the share price of the 
sector in which it operates, or with share prices in the 
economy as a whole?, and is the compensation paid to the 
senior, or highest paid executive officer of a company 
cointegrated with the companies share price? As far as the 
former question is concerned, the presence of cointegration 
could be seen as prima facie evidence that competitive 
advantage has not been sustained over the period in 
question. In relation to the second question, the presence 
of cointegration could be interpreted to imply that the 
executive compensation schedule is serving to align the 
interests of the principal (the shareholders) with'those of 
the agent (the executive). The absence of cointegration 
could be seen as implying, in relation to the first 
question, that there are opportunities for sustained 
competitive advantage and, in relation to the second 
question, that the executive's compensation, although 
perhaps nominally tied to performance, as measured by the 
share price, has no deep-seated relationship with the share 
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price of the company. As far as both questions are 
concerned, any moron would expect, and could find, a 
positive correlation between the time series variables'under 
consideration. There would be no way of knowing, however, 
whether the correlations were spurious, or of some 
significance. The conditions for cointegration serve to 
define a more stringent test for distinguishing spurious 
from non-spurious relationships. The presence of a 
cointegration relationship between a set of variables does 
not in itself, of course, say anything about causality : any 
causal relationship inferred would be in the eye of the 
beholder, not endemic in the time series data. 
Unit Root Tests 
Given that we are interested purely in the case of 
whether two variables, Xx and X2, are cointegrated, the 
tests for cointegration can be simplified. Define a variable 
Y, such that 
Y, = lnX,,, - - 
lnX2,1- [11.4] 
In such circumstances the condition for cointegration 
becomes simply that the Y*- - I(1) null hypothesis can be 
rejected in favour of the Yft - 1(0) alternative if Y., - 
-I(l), the behaviour of ln(Xx, *-/X2,1--) is random, and there 
is no tendency to return to equilibrium or any other fixed 
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point; if Y*--I(O), however, ln (XX, -t--/X2, -t-) 
is stationary, 
and will tend to revert to some mean value ln(X3L,. t--/X2, *-)*. 
In relation to the tests to be conducted, our first question 
defines Xx as the firm's share price, and X2 as share prices 
in the sector or economy as a whole, and the cointegration 
tests ask whether there is a tendency to converge on an 
equilibrium ratio between the two prices; and in the second 
question X3L is defined as the compensation paid to the 
senior executive, and X2 as the firm's share price, and the 
cointegration test is for the existence of an equilibrium 
compensation - share price relationship. Using the notion 
introduced in [11.4], the critical question is whether we 
can reject the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in 
Y, 
_. 
General surveys of the problem involved in testing for unit 
roots in time series can be found in Dickey, Bell and Miller 
(1986), Phillips (1987) and Engle and Granger (1987). The 
central problem can be seen in relation to the following 
equation: 
Y*- = 13. + 13Yt--. L + E., - 
(11.5] 
It might be thought that the appropriate way to test for a 
unit root in Y*- would be to run regression equation (11.4] 
and see if the null hypothesis 0=1 can be rejected : if' not 
the unit root hypothesis, implying no cointegration between 
XýL and X2, could not be rejected. The problem is that under 
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the J3=1 null hypothesis the moments of the sample 
distribution of the estimators will not converge on those of 
the population, so any inferences drawn from such a 
regression equation would be invalid. 
The Sarqan - Bharqava Test 
The most straightforward test for cointegration is the 
Sargan - Bhargava (1983) test which uses the Durbin - Watson 
(DW) test statistic. This involves the primitive regression 
equation: 
Y-t- = 13. + E-, - 
[ 11.61 
The null hypothesis Y, - i(l) is equivalent to the p 
null hypothesis in : 
E*- = PE*--l. + gt- [11.7 
where g*- - IN(O, G2,, ) . Given that Y, - Y, -x = 
the 
case where A=l in [11.4] above if E, follows a random 
walk, so does Y*-- The Durbin Watson (DW) statistic is 
automatically calculated by most regression programmes, so 
this is a readily available test statistic. Sargan and 
Bhargava (1983) have calculated confidence limits for this 
test. Using a 5% size of test, and referring to the sample 
sizes involved in the tests reported in the next chapter, 
the null hypothesis that Y,, as defined in (11.4], has a 
unit root can be rejected only if the DW for Et- in [11.6] is 
274 
less than 0.259 in the case of 101 observations, or greater 
than 1.733 in the case of 11 observations (Sargan and 
Bhargava 1983, Table 1). The main drawback of the Sargan - 
Bhargava test is that it is only powerful against the 
alternative hypothesis that Y, follows a first-order 
autogressive process (see Engle and Granger, 1987, for an 
evaluation). 
The Dickey - Fuller Test 
The most general form of this test extends equation 
(11.5] to allow for the possible existence of a time trend : 
the existence of a significant time trend is fairly 
implausible in the relation to the two Yt-- 
ratios considered in this thesis, but cannot be ruled out a 
priori. Adding a time trend, [11.5] becomes : 
Yft = 13. + a(T-N/2) + PY-t---3L + E*- (11.81 
where (T-N/2) is used as the time trend to ensure a zero 
mean, N being the number of observations. The Dickey - 
Fuller test (see Fuller, 1976, Dickey and Fuller, 1979 and 
1981) involves subtracting Y*--.. L from both sides of (11.8], 
yielding : 
6 Yt- = 13. + (x(T-N/2) + (0-1)Y, -x + E*- (11.9] 
The null hypothesis Yt--I(l) is equivalent to A=l or A-1=0 in 
[11.9]. Thus the Y*- - I(I) null can be tested by asking 
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whether (13-1) is significantly different from zero. Given 
the null hypothesis, the relevant test is not the 
conventional t-statistic but the "Dickey-Fuller t-statistic" 
the distribution of which was calculated in Fuller (1976). 
For the latter distribution to be applied we need Ei-- to be 
IN(O, a2e) : otherwise it would be necessary to add lagged 
values of Y to [11.9] in order to generate "white noise" 
innovations for E, _ - in a formal sense, the critical values 
of the test statistics depend on the particular data 
generation process under consideration. In the particular 
applications considered in this thesis, such complications 
do not appear to arise, so we can stay with the 
"unaugmented" version of the Dickey-Fuller tests. Given a 
5% size of test, the null that A=1 or A-1=0 cannot be 
rejected if the t- statistic on the (A-1) coefficient in 
(11.9) is greater than -3.43 (i. e. less than 3.43 in terms 
of absolute size or modulus) in the case of 250 observations 
(see the third block in Table 8.5.2 of Fuller, 1976). If the 
time trend is eliminated for not being significant, as is 
likely, [11-9] becomes : 
Y, _ = A. + (A-1)Y, __, + E, _ [11.10] 
In the case, for a 5% size of test, the unit root null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected if the t-statistic on the 
(0-1) coefficient in [11.10] is greater than -2.88 (i. e. 
less than 2.88 in terms of absolute size or modulus) for the 
276 
case of 250 observations, the case relevant to the results 
reported in the next chapter (see the second block of Table 
8.5.2 in Fuller, 1976). 
A word of warning is perhaps necessary here in view of 
the fact that there is, as of yet, no general theory of 
optimality in tests for unit roots. Despite this, in the 
view of two of the leading researchers in this field, 
11 .... it appears that the critical values ..... can be used 
as a rough guide in empirical studies at this point 
... "(Engle and Granger 1987, p. 270). The field of testing 
for cointegration is developing rapidly at the moment. 
Amongst developments which might impinge on the approach 
adopted in this thesis, is the idea that it is preferable to 
test for cointegration by investigating error-correction 
mechanisms, and drawing inferences about equilibrium 
relationships from the disequilibrium, or error-correction 
framework (this point was made orally to the author by David 
-Hendry, 
but has not yet appeared in print). Engle and 
Granger (1987) suggest that the two approaches can generate 
equivalent results, so it is perhaps sensible to remain 
agnostic on this issue. Another approach, not employed in 
this thesis, is that of Phillips (1987), who develops a 
framework for testing for unit roots in the presence of 
"weakly dependent and heterogeneously distributed 
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innovations" (Phillips 1987, p. 277). Given that the point of 
our exercise is to investigate the usefulness of 
cointegration tests in an area, competitive advantage, to 
which they have not been applied, perhaps the high priests 
of econometrics would let us off with a warningl 
The main specific caveat to be made regarding our tests 
for unit roots would apply to any of the methods which could 
be used : the power of a, test of a null hypothesis that A=1 
is not likely to be high against alternative hypotheses 
which lie near the unit circle, A=0.95 for example. In a 
sense, this problem does not matter too much because, for 
example, A=0.95 case, although stationary, will imply that 
the time series in question will display only a weak 
tendency to return to a fixed value, such as the mean of the 
series. If the problem of low power of tests is deemed to be 
important all that we can say is that it is a problem about 
which not much can be done. 
10.3 THE DATA 
[a]. THE SAMPLE 
An initial sample of 100 companies was chosen, 
representing the top U. K. companies in terms of market 
capitalisation during 1987 (Source : Datastream). The 
observation period ran monthly from January 1970 to October 
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1987 and it was discovered that, for various reasons, such 
as merger or acquisition, only 52 companies of the original 
100 survived in the top 100 until the end of the period. 
Therefore the final sample of 52 reflects those companies 
operating during this seventeen year interval, and are 
categorised within the following industrial sectors : ten 
industrial companies; five building materials or supplies 
and construction firms; five electrical engineering or 
electronic and computer companies; nine natural resource or 
petroleum processing firms; two consumer goods and other 
manufacturing companies; four leisure and service firms; 
five retail and distribution companies; eleven food and 
drink or tobacco firms; six holding companies and five U. K. 
banks or insurance companies. 
See Table 11.1 for a comprehensive listing of the sample 
f irms. 
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[b]. THE DATA SOURCES 
The primary source of executive compensation data for 
the sample companies was, in the first instance, company 
annual reports, and secondly Monks Publications 
"Charterhouse Top Management Remuneration for the United 
Kingdom, 1979 - 19870. The Charterhouse report also contains 
a comprehensive summary of other firm specific data. 
Dividend and monthly share price data covering the 
period 1970 (1) - 1987 (10) was obtained from Datastream. 
THE VARIABLES 
Under the provisions of the 1967 Companies Act a 
requirement exists for companies to publish in their Annual 
Report the emoluments ( excluding pension contributions) of 
the chairman and the highest paid director (when other than 
the chairman). Executive Compensation is defined as base 
salary, bonus and the estimated money value of benefits paid 
in kind. However, these figures do not include the possible. 
impact of any shares or share options which may form a large 
part of the total compensation package. The holding of such 
shares or share options is, however, generally reported in 
each company's Annual Report. In the empirical work, we 
distinguish between those companies which do and those 
281 
companies which do not employ share option schemes. It was 
not possible, however, to distinguish between the different 
components of compensation (salary, bonus and other fringe 
benefits). 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
In the cointegration tests a specific measure of 
competitive advantage is adopted in the form of the 
deviation of a firm's share price from the industry -share 
price or the FT All-Share Index. As discussed previously, 
there are many measures of performance - return on capital, 
market share and so on. The rationale for using a firm's 
share price as the measure of performance restý with the 
Efficient Market hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that 
all relevant information relating to a firm's competitive 
strategy should be reflected in its share price. The firm's 
share price therefore encompasses information on all other 
performance measures. According to the Efficient Markets 
hypothesis, investors will never knowingly make forecasting 
errors given current information, thus any discrepancy. 
between the expected rates of return of different assets 
will quickly arbitrage to eliminate supernormal profits. A 
survey by Fama (1970) overwhelmingly concluded that data on 
past returns and asset prices cannot be used to predict 
changes in actual asset returns -a suggestion that stock 
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markets are perhaps efficient. 
Given that corporate performance is measured by a firm's 
share price, the test for competitive advantage is to 
ascertain whether there is any systematic deviation between 
the company share price and that of its competitors. A major 
issue discussed earlier, however, is the difficulty of 
delineating properly the market within which firms compete. 
Initially, tests were conducted using the traditional 
assumption that firm's compete with others within the. same 
industry. Given that there is some doubt about the concept 
of a market, however, firms were also judged against the 
market as a whole, using the FT All-Share Index. It turned 




TESTS OF THE FIRM - INDUSTRY - ECONOMY - RELATIONSHIP 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
Section 10.2 indicated that a test for the existence of 
competitive advantage is to examine whether the share 'price 
of an individual company is cointegrated with the share 
price of the sector within which it operates, or with share 
prices in the economy as a whole. The presence of 
cointegration can be seen as evidence that competitive 
advantage has not been sustained over the period in 
question. 
A visual inspection of the data (see Appendix 3), does 
not readily provide an answer. The top 52 U. K. companies 
display a wide variety of share price experiences and it is 
not readily apparent whether or not there is any tendency 
for the share prices to converge on a mean value. 
The two conditions necessary for the presence of 
cointegration were explained in section 11.2. First, the 
variables must be integrated of the same order. 
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which implies that the same amount of differencing is 
required to induce stationarity. In other words : 
XýL. A. V-, 
X2ýLl- -I (N) 
where Xi., L., -- is the share price of the i-I& firm and X2; Ll is 
either the share price of the sector in which the i-2" firm 
operates or shares in the whole economy (FT All-Share 
Index). Second, there must exist a cointegration vector for: 
X3L--Lt- =aO + (X3LX2$. -t-- + Ej-t- 
such that E, - 
11.2 ORDER OF INTEGRATION 
I To examine the order of integration of the variables, 
two tests were conducted : the Sargan - Bhargava and Dickey 
- Fuller tests. The Sargan - Bhargava test involved running 
regressions for : 
X3L, L*- ý Ao + E. -L*- 
and 
X2x*- = po + EL*- 
The null hypothesis of a unit root, that X2. L*- - I(l), 
is rejected in favour of the alternative that Xx&*-, X2&-l 
were stationary [1(0)] if the Durbin - Watson test was 
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greater than 0.259 in the case of 101 observations. In 
levels it was found that the null hypothesis of a unit root 
could not be rejected (see table 11.1) in any of the 52 
firm's share prices, the 13 industries or the FT All-Share 
price. 
The problem with the Sargan - Bhargava test mentioned 
earlier, however, is that it is only powerful against the 
alternative that the variables follow a first - order 
autoregressive process. The order of integration was 
therefore also tested using the Dickey - Fuller test. The 
most general form of this test involved running regressions 
for : 
13ýLo + 13., LL (T-n/2) 
+ AýL2 XýLJ-*--X + E5-*- 
and 
6 X2ZLI AlLO + D. ILX (T-n/2) + AýL2 X2. Li---X + EL*- 
If the hypothesis that Am #0 cannot be rejected, 
then the hypothesis that A2 0, that is Xx: L*-, X24-*- 
cannot be rejected if the Dickey - Fuller test statistic on 
A2 is greater than -3.43 for 250 observations. 
The first step, however, was to test the significance of 
the go and Ax coefficients using the standard t-test. With a 
5% test size, the hypothesis that go, Ax are significantly 
different from zero can be rejected if the t- statistic is 
less than 1.98 for 120 observations. In a number of cases 
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the time trend and constant were significant (see table 
11.1), but in all cases the null hypothesis that =0 could 
not be rejected. The tests were re-run excluding first the 
time trend and then both the time trend and constant. In the 
first instance, the test was : 
6 XxýL*- = AýLo + ILL2 Xi. ýL*--x + ELt- 
and 
6 x, 2&, - = 13; Lo + 13&2 X2&. e-x 
If J3o proved significantly different from zero, we could 
not reject the null that A2 = 0, for a 5% test size, if the 
Dickey - Fuller statistic was greater than -2.88 (see Table 
11.2). In the second instance, the test was : 
XXýL*- ý J31.2 X3., L*--3. + EL*- 
and 
6 Xla-*- ý-- 13.1.2 XXlLt--X + EL-r- 
The null that 92 =0 could not be rejected if the Dickey 
- Fuller test statistic was greater than -1.95 for 250 
observations (see Table 11.3). It turned out that in no case 
could the null hypothesis, that there existed a unit root be 
rejected, the implication being that neither the firm's 
share prices, industry prices nor the FT-All Share Index 
were integrated of order zero. 
It is important to note here that in all the Dickey - 
Fuller tests conducted, problems of heteroscedasticity, as 
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reflected in the F(4) statistic, or higher order 
autocorrelation reflected in the F(12) statistic, did not 
appear to arise. It did not appear necessary therefore, to 
add lagged values Of XXJL1 Or X2, Lt--. The unaugmented Dickey - 
Fuller tests proved sufficient. 
Both the Sargan - Bhargava test and Dickey - Fuller 
tests suggested that we could not reject the hypothesis that 
variables were I(l) against the alternative that they were 
I(0). 
The Sargan - Bhargava tests were therefore run using the 
first difference of the variables : 
6 XxýL-t- ý l3o + EL*- 
and 
6 X2&*- -,: j3o + E&*- 
In this case the null hypothesis was that 6 Xxtt-, 6 
X2.. L,, --I(2), against 
the alternative that the variables were 
integrated of order one. Table 11.4 demonstrates that the 
variables appear to be integrated of order one. The null 
hypothesis could be rejected in favour of the alternative. 
According to the Sargan - Bhargava test therefore, the first 
condition for cointegration, that the variables are 
integrated of the same order, appears to be satisfied. 
Confirmation of the above results can be gained by 
re-running the Dickey - Fuller tests in second differences, 
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such that : 
62 Xl. ýL*- = )3jo + JILx(T-N/2) + pýL. XxýL-t---x 
and 
X2ýL-t- = AjLo + A,,, (T-N/2) + AJL2 X2J-, --X + E. L-t- 
11.3 COINTEGRATION VECTOR 
The second condition for cointegration, that there 
exists a cointegration vector for 
X3L. I. V- -'ý aO 
+ aXX2ýL*- + ELim 
such that EL*- - 1(0) is examined in much the same way as 
above, replacing Yj-*- for X3... L, - and X2, L*- 
in the above 
equations, where : 
YX*- ý X3LXV- - X2Xt- 
ie. the log of the company share price divided by the sector 
or economy wide index. 
The Durbin - Watson statistics for the Sargan - Bhargava 
tests were thus derived from the regression : 
YýL*-- = Ao + EjL*- 
while the Dickey - Fuller test statistics were derived from 
one of the following regressions : 
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62 YxýL*- ---2 Axo + )3xjL(T-N/2) + 
13X2 YJLALt--3. + Ext- 
r) 2 YJLX*- = j3XO + 13J-2 YI.; Lt---JL + E5-*- 
62 Y3.. ILt-- '= 13ýL2 
YXýL-t: 
-l + Ei. -t-- 
depending on whether the constant and time trends were 
significant. The null hypothesis in each case, as above, was 
that the variables were I(l) against the alternative that 
they were 1(0). 
According to the Sargan - Bhargava test, in no case 
could the null be rejected when X2., Lft represented the 
industry share price (Table 11.5). In every case the Durbin 
- Watson statistic was less than 0.259. The same was true 
when X2., -.,, - represented share prices 
in the whole economy 
(Table 11.6) with only four exceptions. The share prices of 
Bunzl, The Granada Group, Grand Metropolitan and Whitbread 
appeared to converge on that of the FT All-Share price. 
The more general Dickey - Fuller testst however, threw 
up more diverse results. The first point of interest was 
that in both cases when X2,.., -- represented the industry and 
economy share prices, the time trend did prove significant 
in some cases (see Tables 11.5 & 11.8). It does seem 
dangerous, however, given the limited length of the time 
period under consideration, to extrapolate outside the data 
period. It was noted earlier that a significant time trend 
seems fairly implausible given that a firm's share price is 
included in the industry price index. A significant time 
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trend would appear to imply that the firm's share price 
diverges exponentially away from the industry index. Little 
confidence has therefore been placed in these results and 
the time trend excluded in all cases. 
It turned out that when X2. L, represented the industry 
share price and it was appropriate to include a constant 
(see Table 11.6), the null that there exists a unit root 
could not be rejected in 11 out. of 21 cases (the Dickey - 
Fuller statistic was greater than -2.89 in all these cases). 
Where it was appropriate to exclude the constant (Table 
11.7), the null could not be rejected in, 26 out of 28 cases 
(the Dickey - Fuller statistic was greater than -1.96 in 
these cases). 
When X2-L*- represented share prices in the economy as a 
whole and it was appropriate to include a constant (Table 
11.9), the null could not be rejected in 10 out of 19 cases 
and where the constant was excluded (Table 11.10) the null 
could not be rejected in 26 out of 31 cases. 
A caveat to the results must be noted, however. The 
regressions did appear to suffer in a number of instances, 
from problems of both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. These instances are denoted by an asterisk 
against the LM and Heteroscedasticity test statistics in the 
results. However, the problems do appear to emerge in those 
instances where the null hypothesis can be rejected, a 
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situation which perhaps does not undermine the conclusions 
highlighted below. 
11.4 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
The results above are, of course, open to many 
interpretations and given problems of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity are at best tentative. What they appear 
to suggest, however, is that opportunities exist to exploit 
the market, which implies that supernormal profits are 
sustainable over time. The first condition for 
cointegration, which states that the variables under 
consideration must be integrated of the same order, appears 
to be satisfied without exception. In approximately 75% of 
the cases, however, there does not appear to exist a 
cointegration vector such that the regression residuals are 
1(0). The implication is that the firm's share prices are 
not cointegrated with either those of the industry in which 
they compete nor (if the industry is not the appropriate 
unit of analysis) with the share prices in the economy as a- 
whole. What the above tests have demonstrated is that it is 
appropriate to test for cointegration formally, rather than 
just eyeball the curves in question (Appendix 1). Of course, 
the above tests say little about the manner in which 
companies may achieve competitive advantage, whether it be 
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through internal or external means. 
In the following chapter, ability to 
competitive advantage through 
contracts is investigated. 




Ho : X3. ýLftj 
X2X*-- - I(l) 
S-B, Test (DW) and D-F Test (A2) 
including Constant (Po) and 
TABLE 11.1 Trend (Ax) 
COMPANY D. W. Ao 13M 132 F(12) F(4) 
ALLIED-LYONS 0.02 0.12 0.00 -0.02 1.43 4.67 
2.02 1.65 -1.46 
ASS. BRIT FOODS 0.02 0.23 0.00 --0.05 1.57 8.92 
2.40 2.33 -2.31 
BAT INDUSTRIES 0.01 0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.94 10.70 
1.92 2.15 -1.78 
THE BOC GROUP 0.01 0.19 0.00 -0.04 0.61 7.31 
2.22 2.11 -2.11 
BTR 0.00 0.17 0.00 -0.05 1.42 11.06 
2.48 2.13 -2.18 
BARCLAYS BNK 0.03 0.28 0.00 -0.05 0.91 11.10 
2.41 1.99 -2.33 
BASS 0.02 0.17 0.00 -0-03 0.63 6.78 
1.84 1.89 -1.73 
BEECHAM GROUP 0.01 0.28 0.00 -0.05 0.65 9.23 
2.46 2.23 -2.37 
BLUE CIRCLE IND. 0.03 0.27 0.00 -0-05 0.89 19.84 
2.44 2.12 -2.37 
BOOTS COMPANY 0.03 0.43 0.00 -0-09 1.16 10.74 
3.25 2.80 -3.18 
BRITISH PETROLEUM 0.02 0.33 0.00 -0.07 1.65 16.88 
2.85 2.66 -2.76 
BUNZL 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.95 2.85 
1.63 1.66 -1.31 
BURTON GROUP 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.02 1.83 11.94 
1.73 1.89 -1.43 
CADBURY SCHWEPPES 0.02 0.20 0.00 -0.05 1.68 6.76 
2.24 2.24 -2.16 
COURTAULDS 0.05 0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.91 5.59 
1.30 1.30- -1.23 - DIXONS GROUP 0.01 0.13 0.00 -0.03 2.79 3.12 
2.57 1.49 -2.08 
ENGLISH CHINA CLAY 0.03 0.20 0.00 -0.04 1.17 7.62 
2.17 2.34 -2.11 
FISON 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.01 1.48 4.14 
1.13 1.46 -0.88 
GLAXO HOLDING 0.01 0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.85 5.06 
1 1.89 2.19 -1.62 
GRANADA GROUP 0.02 0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.88 8.92 
1.87 1.43 -1.73 
GRAND METROPOLITAN 0.02 0.13 0.00 -0.02 1.09 9.70 
1.75 1.61 -1.62 
HANSON 0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.77 7.49 
2.17 1.71 -1.74 
294 
Ho : XX. IL-ft, X2. t-t-- - I(l) 
TABLE 11'. 1 
COMPANY 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (A2) 
including Constant (Po) and 
Trend (Ax) 
I D. W. Ao 13 x 
132 F(12) F(4) 
HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.02 0.39 0.00 -0.07 0.89 7.74 
2.77 2.34 -2.69 
ICI 0.02 0.24 0.00 -0.04 0.94 13.82 
2.04 2.05 -1.98 
LADBROKE GROUP 0.01 0.34 0.00 -0.08 1.69 5.18 
3.40 2.73 -3.22 
LLOYDS BNK 0.02 0.18 0.00 -0.04 0.70 9.39 
2.07 1.83 -1.97 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.04 0.69 6.44 
2.22 2.20 -2.10 
MIDLAND BNK 0.07 0.37 0.00 -0.07 0. -97 11.30 
2.74 1.47 -2.71 
NATIONAL WESTMINSTER 0.02 0.21 0.00 -0.04 0.99 12.80 
2.02 1.74 -1.93 
PEARSON 0.02 0.12 0.00 -0.02 1.15 18.96 
1.55 1.92 -1.43 
PILKINGTON 0.04 0.22 0.00 -0.05 1.13 22.41 
2.29 1.90 -2.19 
PLESSEY COMPANY 0.01 0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.87 4.06 
2.08 2.02 -2.01 
PRUDENTIAL CORP. 0.02 0.17 0.00 -0.03 0.46 15.69 
1.97 2.21 -1.88 
RACAL ELECTRONICS 0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.67 2.76 
1.45 0.69 -1-18 
RANK ORGANISATION 0.05 0.12 0.00 -0.02 0.89 12.53 
1.41 0.95 -1.37 
RANK HOVIS McDOUGALL 0.02 0.10 0.00 -0.02 1.15 4.20 
1.46 1.72 -1.33 
RICKITT & COLMAN 0.02 0.31 0.00 -0.06 0.63 13.45 
2.51 2.39 -2.43 
REDLAND 0.02 0.38 0.00 -0.07 1.57 13.27 
2.96 2.58 -2.87 
REED INTERNATIONAL 0.02 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.63 5.60 
1.15 1.71 -1.00 
ROTHMANS INTERNATIONAL 0.02 0.25 0.00 -0.06 1.08 10.55 
2.65 3.07 -2.60 
ROWNTREE 0.02 0.19 0.00 -0.04 2.75 20.07 
2.04 1.68 -1.94 
ROYAL BNK OF SCOTLAND 0.03 0.23 0.00 -0.05 1.96 2.32 
2.31 1.96 -2.21 
SEARS 0.02 0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.51 4.57 
2.06 1.78 -1.87 
SHELL TRANS. & TRADING COO. 01 0.34 0.00 -0.06 0.80 17.31 
2.72 2.77 -2.65 
TARMAC 0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.02 1.03 12.05 
HO : X3.. -L*-l 
X2JLI- - I(1) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (J32) 
TABLE 11.1 
including Constant (Po) and 
Trend (A, ) 
COMPANY D. W. Ao 03. A2 
1 F(12) F(4) 
1.85 1.95 -1.64 
TESCO 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.77 6.77 
1.38 1.86 -1.13 
THORN EMI 0.06 0.27 0.00 --0.05 1.07 10.02 
2.21 1.15 -2.19 
TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.02 0.20 0.00 -0.04 1.69 17.70 
2.22 1.88 -2.11 
TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.02 0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.63 12.72 
2.12 2.09 -1.97 
UNILEVER 0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.03 2.00 11.88 
1.78 1.90 -1.66 
UNITED BISCUITS HOLDING 0.02 0.33 0.00 -0.07 1.51 21.12 
2.87 2.60 -2.76 
WHITBREAD & COMPANY 0.02 0.22 0.00 -0.05 0.89 5.70 
2.33 2.18 -2.23 
PACKING IND 0.02 0.16 0.00 -0.03 1.02 9.99 
1.89 2.19 -1.81 
LEISURE IND 0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.03 1.11 16.40 
1.83 1.91 -1.74 
STORES 0.01 0.19 0.00 -0.03 1.12 9.53 
1.93 1.93 -1.83 
TEXTILES 0.03 0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.73 12.37 
1.37 1.66 -1.29 
BANK 0.02 0.23 0.00 -0.04 1.14 12.18 
2.09 1.76 -2.01 
CHEMICAL 0.01 0.27 0.00 -0.05 0.84 14.32 
2.32 2.34 -2.24 
OIL 0.02 0.39 0.00 -0.06 1.21 22.53 
2.65 2.59 -2.58 
BUILDING 0.02 0.20 0.00 -0.03 1.17 18.26 
1.99 1.97 -1.89 
ELECTRICAL 0.01 0.22 0.00 -0-03 0.63 11.31 
1.96 1.76 -1.87 
MINF 0.03 0.39 0.00 -0.07 0.61 12.28 
3.05 3.08 -3.02 
FOOD RETAIL 0.01 0.16 0.00 -0.02 1.57 10.41 
1.85 1.84 -1.69 
FOOD MANUFACTURE 0.01 0.19 0.00 -0.03 2.05 12.20 
1.86 1.92 -1.76 
FT ALL-SHARE INDEX 0.01 0.18 0.00 -0.03 1.21 16.57 
1.91 1.96 -1.82 
296 
Ho : XýLa. *-, 
X2. iL., -- 
- I(I) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test 
including Constant (go) 
TABLE 11.2 
COMPANY D. W. Ao 
132 
F(12) F(2) 
ALLIED-LYONS 0.02 0.02 -0.00 1.43 8.89 
0.50 -0.32 
ASS. BRIT FOODS 0.02 0.03 -0.00 1.64 14.30 
0.70 -0.47 
BAT INDUSTRIES 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 10.76 
0.11 0.17 
THE BOC GROUP 0.01 0.03 -0.00 1.00 10.76 
0.74 -0.50 
BTR 0.00 0.03 -0.00 1.25 7.21 
1.82 -0.45 - 
BARCLAYS BNK 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.78 16.65 
1.36 -1.21 
BASS 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.62 11.54 
0.40 -0.17 
BEECHAM GROUP 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.53 10.51 
1.06 -0.81 
BLUE CIRCLE IND. 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.80 35.53 
1.20 -1.08 
BOOTS COMPANY 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.95 12.29 
1.69 -1.50 
BRITISH PETROLEUM 0.02 0.04 -7.00 1.52 16.85 
1.01 -0.77 
BUNZL 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.95 4.17 
0.44 0.19 
BURTON GROUP 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.55 22.70 
0.46 0.05 
CADBURY SCHWEPPES 0.02 0.04 -0.01 1.71 12.72 
0.69 -0.55 
COURTAULDS 0.05 0.07 -0.01 - 0.94 10.14 
0.97 -0.89 
DIXONS GROUP 0.01 0.06 -0.01 1.70 5.53 
2.65 -1.68 
ENGLISH CHINA CLAY 0.03 0.04 -0.01 1.19 13.66 
0.66 -0.56 
FISON 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.45 7.77 
0.21 0.14 
GLAXO HOLDING 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.85 8.02 
-0.12 0.75 
GRANADA GROUP 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.64 13.28 
1.24 -0.97 
GRAND METROPOLITAN 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.99 17.54 
0.77 -0.56 
HANSON 0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.65 9.95 
297 
Ho : XJL. L-tz,, X21.1- 
" I(l) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (132) 
TABLE 11.2 
including Constant 
COMPANY D. W. Ao 132 F(12) F(2) 
1.64 -0.35 
HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.68 10.46 
1.72 -1.49 
ICI 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.91 20.41 
0.63 -0.52 
LADBROKE GROUP 0.01 0.08 -0.01 1.25 7.90 
2.56 -2.01 
LLOYDS BNK 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.66 16.72- 
0.99 -0.80 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.73 10.71 
0.58 -0.29 
MIDLAND BNK 0.07 0.25 -0.04 0.71 21.68 
2.33 -2.28 
NATIONAL WESTMINSTER 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.86 23.68 
1.04 -0.88 
PEARSON 0.02 0.01 0.00 1.14 . 36.08 
0.14 0.07 
PILKINGTON 0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.82 31.97 
1.27 -1.12 
PLESSEY COMPANY 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.87 4.50 
0.77 -0.64 
PRUDENTIAL CORP. 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.46 28.02 
0.24 -0.06 
RACAL ELECTRONICS 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.71 1.79 
2.20 -1.55 
RANK ORGANISATION 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.96 22.68 
1.28 -1.24 
RANK HOVIS MCDOUGALL 0.02 0.01 -0.00 1'. 14 4.85 
0.32 -0.12 
RICKITT & COLMAN 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.65 16.75 
0.81 -0.64 
REDLAND 0.02 0.07 -0.01 1.12 16.23 
1.51 -1.27 
REED INTERNATIONAL 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.65 10.03 
-0.01 0.23 
ROTHMANS INTERNATIONAL 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.03 21.54 
0.05 0.16 
ROWNTREE' 0.02 0.05 -0.01 2.17 33.07 
1.16 -0.97 
ROYAL BNK OF SCOTLAND 0.03 0.07 -0.01 1.90 1.69 
1.21 -1.04 
SEARS 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.46 7.45 
1.01 -0.61 
SHELL TRANS. & TRADING CO 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.82 21.26 
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Ho : Xi.. I. -t-, 
X2. lLt-- - I(I) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (A2) 
including Constant (po) 
TABLE 11.2 
COMPANY D. W. Ao J32 F(12) F(2) 
0.41 -0.22 TARMAC 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.05 22.46 
0.40 0.00 
TESCO 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.77 12.60 
-0.11 0.55 
THORN EMI 0.06 0.20 -0.03 0.98 19.51 
1.89 -1.86 
TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.02 0.06 -0.01 1.42 25.47 
1.15 -0.97 
TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.58 21.84 
0.62 -0.29 
UNILEVER 0.01 0.01 0.00 2.01 12.82 
0.13 0.17 
UNITED BISCUITS HOLDING 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.93 23.43 
1.21 -0.93 
WHITBREAD & COMPANY 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.98 9.60 
0.82 -0.58 
PACKING IND 0.02 0.01 -0.00 1.05 18.19 
0.18 -0.03 
LEISURE INDý 0.01 0.02 -0.00, 0.94 27.74 
0.40 -0.23 
STORES 0.01 0.02 -0.00 1.10 15.17 
0.49 -0.26 
TEXTILES 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.72 24.18 
0.36 -0.25 
BANK 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.98 20.57 
1.12 -0.98 
CHEMICAL 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.85 18.34 
0.40 -0.20 
OIL 0.02 0.04 -0.00 1.15 23.80 
0.66 -0.48 
BUILDING 0.02 0.03 -0.00 1.03 29.60 
0.53 -0.32 
ELECTRICAL 0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.60 17.90 
0.90 -0.65 
MINP 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.71 21.69 
0.75 -0.66 
FOOD RETAIL 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.54 13.75 
0.39 0.06 
FOOD MANUFACTURE 0.01 0.01 -0.00 1.93 18.20 
0.31 -0.09 





Ho : X3. &*-, X2&-ft - I(l) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (A2) 
excludinq Constant (Do) and 
Trend (D3. ) 
D. W. 132 F(12) F(2) 
ALLIED-LYONS 0.02 0.00 1.42 9.29 
1.42 
ASS. BRIT FOODS 0.02 0.00 1.69 14.53 
1.41 
BAT INDUSTRIES 0.01 0.00 1.00 10.74 
1.73 
THE BOGGROUP 0.01 0.00 0.52 13.01 
1.34 
BTR 0.00 0.00 1.24 -6.91 
2.68 
BARCLAYS BNK 0.03 0.00 0.78 16.43 
1.32 
BASS 0.02 0.00 0.62 11.54 
1.74 
BEECHAM GROUP 0.01 0.00 0.54 10.99 
1.59 
BLUE CIRCLE IND. 0.03 0.00 0.80 35.51 
0.97 
BOOTS COMPANY 0.03 0.00 0.99 13.67 
1.32 
BRITISH PETROLEUM 0.02 0.00 1.54 16.56 
1.50 
BUNZL 0.01 
BURTON GROUP 0.01 0.00 1.49 23.21 
1.43 
CADBURY SCHWEPPES 0.02 0.00 1.75 13.14 
1.10 
COURTAULDS 0.05 0.00 0.93 10.26 
0.71 
DIXONS GROUP 0.01 0.01 1.59 9.72 
2.03 
ENGLISH CHINA CLAY 0.03 0.00 1.23 14.35 
0.78 
FISON 0.01 0.00 1.38 7.91 
1.71 
GLAXO HOLDING 0.01 0.00 0.86 7.99 
2.55 
GRANADA GROUP 0.02 0.00 0.59 13.32 
1.28 
GRAND METROPOLITAN 0.02 0.00 0.91 17.40 
1.20 
HANSON 0.01 0.01 0.62 10.52 
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Ho : XX. L-t--, X2ýLl-- ' I(l) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (A2) 
excludina Constant (0o) and 
TABLE 11.3 Trend (13x) 
COMPANY D. W. 132 F(12) F(2) 
2.59 
HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.02 0.00 0.67 10.88 
1.34 
ICI 0.02 0.00 0.92 20.12 
1.24 
LADBROKE GROUP 0.01 0.00 1.29 8.76 
2.11 
LLOYDS BNK 0.02 0.00 0.67 16.80 
1.39 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.01 0.00 0.76 10.45 
1.53 
MIDLAND BNK 0.07 0.01 0.56 20.57 
0.67 
NATIONAL WESTMINSTER 0.02 0.00 0.83 24.28 
1.37 
PEARSON 0.02 0.00 1.13 35.87 
1.44 
PILKINGTON 0.04 0.00 0.76 30.93 
1.16 
PLESSEY C014PANY 0.01 0.00 0.87 4.93 
0.58 
PRUDENTIAL CORP. 0.02 0.00 0.47 27.83 
1.38 
RACAL ELECTRONICS 0.01 0.00 0.61 1.97 
1.72 
RANK ORGANISATION 0.05 0.00 0.83 24.47 
0.38 
RANK HOVIS MCDOUGALL 0.02 0.00 1.13 5.04 
1.37 
RICKITT & COLMAN 0.02 0.00 0.68 16.65 
1.41 
REDLAND 0.02 0.00 1.09 16.22 
1.51 
REED INTERNATIONAL 0.02 0.00 0.64 10.03 
1.49 
ROTHMANS INTERNATIONAL 0.02 0.00 1.03 21.56 
1.24 
ROWNTREE 0.02 0.00 2.05 31.86 
1.23 
ROYAL BNK OF SCOTLAND 0.03 0.00 1.92 1.94 
1.15 
SEARS 0.02 0.00 0.46 7.69 
1.61 




Ho : XXýL*_j X2., L-t-- 
S-B Test (DW) and 
excludinq Constant 
Trend (Ax) 
D. W. J32 
I 




TARMAC 0.01 0.00 1.04 22.60 
1.58 
TESCO 0.01 0.00 0.76 12.50 
1.89 
THORN EMI 0.06 0.00 0.81 18.63 
0.24 
TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.02 0.00 1.36 25.33 
1.09 
TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.02 0.00 0.57 22.08 
1.44 
UNILEVER 0.01 0.00 2.02 12-80 
2.22 
UNITED BISCUITS HOLDING 0.02 0.00 0.93 23.54 
1.47 
WHITBREAD & COMPANY 0.02 0.00 1.01 10.37 
1.57 
PACKING IND 0.02 0.00 1.05 18.14 
1.34 
LEISURE IND 0.01 0.00 0.88 27.27 
1.53 
STORES 0.01 0.00 1.11 15.34 
1.73 
TEXTILES 0.03 0.00 0.70 23.91 
1.24 
BANK 0.02 0.00 0.95 20.32 
1.41 
CHEMICAL 0.01 0.00 0.86 18.09 
1.77 
OIL 0.02 0.00 1.16 22.97 
1.52 
BUILDING 0.02 0.00 1.04 29.10 
1.67 
ELECTRICAL 0.01 0.00 0.60 17-59 
1.78 
MINF 0.03 0.00 0.75 22.48 
0.84 
FOOD RETAIL 0.01 0.00 1.55 13.79 
2.55 
FOOD MANUFACTURE 0.01 0.00 1.93 18.08 
1.98 
FT ALL-SHARE INDEX 0.01 0.00 1.04 17.45 
1.85 
301 
Ho : X3. -c*-, 
X2. t.. t-- 
TABLE 11.4 S-B Test (DW) 
COMPANY D. W. 
ALLIgb-LYONS 2.07 
ASS. BRIT FOODS 2.04 
BAT INDUSTRIES 1.95 
THE BOC GROUP 1.91 
BTR 1.75 
BARCLAYS BNK 1.90 
BASS 2. Q3 
BEECHAM GROUP 1.98 
BLUE CIRCLE IND. 1.87 
BOOTS COMPANY 1.96 
BRITISH PETROLEUM 1.86 
BUNZL 1.81 
BURTON GROUP 1.60 
CADBURY SCHWEPPES 2-20 
COURTAULDS 1.96 
DIXONS GROUP 1.64 
ENGLISH CHINA CLAY 2.13 
FISON 1.72 
GLAXO HOLDING 1.80 
GRANADA GROUP 1.81 
, GRAND METROPOLITAN 1.87 
HANSON 1.89 
303 
HO XXýL*-, X2ýL*- 
TABLE 11.4 S-B Test (DW) 
COMPANY D. W. 
HAWKER SIDDELEY 2.04 
ICI 1.76 
LADBROKE GROUP 1.71 
LLOYDS BNK 1.94 
MARKS & SPENCER 2.10 
MIDLAND BNK 1.90 
NATIONAL WESTMINSTER 1.80 
PEARSON 1.85 
PILKINGTON 2.07 
PLESSEY COMPANY 1.99 
PRUDENTIAL CORP. 2.00 
RACAL ELECTRONICS 1.87 
RANy, ORGANISATION 1.88 
RANK HOVIS McDOUGALL 2.05 
RICKITT & COLMAN 1.89 
REDLAND 1.89 
REED INTERNATIONAL 2.03 
ROTHMANS INTERNATIONAL 1.98 
ROWNTREE 1.66 
ROYAL BNK OF SCOTLAND 1.83 
SEARS 2.01 
SHELL TRANS. & TRADING 1.95 
301 
Ho : YýL, -. 1 (1. ) 
TA13LE 11.4 S-B Test (DW) 
COMPANY D. W. 
TARMAC 2.02 
TESCO 2.01 
THORN EXI 1.69 
TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1.88 
TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1.89 
UNILEVER 1.70 
UNITED BISCUITS HOLDIN 2.12 
WHITBREAD & COMPANY 2.22 
PACKING IND 1.89 









FOOD RETAIL 1.73 
FOOD MANUFACTURE 1.71 
FT ALL-SHARE INDEX 1.71 
3 OS 
Ho : Yi-*- -1 (1) 
1 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (J32) 
including Constant (po) and 
TABLE 11.5 Trend (A. L) 
where X2JLt- = Industry Price 
COMPANY D. W. Ao J33. 132 F(12) F(4) 
Allied-Lyons 0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 1.85* 3.10* 
t-statistic -1.77 -0.65 -1.73 
Ass. Brit Foods 0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.08 1.56 0.78 
-2.81 1.45 2.84 
BAT Industries 0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 1.02 3.16* 
-2.55 1.87 -2.64 
The BOC Group 0.06 -0.04 -0.00 -0.04 0.61 0.67 
-1.88 0.69 1.94 
BTR 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.93 2.22 
-0.71 0.74 -1.00 
Barclays 0.12 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 2.54* 1.75 
-2.50 0.55 -2.63 
Bass 0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 1.22 0.53 
-2.78 2.54 -2.98 
Beecham Group 0.07 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 1.19 2.79* 
-1.71 -0.04 -1.84 
Blue Circle Ind. 0.05 -0.03 -0.00 -0.05 0.32 0.71 
-2.38 -2.03 -2.23 
Boots Company 0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.42 1.76 3.42* 
-2.35 -2.40 -2.42 
British Petroleum Co. 0.15 -0.22 0.00 -0.11 0.93 3.58* 
-3.80 1.20 -3.82 
Bunzl 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.65 0.72 
-1.37 1.23 -1.60 
Burton Group 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 2.83* 8.39* 
-1.51 1.86 -1.67 
Cadbury Schweppes 0.13 -0.10 0.00 -0.09 2.41* 0.80 
-3.21 -1.19 -3.17 
Courtaulds 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -1.01 8.97* 
-1.80 -1.08 -1.76 
Dixons Group 0.02 -0.12 0.00 -0.06 3.10* 5.24* 
-3.09 2.00 -3.55 
English China Clay 
Fison 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 1.03 4.88* 
-0.73 0.72 -0.86 
Glaxo Holding 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.18 0.95 0.33 
-0.93 2.23 -1.55 
Granada Group 0.04 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 1.57 3.84* 
-1.36 -0.10 -1.53 
Grand Metropolitan 0.07 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 1.17 1.08 
-2.02 0.59 -2.08 
Hanson 0.01 -0.17 0.00 -0.06 0.98 3.09* 
-2.33 2.15 -2.47 
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Ho : Ys. -t-- - 1 (1) 
S-B Test ( DW) and D-F Test (A2) 
including Constant (Ao) and 
TABLE 11.5 Trend (Am) 
where X2., Li-- = Indus try Price 
COMPANY D. W. 00 Ax 13 2 F(12) F(4) 
Hawker Siddeley 0.08 -0.06 -0.00 -0.05 1.49 2.435* 
-2.39 -1.59 -2.46 
Imperial Chemical Ind. 
Ladbroke Group 0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0-06 1.61 3.77* 
-3.26 1.35 -3.80 
Lloyds Bank 0.20 -0.14 0.00 -0.14 2.16* 1.59 
-3.78 2.37 -3.82 
Marks and Spencer 0.11 -0.11 0.00 -0.07 0.57 0.33 
-2.86 1.48 -2.86 







The Rank Organisation 
Rank Hovis McDougall 
















Reed International 0.13 
Rothmans International 0.13 
Rowntree 0.05 
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.16 
Sears 0.15 

























0.00 -0.09 1.94* 0.97 
1.85 -0.31 
0.00 -0.09 2.37* 4.07* 
-0.73 -2.88 
0.00 -0.04 2.69* 2.55* 
-1.47 -1.97 



































































TABLE 11 . 
COMPANY D. W. Bo Bl B2 F(12) F(4) 
Tarmac 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 1.96* 1.18 
-1.62 1.76 -1.70 
Tesco 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.02 1.64 1.48 
-1.29 1.57 -1.33 
Thorn EMI 0.01 -0.04 -0.00 -0.06 0.72 2.24 
-2.69 -2.12 -2.35 
Trafalgar House 0.13 0.07 0.00 -0.06 1.47 2.65* 
-2.56 -0.60 -2.61 
Trusthouse Forte 0.06 -0.15 0.00 0.08 1.44 2.45* 
-2.90 2.48 -2.95 
Unilever 0.10 0.04 0.00 -0.06 1.02 2.45* 
-2.20 1.43 -2.32 
United Biscuits Holdin 0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 1.89* 6.84* 
-1.99 0.89 -2.12 
Whitbread and Company 0.15 -0.13 0.00 -0.11 3.36* 4.01* 
-3.37 1.84 -3.40 
308 
Ho : YýL*- 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (132) 
TABLE 11-6 including Constant (p. ) 
where X2. Lt- = Industry Price 
COMPANY D. W. J30 J32 F(12) F(4) 
Allied-Lyons 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 1.86* 2.37 
t-statistic -1.82 -1.78 
Ass. Brit Foods 0.11 -0.05 -0.06 1.65 1.33 
-2.40 -2.44 
BAT Industries 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 1.12 2.83 
-1.89 -1.98 
The BOC Group 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.58 0.12 
-1.75 -1.81 
BTR 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.83 1.10 
-0.01 -1.10 
Barclays 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 2.58* 0.18 
-2.51 -2.66 
Bass 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 1.31 0.63 
-1.50 -1.73 
Beecham Group 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 1.19 4.30* 
-1.90 -2.05 
Blue Circle Ind. 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.29 1.12 
-1.37 -1.14 
Boots Company 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 1.43 2.03 
-1.65 -1.70 
British Petroleum Co. 0.15 -0.18 -0.10 0.97 5.94* 
-3.68 -3.71 
Bunzl 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.66 0.53 
-0.64 -1.04 
Burton Group 0.02 -0.01 0.01 3.08* 16.91* 
-0.57 -0.73 
Cadbury Schweppes 0.13 -0.09 -0.07 2.51* 0.82 
-3.02 -2.97 
Courtaulds 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 1.04 16.94* 
-1.47 -1.44 
Dixons Group 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 2.58* 9.72* 
-2.53 -3.42 
English China Clay 
Fison 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1.08 9.78* 
-0.81 -0.95 
Glaxo Holding 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.84 
1.08 0.33 
Granada Group 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 1.58 6.99* 
-1.65 -1.86 
Grand Metropolitan 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 1.17 1.93 
-1.95 -2.01 




TABLE 11'.. 6 
COMPANY 
Ho : YýLý- - I(1) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test 
including Constant (p. ) 
where X2. L-t- = Industry Price 
D. W. J30 02 
(132) 
F(12) F(4) 
Hawker Siddeley 0.08 -0.05 -0.04 1.49 2.07 
-2.08 -2.14 
Imperial Chemical Ind. 
Ladbroke Group 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 1.59 7.55* 
-3.60 -4.60 
Lloyds Bank 0.20 -0.09 -0.09 2.29* 2.12 
-2.97 -3.00 
Marks and Spencer 0.11 -0.08 -0.06 0.58 0.58 
-2.46 -2.45 
Midland Bank 0.09 -0.00 -0.00 1.78 8.43* 
-1.40 -0.28 
Nation Westminster 0.15 -0.02 -0.07 1.98* 0.79 
-2.29 -2.49 
Pearson 0.15 -0.06 -0.08 2.42* 4.86* 
-2.90 -2.95 
Pilkington 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 2.63* 4.69* 
-1.37 -1.35 
Plessey Company 0.06 -0.10 -0.04 1.50 0.48 
-2.78 -2.66 
Prudential Corp. 
Racal Electronics 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 1.99* 1.09 
-1.70 -2.13 
The Rank Organisation 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1.10 5.21* 
-1.52 -1.18 
Rank Hovis McDougall 0.02 0.00 -0.00 1.57 0.29 
0.07 -0.07 
Rickitt and Colman 0.24 -0.03 -0.12 0.72 1.29 
-3.21 -3.64 
Redland 0.10 -0.04 -0.07 3.06* 3.02* 
-3.14 -3.39 
Reed International 0.13 -0-01 -0.02 1.72 0.09 
7.19 -1.12 
Rothmans International 0.13 -0.08 -0.06 1.43 2.20 
-2.07 -2.14 
Rowntree 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 1.61 14.79* 
-1.41 -1.68 
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.16 -0.04 -0.09 1.03 0.97 
-3.04 -3.15 
Sears 0.15 -0-18 -0.08 1.39 0.64 
-3.19 -3.24 
Shell Trans. & Trading 0.10 -0.03 -0.05 1.37 4.20* 
-2.28 -2.32 
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TABLE ll:. 6 
COMPANY D. W. Bo B2 F(12) F(4) 
Tarmac 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 2.01* 1.14 
-0.82 -0.91 
Tesco 0.06 -0.05 -0.02 1.67 2.44 
-1.23 -1.27 
Thorn EXI 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.75 2.68 
-1.69 -1-03 
Trafalgar House 0.13 -0.07 -0.07 1.54 3.28* 
-2.58 -2-62 
Trusthouse Forte 0.06 -0.05 -0.03 1.38 4.14 
-1.50 -1.59 
Unilever 0.10 -0.03 -0.04 1.03 4.14* 
-1.75 -1.88 
United Biscuits Holdin 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 1.89* 6.85* 
-1.90 -2.08 
Whitbread and Company 0.15 -0.09 -0-08 3.39 1.21 
-2.82 -2.85 
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TABLE 11'. 7 
COMPANY 
Ho : Y. Lt- -1 (1) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test 
where X2J.., -- = Industry Price 
D. W. J32 F(12) 
(J32) 
F(4) 
Allied-Lyons 0.04 0.00 1.92* 2.02 
t-statistic 0.09 
Ass. Brit Foods 0.11 -0.00 1.82 1.96 
-0.41 
BAT Industries 0.08 -0.00 0.11 3.88* 
-0-59 
The BOC Group 0.06 -0.00 0.42 0.72 
-0.46 
BTR 0.00 -0.01 0.84 1.10 
-2.84 
Barclays 0.12 -0.01 3.99* 0.04 
-0.88 
Bass 0.09 -0.01 1.42 1.21 
-0.96 
Beecham Group 0.07 -0.00 1.15 4.75* 
-0.80 
Blue Circle Ind. 0.05 0.00 0.30 1.38 
0.36 
Boots Company 0.06 -0.00 1.50 2.16 
-0.40 
British Petroleum Co. 0.15 -0.00 0.97 7.65* 
-0.83 
Bunz1 0.03 -0.00 0.65 0.47 
-1.52 
Burton Group 0.02 -0.00 2.96* 17.19* 
-0.62 
Cadbury Schweppes 0.13 0.00 2.92* 1.20 
0.11 
Courtaulds 0.03 -0.00 1.03 17.17* 
-0.26 
Dixons Group 0.02 -0.01 2.32* 13.35* 
-3.27 
English China Clay 
Fison 0.03 -0-00 0.91 10.20* 
-0.67 
Glaxo Holding 0.01 -0-00 1.00 1.06 
-1.14 
Granada Group 0.04 -0-00 1.54 8.64* 
-0.98 
Grand Metropolitan 0.07 -0-00 1.23 3.27 
-0-52 
Hanson 0.01 -0-00 0.93 6.27* 
-2-56 
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Ho : YýL-r- -1 (1) 
TABLE 11'. 7 S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test 
where X2J-., - = 
Industry Price 
COMPANY D. W. J3 2, F(12) 
(A2) 
F(4) 
Hawker Siddeley 0.08 -0.00 1.55 2.31 
0.54 
Imperial Chemical Ind. 
Ladbroke Group 0.02 -0.01 1.21 6.97* 
-3.60 
Lloyds Bank 0.20 -0.00 2.92* 3.32* 
-0.55 
Marks and Spencer 0.11 -0.00 0.74 1.25 
-0.06 
Midland Bank 0.09 -0.00 1.48 14.15* 
-0.23 
Nation Westminster 0.15 -0.01 2.16* 1.70 
-1.06 
Pearson 0.15 -0.00 4.02* 6.35* 
-0.51 
Pilkington 0.04 0.00 2.52* 5.37* 
-0-12 
Plessey Company 0.06 0.00 1.52 0.36 
0.66 
Prudential Corp. 
Racal Electronics 0.02 -0.00 1.92* 0.71 
-1-93 
The Rank Organisation 0.01 -0.00 1.06 5.22* 
-0.16 
Rank Hovis McDougall 0.02 0.00 
-0.04 
Rickitt and Colman 0.24 -0-03 0.79 0.92 
-1.67 
Redland 0.10 -0.01 3.28* 2.49 
-1.34 
Reed International 0.13 -0.01 1.46 0.14 
-1.04 
Rothmans International 0.13 -0.00 1.24 3.44* 
-0-62 
Rowntree 0.05 -0.01 1.32 15.21 
-0-92 
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.16 -0.01 1.18 1.94 
-0-86 
Sears 0.15 -0.00 1.76 2.41 
-0.76 




COMPANY D. W. B2 F(12) F(4) 
Tarmac 0.03 -0.00 2.02* 1.11 
-0.55 
Tesco 0.06 -0.00 1.68 2.64 
- 0.49 
Thorn EMI 0.01 0.00 0.56 2.58 
0.11 
Trafalgar House 0.13 -0.00 1.24 3.876 
- 0.47 
Trusthouse Forte 0.06 -0.00 1.53 4.570* 
-0.81 
Unilever 0.10 -0.00 1.14 4.84* 
-1.00 
United Biscuits Holdin 0.06 -0.00 1.97* 7.30* 
-0.98 
Whitbread and Company 0.15 -0.00 3.76* 1.18 
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Ho : Yt, - I(l) 
TABLE 11- 8 
COMPANY 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (02) 
including Constant (Ao) and 
Trend (Ax) 
- where X2s, FT All-Share Index 
D. W. a Ax J32 
I 
F(12) F(2) 
Allied-Lyons 0.06 -0-05 0.00 -0.05 1.36 0.53 
t-statistic -2.09 -1.03 2.11 
Ass. Brit Foods 0.19 -0.13 0.00 -0.12 1.29 0.91 
-3.53 1.60 -3.57 
BAT Industries 0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.72 1.25 
-1.96 1.46 -2.06 
The BOC Group -0.07 -0.00 0.93 0.80 1.10 
2.58 1.62 36.77 
BTR 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 1.41 8.38* 
-0.55 0.61 -0.83 
Barclays 0.13 -0.04 -0-00 -0-10 1.26 1.56 
-0.35 -2.89 -3.71 
Bass 0.16 -0.03 0.00 0.90 0.91 0.50 
-2.82 1.73 29.00 
Beecham Group 0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.78 1.33 
-1.31 0.00 -1.48 
Blue Circle Ind. ? -0.05 -0-00 0.06 0.31 1.06 
-3.14 -2.01 -3.02 
Boots Company 0.12 0.08 0.00 -0.07 1.49 2.36 
-3.10 -1.61 -3.20 
British Petroleum Co. 0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0-06 0.76 0.63 
-2.46 0.31 -2.54 
Bunzl 2.22 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.89 0.81 
-1.21 1.34 -1.36 
Burton Group 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 2.04* 10.59* 
-0.13 1.80 -1.55 
Cadbury Schweppes 0.17 -0.20 0.00 -0.15 2.11* 0.56 
- 4.09 -2.43 -4.08 
courtaulds 0.02 -10.02 -0.00 -0.02 1.25 3.14* 
-1.27 -0.45 -1.12 
Dixons Group 0.02 -0-11 0.00 -0.06 2.92* 2.58* 
-2.85 1.92 -3.34 
English China Clay 
Fison 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00 3.984* 
-0.67 0.83 -0.83 
Glaxo Holding 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0-02 1.19 0.01 
-1.06 2.35 -1.76 
Granada Group 2.25 -0.02 0.00 -0-02 1.38 3.58* 
-1.11 -0.19 -1.31 
Grand Metropolitan 2.15 -0.03 0.00 -0-03 1.37 3.23* 
-1.80 0.53 -1.89 
Hanson 0.01 -0.12 0.00 -0-04 1.22 1.59 
-1.94 1.87 -2-13 
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Ho : YjL-r- -1 (1) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (A2) 
including Constant (Ao) and 
TABLE 11.8 Trend (Ax) 
where X2. L1_ FT All-Share Index 
13o Ax J32 , COMPANY D. W. F(12) F(2) 
Hawker Siddeley 0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 1.19 2.20 
-0.72 -0.87 -1.18 
Imperial Chemical Ind. 
Ladbroke Group 0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 1.56 2.88* 
-3.26 1.69 -3.79 
Lloyds Bank 0.19 -0.16 -0.00 -0.15 1.03 0.41 
-4.16 -2.61 -4.20 
Marks and Spencer ? -0.19 0.00 -0.12 0.41 0.06 
-3.57 2.61 -3.60 
Midland Bank 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.08 1.57 4.23* 
-2.78 -3.64 -3.38 
Nation Westminster 0.16 -0.05 0.00 -0.12 1.25 0.79 
-3.65 -2.53 -3.90 
Pearson 0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 1.99* 0.43 
-1.61 1.07 -1.73 
Pilkington 0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.04 2.37* 1.02 
-2.15 -1.41 -2.21 
Plessey Company 0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 1.03 1.95 
-1.87 0.77 -1.74 
Prudential Corp. 
Racal Electronics 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.96 1.84 
0.21 -1.19 -0.33 
The Rank Organisation 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.91 3.13* 
-1.53 -1.27 -1.69 
Rank Hovis McDougall 0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.98 2.01 
-1.53 0.04 -1.55 
Rickitt and Colman 0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.44 1.52 
-1.58 0.27 -2.58 
Redland 0.11 -0.07 0.00 -0.10 2.34* 2.95* 
-3.40 1.30 -3.63 
Reed International 0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.15 0.29 
-0.63 0.95 -0.71 
Rothmans International 0.16 -0.11 0.00 -0.07 1.54 1.80 
-2.34 1.28 -2.36 
Rowntree 0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 1.76 3.41* 
-1.48 -0.13 -1.70 
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.10 1.16 1.24 
-3.41 -2.96 -3.40 
Sears 0.08 -0.19 0.00 -0.09 1.06 0.14 
-3.10 2.08 -3-17 
Shell Trans. & Trading 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.64 3.23 
1.14 1.37 -2.47 
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TABLE 11 .8 
COMPANY D. W. Bo Bl B2 F(12) F(2) 
Tarmac 0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 1.96* 1.26 
-1.66 1.81 -1.78 
Tesco 0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.99 0.98 
-1.10 1.73 -1-18 
Thorn EMI 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.05 0.90 3.75* 
0.89 -2.33 -2.27 
Trafalgar House 0.10 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 1.64 2.65* 
-2.26 0.33 -2.37 
Trusthouse Forte 0.07 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 1.60 5.11* 
-2.69 2.20 -2.75 
Unilever 0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 1.13 0.61 
-1.57 0.61 -1.74 
United Biscuits Holdin 0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 1.35 3.73* 
-2.01 0.67 -2.16 
Whitbread and Company 0.28 0.21 0.00 -0.18 0.98 1.36 
4.49 1.92 -4.54 
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Ho : YýL.,, _ -1 
(1) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test (A2) 
TABLE 11'ý. 9 including Constant (Po) 
where X2j-. t- = FT All-Share Index 
COMPANY D. W. A0 132 F(12) F(2) 
Allied-Lyons 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 1.31 0.04 
t-statistic -1.84 -1-86 
Ass. Brit Foods 0.19 -0.10 -0.09 1.30 1.64 
-3.13 -3.17 
BAT Industries 0.06 -0.03 -0-03 0.76 0.16 
-1.55 -1.65 
The BOC Group -0.04 0.04 0.77 0.18 
-2.00 2.07 
BTR 0.00 0.00 -0.00 1.37 6.12* 
0.19 -1.07 
Barclays 0.13 -0.02 -0.06 0.90 0.26 
-2.32 -2-52 
Bass 0.16 -0.02 0.92 1.00 0.63 
-2.29 33.22 
Beecham Group 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.77 0.13 
-1.55 -1.78 
Blue Circle Ind. ? -0.03 -0.04 0.32 1.76 
-2.48 -2.33 
Boots Company 0.12 -0.07 -0.07 1.17 0.33 
-2.98 -3.08 
British Petroleum Co. 0.11 -0.07 -0.06 0.76 0.63 
-2.49 -2.57 
Bunzl 2.22 -0.01 -0.01 0.90 0.08 
-0.45 -0.65 
Burton Group 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 2.20* 19.91* 
-0.37 -0.59 
Cadbury Schweppes 0.17 -0.12 -0.09 2.26* 0.05 
-3.28 -3.26 
Courtaulds 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.23 5.86* 
-1.38 -1.25 
Dixons Group 0.02 -0.05 -0-03 2.24* 4.89* 
-2.25 -3.20 
English China Clay 
Fison 0.02 -0-01 -0.01 1.05 7.979* 
-0.68 -0.84 
Glaxo Holding 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.11 0.09 
1.12 0.29 
Granada Group 2.25 -0.02 -0.02 1.37 6.82* 
-1.32 -1.57 
Grand Metropolitan 2.15 -0.03 -0.03 1.38 3.12* 
-1.73 -1.81 






Ho : YjL*_ - I(1) 
S-B Test (DW) and D-F Test 
including Constant (p. ) 
where X2. Lt-- = FT All-Share 




Hawker Siddeley 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 1.06 3.74* 
-1.31 -2.05 
Imperial Chemical Ind. 
Ladbroke Group 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 1.57 5.40* 
-3.21 -4.21 
Lloyds Bank 0.19 -0.11 -0.10 1.09 0.20 
-3.23 -3.27 
Marks and Spencer ? -0.09 -0.06 0.50 0., 10 
-2.42 -2.46 
Midland Bank 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 1.39 3.82 
-1.05 -0.21 
Nation Westminster 0.16 -0.03 -0.08 1.24 0.87 
-2.71 -2.97 
Pearson 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 2.05* 0.37 
-1.71 -1.83 
Pilkington 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 2.33* 1.08 
-1.67 -1.74 
Plessey Company 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 1.04 1.47 
-1.71 -1.58 
Prudential Corp. 
Racal Electronics 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.83 1.98 
-0.96 -1.96 
The Rank Organisation 0.02 -0-01 -0-01 0.83 1.62 
-1.23 -1.19 
Rank Hovis McDougall 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 0.98 1.04 
-1.72 -1.75 
Rickitt and Colman 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 0.44 2.41 
-1.56 -2.59 
Redland 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 2.50* 5.22* 
-3.30 -3.62 
Reed International 0.14 -0.02 -0.02 1.22 0.37 
-1.03 -1.13 
Rothmans International 0.16 -0.10 -0.07 1.68 2.00 
-2.19 -2.25 
Rowntree 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 1.73 5.63* 
-i. 61 -1-86 
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 1.40 1.65 
-1.71 -1.67 
Sears 0.08 -0.10 -0.05 1.11 0.31 
-2.30 -2.40 
Shell Trans. & Trading 0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.65 5.92* 
0.89 -2.08 
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TABLE It .9 
COMPANY D. W. Bo B2 F(12) F(2) 
Tarmac 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 2.00* 1.58 
-0.70 -0.84 
Tesco 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 1.02 1.06 
-0.69 -0.77 
Thorn EXI 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.89 5.15* 
-0.83 -0.54 
Trafalgar House 0.10 -0.05 -0.05 1.53 2.58 
-2.27 -2.39 
Trusthouse Forte 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 1.61 8.91* 
-1.60 -1.68 
Unilever 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 1.12 0.89 
-1.50 -1.67 
United Biscuits Holdin 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 1.33 4.37* 
-2.00 -2.19 
Whitbread and Company 0.28 -0.16 -0.14 1.19 0.10 
-4.04 -4.09 
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H, : Y. I., -1 (1) 
TABLE 11 . 10 S-B Test (DW) and 
D-F Test (A2) 
where X2. Lt-- = FT All-Share Index 
COMPANY D. W. 02 F(12) F(4) 
Allied-Lyons 0.06 0.00 1.33 0.01 
t-statistic 0.31 
Ass. Brit Foods 0.19 0.00 1.57 2.07 
-0.53 
BAT Industries 0.06 -0.00 0.64 0.34 
-0.60 
The BOC Group -0.00 0.75 0.82 
-0.55 
BTR 0.00 -0.01 1.38 6.19* 
-3.05 
Barclays 0.13 -0.01 1.03 0.03 
-0.98 
Bass 0.16 0.98 1.09 0.44 
0.87 
Beecham Group 0.05 -0.01 0.69 0.25 
-0.90 
Blue Circle Ind. ? 0.00 0.27 2.32 
0.13 
Boots Company 0.12 0.00 1.37 0.36 
-0.81 
British Petroleum Co. 0.11 -0.00 0.83 1.27 
-0.69 
Bunzl 2.22 -0.00 0.84 0.07 
-1.05 
Burton Group 0.02 -0.00 2.08* 20.24* 
-0.75 
Cadbury Schweppes 0.17 0.00 2.74* 1.44 
-0.08 
Courtaulds 0.02 -0.00 1.18 6.01* 
-0.16 
Dixons Group 0.02 -0.01 2.14* 7.40* 
-3-35 
English China Clay 
Fison 0.02 -0.00 0.88 8.218* 
-0.71 
Glaxo Holding 0.01 -0.00 1.19 0.19 
-1.06 
Granada Group 2.25 -0-00 1.24 7.86* 
-0.94 
Grand Metropolitan 2.15 -0.00 1.59 7.55* 
-0.55 
Hanson 0.01 -0.00 1.15 2.58 
-2.68 
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Ho : Yj_*_ -1 (1) 
TABLE 11.10 S-B Test (DW) and D-F 
Test (02) 
where X2.1. t- = FT All-Share Index 
COMPANY D. W. 
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F(12) F(4) 
Hawker Siddeley 0.04 -0.01 1.01 3.86* 
-1.64 
Imperial Chemical Ind. 
Ladbroke Group 0.02 -0.01 1.42 1.39 
-3.37 
Lloyds Bank 0.19 -0.00 1.66 0.16 
-0.51 
Marks and Spencer ? -0.00 0.77 0.54 
-0.50 
Midland Bank 0.02 0.00 1.27 3.88 
0.11 
Nation Westminster 0.16 ý-0.01 1.48 0.66 
-1.21 
Pearson 0.09 -0.00 2.11* 0.74 
-0.76 
Pilkington 0.06 -0.00 2.23* 0.77 
-0.48 
Plessey Company 0.04 0.00 0.87 1.15 
0.27 
Prudential Corp. 
Racal Electronics 0.01 -0.01 0.82 1.94 
-2.28 
The Rank Organisation 0.02 -0.01 0.73 1.48 
-0.99 
Rank Hovis McDougall 0.06 -0.00 1.06 2.01 
-0.36 
Rickitt and Colman 0.12 0.04 0.36 2.13 
-2.06 
Redland 0.11 -0.01 2.56* 4.08* 
-1.62 
Reed International 0.14 -0.00 1.16 0.30 
-0.54 
Rothmans International 0.16 -0.00 1.25 2.64 
-0.61 
Rowntree 0.06 0.01 1.45 5.75* 
-0.95 
Royal Bank of Scotland 0.06 0.00 1.50 1.19 
-0.22 
Sears 0.08 -0.00 1.25 0.90 
-1.04 
Shell Trans. & Trading 0.08 -0.03 0.56 5.973 
-1.88 
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TABLE 11 10 
COMPANY D. W. B2 F(12) F(4) 
Tarmac 0.03 -0.00 2.00* 1.53 
-0.78 
Tesco 0.05 -0.00 1.02 1.16 
-0.70 
Thorn EMI 0.03 -0.01 0.83 5.119 
-1.13 
Trafalgar House 0.10 -0.00 1.23 2.77 
-0.76 Trusthouse Forte 0.07 -0.00 1.72 9.51* 
-0.69 
Unilever 0.08 -0.00 1.16 0.85 
-1.05 
United Biscuits Holdin 0.06 -0.00 1.38 3.76* 
-1.07 




NONSTATIONARY TIME SERIES 
E-inpiricalcuntulative distribution of -F for p= I 
Sample Size 
Probability of a Smaller Value 
n 0.01 0.025 0.05 0.10 0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99 
25 -2.66 -2.26 -1.95 -1.60 0.92 1.33 1.70 2.16 
50 -2.62 -2.25 -1.95 -1.61 0.91 1.31 1.66 2.08 
100 -2.60 -2.24 -1.95 -1.61 0.90 1.29 1.64 2.03 
250 -2.58 -2.23 -1.95 -1.62 0.89 1.29 1.63 2.01 
500 -2.58 -2.23 -1.95 -1.62 0.89 1.28 1.62 2.00 
00 -2.58 -2.23 -1.95 -1.62 0.89 1.28 1.62 2.00 
1, 
25 -3.75 -3.33 -3.00 -2.63 -0.37 0.00 0.34 0.72 
50 -3.58 -3.22 -2.93 -2.60 -0.40 -0.03 0.29 0.66 
100 -3.51 -3.17 -2.89 -2.58 -0.42 -0.05 0.26 0.63 
250 -3.46 -3.14 -2.88 -2.57 -0.42 -0.06 0.24 0.62 
500 -3.44 -3.13 -2.87 -2.57 -0.43 -0.07 0.24 0.61 
00 -3.43 -3.12 -2.86 -2.57 -0.44 -0.07 0.23 0.60 
1 
25 -4.38 -3.95 -1.60 -3.24 -1.14 -0.80 -0.50 -0.15 
50 -4.15 -3.80 -3.50 -3.18 -1.19 -0.87 -0.58 -0.24 
100 -4.04 -3.73 -3.45 -3.15 -1.22 -0.90 -0.62 -0.28 
250 -3.99 -3.69 -3.43 -3.13 -1.23 -0.92 -0.64 -0.31 
500 -3.98 -3.68 -3.42 -3.13 -1.24 -0.93 -0.65 -0.32 
00 -3.96 -3.66 -3.41 -3.12 -1.25 -0.94 -0.66 -0.33 
This table was constructed by David A. Dickey using the Monte Carlo me'ttod. 
Details are given in Dickey (1975). Standard errors of the estimates vary, but most arc 
less than 0.02. 
FROM W. A. Fuller 
Introduction to Statistical Time Serie 
John Wiley & Sons 
New York 1976 
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CHAPTER 12 
TESTS OF THE REMUNERATION - PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
Cointegration tests on the remuneration / performance 
relationship amount to examining whether there exists a 
tendency for executive compensation to converge on an 
equilibrium relationship with the parent firm's share price. 
The existence of such a tendency may be taken as prima facie 
evidence that compensation contracts do indeed motivate 
managers to work in the best interests of the company and 
therefore could be one manner in which a company could 
sustain a competitive advantage. 
The procedure for testing this proposition is analogous 
to that applied in the previous chapter. Unfortunately, 
however, lack of data meant that the rigorous tests 
presented in Chapter 11 could not be repeated for the 
remuneration / performance relationship. In the U. K., Chief 
Executive officer (CEO) salaries have only been published in 
the last few years which has meant that for most companies 
there were only nine data points. Satisfactory tests for 
cointegration regressions require a larger data sample. In 
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particular, it was not possible to conduct the Dickey - 
Fuller tests. Furthermore, while critical values do exist 
for 11 observations for the Sargan - Bhargava test, the 
confidence which can be placed In the results is severely 
limited. Nevertheless, the motivation for carrying out the 
Sargan - Bhargava tests was more one of suggesting a method 
that can be applied in a more rigorous fashion when or 
should more data become available. 
In the analysis, the results have been separated into 
two groups representing companies which do not and those 
that do have stock option schemes (see Tables 12.1 & 12.2 
respectively). This is to reflect the notion that stock 
options may be an important motivational force. 
12.2 ORDER OF INTEGRATION & COINTEGRATION VECTOR 
Following Chapter 11, the first condition for 
cointegration is to test for the order of integration of the 
variables. If it were possible to conduct the Dickey -Fuller 
test, the method would be to derive the Dickey - Fuller test 
statistics from the regressions : 
6 C., 
. 
J3. L. L(T-N/2) 
+ j3ýL2CJ-1---JL + C: 
-Lt- 
6 XJLýLt- JILo + J3ýL: L(T-N/2) + A. L2XjL.,., ---x + E-iL-t- 
as before. 
3Z6 
The Durbin - Watson statistics for the Sargan - Bhargava 
test were derived from the regressions : 
Po + Ea--t- 
and 
X3L; Lt- Ao + Ett- 
Analogous to the earlier tests, the null hypothesis is that 
there exists a unit root in the time series [that is CLft, 
X. L, --I(l)] against the alternative that C. L.,, XL., --I(O). With 
a 5% test size and eleven observations, however, the 
critical value is 1.733. Where the null could not be 
rejected, tests were re-run in differences such that: 
CýL, - = 
Ao + 
and 
6 XX. L*- = 00 + CA-, t- 
In this case the null is that C. Lt-, Xxs. *--I(2) against the 
alternative that CýL*_, XjLj-*--I (1) - 
The results for these tests are reported in Tables 12.1 
& 12.2. It is immediately apparent that the results are not 
as robust as those reported in the previous section. In 
particular, in 25 cases the compensation and parent company 
share price variables do not appear to be integrated of the 
same order. For example, in the case of Allied-Lyons, while 
we can reject the null that the share price is integrated of 
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order 2 in favour of the alternative that it is I(l) (the 
Durbin - Watson statistic is greater than 1.733), we cannot 
similarly reject the null that compensation paid to the 
highest paid director at Allied-Lyons is 1(2) against the 
alternative. The implication is that the first condition for 
cointegration is not uniformly satisfied. The tentative 
nature of these results must of course be stressed once 
again. 
For the second condition for cointegration that there 
exists a cointegration vector for : 
CY,. LO + CYI-1. CýLtz EýLI- 
such that E. L*--I(O), Durbin - Watson statistics were derived 
from the regression : 
Z. Lv- = Po + Esi- 
where 
&Lt- -ý 
C; L*- - 
XL't- 
(that is, the log of compensation less the log of the parent 
company's share price). With the limited amount of data 
available, the results (Tables 12.1 & 12.2) appeared to 
suggest that the second condition for cointegration was not 
satisfied either. In general, it was not possible to reject 
the null hypothesis that E&*- - I(l). Furthermore, this 
condition did not appear to differ in those companies that 
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did employ stock option contracts. In Table 12.1 containing 
companies which did not employ such contracts it was only 
possible to reject the null hypothesis in 3 out of 23 cases. 
In table 12.2 containing companies which did employ such 
contracts, it was only possible to reject the null in 4 out 
of 24 cases. 
12.3 INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated a method 
which can usefully be employed to distinguish between 
spurious and non spurious relationships between compensation 
and corporate performance. While the results necessarily 
remain tentative, given the shortage of observations, the 
conclusions to emerge in this work are clear. It remains for 
future work to corroborate the conclusions when more 
information becomes available. 
The fact that neither the first, nor second conditions 
for cointegration appeared to be satisfied, suggests that 
there is no stable relationship between executive 
compensation and corporate performance. Taken in conjunction 
with the results reported in Chapter 11, the implication is 
that while companies may be able to achieve a sustained 
competitive advantage, the compensation contracts employed 
have not been a successful means of obtaining such 
3&9 
advantage. Of course, the analysis reveals nothing about 
optimality of the contracts employed. It may well be that 
scope for competitive advantage through the use of optimal 
compensation contracts does- exist. However, the 
complexities of such contracts alluded to in the first part 
of this thesis appear so far to have prevented practical 
implementation. The suggestion is that external routes to 
competitive advantage might be more effective. 
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COMPANIES THAT DO NOT PROVIDE SHARE OPTION PLANS 
TABLE 12.1 
COMPENSATION (Cit) SHARE PRICE (Xit) (Cit-Xlit) 
COMPANY DWI DW2 DWI DW2 DWI 
ALLIED-LYONS 0.39 1.23 0.23 2.12 0.99 
ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.21 0.92 0.22 1.24 0.34 
BASS 0.21 1.95 0.17 2.50 0.45 
BAT INDS. 0.29 2.42 0.20 2.82 0.29 
BEECHAM GROUP 0.79 2. ý07 0.32 2.36 1.85 
BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.27 3.25 0.40 1.49 1.33 
BOOTS 0.18 1.75 0.34 2.74 1.47 
BPB INDUSTRIES 0.20 1.51 0.21 1. G5 0.75 
BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.17 2.87 0.34 1.89 1.20 
COURTAULDS 0.32 0.97 0.23 2.35 0.60 
ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1.96 3.03 0.19 2.71 2.03 
GLAXO HLDGS 0.25 2.37 0.18 2.07 0.33 
HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.55 2.51 0.30 0.83 1.04 
PILKINGTON BROS 0.31 1.32 0.54 2.29 1.52 
RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.35 1.15 1.04 2.02 1.00 
RANK HOVIS 0.17 0.74 0.18 2.33 0.29 
RECKITT & COLMAN 0.16 1.78 0.16 1.82 0.36 
ROTHMANS INL B 0.19 1.71 0.38 2.14 1.68 
ROWN TREE 0.16 2.40 0.23 2.30 1.43 
SEARS 0.15 1.53 0.22 2. GG 2.10 
THORN EMI 0.25 1.37 0.87 2.44 0.99 
TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.33 1.07 0.20 2.97 0.98 
UNILEVER 0.17 2.22 0.16 2.22 0.38 
Footnote : 
dwjL derived f rom CjL, - = Do + E. Lv- , XýL-, -- = 
Do + Ej-v- 
Zj-, 
- = Do + ELV- 




COMPANIES THAT PROVIDE SHARE OPTION 
COMPENSATION (Cit) SHARE PRICE (Xit) 




BOC GROUP 0.49 0.76 0.28 1.90 1.56 
BTR 0.15 1.25 0.18 1.21 0.85 
BUNZL 0.25 '2.49 0.16 1.02 0.57 
, BURTON GROUP 0.14 1.56 0.19 1.14 0.92 
CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.32 1.94 0.21 3.09 1.17 
-DIXONS 0-17 1.83 0.21 1.69 1.23 
FISONS 0.15 1.68 0.21 1.28 0.40 
GRANADA GROUP 0-20 2.24 0.52 1.59 0.24 
GRAND METROPLTN 1.58 2.99 0.21 2.42 2.03 
HANSON TRUST 0.30 1.91 0.19 1.86 1.24 
IMP. CHEM. INDS 0-36 1.93 0.24 1.68 1.52 
LADBROKE GROUP 0.24 2.03 0.22 1.42 1.61 
. MARKS & SPENCER 1 
0.17 1.62 0.2G 2.62 1.83 
PERSONS 0.47 2.41 0.13 0.72 0.60 
,, PLESSEY 0.29 1.36 0.39 0.83 0.91 
AA. NK ORG. 0.20 2.02 0.38 1.92 1.17 
ýREDLAND 0.15 1.65 0.22 2.43 1.72 
REED INTL. 0.18 2.62 1.41 2.97 1.72 
ýýSHELL TRANSPORT 1-05 1.54 0.35 2.60 1.02 
TARMAC 6.16 1.42 0.20 1.92 0.62 
, 
t-TESCO 0.26 2.00 0.20 1.76 0.75 
TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.18 1.86 0.19 1.00 0.52 
TINITED BISCUITS 0.16 1.45 0.19 2.44 1.50 
WHITBREAD A 0.59 1.48 0.36 3.49 0.42 
Footnote : 
dwx derived f rom CjL, + 
Z j-, - o+ 
EL 
dw. t derived f rom SCLt: = 
Po + Ej-. r- , SXj-., -- = po + E5-, - SZj-, - = 
Ao + Ej.., -- 
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PART V- CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 13 
CONCLUSION 
The central concern of this thesis has been the means 
whereby a firm might gain a sustained competitive advantage 
over its rivals. The subject has largely been brought to 
public attention by the business strategy literature. It has 
been argued that this literature might be able to provide 
useful insights for managers seeking competitive advantage, 
but falls short of providing a formal framework for 
analysing competitive advantage. 
This thesis has explored the formal analysis contained 
within two broad strands of literature. The first strand 
yields the conjecture that firms may gain a competitive edge 
through the use of superior compensation contracts. The 
question of the optimal contract has been the chief concern 
of principal - agent theory. The theory suggests that the 
optimal contract will be highly complex. While some 
empirical evidence has emerged in recent years pointing to a 
significant positive relationship between compensation and 
firm performance, it has been argued that the results may be 
misleading. In particular, it was suggested that the issue 
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of causality has not been adequately addressed and that 
there has been a concentration on cross-section evidence to 
the neglect of time series evidence. 
The second route this thesis has explored through which 
firms might gain a sustained competitive advantage is 
through external market moves. The conjecture here is that 
most markets do not satisfy the conditions for strict 
contestability. In non - contestable markets scope may exist 
for firms to pursue strategic market moves to gain such a 
competitive advantage. For a strategic move to be 
successful, the move must influence other firms' expected 
payoffs from the various courses of action open to them. Two 
broad types of strategic move were identified : those which 
altered in a lasting way cost or demand conditions; and 
those which influenced the beliefs of those whose behaviour 
they were designed to affect. In the former case, it was 
argued that the scope for strategic use of investment in 
capacity, R&D and advertising was a function of the nature 
of market competition and of the investments themselves. In 
the latter case, given the existence of less than perfect 
information, it was suggested that firms may well engage in 
predatory practices to gain a reputation for toughness 
amongst other firms in the market, and those who might be 
contemplating entry. 
The empirical section of the thesis offered an 
assessment of the avenues through which a firm might gain a 
31Y 
competitive advantage, and asks whether competitive 
advantage is sustainable over time. The major point of 
departure in the empirical work was to use cointegration 
techniques to examine the time-series properties of some of 
the key variables involved. In particular, two questions 
were asked: in the experience of the top 100 U. K. companies 
between 1970 and 1987, was there any tendency for company 
share prices to converge on an equilibrium relationship with 
that of the industry in which they operated or the market as 
a whole?; and during the same time span, was there any 
tendency for executive compensation to converge onto an 
equilibrium relationship with the performance of the 
company? The largely unequivocal answer appears to be in the 
negative, in both cases the implication being that while 
there may be scope for companies to achieve a sustained 
competitive advantage over rivals, the compensation 
contracts employed have not been the means through which 
this advantage has been achieved. The suggestion is that 
external routes to competitive advantage might be more 
effective. 
In the absence of sufficient observations, it remains 
for future work to corroborate the conjecture that there 
does not exist a stable, non-spurious relationship between 
executive compensation and corporate performance. It also 
remains for future empirical investigation to explore and 
differentiate between the external strategic market moves 
3.4ir 
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APPENDIX A 
Share price of individual companies related to average 
share price of companies in the industry in question and 
to the FT index. 
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Characteristics and performance of companies with and 
without profit sharing schemes. 
n,,, OU) 
z 















































































































0 111 0 


























00 (Y- m 13- Ir- 
30N3d 
LO 0 LO 0 LO 0 LO 0 















































































































NO 000"0 XO 000 &101 0000 &0, t1o, 
04 0 00 (0 -t 04 0 00 (0 It 04 0 00 (D t 04 










T- ry 0- CD 0 
0 







00 (r 0) 0- 
0 
z 















No xxxxx No No b2 










































00 r- LO 
ry 

























































b2 xx, b2 xxx b2 xxxxx No x 










































































04 0 0) 00 t- (. 0 LO -t r) CN 
APPENDIX C 




COMPANY NAME YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
END (m) PROFIT(OOO) FUND 
D5 BOC GROUP 1979 SEP 79 1,229 63,303 514 
D5 BOC GROUP 1980 SEP 80 1,194 61,500 580 
D5 BOC GROUP 1981 SEP 81 1,523 92,700 785 
D5 BOC GROUP 1982 SEP 82 1,534 112,100 888 
D5 BOC GROUP 1983 SEP 83 1,702 114,800 1042 
D5 BOC GROUP 1984 SEP 84 2,103 137,800 1204 
D5 BOC GROUP 1985 SEP 85 1,901 171,300 1129 
D5 BOC GROUP 1986 SEP 86 1,945 192,100 1035 
D5 BOC GROUP 1987 SEP 87 1,959 263,200 982 
D6 BTR 1979 DEC 79 433 59,650 149 
D6 BTR 1980 JAN 81 510 70,258 221 
D6 BTR 1981 JAN 82 638 90,154 216 
D6 BTR 1982 JAN 83 725 106,661 317 
D6 BTR 1983 DEC 83 1,970 170,600 692 
D6 BTR 1984 DEC 84 3,487 284,200 847 
D6 BTR 1985 DEC 85 3,881 361,800 1016 
D6 BTR 1986 DEC 86 4,019 504,800 1251 
D6 BTR 1987 DEC 87 4,150 590,300 1289 
E7 BUNZL 1979 DEC 79 230 7,366 52 
E7 BUNZL 1980 DEC 80 170 5,444 62 
E7 BUNZL 1981 DEC 81 246 7,878 67 
E7 BUNZL 1982 DEC 82 362 12,689 67 
E7 BUNZL 1983 DEC 83 541 17, 70 
E7 BUNZL 1984 DEC 84 875 27,648 76 
E7 BUNZL 1985 DEC 85 788 42,664 135 
E7 BUNZL 1986 DEC 86 1,067 64,823 314 
E7 BUNZL 1987 DEC 87 1,471 86,000 
G6 BURTON GROUP 1979 SEP 79 165 12,337 142 
G6 BURTON GROUP 1980 AUG 80 226 16,897 126 
GG BURTON GROUP 1981 AUG 81 219 16,374 139 
G6 BURTON GROUP 1982 AUG 82 203 24,263 21G 
G6 BURTON GROUP 1983 AUG 83 299 38,817 239 
G6 BURTON GROUP 1984 AUG 84 417 56,028 261 
GG BURTON GROUP 1985 AUG 85 551 79,415 369 
G6 BURTON GROUP 1986 AUG 86 1,229 148,500 441 
G6 BURTON GROUP 1987 AUG 87 1,339 182,500 523 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 1979 DEC 79 1,006 55,110 273 
H3 'CAffBURY SCHWEPPS 1980 JAN 81 1,119 61,300 292 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 1981 JAN 82 1,271 80, GOO 384 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 1982 JAN 83 1,578 89,700 389 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 1983 DEC 83 1,703 106,900 397 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 1984 DEC 84 2,016 124,000 515 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 1985 DEC 85 1,874 93,300 468 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 1986 JAN 87 1,840 130,700 460 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 1987 JAN 88 2,031 176,100 473 
G6 DIXONS 1979 APR 79 208 10,890 46 
G6 DIXONS 1980 APR 80 219 llf466, 55 
G6 DIXONS 1981 MAY 81 230 12,042 60 
G6 DIXONS 1982 MAY 82 251 13,141 70 
G6 DIXONS 1983 APR 83 268 13,974 84 
G6 DIXONS 1984 APR 84 351 20,553 113 
G6 DIXONS 1985 APR 85 607 39,600 145 
- 
COMPANY NAME YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
END (ni) PROFIT(OOO) FUND 
G6 DIXONS 1986 APR 86 943 78,100 172 
G6 DIXONS 1987 A. PR 87 1,111 102,600 230 
D5 FISONS 1979 DEC 79 433 3,656 164 
D5 FISONS 1980 DEC 80 454 3,833 146 
D5 FISONS 1981 DEC 81 494 9,246 131 
D5 FISONS 1982 DEC A2 235 20,952 137 
D5 FISONS 1983 DEC 83 279 31,300 172 
D5 FISONS 1984 DEC 84 506 48,300 181 
D5 FISONS 1985 DEC 85 601 72,300 291 
D5 FISONS 1986 DEC 86 664 85,100 305 
D5 FISONS 1987 DEC 87 720 100,800 329 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 1979 SEP 79 278 23,158 122 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 1980 SEP 80 331 27,573 118 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 1981 SEP 81 385 32,071 148 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 1982 SEP 82 460 38,319 161 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 1983 SEP 83 521 43,400 177 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 1984 SEP 84 630 53,754 264 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 1985 SEP 85 762 64,618 262 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 1986 SEP 86 836 92,431 361 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 1987 SEP 87 1,014 111,100 405 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1979 SEP 79 2,171 127,839 890 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1980 SEP 80 2,583 152,100 1238 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1981 SEP 81 3,221 186,600 1213 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1982 SEP 82 3,849 220,200 1421 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1983 SEP 83 4,469 295,400 1554 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1984 SEP 84 5,075 334,300 1731 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1985 SEP 85 5,590 347,300 1952 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1986 SEP 86 5,291 383,200 2033 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1987 SEP 87 5,706 451,700 1725 
Il HANSON TRUST 1979 SEP 79 658 37,614 107 
Il HANSON TRUST 1980 SEP 80 684 39,100 121 
Il HANSON TRUST 1981 SEP 81 856 49,700 165 
Il HANSON TRUST 1982 SEP 82 1,148 60,400 189 
Il HANSON TRUST 1983 SEP 83 1,484 91,100 429 
Il HANSON TRUST 1984 SEP 84 2,382 169,100 410 
Il HANSON TRUST 1985 SEP 85 2,675 252,800 976 
Il HANSON TRUST 1986 SEP 86 4,312 464,000 1439 
Il HANSON TRUST 1987 SEP 87 6,682 741,000 1730 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1979 DEC 79 5,368 266,756 2798 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1980 DEC 80 5,715 284,000 3010 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1981 DEC 81 6,581 335,000 2955 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1982 DEC 82 7,358 270,000 3249 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1983 DEC 83 8,256 612,000 3531 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1984 DEC 84 9,909 1,037,000 4016 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1985 DEC 85 10,725 904,000 3684 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1986 DEC 86 10,136 1,005,000 3848 
D5 IMP. CHEX. INDS 1987 DEC 87 11,123 1,302,000 3584 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1979 JAN 80 579 28,384 128 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1980 DEC 80 665 32,600 146 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1981 DEC 81 702 32,800 190 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1982 DEC 82 701 31,400 208 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1983 JAN 84 788 41,400 219 
- 
COMPANY NAME YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
END (m) PROFIT(OOO) FUND (M) 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1984 JAN 85 1,045 50,200 330 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1985 DEC 85 1,256 75,100 546 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1986 DEC 86 1,664 101,300 699 
F3 ILADBROKE GROUP 1987 DEC 87 2,130 160,200 
G6 MA1ýKS & SPENCER 1979 MAR 79 1,098 106,199 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1980 MAR 80 1,668 161,368 548 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1981 MAR 81 1,873 181,200 598 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1982 MAR 82 2,199 222,100 1064 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1983 MAR 83 2,506 237,400 1143 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1984 MAR 84 2,855 280,700 1225 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1985 MAR 85 3,194 303,100 1324 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1986 MAR 86 3,716 364,400 1451 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1987 MAR 87 4,221 425,400 1577 
Il PERSONS 1979 DEC 79 484 30,029 195 
Il PERSONS 1980 DEC 80 591 36,668 237 
Il PERSONS 1981 DEC 81 702 59,551 270 
Il PERSONS 1982 DEC 82 719 59,858 318 
Il PERSONS 1983 DEC 83 730 77,353 334 
Il PERSONS 1984 DEC 84 843 99,443 395 
Il PERSONS 1985 DEC 85 970 109,300 389 
Il PERSONS 1986 DEC 86 953 121,100 444 
Il PERSONS 1987 DEC 87 952 151,800 594 
Bl PLESSEY 1979 MAR 79 567 56,711 248 
Bl PLESSEY 1980 MAR 80 751 75,133 298 
Bl PLESSEY 1981 APR 81 845 84,537 360 
Bl PLESSEY 1982 APR 82 963 111,438 408 
BI PLESSEY 1983 APR 83 1,075 146,648 411 
BI PLESSEY 1984 MAR 84 1,219 176,112 495 
Bl PLESSEY 1985 MAR 85 1,416 162,335 533 
BI PLESSEY 1986 MAR 86 1,461 169,800 533 
Bl PLESSEY 1987 APR 87 1,430 183,200 608 
B2 RANK ORG. 1979 OCT 79 538 100,244 469 
B2 RANK ORG. 1980 OCT 80 597 111,237 513 
B2 RANK ORG. 1981 OCT 81 618 102,756 567 
B2 RANK ORG. 1982 OCT 82 675 60,373 534 
B2 RANK ORG. 1983 OCT 83 742 62,700 530 
B2 RANK ORG. 1984 OCT 84 722 87,900 526 
B2 RANK ORG. 1985 OCT 85 631 127,500 528 
B2 RANK ORG. 1986 OCT 86 718 160,400 562 
B2 RANK ORG. 1987 OCT 87 668 200,700 610 
Al REDLAND 1979 MAR 79 420 38,132 
Al REDLAND 1980 MAR 80 495 44,944 122 
Al REDLAND 1981 MAR 81 515 46,760 135 
Al REDLAND 1982 MAR 82 572 43,510 163 
Al REDLAND 1983 MAR 83 799 60,000 245 
Al REDLAND 1984 MAR 84 915 93,900 236 
Al REDLAND 1985 MAR 85 955 103,500 286 
Al REDLAND 1986 MAR 86 921 105,600 305 
Al REDLAND 1987 MAR 87 979 130,600 499 
H4 REED INTL. 1979 MAR 79 1,387 47,232 
Il REED INTL. 1980 MAR 80 1,516 51,626 491 
Il REED INTL. 1981 MAR 81 1,480 50,400 631 
- 
COMPANY NAME YEAR 
Il REED INTL. 1982 
Il REED INTL. 1983 
Il REED INTL. 1984 
Il REED INTL. 1985 
Il REED INTL. 1986 
Il REED INTL. 1987 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1979 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1980 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1981 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1982 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1983 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1984 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1985 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1986 
DS SHELL TRANSPORT 1987 
A4 TARMAC 1979 
A4 TARMAC 1980 
A4 TARMAC 1981 
A4 TARMAC 1982 
A4 TARMAC 1983 
A4 TARMAC 1984 
A4 TARMAC 1985 
A4 TARMAC 1986 
A4 TARMAC 1987 
G2 TESCO 1979 
G2 TESCO 1980 
G2 TESCO 1981 
G2 TESCO 1982 
G2 TESCO 1983 
G2 TESCO 1984 
G2 TESCO 1985 
G2 TESCO 1986 
G2 TESCO 1987 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1979 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1980 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1981 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1982 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1983 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1984 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1985 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1986 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1987 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1979 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1980 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1981 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1982 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1983 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1984 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1985 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1986 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 1987 
























































(M) PROFIT(OOO) FUND (M) 
1,699 71,600 669 
1,809 74,100 593 
2,043 105,600 642 
2,115 112,200 645 
1,931 149,800 626 
1,950 187,700 690 
-22,706 1,662,999 4181 34,257 2,509,000 4814 
41,569 2,638,000 5295 
19,151 2,945,000 6781 
24,838 3,020,200 7843 
29,522 3,495,500 10211 
29,241 3,208,000 9390 
22,219 2,107,900 10025 
23,924 2,184,400 9195 
836 41,629 126 
884 44,019 161 
918 52,131 203 
988 68,700 232 
1,124 87,700 253 
1,277 105,100 333 
1,536 122,900 427 
1,718 161,900 491 
2,201 265,400 
1,531 25,922 197 
1,916 32,441 238 
2,102 35,590 282 
2,404 42,700 321 
2,277 53,500 335 
2,595 67,400 380 
3,000 81,504 589 
3,355 122,900 690 
3,593 166,500 
946 43,726 
1,066 49,272 168 
1,190 55,004 183 
913 64,812 227 
1,191 78,511 260 
1,337 103,410 326 
1,649 124,873 503 
1,739 120,100 414 
2,138 148,200 731 
633 38,261 
791 47,800 194 
880 60,900 300 
1,205 68,400 264 
1,425 83,200 258 
1,660 87,200 301 
1,806 102,200 414 
1,818 125,260 453 
1,832 147,000 490 
604 51,270 
COMPANY NAME YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
END (m) PROFIT(000) FUND 
HI WHITBREAD A 1980 MAR 80 738 62,653 431 
Hl WHITBREAD A 1981 FEB 81 782 66,388 761 
Hl WHITBREAD A 1982 FEB 82 842 73,188 789 
Hl WHITBREAD A 1983 FEB 83 1,002 80,000 810 
HI WHITBREAD A 1984 MAR 84 1,186 93,800 850 
Hl WHITBREAD A 1985 MAR 85 1,444 108,800 1016 
HI WHITBREAD A 1986 MAR 86 1,533 127,500 1088 
Hl WHITBREAD A 1987 FEB 87 1,554 148,500 1159 
A 
COMPANY NAME 
D5 BOC GROUP 
D5 BOC GROUP 
D5 BOC GROUP 
D5 BOC GROUP 
D5 BOC GROUP 
D5 BOC GROUP 
D5 BOC GROUP 
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G6 BURTON GROUP 
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COMPANY NAME OPERATING HPD MARKET 
ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES VALUE (m) 
G6 DIXONS 0.330 0.085 487,654 118,720 
G6 DIXONS 0.330 0.089 659,000 77,162 
D5 FISONS -13,245 64,392 9,733 
D5 FISONS 11,304 72,984 7,246 
D5 FISONS 9,839 75,549 5,890 
D5 FISONS 0.153 0.110 7,539 91,398 15,976 
D5 FISONS 0.169 0.111 7,495 111,773 32,784 
D5 FISONS 0.202 0.100 8,634 131,362 59,252 
D5 FISONS 0.209 0.107 9,021 164,395 106,514 
D5 FISONS 0.207 0.116 189,174 130,200 
D5 FISONS 0.247 0.131 253,181 121,351 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 11,427 36,584 19,811 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 12,058 44,678 27,690 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 12,163 44,908 33,128 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 11,736 55,000 30,931 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 13,975 61,000 28,776 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 0.131 0.095 15,556 72,000 47,926 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.166 0.088 18,916 91,000 52,044 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.182 0.123 155,000 73,562 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.196 0.121 168,000 81,314 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 118,735 50,380 64,988 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 126,737 54,167 78,530 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 131,757 67,770 98,026 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.157 0.088 129,454 82,578 200,198 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.160 0.088 136,297 111,138 198,749 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.153 0.086 125,074 144,284 229,853 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.145 0.079 137,195 176,289 306,741 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.160 0.091 176,504 388,624 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.177 0.099 208,504 384,087 
Il HANSON TRUST 36,000 36,000 13,171 
Il HANSON TRUST 36,000 66,000 22,424 
Il HANSON TRUST 39,000 69,000 31,371 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.193 0.068 44,000 87,000 59,764 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.147 0.072 50,000 140,000 110,622 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.163 0.085 67,000 177,000 227,521 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.158 0.107 64,000 301,000 279,378 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.133 0.097 327,000 503,629 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.209 0.096 1,260,000 454,406 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 148,200 124,380 206,028 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 143,200 134,853 192,200 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 132,400 164,682 173,397 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 8.410 0.046 123,800 150,575 217,242 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.133 0.081 117,900 170,999 388,947 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.180 0.105 115,600 287,261 455,470 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.176 0.089 118,600 312,991 491,283 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.183 0.100 393,068 693,064 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.238 0.114 283,283 729,820 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 195,220 37,000 77 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 17,970 45,000 142 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 16,955 52,000 185 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.108 0.048 16,500 59,000 240 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.120 0.051 16,090 97,000 300 
C014PANY NAME OPERATING HPD MARKET 
ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES VALUE (m) 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.108 0.043 18,479 107,000 461 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.116 0.056 21,182 130,000 655 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.119 0.064 24,994 145,000 1,033 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 32,167 281,000 1,351 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 42,170 1,001 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 44,969 64,077 1,527 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 
-- 
44,646 78,331 1,655 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 45,703 93,525 2,903 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.191 0.090 54,136 119,721 2,830 
GG MARKS & SPENCER 0.210 0.092 56,891 158,508 3,166 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.222 0.091 60,252 178,952 4,656 
G6 14ARKS & SPENCER 0.253 0.093 63,144 217,016 4,803 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.276 0.099 287,234 4,868 
Il PERSONS 34,553 62,805 133 
Il PERSONS 35,564 88,723 141 
Il PERSONS 34,223 103,445 149 
Il PERSONS 0.156 0.092 31,598 99,219 251 
Il PERSONS 0.171 0.094 27,567 200,672 382 
Il PERSONS 0.187 0.102 27,872 187,000 550 
Il PERSONS 0.209 0.102 30,158 170,000 862 
Il PERSONS 0.196 0.097 27,811 176,000 1,269 
Il PERSONS 0.206 0.117 23,250 283,000 1,486 
Bl PLESSEY 38,006 101,101 240 
Bl PLESSEY 35,922 133,944 585 
Bl PLESSEY 33,026 139,937 1,315 
BI PLESSEY 40,872 188,200 2,206 
Bl PLESSEY 0.273 0.110 38,838 233,128 1,651 
Bl PLESSEY 0.268 0.119 37,533 248,365 1,536 
BI PLESSEY 0.223 0.099 34,366 220,919 1,248 
BI PLESSEY 0.216 0.104 218,334 1,358 
Bl PLESSEY 0.220 0.110 237,347 1,063 
B2 RANK ORG. 36,297 52,000 358 
B2 RANK ORG. 35,933 61,000 347 
B2 RANK ORG. 31,578 69,000 368 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.125 0.043 28,112 73,000 214 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.113 0.025 24,104 80,000 374 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.157 0.039 20,616 131,000 598 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.197 0.090 19,046 152,000 883 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.202 0.109 152,000 1,127 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.247 0.133 166,000 1,198 
Al REDLAND 52,895 170 
Al REDLAND 7,030 62,344 201 
Al REDLAND 6,519 70,628 189 
Al REDLAND 5,174 78,982 492 
Al REDLAND 0.155 0.058 11,514 83,232 536 
Al REDLAND 0.226 0.082 100,000 637 
Al REDLAND 0.226 0.089 120,311 735 
Al REDLAND 0.208 0.094 12,041 125,426 1,085 
Al REDLAND 0.167 0.122 131,375 1,091 
H4 REED INTL. 68,808 192 
Il REED INTL. 61,100 75,209 210 
Il REED INTL. 58,200 87,957 285 
COMPANY NAME OPERATING HPD MARKET 
ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES VALUE (m) 
Il REED INTL. 56,500 95,487 280 
Il REED INTL. 0.129 0.050 57,800 102,753 442 
Il REED INTL. 0.160 0.060 55,000 129,058 644 
Il REED INTL. 0.163 0.063 45,200 138,291 819 
Il REED INTL. 0.235 0.084 34,700 141,941 1,447 
Il REED INTL. 0.281 0.103 171,433 2,156 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 32,000 120,385 3,580 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 33,000 225,163 5,171 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 81,000 245,948 4,419 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.231 0.122 163,000 192,553 4,552 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.207 0.095 202,434 6,275 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.200 0.094 149,000 209,799 7,215 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.213 0.084 142,000 296,722 7,325 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.138 0.071 268,145 10,883 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.157 0.069 265,430 11,104 
A4 TARMAC 23,688 41,856 104 
A4 TARMAC 21,739 56,615 141 
A4 TARMAC 18,585 67,425 262 
A4 TARMAC 0.261 0.074 19,566 95,000 577 
A4 TARMAC 0.265 0.079 23,061 125,300 584 
A4 TARMAC 0.223 0.092 24,264 140,000 795 
A4 TARMAC 0.229 0.092 25,748 152,000 1,167 
A4 TARMAC 0.244 0.105 182,000 1,309 
A4 TARMAC 213,000 1,588 
G2 TESCO 52,829 42,407 225 
G2 TESCO 50,578 51,162 186 
G2 TESCO 49,610 54,296 171 
G2 TESCO 0.156 0.027 49,372 62,486 402 
G2 TESCO 0.170 0.027 52,342 81,546 559 
G2 TESCO 0.178 0.027 57,180 122,338 808 
G2 TESCO 0.190 0.031 60,781 118,461 1,183 
G2 TESCO 0.206 0.040 155,504 1,674 
G2 TESCO 196,951 2,276 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 70,000 140 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 26,967 80,000 196 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 26,332 95,000 257 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.197 0.080 24,015 110,000 360 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.219 0.072 16,160 105,000 533 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.193 0.077 30,904 135,000 970 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.174 0.078 31,249 190,000 1,192 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.144 0.074 34,278 225,000 1,089 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.139 0.083 236,000 1,490 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 32,018 205 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 42,000 40,000 256 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 41,000 53,000 358 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.203 0.071 40,000 64,000 402 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.213 0.070 40,400 75,000 424 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.189 0.067 40,881 87,000 631 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.199 0.068 41,131 96,000 976 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.197 0.076 41,467 122,000 949 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.233 0.085 154,000 1,073 
Hl WHITBREAD A 34,288 296 
COMPANY NAME OPERATING 
ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES 
Hl WHITBREAD A 40,916 
Hl WHITBREAD A 40,217 
Hl WHITBREAD A 39,496 
Hl WHITBREAD A 0.092 0.090 36,961 
Hl WHITBREAD A 0.103 0.080 39,581 
Hl WHITBREAD A 0.107 0.083 42,786 
HI WHITBREAD A 0.116 0.092 47,132 












COMPANY NAME SHARE DIVIDEND NET EARNI RETURN ON 
PRICE (p) NET (p) SHARE (p) SALES 
D5 BOC GROUP 57.00 4.20 0.052 
D5 BOC GROUP 105.00 4.62 0.052 
D5 BOC GROUP 152.00 5.11 0.061 
D5 BOC GROUP 173.00 5.74 18.37 0.073 
D5 BOC GROUP 297.00 6.30 14.28 0.067 
D5 BOC GROUP 259.00 7,70 18.06 0.066 
D5 BOC GROUP 289.00 9.38 26.48 0.090 
D5 BOC GROUP 372.00 10.79 26.52 0.099 
D5 BOC GROUP 382.00 12.80 36.85 0.134 
D6 BTR 31.30 1.25 0.138 
D6 BTR 54.52 1.58 0.138 
D6 BTR 76.00 1.94 0.141 
D6 BTR 84.00 2.22 6.35 0.147 
D6 BTR 142.34 2.83 8.47 0.087 
D6 BTR 204.67 4.33 12.20 0.082 
D6 BTR 252.00 5.83 16.02 0.093 
D6 BTR 269.00 8.25 21.23 0.126 
D6 BTR 275.00 9.70 23.57 0.142 
E7 BUNZL 16.12 1.03 0.032 
E7 BUNZL 17.06 1.13 0.032 
E7 BUNZL 24.10 1.25 0.032 
E7 BUNZL 35.53 1.41 4.10 0.035 
E7 BUNZL 61.51 1.70 5.29 0.032 
E7 BUNZL 133.96 2.30 7.19 0.032 
E7 BUNZL 167.27 3.20 9.62 0.054 
E7 BUNZL 208.00 4.20 11.95 0.061 
E7 BUNZL 160.00 5.00 0.058 
G6 BURTON GROUP 29.00 1.25 0.075 
G6 BURTON GROUP 23.50 1.38 0.075 
GG BURTON GROUP 33.25 1.63 0.075 
G6 BURTON GROUP 75.50 1.94 5.96 0.119 
G6 BURTON GROUP 106.00 2.50 8.21 0.130 
G6 BURTON GROUP 210.50 3.25 10.44 0.134 
G6 BURTON GROUP 277.50 4.40 14.30 0.144 
G6 BURTON GROUP 284.00 5.70 17.71 0.121 
G6 BURTON GROUP 221.00 7.20 21.00 0.136 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 54.19 3.79 21.00 0.055 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 69-9ý 4.04 0.055 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 86.00 4.60 0.063 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 117.00 4.90 10.94 0.057 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 118.00 5.40 13 . 28 
0.063 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 163.00 5.90 15 . 56 
0.062 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 158.00 5.90 9.15 0.050 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 186.00 6.70 14 . 37 
0.071 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 232.00 8.00 18 . 67 0.087 
G6 DIXONS 21-83 0.68 0.052 
G6 DIXONS 30.14 0.79 0.052 
G6 DIXONS 39.86 0.83 0.052 
G6 DIXONS 56.95 0.90 0.052 
G6 DIXONS 58.49 0.97 5.66 0.052 
G6 DIXONS 139.89 1.22 7.25 0.059 
G6 DIXONS 221-53 1.46 8.69 0.065 
COMPANY NAME SHARE DIVIDEND NET EARNI RETURN ON 
PRICE (p) NET (p) SHARE (p) SALES 
G6 DIXONS 310.97 2.92 13.70 0.083 
G6 DIXONS 207.00 3.97 19.21 0.092 
D5 FISONS 29.08 1.83 0.008 
D5 FISONS 21.64 1.11 0.008 
D5 FISONS 17.54 1.11 0.019 
D5 FISONS 47.50 1.42 4.43 0.089 
D5 FISONS 85.88 1481 6.95 0.112 
D5 FISONS 139.85 2.17 9.41 0.095 
D5 FISONS 214.92 2.75 12.15 0.120 
D5 FISONS 259.76 3.25 13.74 0.128 
D5 FISONS 241.73 4.00 15.69 0.140 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 136.00 3.99 0.083 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 180.00 5.58 0.083 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 214.00 6.68 0.083 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 199.00 6.23 0.083 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 184.00 5.80 0.083 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 194.00 6.40 14.58 0.085 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 210.00 7.10 12.66 0.085 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 294.00 8.50 21.17 0.111 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 295.71 9.80 25.50 0.110 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 93.70 4.20 0.059 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 112.89 4.89 0.059 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 138.71 5.48 0.058 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 253.04 6.34 20.16 0.057 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 250.01 7.29 24.30 0.066 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 286.37 8.36 27.65 0.066 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 361.82 9.09 29.82 0.062 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 458.00 10.20 30.44 0.072 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 450.00 12.00 35.90 0.079 
Il HANSON TRUST 9.94 0.53 0.057 
Il HANSON TRUST 16.89 0.69 0.057 
Il HANSON TRUST 23.53 0.82 0.058 
Il HANSON TRUST 44.43 0.98 3.13 0.053 
Il HANSON TRUST 63.22 1.20 4.14 0.061 
Il HANSON, TRUST 126.07 1.80 7.04 0.071 
Il HANSON TRUST 111.38 2.40 8.64 0.095 
Il HANSON TRUST 141.76 3.20 11.75 0.108 
Il HANSON TRUST 127.00 4.40 15.74 0.111 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 354.00 23.00 -0.050 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 324.00 17.00 0.050 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 292.00 19.00 0.051 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 360.00 19.00 26.04 0.037 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 636.00 24 . 00 
64.72 0.074 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 736.00 30-00 96.61 0.105 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 761.00 33-00 85.06 0.084 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 1,068-00 36-00 90.26 0.099 
D5 IMP. CHEX. INDS 1,079.50 41.00 112.11 0.117 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 58.61 5.18 0.049 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 107.52 5.95 0.049 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 116.80 6.43 0.047 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 151.21 7.24 11.62 0.045 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 186.52 8.16 15.28 0.053 
COMPANY NAME SHARE DIVIDEND NET EARNI RETURN ON 
PRICE (p) NET (p) SHARE (p) SALES 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 242-93 9.27 15.33 0.048 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 295.77 10.43 '19.49 0.060 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 353.26 11.59 22.53 0.061 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 320.00 13.89 0.075 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 38.50 1.30 0.097 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 58.50 
. 
1,70 0.097 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 63.00 1.90 0.097 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 110.50 2.30 0.101 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 107.50 2.55 5.07 0.095 
GG MARKS & SPENCER 120.00 3.13 6.37 0.098 
GG MARKS & SPENCER 176.00 3.40 6.84 0.095 
GG MARKS & SPENCER 181.00 3.90 8.35 0.098 
GG MARKS & SPENCER 183.00 4.50 10.15 0.101 
Il PERSONS 97.50 5.00 0.062 
Il PERSONS 100.00 5.00 0.062 
Il PERSONS 105.50 5.60 0.085 
Il PERSONS 135.50 5.60 16.57 0.083 
Il PERSONS 204.00 7.00 22.65 0.106 
Il PERSONS 293.00 8.50 28.90 0.118 
Il PERSONS 435.00 10.00 29.94 0.113 
Il PERSONS 616.00 12.00 37.40 0.127 
Il 'PERSONS 688.00 15.00 46.70 0.159 
Bl PLESSEY 64.83 2.10 0.100 
Bl PLESSEY 85.89 2.31 0.100 
Bl PLESSEY 121.00 2.54 0.100 
Bl PLESSEY 203.00 2.87 0.116 
Bl PLESSEY 228.00 3.30 11.32 0.136 
Bl PLESSEY 212.00 3.80 15.03 0.144 
Bl PLESSEY 172.00 4.38 12.34 0.115 
Bl PLESSEY 184.00 5.03 13.44 0.116 
Bl PLESSEY 144.00 5.79 15.90 0.128 
B2 RANK ORG. 178.00 10.80 0.186 
B2 RANK ORG. 172.00 10.80 0.186 
B2 RANK ORG. 182.00 10.80 0.166 
B2 RANK ORG. 106.00 8.00 12.25 0.089 
B2 RANK ORG. 185.00 10.00 11.70 0.085 
B2 RANK ORG. 296.00 12.00 20.64 0.122 
B2 RANK ORG. 437.00 15.00 31.33 0.202 
B2 RANK ORG. 523.00 18.00 43.64 0.223 
B2 RANK ORG. 556.00 21.75 54.71 0.300 
Al REDLAND 136.75 5.12 0.091 
Al REDLAND 161.18 6.52 0.091 
Al REDLAND 151.41 7.17 0.091 
Al REDLAND 229-55 7.17 0.076 
Al REDLAND 250.06 7.91 14.96 0.075 
Al REDLAND 290.11 9.30 23.76 0.103 
Al REDLAND 334.07 10.27 25.72 0.108 
Al REDLAND 403.00 11.30 27.73 0.115 
Al REDLAND 405.00 13.00 35.90 0.133 
H4 REED INTL. 43.00 2.00 0.034 
Il REED INTL. 47.00 3.25 0.034 
Il REED INTL. 60.50 3.25 0.034 
Ia 
COMPANY NAME SHARE DIVIDEND NET EARNI RETURN ON 
PRICE (p) NET (p) SHARE (p) SALES 
Il REED INTL. 59.50 3.50 0.042 
Il REED INTL. 93.50 3.50 9.00 0.041 
Il REED INTL. 135.50 4.10 15.29 0.052 
Il REED INTL. 171.75 4.60 14.36 0.053 
Il REED INTL. 303.00 5.60 22.45 0.078 
Il REED INTL. 397.00 8.00 26.51 0.096 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 324.00 18.76 0.073 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 468.00 ig. 10 0.073 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 400.00 20.50 0.063 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 412.00 21.80 68.73 0.154 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 568.00 26.20 96.00 0.122 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 653.00 33.00 127.52 0.118 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 663.00 35.00 101.48 0.110 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 985.00 43.00 79.97 0.095 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 1005.00 48.00 90.39 0.091 
A4 TARMAC 23.50 1.72 0.050 
A4 TARMAC 30.88 2.00 0.050 
A4 TARMAC 50.25 2.30 0.057 
A4 TARMAC 109.00 2.75 8.71 0.070 
A4 TARMAC 107.50 3.40 11.29 0.078 
A4 TARMAC 129.50 4.00 12.48 0.082 
A4 TARMAC 189.00 4.70 12.04 0.080 
A4 TARMAC 212.00 5.54 16.16 0.094 
A4 TARMAC 225.00 7.25 0.121 
G2 TESCO 22.14 0.65 0.017 
G2 TESCO 18.37 0.80 0.017 
G2 TESCO 16.89 0.84 0.017 
G2 TESCO 39.36 0.98 0.018 
G2 TESCO 54.44 1.17 4.08 0.023 
G2 TESCO 78.38 1.37 4.15 0.026 
G2 TESCO 96.00 1.62 4.76 0.027 
G2 TESCO 132.34 1.93 6.22 0.037 
G2 TESCO 156.00 2.43 8.67 0.046 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 54.79 4.32 0.046 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 76.79 5.08 0.046 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 100.20 5.81 0.046 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 147.13 7.06 19.92 0.071 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 215.79 8.50 23.99 0.066 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 331.52 10.00 28.93 0.077 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 346.00 11.50 33.09 0.076 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 274.00 13.20 25.13 0.069 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 305.00 14.50 29.20 0.069 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 77.40 3.58 0.060 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 81.05 4.27 0.060 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 113.27 5.13 0.069 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 125.97 5.66 14.46 0.057 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 131.83 6.84 18.04 0.058 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 193.34 7.50 19.46 0.053 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 240.00 8.00 19.28 0.057 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 233.00 9.50 20.54 0.069 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 263.00 11.00 23.39 0.080 
HI WHITBREAD A 84.67 3.17 0.085 
COMPANY NAME SHARE DIVIDEND NET EARNI RETURN ON 
PRICE (p) NET (p) SHARE (p) SALES 
Hl WHITBREAD, A 100.67 4.00 0.085 
Hl WHITBREAD A 93.00 4.47 0.085 
Hl WHITBREAD A 158.00 4.90 0.087 
Hl WHITBREAD A 128.00 5.40 13.93 0.080 
Hl WHITBREAD A 219.00 6.30 19.48 0.079 
Hl WHITBREAD A 251.00 7.00 20.31 0.075 
Hl WHITBREAD A 270.00 7.80 21.84 0.083 
Hl WHITBREAD A 290.00 8.90 23.73 0.096 
COMPANY NAME RETURN ON % GROWTH index CUM. GROWTH 
EQUITY IN EQUITY EQUITY IN EQUITY 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.123 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.106 0.128 -0.043 -0.043 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.118 0.353 0.210 0.166 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.126 0.131 0.041 0.208 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.110 0.174 0.122 0.330 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.114 0.155 0.101 0.431 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.152 -0.062 -0.116 0.315 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.186 -0.083 -0.113 0.202 
D5 BOC GROUP 0.268 -0.051 -0.089 0.112 
D6 BTR 0.400 
D6 BTR 0.318 0.483 0.258 0.258 
D6 BTR 0.417 -0.023 -0.127 0.131 
D6 BTR 0.336 0.468 0.352 0.483 
D6 BTR 0.246 1.183 1.087 1.570 
DG BTR 0.335 0.224 0.166 1.736 
D6 BTR 0.356 0.199 0.130 1.866 
D6 BTR 0.404 0.232 0.191 2.058 
D6 BTR 0.458 0.031 -0.011 2.047 
E7 BUNZL 0.142 
E7 BUNZL 0.088 0.192 0.011 0.011 
E7 BUNZL 0.118 0.081 -0.034 -0.023 
E7 BUNZL 0.191 -0.006 -0.085 -0.108 
E7 BUNZL 0.246 0.058 0.011 -0.097 
E7 BUNZL 0.365 0.075 0.024 -0.073 
E7 BUNZL 0.316 0.786 0.684 0.611 
E7 BUNZL 0.207 1.320 1.244 1.855 
E7 BUNZL -1.000 -1.000 
0.855 
G6 BURTON GROUP 0.087 
G6 BURTON GROUP 0.134 -0.113 -0.248 -0.248 
GG BURTON GROUP 0.118 0.103 -0.014 -0.262 
GG BURTON GROUP 0.112 0.555 0.432 0.171 
G6 BURTON GROUP 0.162 0.106 0.057 0.228 
G6 BURTON GROUP 0.215 0.091 0.039 0.267 
G6 BURTON GROUP 0.215 0.416 0.335 0.602 
GG BURTON GROUP 0.337 0.193 0.154 0.756 
GG BURTON GROUP 0.349 0.188 0.140 0.896 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.202 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.210 0.070 -0.093 -0.093 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.210 0.315 0.175 0.082 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.230 0.014 -0.066 0.016 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.270 0.019 -0.026 -0.010 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.241 0.300 0.238 0.228 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.199 -0.093 -0.144 0.083 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.284 -0.017 -0.049 0.035 
H3 CADBURY SCHWEPPS 0.372 0.029 -0.012 0.023 
G6 DIXONS 0.237 
G6 DIXONS 0.208 0.196 0.014 0.014 
G6 DIXONS 0.201 0.091 -0.025 -0.011 
G6 DIXONS 0.188 0.167 0.074 0.063 
G6 DIXONS 0.167 0.193 0.140 0.204 
G6 DIXONS 0.182 0.354 0.290 0.494 
G6 DIXONS 0.274 0.280 0.206 0.700 
COMPANY NAME RETURN ON % GROWTH index CUM. GROWTH 
EQUITY IN EQUITY EQUITY IN EQUITY 
G6 DIXONS 0.453 0.191 0.152 0.853 
G6 DIXONS 0.446 0.334 0.280 1.133 
D5 FISONS 0.022 
D5 FISONS 0.026 -0.110 -0.245 -0.245 
D5 FISONS 0.071 -0-103 -0.198 -0.443 
D5 FISONS 0.153 0.047 -0.036 -0.479 
D5 FISONS 0.182 0.255 0.200 -0.279 
D5 FISONS 0.267 0.049 -0.001 -0.280 
D5 FISONS 0.249 0.609 0.517 0.237 
D5 FISONS 0.279 0.051 0.016 0.254 
D5 FISONS 0.306 0.079 0.036 0.289 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.190 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.234 -0-033 -0.180 -0.180 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.217 0.254 0.121 -0.059 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.238 0.088 0.002 -0.057 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.245 0.099 0.051 -0.006 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.203 0.492 0.422 0.416 
rl GRANADA GROUP 0.247 -0.010 -0.066 0.350 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.256 0.381 0.336 0.686 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.274 0.121 0.076 0.761 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.144 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.123 0.391 0.180 0.180 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.154 -0.020 -0.124 0.055 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.155 0.171 0.079 0.134 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.190 0.094 0.045 0.179 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.193 0.114 0.062 0.241 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.178 0.128 0.063 0.304 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.188 0.041 0.007 0.311 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.262 -0.152 -0.186 0.126 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.352 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.323 0.131 -0.041 -0.041 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.301 0.364 0.219 0.178 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.320 0.142 0.052 0.230 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.212 1.275 1.175 1.405 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.412 -0.043 -0.089 1.316 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.259 1.379 1.243 2.559 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.322 0.474 0.426 2.985 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.428 0.202 0.154 3.139 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.095 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.094 0.076 -0.088 -0.088 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.113 -0.018 -0.123 -0.210 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.083 0.099 0.013 -0.198 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.173 0.087 0.039 -0.159 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.258 0.137 0.084 -0.075 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.245 -0-083 -0.135 -0.210 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.261 0.045 0.010 -0.200 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.363 -0.069 -0.106 -0.306 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.222 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.223 0.141 -0.033 -0.033 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.173 0.301 0.163 0.130 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.151 0.095 0.008 0.138 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.189 0.050 0.004 0.143 
COMPANY NAME RETURN ON % GROWTH index CUM. GROWTH 
EQUITY IN EQUITY EQUITY IN EQUITY 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.152 0.510 0.439 0.581 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.138 0.654 0.559 1.140 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.145 0.281 0.239 1.379 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.294 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.303 0.091 -0.025 -0.025 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.209 0.779 0.639 0.614 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.208 0.074 0.027 0.641 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.229 0.072 0.021 0.662 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.229 0.080 0.019 0.681 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.251 0.096 0.060 0.741 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 0.270 0.087 0.044 0.784 
Il PERSONS 0.154 
Il PERSONS 0.155 0.215 0.031 0.031 
Il PERSONS 0.221 0.139 0.018 0.049 
Il PERSONS 0.188 0.179 0.086 0.135 
Il PERSONS 0.231 0.051 0.004 0.139 
Il PERSONS 0.252 0.180 0.124 0.263 
Il PERSONS 0.281 -0.015 -0.071 0.192 
Il PERSONS 0.273 0.143 0.105 0.297 
Il PERSONS 0.256 0.337 0.284 0.580 
BI PLESSEY 0.229 
Bl PLESSEY 0.252 0.202 0.019 0.019 
BI PLESSEY 0.235 0.208 0.080 0.099 
El PLESSEY 0.273 0.133 0.044 0.142 
Bl PLESSEY 0.357 0.007 -0.037 0.105 
Bl PLESSEY 0.356 0.204 0.147 0.252 
Bl PLESSEY 0.304 0.078 0.016 0.269 
Bl PLESSEY 0.319 -0.002 -0.034 0.234 
Bl PLESSEY 0.301 0.142 0.096 0.331 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.214 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.217 0.094 -0.072 -0.072 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.181 0.105 -0.012 -0.085 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.113 -0.058 -0.133 -0.218 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.118 -0.008 -0.051 -0.269 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.167 -0.008 -0.055 -0.324 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.242 0.005 -0-053 -0.377 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.285 0.065 0.030 -0.347 
B2 RANK ORG. 0.329 0.085 0.042 -0.305- 
Al REDLAND 
Al REDLAND 0.368 
Al REDLAND 0.346 0.107 -0.011 -0.011 
Al REDLAND 0.267 0.207 0.112 0.101 
Al REDLAND 0.245 0.501 0.435 0.536 
Al REDLAND 0.398 -0.036 -0.081 0.455 
Al REDLAND 0.363 0.210 0.140 0.595 
Al REDLAND 0.347 0.067 0.032 0.627 
Al REDLAND 0.262 0.638 0.573 1.199 
H4 REED INTL. 
Il REED INTL. 0.105 
Il REED INTL. 0.080 0.285 0.148 0.148 
I 
COMPANY NAME RETURN ON % GROWTH index CUM. GROWTH 
EQUITY IN EQUITY EQUITY IN EQUITY 
Il REED INTL. 0.107 0.060 -0.024 0.125 
Il REED INTL. 0.125 -0.114 -0.153 -0.028 
Il REED INTL. 0.164 0.084 0.033 0.005 
Il REED INTL. 0.174 0.004 -0.053 -0.049 
Il REED INTL. 0.239 -0.029 -0.061 -0.110 
Il REED INTL. 0.272 0.102 0.058 -0.052 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.398 ' 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.521 0.151 -0.024 -0.024 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.498 0.100 -0.017 -0.041 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.434 0.281 0.180 0.139 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.385 0.157 0.106 0.244 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.342 0.302 0.240 0.485 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.342 -0.080 -0.133 0.352 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.210 0.068 0.033 0.384 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.238 -0.083 -0.120 0.265 
A4 TARMAC 0.330 
A4 TARMAC 0.273 0.278 0.084 0.084 
A4 TARMAC 0.257 0.261 0.127 0.210 
A4 TARMAC 0.296 0.143 0.053 0.263 
A4 TARMAC 0.347 0.090 0.042 0.306 
A4 TARMAC 0.315 0.317 0.255 0.561 
A4 TARMAC 0.288 0.279 0.206 0.767 
A4 TARMAC 0.330 0.152 0.114 0.881 
A4 TARMAC 0.881 
G2 TESCO 0.132 
G2 TESCO 0.136 0.208 0.024 0.024 
G2 TESCO 0.126 0.185 0.059 0.083 
G2 TESCO 0.133 0.139 0.049 0.133 
G2 TESCO 0.160 0.044 -0.002 0.130 
G2 TESCO 0.177 0.133 0.080 0.210 
G2 TESCO 0.138 0.549 0.460 0.670 
G2 TESCO 0.178 0.172 0.134 0.804 
G2 TESCO 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.293 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.301 0.089 -0.027 -0.027 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.285 0.242 0.144 0.117 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.302 0.142 0.092 0.209 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.317 0.256 0.196 0.405 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.248 0.543 0.455 0.860 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.290 -0.176 -0.203 0.657 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.203 0.766 0.695 1.352 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.246 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.203 0.546 0.382 0.382 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.259 -0-119 -0.189 0.193 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.322 -0.024 -0.067 0.126 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.290 0.167 0.112 0.239 
HS UNITED BISCUITS 0.247 0.374 0.296 0.534 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.277 0.094 0.058 0.593 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.300 0.081 0.038 0.630 
HI WHITBREAD A 
COMPANY NAME RETURN ON % GROWTH index CUM. GROWTH 
EQUITY IN EQUITY EQUITY IN EQUITY 
HI WHITBREAD A 0.145 
HI WHITBREAD A 0.087 0.766 0.578 0.578 
HI WHITBREAD A 0.093 0.037 -0.045 0.533 
HI WHITBREAD A 0.099 0.027 -0.018 0.514 
Hl WHITBREAD A 0.110 0.049 -0.000 0.514 
Hl WHITBREAD A 0.107 0.196 0.127 0.641 
Hl WHITBREAD A 0.117 0.071 0.036 0.677 




























































































































SALES GROWTH CUM. GROWTH TOTAL ANNUAL 
RATIO SALES(%) INVESTORS RETURN 
0.85 
-0.028 -0.176 0.923 1.00 0.276 -0.036 0.496 1.12 
0.007 -0.108 0.176 1.22 
0.109 -0.048 0.753 1.27 
0.236 0.129 -0.102 1.33 
-0.096 -0.019 0.152 1.42 
0.023 -0.029 0.325 1.46 0.007 -0.062 0.061 1.52 
0.178 -0.001 0.792 
0.251 0.117 0.430 
0.136 0.163 0.134 
1.717 1.761 0.728 
0.770 2.447 0.468 
0.113 2.497 0.260 
0.036 2.498 0.100 
0.033 2.490 0.058 
-0.261 -0.373 0.128 0.447 -0.080ý 0.486 0.470 0.273 0.533 
0.495 0.703 0.779 
0.619 1.245 1.215 
-0.100 1.094 0.273 
0.355 1.405 0.269 
0.378 1.728 -0.207 
0.370 0.162 -0.142 
-0.031 0.027 0.484 
-0.071 -0.117 1.329 
0.470 0.289 0.437 
0.393 0.616 1.017 
0.322 0.862 0.339 
1.230 2.019 0.044 
0.089 2.065 -0-196 
0.112 -0.057 0.366 
0.136 -0.042 0.295 
0.241 0.102 0.417 
0.079 0.133 0.055 
0.184 0.261 0.431 
-0.071 0.138 0.006 
-0.018 0.087 0.220 
0.104 0.147 0.290 
0.053 -0-107 0.417 
0.050 -0.169 0.350' 
0.091 -0.164 0.451 
0.069 -0.141 0.044 
0.307 0.104 1.413 
0.730 0.735 0.594 
COMPANY NAME SALES GROWTH CUM. GROWTH TOTAL ANNUAL 
RATIO SALES(%) INVESTORS RETURN 
G6 DIXONS 0.555 1.238 0.417 
G6 DIXONS 0.178 1.369 -0.322 
D5 FISONS 
D5 FISONS 0.048 -0.111 -0.218 
DS FISONS 0.088 -0.138 -0.138 
D5 FISONS -0.524 -0.700 1.789 
D5 FISONS 0.188 -0.565 0.846 
D5 FISONS 0.812 0.162 0.654 
D5 FISONS 0.187 0.281 0.556 
D5 FISONS 0.105 0.350 0.224 
D5 FISONS 0.085 0.391 -0.054 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.191 0.010 0.365 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.163 0.049 0.226 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.195 0.150 -0.041 
PI GRANADA GROUP 0.133 0.232 -0.046 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.210 0.385 0.089 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.209 0.525 0.119 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 0.097 0.586 0.440 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 0.213 0.750 0.039 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.190 0.009 0.257 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.247 0.123 0.277 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.195 0.224 0.870 
F2 
. 
GRAND METROPLTN 0.161 0.334 0.017 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.136 0.416 0.179 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.101 0.454 0.295 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN -0.053 0.370 0.294 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 0.078 0.405 0.009 
Il HANSON TRUST 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.040 -0.118 0.769 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.251 -0.000 0.442 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.341 0.235 0.930 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.292 0.471 0.450 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.605 1.000 1.023 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.123 1.059 -0.097 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.612 1.618 0.301 
Il HANSON TRUST 0.550 2.106 -0.073 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.065 -0.097 -0.037 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.152 -0.068 -0.040 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.118 -0.038 0.298 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.122 0.034 0.833 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.200 0.178 0.204 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.082 0.198 0.079 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS -0.055 0.112 0.451 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 0.097 0.166 0.049 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.149 -0.026 0.936 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.056 -0.083 0.146 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP -0.001 -0.163 0.357 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 0.124 -0.089 0.287 
- ?3, 




LADBROKE GROUP 0.327 0.175 0.352 
LADBROKE GROUP 0.202 0.308 0.260 
LADBROKE GROUP 0.325 0.590 0.234 
LADBROKE GROUP 0.818 -0.055 
MARKS & SPENCER 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.519 0.289 0.5G4 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.123 0.292 0.109 
MARKS & SPENCER - 0.174 0.373 
0.790 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.139 OAG2 -0.004 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.139 0.548 0.145 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.119 O. GO3 0.495 
MARKS '& SPENCER 0.163 0.728 0.051 
MARKS & SPENCER 0.136 0.818 0.036 
PERSONS 
PERSONS 0.221 0.035 0.077 
PERSONS 0.188 0.097 0.111 
PERSONS 0.024 0.040 0.337 
PERSONS 0.016 0.011 0.557 
PERSONS 0.155 0.111 0.478 
PERSONS 0.150 0.196 0.519 
PERSONS -0.018 0.146 
0.444 
PERSONS -0.000 0.105 
0.141 
PLESSEY 
PLESSEY 0.325 0.123 0.360 
PLESSEY 0.125 0.129 0.438 
PLESSEY 0.140 0.179 0.701 
PLESSEY 0.116 0.245 0.139 
PLESSEY 0.134 0.326 -0.054 
PLESSEY 0.161 0.421 -0.168 
PLESSEY 0.032 0.419 0.099 
PLESSEY -0.021 0.359 -0.186 
RANK ORG. 
RANK ORG. 0.110 -0-059 0.027 
RANK ORG. 0.035 -0.134 0.121 
RANK ORG. 0.093 -0.128 -0.374 
RANK ORG. 0.098 -0.078 0.840 
RANK ORG. -0.027 -0.151 
0.665 
RANK ORG. -0.12G -0.326 
0.527 
RANK ORG. 0.138 -0.226. 0.238 
RANK ORG. -O. OG9 -0.332 
0.105 
REDLAND 
REDLAND 0.179 -0-001 0.226 
REDLAND 0.040 -0.071 -0-016 
REDLAND 0.111 -0.048 0.563 
REDLAND 0.397 0.288 0.124 
REDLAND 0.145 0.378 0.197 
REDLAND 0.044 0.362 0.187 
REMAND -0.036 0.295 
0.240 
REDLAND 0.064 0.316 0.037 
REED INTL. 
REED INTL. 0.093 -0.073 0.169 
REED INTL. -0.024 -0.201 
0.356 
- 24 - 
COMPANY NAME SALES GROWTH CUM. GROWTH TOTAL ANNUAL 
RATIO SALES(%) INVESTORS RETURN 
Il REED INTL. 0.148 -0.143 0.041 
Il REED INTL. 0.065 -0.126 0.630 
Il REED INTL. 0.129 -0.050 0.493 
Il REED INTL. 0.035 -0.073 0.301 
Il REED INTL. -0.087 -0.190 0.797 
Il REED INTL. 0.010 -0.221 0.337 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.509 0.279 0.503 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.213 0.364 -0.101 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT -0.539 -0.212 0.085 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.297 0.028 0.442 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.189 0.160 0.208 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT -0.010 0.094 0.069 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT -0.240 -0.171 0.551 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 0.077 -0.137 0.069 
A4 TARMAC 
A4 TARMAC, 0.057 -0.103 0.399 
A4 TARMAC 0.038 -0.175 0.702 
A4 TARMAC 0.077 -0.184 1.224 
A4 TARMAC 0.137 -0.097 0.017 
A4 TARMAC 0.136 -0.014 0.242 
A4 TARMAC 0.203 0.120 0.496 
A4 TARMAC 0.119 0.202 0.151 
A4 TARMAC 0.281 0.431 0.096 
G2 TESCO 
G2 TESCO 0.251 0.061 -0.134 
G2 TESCO 0.097 0.042 -0.035 
G2 TESCO 0.144 0.095 1.388 
G2 TESCO -0.053 0.000 0.413 
G2 TESCO 0.140 0.086 0.465 
G2 TESCO 0.156 0.176 0.245 
G2 TESCO 0.118 0.258 0.399 
G2 TESCO 0.071 0.286 0.197 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.127 -0.044 0.494 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.116 -0.047 0.381 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE -0.233 -0.340 0.539 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.304 -0.093 0.524 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.123 -0-023 0.583 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.233 0.139 0.078 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.054 0.159 -0.170 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 0.229 0.339 0.166 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.249 0.059 0.102 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.113 0.054 0.461 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.370 0.315 0.162 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.182 0.445 0.101 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.165 0.555 0.523 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.089 0.581 0.283 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.007 0.555 0.010 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 0.008 0.522 0.176 
Hl WHITBREAD A 
COMPANY 14AME 
Hl WHITBREAD A 
Hl WHITBREAD A 
Hl WHITBREAD A 
HI WHITBREAD A 
Hl WHITBREAD A 
Hl WHITBREAD A 
HI WHITBREAD A 











CUM. GROWTH TOTAL ANNUAL 

























































































































































































































































































- 27 - 
COMPANY NAME Index 
INDEX fund sales 
G6 DIXONS 117.840 645 0.504 
G6 DIXONS 150.853 729 0.131 
D5 FISONS 193.396 511 
D5 FISONS 146.000 454 -0.111 
D5 FISONS 117.069 441 -0.028 
D5 FISONS 112.912 193 -0.562 
D5 FISONS 135.484 220 0.135 
D5 FISONS 135.382 379 0.727 
D5 FISONS 205.371 424 0.119 
D5 FISONS 208.681 454 0.069 
D5 FISONS 216.142 473 0.042 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 143.868 328 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 118.000 331 0.010 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 132.261 344 0.039 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 132.510 379 0.100 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 139.260 410 0.083 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 198.022 473 0.153 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 184.903 539 0.140 
Fl GRANADA GROUP 247.024 572 0.061 
F1 GRANADA GROUP 265.748 666 0.164 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1049.528 2560 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1238.000 2583 0.009 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1084.004 2878 0.114 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1169.300 3167 0.100 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1222.423 3516 0.110 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1297.901 3804 0.082 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1379.717 3950 0.038 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1389.815 3617 -0.084 
F2 GRAND METROPLTN 1131.824 3744 0.035 
Il HANSON TRUST 126.179 776 
Il HANSON TRUST 121.000 684 -0.118 
Il HANSON TRUST 147.453 765 0.118 
Il HANSON TRUST 155.144 945 0.235 
Il HANSON TRUST 337.451 1168 0.235 
Il HANSON TRUST 307.571 1786 0.530 
Il HANSON TRUST 689.823 1890 0.058 
Il HANSON TRUST 983.595 2947 0.559 
Il HANSON TRUST 1135.171 4385 0.488 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 3299.528 6330 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 3010.000 5715 - 0.097 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 2640.751 5881 0.029 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 2674.074 6056 0.030 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 2778.127 6496 0.073 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 3010.495 7428 0.144 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 2603.534 7580 0.020 
D5 IMP. CHEK. INDS 2630.212 6928 -0-086 
D5 IMP. CHEM. INDS 2351.706 7299 0.053 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 150.943 683 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 146.000 665 -0.026 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 169.794 627 -0.057 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 171.193 577 -0.080 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 171.912 620 0.074 
COMPANY NAME Index 
INDEX fund sales 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 247.301 784 0.264 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 385-583 888 0.133 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 477.649 1138 0.282 
F3 LADBROKE GROUP 1398 0.229 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1295 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 548.000 1668 0.289 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 534.406 1674 0.003 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 875.720 1810 0.081 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 899.449 1971 0.089 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 918.591 2140 0.085 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 935.618 2257 0.055 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 991.798 2540 0.125 
G6 MARKS & SPENCER 1035.039 2770 0.090 
Il PERSONS 229.953 571 
Il PERSONS 237.000 591 0.035 
Il PERSONS 241.287 627 0.061 
Il PERSONS 262.016 591 -0.057 
Il PERSONS 263-155 575 -0.028 
Il PERSONS 295.785 632 0.100 
Il PERSONS 274.700 686 0.085 
Il PERSONS 303.554 651 -0.050 
Il PERSONS 389.633 625 -0.040 
Bl PLESSEY 292.453 668 
Bl PLESSEY 298.000 751 0.123 
Bl PLESSEY 321.716 755 0.006 
B1 PLESSEY 335.802 793 0.050 
B1 PLESSEY 323.338 846 0.067 
Bl PLESSEY 370.921 914 0.081 
B1 PLESSEY 377.027 1001 0.095 
Bl PLESSEY 364.046 999 -0.002 
Bl PLESSEY 399.147 938 -0-061 
B2 RANK ORG. 553.066 634 
B2 RANK ORG. 513.000 597 -0.059 
B2 RANK ORG. 506.702 552 -0.075 
B2 RANK ORG. 439.371 556 0.006 
B2 RANK ORG. 416.758 583 0.050 
B2 RANK ORG. 393.928 541 -0.073 
B2 RANK ORG. 373.074 446 -0.176 
B2 RANK ORG. 384.211 491 0.101 
B2 RANK ORG. 400.262 439 -0.106 
Al REDLAND 495 
Al REDLAND, 122.000 495 -0.001 
Al REDLAND 120.643 460 -0.070 
Al REDLAND 134.156 471 0.023 
Al REDLAND 192.526 629 0.335 
Al REDLAND 176.912 686 0.091 
Al REDLAND 201.767 675 -0.016 
Al REDLAND 208.134 629 -0.067 
Al REDLAND 327.297 642 0.021 
H4 REED INTL. 1636 
Il REED INTL. 491.000 1516 -0.073 
Il REED INTL. 563.896 1323 -0.128 
- 90 
C014PANY NAME Index 
INDEX fund sales 
Il REED INTL. 550.617 1398 0.057 
Il REED INTL. 466.168 1423 0.018 
Il REED INTL. 481.559 1531 0.076 
Il REED INTL. 455.830 1495 -0.024 
Il REED INTL. 428.093 1320 -0.117 
Il REED INTL. 452.953 1280 -0.030 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 4930.425 26776 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 4814.000 34257 0.279 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 4731.903 37148 0.084 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 5581.398 15762 -0.576 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 6170.889 19542 0.240 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 7654.421 22131 0.132 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 6636.394 20665 -0.066 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 6852.562 15187 -0.265 
D8 SHELL TRANSPORT 6033.463 15698 0.034 
A4 TARMAC 148.585 986 
A4 TARMAC 161.000 884 -0.103 
A4 TARMAC 181.412 820 -0.072 
A4 TARMAC 191.029 813 -0.008 
A4 TARMAC 199.135 884 0.087 
A4 TARMAC 249.925 957 0.083 
A4 TARMAC 301.413 1086 0.134 
A4 TARMAC 335.817 1175 0.082 
A4 TARMAC 1444 0.230 
G2 TESCO 232.311 1805 
G2 TESCO 238.000 1916 0.061 
G2 TESCO 252.011 1878 -0.020 
G2 TESCO 264.444 1979 0.053 
G2 TESCO 263.808 1791 -0-095 
G2 TESCO 284-858 1945 0.086 
G2 TESCO 415.972 2120 0.090 
G2 TESCO 471.702 2293 0.082 
G2 TESCO 2358 0.028 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 1116 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 168.000 1066 -0.044 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 163.539 1063 -0.002 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 187.079 751 -0.293 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 204.245 937 0.247 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 244.345 1003 0.070 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 355.425 1166 0.163 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 283.117 1189 0.020 
Il TRAFALGAR HOUSE 479.856 1403 0.180 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 747 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 194.000 791 0.059 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 268.097 786 -0.006 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 217.531 992 0.261 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 202.990 1121 0.130 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 225.787 1244 0.110 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 292.509 1277 0.026 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 309.569 1243 -0.026 
H5 UNITED BISCUITS 321.194 1202 -0.033 
HI WHITBREAD, A 712 
COMPANY NAME Index 
INDEX fund sales 
Hl WHITBREAD A 431.000 738 0.036 
Hl WHITBREAD A 680.071 699 -0.053 
Hl WHITBREAD A 649.383 693 -0.008 
HI WHITBREAD A 637.372 788 0.137 
Hl WHITBREAD A 637.106 889 0.128 
HI WHITBREAD A 718.092 1020 0.148 
Hl WHITBREAD A 743.814 1048 0.027 
Hl WHITBREAD A 760.302 1020 -0.027 
NO PROFIT SCHEMES 
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IND. COMPANY YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
CODE END (m) PROFIT(OOO) 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1979 MAR 79 2,, 000 117,765 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1980 MAR 80 2,200 105r874 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1981 MAR 81 2,268 112,400 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1982 MAR 82 2,398 141,200 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1983 MAR 83 2,643 144r6OO 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 1984 MAR 84 2, r851 178,600 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1985 MAR 85 3,175 192r7OO 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 1986 MAR 86 3,302 234,600 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1987 MAR 87 3,615 303,278 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1979 MAR 79 1,900 84,819 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1980 MAR 80 2,146 95,801 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1981 MAR 81 2,574 114,908 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1982 APR 82 2,969 139,252 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1983 APR 83 3,366 146,539 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1984 APR 84 2,765 126,700 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1985 MAR 85 2,931 132,300 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1986 MAR 86 3,129 163,500 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1987 MAR 87 2,202 187,700 
H 1 BASS 1979 SEP 79 1,134 101,907 
H 1 BASS 1980 SEP 80 1,263 113,500 
H 1 BASS 1981 SEP 81 1,713 133,200 
H 1 BASS 1982 SEP 82 1,861 123,700 
H 1 BASS 1983 SEP 83 1,988 161,400 
H 1 BASS 1984 SEP 84 2,252 210,200 
H I BASS 1985 SEP 85 2,411 248,100 
H 1 BASS 1986 SEP 86 2,710 296,100 
H 1 BASS 1987 SEP 87 3,213 351,700 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1979 DEC 79 7,228 452,873 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1980 DEC 80 7,645 479,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1981 DEC 81 9,265 684,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1982 DEC 82 11,318 856,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1983 DEC 83 11,652 979,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1984 DEC 84 14,222 1,405,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1985 DEC 85 12,525 1,168,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1986 DEC 86 13,623 1,367,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1987 DEC 87 17,208 1,394,000 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1979 MAR 79 990 124,765 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1980 MAR 80 1,028 129,554 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1981 MAR 81 1,195 150,600 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1982 MAR 82 1,407 201,900 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1983 MAR 83 1,702 237,100 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1984 MAR 84 1,944 267,900 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1985 MAR 85 2,289 306,100 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1986 MAR 86 2,603 303,800 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1987 MAR 87 2,730 350,400 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1979 DEC 79 528 65,150 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1980 DEC 80 637 78,600 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1981 DEC 81 750 104,100 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1982 DEC 82 785 106,500 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1983 DEC 83 907 112,200 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1984 DEC 84 870 127,700 
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IND. COMPANY YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
CODE END (m) PROFIT(OOO) 
A 5 
, 
BLUE CIRCLE IND 1985 DEC 85 947 116,900 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1986 DEC 86 1,098 132,100 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1987 DEC 87 1,068 155,000 
G 6 BOOTS 1979 MAR* 79 805 71,, 139 
G 6 BOOTS 1980 MAR 80 1,202 106,203 
G 6 BOOTS 1981 MAR 81 1,374 121,400 
G 6 BOOTS 1982 MAR 82 1,487 124,700 
G 6 BOOTS 1983 MAR 83 1,670 125,600 
G 6 BOOTS 1984 MAR 84 1,833 154,800 
G 6 BOOTS 1985 MAR 85 2,033 175,600 
G 6 BOOTS 1986 MAR 86 2,126 187,800 
G 6 BOOTS 1987 MAR 87 2,352 221,800 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1979 MAR 79 239 27,892 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1980 MAR 80 341 39,768 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1981 MAR 81 361 42,100 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1982 MAR 82 406 56,500 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1983 MAR 83 466 65,430 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1984 MAR 84 540 79,700 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1985 MAR 85 564 78r6OO 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1986 MAR 86 616 103,200 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 1987 MAR 87 751 144,700 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1979 DEC 79 22,706 4,270,112 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1980 DEC 80 25,848 4,861,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1981 DEC 81 30,624 2,432,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1982 DEC 82 29,336 2,305,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1983 DEC 83 37,960 2,593,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1984 DEC 84 44,059 3,455,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1985 DEC 85 47,156 3,613,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1986 DEC 86 34,247 958,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 1987 DEC 87 34,932 2,387,000 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1979 MAR 79 2339 49,718 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1980 MAR 80 1,819 38,671 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1981 MAR 81 1,710 5,100 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1982 MAR 82 1,790 51,100 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1983 MAR 83 1906 63,300 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1984 MAR 84 2,038 117,800 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1985 MAR 85 2,152 128,200 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1986 MAR 86 2,173 143,000 
E 9 COURTAULDS 1987 MAR 87 2,262 201,100 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1979 SEP 79 281 34,285 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1980 SEP 80 332 40,507 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1981 SEP 81 345 41,692 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1982 SEP 82 402 43,494 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1983 SEP 83 490 46,473 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1984 SEP 84 604 63,768 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1985 SEP 85 714 74,648 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1986 SEP 86 689 90,361 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 1987 SEP 87 763 110,500 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1979 JUN 79 539 66,296 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1980 JUN 80 618 76,013 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1981 JUN 81 710 87,329 
IND. COMPANY YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
CODE END (M) PROFIT(OOO) 
D 7 GILAXO HLDGS 1982 JUN 82 866 133,636 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1983 JUN 83 1,028 192,700 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1984 JUN 84 1,200 258j900 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1985 JUN 85 1,412 402j300 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1986 JUN 86 1,429 571,600 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1987 JUN 87 1,741 750,000 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 1979 DEC 79 1,110 107,800 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 1980 DEC 80 1,205 113,000 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 1981 DEC 81 1,395 121,100 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 1982 DEC 82 1,407 123,000 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 1983 DEC 83 1,457 145,000 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 1984 DEC 84 1,600 156,800 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 1985 DEC 85 1,592 154,900 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 1986 DEC 86 1,608 144,300 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 1987 DEC 87 1,743 163,200 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1979 MAR 79 475 48,865 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1980 MAR 80 629 64, r738 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1981 MAR 81 787 81,000 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1982 MAR 82 959 53,400 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1983 MAR 83 1,022 76,000 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1984 MAR 84 1,214 103,100 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1985 MAR 85 1,227 133rOOO 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1986 MAR 86 1,321 123,700 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1987 MAR 87 2,103 267,800 
B 2 C RACAL ELECTRONI 1979 MAR 79 145 19,752 
B 2 , RACAL ELECTRONIC 1980 MAR 80 263 35,923 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 1981 MAR 81 536 73,211 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 1982 MAR 82 644 102,616 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 1983 MAR 83 762 114r268 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 1984 MAR 84 816 119,245 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 1985 MAR 85 1,107 132,305 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 1986 MAR 86 1,266 81,994 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 1987 MAR 87 1,291 103,439 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1979 AUG 79 1,422 35,127 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1980 AUG 80 1,456 35,963 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1981 SEPT 81 1,833 45,275 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1982 SEPT 82 1,598 34,367 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1983 SEPT 83 1,637 40,727 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1984 SEPT 84 1,230 52,020 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1985 SEPT 85 1,314 70,900 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1986 SEPT 86 1,414 91,000 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1987 SEPT 87 1,544 117,500 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1979 DEC 79 659 48,131 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1980 DEC 80 728 53,170 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1981 DEC 81 908 66,350 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1982 JAN 83 901 76,340 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1983 DEC 83 981 88,210 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1984 DEC 84 1,124 101,450 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1985 JAN 86 1,267 124,070 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1986 JAN 87 1,329 142,430 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 1987 JAN 88 1,493 167,600 
IND. COMPANY YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
CODE END (m) PROFIT(OOO) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1979 MAR 79 21708 77,960 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1980 MAR 80 2,475 71,, 251 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1981 MAR 81 2,475 71,251 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1982 MAR 82 2,767 105,226 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1983 MAR 83 1,465 140,542 
H 6 ROTHMANS INI, B 1984 MAR 84 3,671 175,145 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1985 MAR 85 1,604 154,376 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1986 MAR 86 1,467 141,908 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1987 MAR 87 1,495 210,900 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1979 DEC 79 601 29,955 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1980 JAN 81 630 31,400 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1981 JAN 82 688 39,900 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1982 JAN 83 771 50,500 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1983 DEC 83 952 61,400 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1984 DEC 84 1,157 74,500 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1985 DEC 85 1,205 79,300 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1986 JAN 87 1,290 84,000 
H 4 ROWN TREE 1987 JAN 88 1,428 112,100 
1 1 SEARS 1979 JAN 79 884 63,687 
1 1 SEARS 1980 JAN 80 1,258 90,629 
I I SEARS 1981 JAN 81 1,384 99,706 
1 1 SEARS 1982 JAN 82 1,491 104,000 
I I SEARS 1983 JAN 83 1,597 110,100 
1 1 SEARS 1984 JAN 84 1,846 155,900 
I I SEARS 1985 JAN 85 2,019 168,500 
1 1 SEARS 1986 JAN 86 2,278 177,800 
1 1 SEARS 1987 JAN 87 2,480 207,500 
B 2 THORN EMI 1979 MAR 79 1,127 47,686 
B 2 THORN EMI 1980 MAR 80 1,621 68,578 
B 2 THORN EMI 1981 MAR 81 2,229 94,300 
B 2 THORN EMI 1982 MAR 82 2,436 105,400 
B 2 THORN EMI 1983 MAR 83 2,716 122,000 
B 2 THORN EMI 1984 MAR 84 2,821 156,825 
B 2 THORN EMI 1985 MAR 85 3,204 123,425 
B 2 THORN EMI 1986 MAR 86 3,317 124,100 
B 2 THORN EMI 1987 MAR 87 3,185 132,100 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1979 OCT 79 712 60,870 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1980 OCT 80 772 66,000 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1981 OCT 81 833 52,300 
P 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1982 OCT 82 907 53,100 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1983 OCT 83 963 69,300 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1984 OCT 84 1,131 96,000 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1985 OCT 85 1,245 121,800 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1986 OCT 86 1,477 131,500 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1987 OCT 87 1,778 165,000 
H 3 UNILEVER 1979 DEC 79 10,249 577,465 
H 3 UNILEVER 1980 DEC 80 10,152 572,000 
H 3 UNILEVER 1981 DEC 81 11,889 709,200 
H 3 UNILEVER 1982 DEC 82 13,216 761,500 
H 3 UNILEVER 1983 DEC 83 13,386 813,000 
H 3 UNILEVER 1984 DEC 84 16,172 995,000 
IND. COMPANY YEAR YEAR TURNOVER PRE-TAX 
CODE END (m) PROFIT(OOO) 
H 3 UNILEVER 1985 DEC 85 16,693 978,000 
H 3 UNILEVER 1986 DEC 86 17,140 1,186,000 
H 3 UNILEVER 1987 DEC 87 l6r550 1#327,000 
IND. COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS' OPERATING 
CODE FUND (m) ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 885 73,060 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 887 72f589 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 932 64,509 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 979 0.139 0.065 62,643 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 1210 0.131 0.069 71,204 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1302 0.134 0.069 71,448 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 1858 0.126 0.080 70,301 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 1697 0.117 0.091 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 409 72,031 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 461 73,689 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 543 72,419 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 628 0.176 0.049 68,518 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 786 0.150 0.040 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 841 0.143 0.039 77,273 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 917 0.162 0.035 78,772 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 1477 0.122 0.055 
H 1 BASS 599 61,677 
H 1 BASS 864 63,056 
H 1 BASS 1023 74,604 
H 1 BASS 1086 0.116 0.079 69,456 
H 1 BASS 1155 0.136 0.089 71,207 
H 1 BASS 1250 0.155 0.097 69,192 
H I BASS 1380 0.167 0.104 71,260 
H 1 BASS 1446 0.183 0.111 
H 1 BASS 2437 0.134 0.112 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1680 185,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1746 177,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 2218 169,500 
H 6 BAT INDS. 2721 0.221 0.069 178,000 
H 6 BAT INDS. 3168 0.221 0.073 187,173 
H 6 BAT INDS. 4276 0.211 0.081 212,822 
H 6 BAT INDS. 3672 0.211 0.080 185,503 
H 6 BAT INDS. 4168 0.218 0.080 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 520 16,100 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 558 16,800 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 693 15,800 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 747 0.293 0.142 35,400 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 984 0.272 0.139 35,900 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1180 0.269 0.140 37,500 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1183 0.280 0.125 42,, 300 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 1275 0.295 0.139 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 635 12,153 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 744 12,852 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 837 13,919 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 855 0.110 0.105 12,508 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 948 0.103 0.102 20,528 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 1006 0.111 0.115 18,998 
IND. COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS' OPERATING 
CODE FUND (m) ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 961 0.108 0.094 17,127 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 889 0.117 0.105 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
G 6 BOOTS 
G 6 BOOTS 474 68,443 
G 6 BOOTS 523 66,100 
G 6 BOOTS 587 63,866 
G 6 BOOTS 636 0.194 68,562 
G 6 BOOTS 687 0.210 68,136 
G 6 BOOTS 771 0.214 67,643 
G 6 BOOTS 828 0.214 67,643 
G 6 BOOTS 913 0.234 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 151 12,300 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 177 11,700 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 202 11,200 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 249 0.234 0.132 10,900 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 268 0.262 0.141 10,990 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 301 0.234 0.130 10,601 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 339 0.271 0.154 10,120 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 399 0.314 0.179 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 4994 113,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 5925 118,200 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 7725 153,250 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 6478 0.149 0.078 163,000 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 9638 0.153 0.069 131,600 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 11543 0.157 0.077 130,100 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 9908 0.192 0.072 129,450 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 9960 0.068 0.020 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 10749 0.150 0.061 
E 9 COURTAULDS 
E 9 COURTAULDS 449 97,261 
E 9 COURTAULDS 327 88,000 
E 9 COURTAULDS 344 80,000 
E 9 COURTAULDS 345 0.145 0.043 73,000 
E 9 COURTAULDS 463 0.194 0.063 73,000 
E 9 COURTAULDS 519 0.177 0.062 70,000 
E 9 COURTAULDS 565 0.194 0.069 67,700 
E 9 COURTAULDS 656 0.237 0.090 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 218 11,940 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 241 11,795 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 275 0.165 0.123 10,806 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 348 0.122 0.114 10,467 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 364 0.144 0.123 12,376 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 450 0.160 0.120 12,440 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 473 0.183 0.131 13,724 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 497 0.190 0.144 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 225 15,602 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 338 14,816 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 382 16,955 
IND. COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS' OPERATING 
CODE FUND (M) ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 438 0.263 0.144 28,406 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 551 0.302 0.172 27#768 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 683 0.318 0.184 25,053 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 858 0.416 0.256 25,634 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1094 0.445 0.358 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1453 0.429 0.381 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 467 56, r6OO 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 502 55,, 600 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 578 52,700 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 637 0.163 0.078 47,200 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 776 0.140 0.086 43,300 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 869 0.137 0.077 41,500 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 816 0.144 0.084 40,800 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 760 0.135 0.071 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 582 35,000 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 736 40,300 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 772 40,300 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 866 39,300 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 915 0.074 0.088 44,000 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 946 0.089 0.091 44,000 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1086 0.105 0.105 44,300 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1041 0.930 0.081 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 891 0.175 0.127 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 128 6,724 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 212 14,135 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 265 12,662 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 311 12,201 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 311 0.268 0.158 18,112 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 369 0.240 0.148 25,220 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 436 0.199 0.131 32,525 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 433 0.132 0.083 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 450 0.158 0.099 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 295 49,403 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 318 45,826 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 335 0.126 0 028 47,454 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 319 0.128 0: 031 42,577 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 310 0.148 0.047 37,973 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 324 0.182 0.057 35,433 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 353 0.195 0.069 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 250 0.237 0.084 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 196 16,000 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 201 15,000 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 243 0.263 0.092 14,300 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 277 0.267 0.090 34,300 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 412 0.210 0.088 34,800 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 381 0.316 0.097 36,500 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 424 0.308 0.111 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 
- An - 
IND. COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS' OPERATING 
CODE FUND (m) ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 272 24,686 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 155 24,, 646 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 233 22,898 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 307 21,655 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 441 0.196 0.088 25,017 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 556 0.202 0.039 23,421 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 459 0.164 0.063 21,833 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 435 0.163 0.065 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 510 0.218 0.099 
H 4 ROWN TREE 226 31t000 
H 4 ROWN TREE 243 30,000 
H 4 ROWN TREE 320 28,000 
H 4 ROWN TREE 346 0.133 0.073 28,800 
H 4 ROWN TREE 346 0.149 0.076 31#, 200 
H 4 ROWN TREE 390 0.155 0.081 320,400 
H 4 ROWN TREE 372 0.172 0.084 52,000 
H 4 ROWN TREE 389 0.155 0.082 
H 4 ROWN TREE 406 0.196 0.091 
1 1 SEARS 
1 1 SEARS 519 58,000 
1 1 SEARS 544 57,000 
1 1 SEARS 560 53,000 
1 1 SEARS 710 0.147 0.070 51,000 
1 1 SEARS 773 0.176 0.084 59,775 
1 1 SEARS 857 0.173 0.077 60,571 
1 SEARS 955 0.162 0.080 64,101 
1 SEARS 1009 0.177 0.081 
B 2 THORN EMI 
B 2 THORN EMI 548 101,040 
B 2 THORN EMI 577 90,894 
B 2 THORN EMI 608 78,083 
B 2 THORN EMI 540 0.171 0.059 73,559 
B 2 THORN EMI 574 0.172 0.063 90,462 
B 2 THORN EMI 559 0.138 0.051 90,327 
B 2 THORN EMI 517 0.158 0.049 85,700 
B 2 THORN EMI 566 0.172 0.046 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 347 72,000 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 403 68,000 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 574 0.097 0.085 66,000 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 631 0.106 0.093 60,400 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 814 0.105 0.101 57,800 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 916 0.125 0.114 55,900 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1100 0.104 0.107 55,400 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 1580 0.103 0.111 
H 3 UNILEVER 2144 85,486 
H 3 UNILEVER 2160 79,148 
H 3 UNILEVER 2569 73,252 
H 3 UNILEVER 2901 0.176 0.056 69,233 
H 3 UNILEVER 3096 0.175 0.060 264,000 
H 3 UNILEVER 3348 0.174 0.061 277,000 
IND. COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS' OPERATING 
CODE FUND (m) ROCE PROFIT EMPLOYEES 
H3 UNILEVER 3316 0.178 0.059 312,000 
H3 UNILEVER 3713 0.132 0.070 
H3 UNILEVER 
- 42 - 
IND. COMPANY HPD MARKET SHARE DIVIDEND 
CODE VALUE (m) PRICE (p) NET (p) 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 65,000 47,134 78.5 4.40 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 69,474 42,379 67.0 5.00 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 86,745 44,991 71.0 5.00 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 98,945 87,503 135.5 5.50 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 89,856 90,636 138.0 6.05 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 106,139 108j197 162.0 6.81 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 124,916 182,190 268.0 7.50 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 146,238 221,511 323.0 9.50 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 293,225 248,813 343.0 li. 40 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 35,415 31,211 79.1 2.35 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 40,000 45,252 114.6 3.09 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 45,000 51,049 129.1 3.45 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 50,000 57,177 143.6 3.91 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 55,000 56,536 142.0 4.27 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 57,460 81,421 204.0 5.00 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 60,000 103,772 260.0 5.40 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 67,000 124r307 312.0 6.10 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 85,000 134,076 300.0 7.30 
H I BASS 56,077 5,337 192.0 7.80 
H 1 BASS 66,077 66,213 208.0 8.60 
H 1 BASS 78,327 66,255 207.0 9.46 
H 1 BASS 90,077 96,528 300.0 10.10 
H 1 BASS 102t144 99,491 308.0 11.36 
H 1 BASS 112,162 156,943 483.0 12.90 
H 1 BASS 105,652 214,808 658.0 14.70 
H I BASS 125,904 239,945 735.0 17.00 
H 1 BASS 146,292 278,015 825.0 19.55 
H 6 BAT INDS. 94,726 80,049 59.5 4.47 
H 6 BAT INDS. 116,336 88,330 60.8 4.75 
H 6 BAT INDS. 137,906 129,405 89.0 5.75 
H 6 BAT INDS. 169,888 227,912 156.8 6.88 
H 6 BAT INDS. 150,112 261,214 179.0 8.25 
H 6 BAT INDS. 200,371 515,202 351.0 10.30 
H 6 BAT INDS. 226,830 464,030 315. 0 12.10 
H 6 BAT INDS. 223,918 682,784 - 462.0 14.30 
H 6 BAT INDS. 224,079 656,100 440.0 16.90 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 99,378 76,012 115.3 5.10 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 103,192 117,416 177.3 6.03 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 115,157 143,674 216.7 6.57 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 129,142 222,515 334.9 6.88 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 154,440 219,736 305.0 9.00 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 171,660 281,139 390.0 10.20 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 196,074 270,801 361.0 11.30 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 146,026 331,540 440.0 12.00 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 368,883 330,033 438.0 13.00 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 63,173 19,599 117.8 6.09 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 71,217 33,275 171.0 6.03 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 81,868 53,835 253.0 6.57 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 87,687 45,749 215.0 9.12 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 101,396 49,104 211.5 9.50 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 111,253 55,720 240.0 10.00 
IND. COMPANY HPD MARKET SHARE DIVIDEND 
CODE VALUE (m) PRICE (p) NET (p) 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 114,733 73,728 287.5 10.50 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 124,403 85,909 335.0 11.50 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 151,830 110,529 430.0 15.00 
G 6 BOOTS 37,511 58,204 80.5 3.00 
G 6 BOOTS 56,000 86,, 892 120.0 3.50 
G 6 BOOTS 60,000 71,324 98.5 3.75 
G 6 BOOTS 69,000 91,503 126.0 4.25 
G 6 BOOTS 81,000 130,904 180.0 4.75 
G 6 BOOTS 99,000 143,550 197.0 5.50 
G 6 BOOTS 124,000 190,372 261.0 6.20 
G 6 BOOTS 148,000 209,588 228.0 7.10 
G 6 BOOTS 163,000 217,438 263.0 8.00 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 32,239 14,369 38.8 1.65 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 45,966 20,487 55.3 2.25 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 54,801 30,485 81.5 2.25 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 58,389 50,040 132.8 2.63 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 71,227 52,474 138.0 3.00 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 78,954 53,234 140.0 3.50 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 92,140 68,063 179.0 3.80 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 106,000 100,954 265.5 4.50 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 134,000 104,650 258.0 12.50 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 120,385 534,941 112.0 5.66 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 143334 663t525 135.3 6.55 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 158,151 574,060 105.3 6.75 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 172,770 537,727 98.7 6.75 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 183,134 740,304 135.3 8.00 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 241,547 886,946 162.0 10.00 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 260,972 1,020,051 186.0 11.33 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 301,382 1,329,369 242.3 12.00 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 347,212 1,502,477 252.0 12.50 
E 9 COURTAULDS 84368 19,673 69.1 8.10 
E 9 COURTAULDS 65,623 15,302 53.8 8.22 
E 9 COURTAULDS 62,000 20,493 72.0 0.96 
E 9 COURTAULDS 75,000 20,220 71.0 2.88 
E 9 COURTAULDS 77,750 44,814 123.0 3.10 
E 9 COURTAULDS 99,052 48,554 128.0 4.20 
E 9 COURTAULDS 113,521 72,837 192.0 5.00 
E 9 COURTAULDS 126,288 116,083 306.0 6.50 
E 9 COURTAULDS 171,879 129,222 333.0 9.50 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 40,829 12,345 74.8 4.89 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 48,324 14,362 87.0 5.86 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 51,224 24,795 149.6 7.04 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 64,371 33,401 161.3 8.01 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 67,590 41,675 201.4 8.75 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 79,098 56,755 251.2 9.60 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 92,074 62j, 431 280.0 11.60 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 97,426 81,632 308.0 12.50 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 110,275 98,753 386.0 14.50 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 73,180 36,774 54.4 2.00 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 88,042 45,711 67.5 2.38 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 64,277 72,893 106.0 2.81 
RA 
IND. COMPANY HPD MARKET SHARE DIVIDEND 
CODE VALUE (m) PRICE (p) NET (p) 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 86,809 229,269 313.3 3.50 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 105,066 258,436 351.0 4.50 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 141,833 404,957 550.0 6.50 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 162,213 569,936 770.0 10.00 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 243,614 777,185 1,050.0 14.00 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 308,724 729,073 985.0 19.00 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 71,218 35,471 180.0 8.00 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 73,554 50,447 256.0 8.20 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 91,169 64,241 326.0 9.30 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 98,664 66,211 336.0 9.80 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 104,694 69,758 354.0 11.00 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 136,097 84,538 429.0 11.80 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 107,497 90,843 461.0 14.50 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 106,345 87,493 444.0 15.00 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 114,106 87,689 445.0 18.50 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 47,994 311 64.8 2.55 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 63,585 444 85.9 3.40 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 71,949 441 85.2 3.39 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 79,169 257 49.6 3.39 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 81,919 374 71.6 3.39 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 85,457 645 101.0 3.72 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 103,457 693 108.7 4.12 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 114,428 1,413 221.0 4.50 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 177,137 1,635 223.0 7.33 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 56,960 419 91.0 1.88 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 103,592 883 165.5 2.06 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 117,476 1,163 218.0 2.27 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 127,542 1,596 298.5 2.50 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 148,267 1,133 212.0 2.75 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 152,117 1,495 262.0 2.89 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 178,117 913 160.0 3.03 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 194,113 1,101 193.0 3.03 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 204,212 1,372 220.0 3.30 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 57,095 123 42.0 3.75 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 58,454 118 43.0 3.64 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 65,264 165 60.0 3.86 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 71,387 147 53.0 3.86 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 78,000 215 77.0 4.00 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 93,000 386 138.0 4.40 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 105,000 484 172.0 5.30 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 134,000 822 284.0 6.60 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 173,000 1,125 332.0 8.50 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 67,724 232 181.7 8.21 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 76,989 230 179.7 8.21 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 80,167 309 241.6 9.47 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 83,344 464 363.3 10.39 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 98,175 547 428.1 11.98 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 109,856 842 568.0 13.82 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 122,807 965 651.0 16.00 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 140,544 1,278 862.0 25.60 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 162,336 1,164 785.0 21.70 
MZ 
IND. COMPANY HPD MARKET SHARE DIVIDEND 
CODE VALUE (m) PRICE (p) NET (p) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 60,068 64 46.5 2.45 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 54,, 901 59 42.5 3.11 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 54,901 104 75.0 3.65 
H 6 ROTHMANS INI, B 67,890 160 115.0 4.40 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 115,349 164 118.0 5.30 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 136,542 395 182.0 6.00 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 152,637 313 133.0 6.40 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 229,961 441 179.0 6.70 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 230,487 1,112 375.0 7.70 
H 4 ROWN TREE 43,000 143 153.7 6.96 
H 4 ROWN TREE 54,000 167 147.9 6.96 
H 4 ROWN TREE 58fooo 225 163.4 7.87 
H 4 ROWN TREE 66,000 285 200.8 8.66 
H 4 ROWN TREE 75,000 342 212.6 9.75 
H 4 ROWN TREE 87,000 614 377.0 11.00 
H 4 ROWN TREE 103,000 689 401.6 12.20 
H 4 ROWN TREE 113,000 658 403.0 13.60 
H 4 ROWN TREE 138,000 961 447.0 15.50 
1 1 SEARS 25,474 350 26.0 0.96 
1 1 SEARS 36,250 498 37.0 1.33 
1 1 SEARS 51,861 489 36.3 1.53 
1 1 SEARS 60,829 915 68.0 1.57 
1 1 SEARS 76,652 1,097 81.5 1.87 
1 1 SEARS 104,959 lj, 231 91.5 2.50 
1 1 SEARS 121,250 1,617 109.5 3.00 
1 1 SEARS 153,795 1,836 123.0 3.40 
1 1 SEARS 164,398 1,941 130.0 4.00 
B 2 THORN EMI 51,922 390 267.2 12.77 
B 2 THORN EMI 74,669 560 316.3 14.37 
B 2 THORN EXI 96,961 798 449.9 14.37 
B 2 THORN EMI 108,412 756 425.4 14.37 
B 2 THORN EMI 115,213 1,142 642.5 15.47 
B 2 THORN EMI 146,909 1,031 484.0 17.19 
B 2 THORN EMI 152,475 861 401.0 17.19 
B 2 THORN EMI 150,919 11016 470.0 17.19 
B 2 THORN EMI 185,444 1,453 535.0 18.17 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 53,499 274 43.6 2.57 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 62,604 404 62.9 2.89 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 66,905 464 59.5 2.97 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 70,616 624 80.0 3.50 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 87,316 729 93.5 4.10 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 99,905 1,138 146.0 4.70 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 105,000 1,224 157.0 5.40 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 125,000 1,399 179.0 6.00 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 234,577 1,700 217.0 7.10 
H 3 UNILEVER 70,490 827 90.4 4.81 
H 3 UNILEVER 67,, 333 838 91.6 4.58 
H 3 UNILEVER 78,367 1,113 121.6 5.37 
H 3 UNILEVER 95,115 1,410 154.0 5.77 
H 3 UNILEVER 108,055 1,638 179.0 6.17 
H 3 UNILEVER 119,939 1,731 219.0 7.10 
IND. C014PANY 
CODE 
HPD MARKET SHARE DIVIDEND 
VALUE (m) PRICE (p) NET (p) 
H 3 UNILEVER 146,338 2,181 276.0 7.10 
H 3 UNILEVER 142,528 3,, 446 436.0 7.72 
H 3 UNILEVER 165,472 3,741 465.0 11.80 
- 47 - 
IND. COMPANY NET EARNINGS RETURN ON RETURN ON 
CODE SHARE(p) SALES EQUITY 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 0.06 
H1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.05 0.12 
H1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.05 0.13 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 0.06 0.15 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 13-63 0.05 0.15 
H1 ALLIED-LYONS 16.67 0.06 0.15 
H1 ALLIED-LYONS 16.37 0.06 0.15 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 20.93 0.07 0.13 
H1 ALLIED-LYONS 28.23 0.08 0.18 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.04 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.04 0.23 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.04 0.25 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.05 0.26 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 20.94 0.04 0.23 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 21.21 0.05 0.16 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 19.80 0.05 0.16 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 24.66 0.05 0.18 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 29.62 0.09 0.13 
HI BASS 0.09 0.17 
H1 BASS 0.09 0.13 
H1 BASS 0.08 0.13 
H1 BASS 25.05 0.07 0.11 
HI BASS 30.98 0.08 0.14 
H1 BASS 41.41 0.09 0.17 
H'I BASS 48.25 0.10 0.18 
HI BASS 54.89 0.11 0.20 
H1 BASS 67.18 0.11 0.14 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.06 0.27 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.06 0.27 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.07 0.31 
H6 BAT INDS. 31.21 0.08 0.31 
H6 BAT INDS. 37.57 0.08 0.31 
H6 BAT INDS. 53.55 0.10 0.33 
H6 BAT INDS. 45.78 0.09 0.32 
H6 BAT INDS. 51.57 0.10 0.33 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.08 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.13 0.24 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.13 0.23 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.13 0.22 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.14 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 22.56 0.14 0.32 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 22.75 0.14 0.27 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 23.87 0.13 0.26 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 23.15 0.12 0.26 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 27.08 0.13 0.27 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.12 0.10 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.12 0.11 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.14 0.12 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 32.32 0.11 0.11 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 30.85 0.12 0.12 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 33.64 0.13 0.11 
- 4A - 
IND. COMPANY NET EARNINGS RETURN ON RETURN ON 
CODE SHARE(p) SALES EQUITY 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 32.98 0.12 0.12 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 38.71 0.12 0.14 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.15 
G 6 BOOTS 0.09 
G 6 BOOTS 0.09 0.22 
G 6 BOOTS 0.09 0.23 
G 6 BOOTS 0.08 0.21 
G 6 BOOTS 10.74 0.08 0.20 
G 6 BOOTS 12.93 0.08 0.23 
G 6 BOOTS 13.43 0.09 0.23 
G 6 BOOTS 15.52 0.09 0.23 
G 6 BOOTS 16.96 0.09 0.24 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.12 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.12 0.26 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.12 0.24 
* 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.14 0.28 
* 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 11.22 0.14 0.26 
* 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 14.01 0.15 0.30 
* 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 12.50 0.14 0.26 
* 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 16.96 0.17 0.30 
* 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 46.15 0.19 0.36 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.19 0.86 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.19 0.82 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.08 0.31 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 13.12 0.08 0.36 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 15.82 0.07 0.27 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 25.59 0.08 0.30 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 29.14 0.08 0.36 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 10.41 0.03 0.10 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 24.91 0.07 0.22 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.02 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.02 0.09 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.00 0.02 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.03 0.15 
E 9 COURTAULDS 11.03 0.03 0.18 
E 9 COURTAULDS 21.26 0.06 0.25 
E 9 COURTAULDS 23.91 0.06 0.25 
E 9 COURTAULDS 29.74 0.07 0.25 
E 9 COURTAULDS 38.03 0.09 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.12 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.12 0.19, 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.12 0.17 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 21.13 0.11 0.16 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 16.97 0.09 0.13 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 23.46 0.11 0.18 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 25.10 0.10 0.17 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 27.80 0.13 0.19 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 34.03 0.14 0.22 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.12 0.29 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.12 0.22 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.12 0.23 
- pn - 
IND. C014PANY NET EARNINGS RETURN ON RETURN ON 
CODE SHARE(p) SALES EQUITY 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 11.60 0.15 0.31 
D 7 GLAXO'HLDGS 15.38 0.19 0.35 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 23.31 0.22 0.38 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 37.56 0.28 0.47 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 47.58 0.40 0.52 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 67.55 0.43 0.52 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.10 0.23 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.09 0.23 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.09 0.21 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 40.55 0.09 0.19 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 45.16 0.10 0.19 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 45.57 0.10 0.18 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 45.36 0.10 0.19 
B I HAWKER SIDDELEY 2.00 0.09 0.19 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.09 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.10 0.08 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.10 0.09 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.10 0.10 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.06 0.06 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 4.63 0.07 0.08 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 4.72 0.08 0.11 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 9.53 0.11 0.12 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 6.58 0.09 0.12 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 25.56 0.13 0.30 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.14 0.15 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.14 0.17 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.14 0.28 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.16 0.33 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 13.28 0.15 0.37 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 14.81 0.15 0.32 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 15.54 0.12 0.30 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 9.25 0.06 0.19 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 11.62 0.08 0.23 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.02 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.02 0.12 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.02 0.14 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 8.55 0.02 0.10 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 9.87 0.02 0.13 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 12.67 0.04 0.17 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 15.57 0.05 0.22 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 20.76 0.06 0.26 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 24.24 0.08 0.47 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.07 0.25 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.07 0.26 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.07 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 33.72 0.08 0.31 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 36.42 0.09 0.32 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 36.89 0.09 0.25 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 48.68 0.10 0.33 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 56.02 0.11 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 68.10 0.11 
rn 
IND. COMPANY NET EARNINGS RETURN ON RETURN ON 
CODE SHARE(p) SALES EQUITY 
H 6 ROTHMANS INI, B 0.03 0.29 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.03 0.46 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.03 0.31 
H 6 ROTHMANS INI, B 0.04 0.34 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 45.04 0.10 0.32 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 45.85 0.05 0.32 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 30.16 0.10 0.34 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 29.05 0.10 0.33 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 38.16 0.14 0.41 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.05 0.13 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.05 0.13 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.06 0.12 
H 4 ROWN TREE 24.46 0.07 0.15 
H 4 ROWN TREE 30.38 0.06 0.18 
H 4 ROWN TREE 34.86 0.06 0.19 
H 4 ROWN TREE 35.47 0.07 0.21 
H 4 ROWN TREE 34.97 0.07 0.22 
H 4 ROWN TREE 41.07 0.08 0.28 
1 1 SEARS 0.07 
I I SEARS 0.07 0.17 
1 1 SEARS 0.07 0.18 
1 1 SEARS 0.07 0.19 
1 1 SEARS 4.73 0.07 0.16 
1 1 SEARS 6.87 0.08 0.20 
1 1 SEARS 7.62 0.08 0.20 
1 1 SEARS 7.77 0.08 0.19 
1 1 SEARS 8.68 0.08 0.21 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.04 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.04 0.13 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.04 0.16 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.04 0.17 
B 2 THORN EMI 34.79 0.04 0.23 
B 2 THORN EMI 44.61 0.06 0.27 
B 2 THORN EMI 33.90 0.04 0.22 
B 2 THORN EMI 34.29 0.04 0.24 
B 2 THORN EMI 28.94 0.04 0.23 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.09 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.09 0.19 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.06 0.13 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 5.49 0.06 0.09 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 6.33 0.07 0.11 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 8.25 0.08 0.12 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 10.11 0.10 0.13 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 11.84 0.09 0.12 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 14.42 0.09 0.10 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.06 0.27 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.06 0.26 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.06 0.28 
H 3 UNILEVER 22.14 0.06 0.26 
H 3 UNILEVER 20.60 0.06 0.26 
H 3 UNILEVER 27.78 0.06 0.30 
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IND. C014PANY NET EARNINGS RETURN ON RETURN ON 
CODE SHARE(p) SALES EQUITY 
H3 UNILEVER 28.34 0.06 0.29 
H3 UNILEVER 34.97 0.07 0.32 
H3 UNILEVER 0.08 
52 
IND. COMPANY % GROWTH EQUITY CUM. GROWTH 
CODE IN EQUITY INDEX IN EQUITY 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 0.00 (0.10) (0.10) 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 0.05 (0-03) (0.14) 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.05 0.00 (0.13) 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.24 0.18 0.05 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 0.08 0.01 0.06 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.43 0.38 0.44 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS (0.09) (0.12) 0.32 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.13 0.01 0.01 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.18 0.08 0.09 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.16 0.11 0.20 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.25 0.19 0.39 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.07 0.01 0.40 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.09 0.05 0.45 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.61 0.55 1.00 
H 1 BASS 
H 1 BASS 0.44 0.23 0.23 
H 1 BASS 0.18 0.06 0.28 
H 1 BASS 0.06 (0.02) 0.26 
H 1 BASS 0.06 0.02 0.28 
H I BASS 0.08 0.03 0.31 
H 1 BASS 0.10 0.04 0.35 
H 1 BASS 0.05 0.01 0.36 
H 1 BASS 0.69 0.62 0.98 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.04 (0.12) (0.12) 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.27 0.14 0.02 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.23 0.13 0.15 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.16 0.11 0.26 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.35 0.29 0.55 
H 6 BAT INDS. (0.14) (0.19) 0.36 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.14 0.10 0.45 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.07 (0.09) (0.09) 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.24 0.11 0.02 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.32 0.26 0.26 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.20 0.13 0.39 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.00 (0.03) 0.36 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.08 0.03 0.39 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.17 (0.00) (0.00) 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.13 0.01 0.00 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.02 (0.06) (0.06) 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.11 0.06 0.00 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.06 0.01 0.01 
IND. C014PANY 
CODE 
% GROWTH EQUITY CUX. GROWTH 
IN EQUITY INDEX IN EQUITY 
* 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND (0.04) (0.10) (0.09) 
* 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND (0.07) (0.10) (0.19) 
* 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
G 6 BOOTS 
G 6 BOOTS 
G 6 BOOTS 0.10 (0.01) (0.01) 
G 6 BOOTS 0.12 0.03 0.02 
G 6 BOOTS 0.08 0.03 0.05 
G 6 BOOTS 0.08 0.03 0.09 
G 6 BOOTS 0.12 0.06 0.14 
G 6 BOOTS 0.07 0.04 0.18 
G 6 BOOTS 0.10 0.06 0.24 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.17 0.05 0.05 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.14 0.05 0.10 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.23 0.18 0.28 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.08 0.03 0.30 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.12 0.06 0.36 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.12 0.09 0.45 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.18 0.13 0.58 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.19 0.01 0.01 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.30 0.17 0.17 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM (0.16) (0.23) (0.05) 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.49 0.42 0.37 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.20 0.14 0.51 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM (0.14) (0.19) 0.32 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.01 (0.03) 0.29 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.08 0.04 0.33 
E 9 COURTAULDS 
E 9 COURTAULDS 
E 9 COURTAULDS (0.27) (0.35) (0.35) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.05 (0.03) (0.38) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.00 (0.04) (0.42) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.34 0.28 (0.14) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.12 0.06 (0.09) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.09 0.05 (0.03) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.16 0.11 0.08 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.11 (0.01) (0.01) 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.14 0.05 0.04 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.27 0.21 0.25 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.04 (0.00) 0.24 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.24 0.17 0.41 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.05 0.02 0.43 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.05 0.01 0.44 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.50 0.28 0.28 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.13 0.01 0.29 
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IND. C014PANY % GROWTH EQUITY CUM. GROWTH 
CODE IN EQUITY INDEX IN EQUITY 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.15 0.06 0.34 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.26 0.20 0.54 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.24 0.18 0.73 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.26 0.18 0.91 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.27 0.23 1.14 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.33 0.27 1.42 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.07 (0.09) (0.09) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.15 0.03 (0.06) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.10 0.02 (0.04) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.22 0.16 0.12 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.12 0.07 0.19 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY (0.06) (0.12) 0.07 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY (0.07) (0.10) (0.02) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.26 0.07 0.07 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.05 (0.06) 0.01 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.12 0.03 0.05 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.06 0.01 0.05 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.15 0.08 0.12 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS (0.04) (0.07) 0.05 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.66 0.41 0.41 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.25 0.12 0.52 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.17 0.08 0.61 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.00 (0.04) 0.56 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.18 0.13 0.69 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.18 0.11 0.81 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC (0.01) (0.04) 0.77 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.04 (0.00) 0.76 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.08 (0.04) (0.04) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.05 (0.03) (0.07) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS (0.05) (0.09) (0.16) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS (0.03) (0.08) (0.23) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.04 (0.02) (0.25) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.09 0.06 (0.19) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS (0.29) (0.32) (0.51) 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.03 (0.13) (0.13) 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.14 0.09 0.09 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.49 0.42 0.51 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN (0.08) (0.13) 0.38 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.11 0.08 0.46 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 
IND. COMPANY % GROWTH EQUITY CUM. GROWTH 
CODE IN EQUITY INDEX IN EQUITY 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B (0.43) (0.52) (0.52) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.50 0.34 (0.17) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.32 0.21 0.04 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.44 0.37 0.41 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.26 0.20 0.62 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B (0.17) (0.22) 0.39 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B (0.05) (0.08) 0.31 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.17 0.13 0.44 
H 4 ROWN TREE 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.08 (0.09) (0.09) 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.32 0.18 0.09 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.08 (0.01) 0.09 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.00 (0.04) 0.04 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.13 0.07 0.12 
H 4 ROWN TREE (0.05) (0.10) 0.01 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.05 0.01 0.03 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.04 0.00 0.03 
1 1 SEARS 
1 1 SEARS 
1 1 SEARS 0.05 (0.06) (0.06) 
I I SEARS 0.03 (0.05) (0.12) 
I I SEARS 0.27 0.21 0.10 
I I SEARS 0.09 0.04 0.13 
1 1 SEARS 0.11 0.05 0.18 
1 1 SEARS 0.11 0.08 0.26 
1 1 SEARS 0.06 0.01 0.27 
B 2 THORN EXI 
B 2 THORN EMI 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.05 (0.06) (0.06) 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.05 (0.03) (0.09) 
B 2 THORN EMI (0.11) (0.15) (0.24) 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.06 0.01 (0.23) 
B 2 THORN EMI (0-03) (0.08) (0.31) 
B 2 THORN EMI (0.08) (0.11) (0.41) 
B 2 THORN EMI --0.10 0.05 (0.36) 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.16 0.04 0.04 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.42 0.31 0.35 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.10 0.05 0.40 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.29 0.23 0.63 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.12 0.06 0.69 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.20 0.16 0.85 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.44 0.38 1.23 
H 3 UNILEVER 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.01 (0.14) (0.14) 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.19 0.06 (0.08) 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.13 0.04 (0.04) 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.07 0.02 (0.02) 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.08 0.03 0.01 
IND. COMPANY 
CODE 
% GROWTH EQUITY CUM. GROWTH 
IN EQUITY INDEX IN EQUITY 
H3 UNILEVER (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) 
H3 UNILEVER 0.12 0.08 0.03 
H3 UNILEVER 
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IND. COMPANY % GROWTH IN SALES CUM. GROWTH 
CODE SALES INDEX SALES 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 
H1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.10 (0.07) (0.07) 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 0.03 (0.08) (0.14) 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 0.06 (0.03) (0.17) 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 0, . 10 0.05 (0.12) HI ALLIED-LYONS 0.08 0.03 (0.09) 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 0.11 0.05 (0.04) 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 0.04 0.01 (0.03) 
HI ALLIED-LYONS 0.09 0.05 0.02 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.13 (0.04) (0.04) 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.20 0.07 0.03 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.15 0.06 0.09 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.13 0.08 0.18 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS (0.18) (0.22) (0.04) 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.06 (0.00) (0.04) 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.07 0.03 (0.01) 
H5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS (0.30) (0.32) (0.33) 
HI BASS 
HI BASS 0.11 (0.05) (0.05) 
H1 BA. SS 0.36 0.21 0.16 
H1 BASS 0.09 0.00 0.16 
H1 BASS 0.07 0.02 0.18 
H1 BASS 0.13 0.08 0.26 
HI BASS 0.07 0.01 0.27 
H1 BASS 0.12 0.09 0.36 
HI BASS 0.19 0.14 0.49 
H6 BAT INDS. 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.06 (0.10) (0.10) 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.21 0.08 (0.02) 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.22 0.13 0.11 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.03 (0.02) 0.09 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.22 0.16 0.25 
H6 BAT INDS. (0.12) (0.17) 0.08 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.09 0.05 0.14 
H6 BAT INDS. 0.26 0.21 0.35 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.04 (0.12) (0.12) 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.16 0.04 (0.08) 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.18 0.08 0.01 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.21 0.16 0.16 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.14 0.09 0.25 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.18 0.11 0.36 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.14 0.10 0.46 
D7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.05 0.01 0.47 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.21 0.03 0.03 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.18 0.05 0.08 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.05 (0.04) 0.04 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.15 0.10 0.15 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND (0.04) (0-09) 0.06 
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IVD. COMPANY % GROWTH IN SALES CUM. GROWTH 
CODE SALES INDEX SALES 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.09 0.03 0.09 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.16 0.12 0.21 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND (0.03) (0.07) 0.14 
G 6 BOOTS 
G 6 BOOTS 0.49 0.27 0.27 
G 6 BOOTS 0.14 0.02 0.29 
G 6 BOOTS 0.08 (0.00) 0.29 
G 6 BOOTS 0.12 0.07 0.36 
G 6 BOOTS 0.10 0.05 0.41 
G 6 BOOTS 0.11 0.05 0.45 
G 6 BOOTS 0.05 0.01 0.46 
G 6 BOOTS 0.11 0.06 0.53 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.43 0.21 0.21 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.06 (0.05) 0.16 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.12 0.04 0.19 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.15 0.10 0.29 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.16 0.10 0.40 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.04 (0.02) 0.38 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.09 0.06 0.44 
A 3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.22 0.17 0.61 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.14 (0.03) (0.03) 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.18 0.06 0.03 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM (0.04) (0.12) (0.09) 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.29 0.24 0.15 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.16 0.11 0.25 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.07 0.01 0.26 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM (0.27) (0.30) (0.04) 
D 8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.02 (0.02) (0.06) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 
E 9 COURTAULDS (0.22) (0.34) (0.34) 
E 9 COURTAULDS (0.06) (0.16) (0.50) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.05 (0.04) (0.53) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.06 0.02 (0.52) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.07 0.02 (0-50) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.06 (0.00) (0-50) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.01 (0.02) (0.53) 
E 9 COURTAULDS 0.04 (0.00) (0-53) 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.18 0.00 0.00 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.04 (0.07) (0.07) 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.17 0.07 0.01 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.22 0.17 0.17 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.23 0.17 0.35 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.18 0.11 0.46 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS (0.04) (0.07) 0.39 
1 2 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.11 0.06 0.46 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.15 (0.03) (0.03) 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.15 0.03 0.00 
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IND. COMPANY % GROWTH IN SALES CUM. GROWTH 
CODE SALES INDEX SALES 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.22 0.12 0.12 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.19 0.13 0.26 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.17 0.11 0.37 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.18 0.11 0.48 
D 7 GLAX0 HLDGS 0,. Q1 (0.02) 0.46 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.22 0.17 0.63 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.09 (0.08) (0.08) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.16 0.03 (0.04) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.01 (0.07) (0.11) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.04 (0.01) (0.12) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.10 0.05 (0.08) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY (0.01) (0.06) (0.14) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.01 (0.02) (0.16) 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.08 0.04 (0.12) 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.32 0.13 0.13 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.25 0.12 0.24 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.22 0.12 0.37 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.07 0.02 0.38 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.19 0.13 0.52 
* 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.01 (0.05) 0.47 
* 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.08 0.04 0.51 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.59 0.53 1.04 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.82 0.55 0.55 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 1.04 0.82 1.37 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.20 0.11 1.47 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.18 0.13 1.61 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.07 0.02 1.62 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.36 0.28 1.90 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.14 0.11 2.01 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.02 (0.02) 1.99 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.02 (0.13) (0.13) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.26 0.13 (0.00) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.02 (0.02) (0.22) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS (0.25) (0.28) (0.51) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.07 0.01 (0.50) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.08 0.04 (0.46) 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.09 0.05 (0.41) 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.10 (0.06) (0.06) 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.25 0.12 0.05 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.09 0.04 0.01 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.15 0.09 0.10 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.13 0.06 0.16 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.05 0.01 0.18 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.12 0.08 0.26 
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IND. COMPANY % GROWTH IN SALES CUX. GROWTH 
CODE SALES INDEX SALES 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B (0.09) (0.22) (0.22) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.00 (0.11) (0.33) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.12 0.03 (0.30) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INI, B (0.47) (0.49) (0.79) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1.51 1.39 0.59 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B (0.56) (0.59) 0.01 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) 
H 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.02 (0.02) (0.13) 
H 4 ROWN TREE 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.05 (0.11) (0.11) 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.09 (0.02) (0.13) 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.12 0.03 (0.10) 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.24 0.18 0.08 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.21 0.16 0.24 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.04 (0.02) 0.22 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.07 0.04 0.25 
H 4 ROWN TREE 0.11 0.06 0.32 
1 1 SEARS 
1 1 SEARS 0.42 0.21 0.21 
1 1 SEARS 0.10 (0.02) 0.19 
1 1 SEARS 0.08 (0.01) 0.18 
1 1 SEARS 0.07 0.02 0.21 
1 1 SEARS 0.16 0.10 0.31 
1 1 SEARS 0.09 0.03 0.34 
1 1 SEARS 0.13 0.09 0.43 
1 1 SEARS 0.09 0.05 0.48 
B 2 THORN EMI 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.44 0.22 0.22 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.38 0.23 0.45 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.09 0.01 0.46 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.11 0.07 0.52 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.04 (0.01) 0.51 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.14 0.07 0.58 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.03 0.00 0.59 
B 2 THORN EMI (0.04) (0.08) 0.51 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.08 (0.08) (0.08) 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.08 (0.04) (0.11) 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.09 0.00 (0.11) 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.06 0.02 (0.10) 
P 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.17 0.12 0.02 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.10 0.04 0.06 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.19 0.15 0.21 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.20 0.16 0.36 
H 3 UNILEVER 
H 3 UNILEVER (0.01) (0.16) (0.16) 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.17 0.05 (0.11) 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.11 0.02 (0.09) 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.01 (0.03) -(0.12) 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.21 0.15 0.03 
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IND. COMPANY GROWTH IN SALES CUM. GROWTH 
CODE SALES INDEX SALES 
H3 UNILEVER 0.03 (0.03) 0.00 
H3 UNILEVER 0.03 (0.01) (0.00) 
H3 UNILEVER (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) 
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IND. COXPANY TOTAL ANNUAL EQUITY SALES 
CODE INVESTORS RETURN INDEX INDEX (m) 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 2,353 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS (0.08) 885 2,200 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.13 793 2,027 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.99 767 1,974 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.06 770 2o, 080 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.22 907 21137 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.70 920 2j244 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.24 1,, 270 2j, 257 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 0.10 1,114 2,372 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 2,, 235 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.49 409 2,, 146 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.16 412 2,300 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.14 447 2#444 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.02 494 2,648 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.47 589 2#, 072 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.30 594 2,, 071 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 0.22 627 2,139 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS (0.02) 969 11445 
H 1 BASS 705 1,334 
H 1 BASS 0.13 864 1,263 
H 1 BASS 0.04 914 1,531 
H 1 BASS 0.50 894 11532 
H 1 BASS 0.06 908 1,, 564 
H 1 BASS 0.61 937 1,, 688 
H 1 BASS 0.39 975 1,704 
H I BASS 0.14 988 li, 852 
H 1 BASS 0.15 11599 2,109 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1,, 976 8, r504 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.10 1,746 7,645 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.56 1,, 982 8j280 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.84 2j240 9,315 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.19 2,493 9,168 
H 6 BAT INDS. 1.02 3r2O5 10,661 
H 6 BAT INDS. (0.07) 2,595 8,852 
H 6 BAT INDS. 0.51 2,849 9,312 
H 6 BAT INDS. (0.01) 11,, 291 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 612 1,165 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.59 558 1,028 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.26 619 1,068 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.58 1,158 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP (0.06) 587 lr339 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.31 738 lo, 457 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP (0-05) 834 1,618 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.25 809 1,779 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 0.03 836 1,791 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 747 621 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.50 744 637 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.52 748 670 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND (0.11) 704 646 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.03 746 713 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.18 754 652 
- 63 - 
IND. COMPANY TOTAL ANNUAL EQUITY SALES 
CODE INVESTORS RETURN INDEX INDEX (m) 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.24 679 670 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.21 608 751 
A5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 0.33 701 
G6 BOOTS 947 
G6 BOOTS 0.53 474 1,202 
G6 BOOTS (0.15) 467 1,228 
G6 BOOTS 0.32 483 1,224 
G6 BOOTS 0.47 Soo 1,314 
G6 BOOTS 0.13 515 1,374 
G6 BOOTS 0.36 545 1,437 
G6 BOOTS (0.10) 566 1,453 
G6 BOOTS 0.19 599 1,543 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 281 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.48 151 341 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.52 158 323 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.66 166 334 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.06 196 367 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.04 201 405 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.31 213 399 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.51 232 421 
A3 BPB INDUSTRIES 0.02 262 492 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 5,875 26,713 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.27 5,925 25,848 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM (0.17) 6,903 27,367 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.00 5,332 24,145 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.45 7,583 29,866 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.27 8,653 33,028' 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.22 7,002 33,326 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.37 6,808 23,409 
D8 BRIT. PETROLEUM 0.09 7,053 22,921 
E9 COURTAULDS 2,752 
E9 COURTAULDS (0.10) 449 1,819 
E9 COURTAULDS 0.36 292 1,528 
E9 COURTAULDS 0.03 283 1,473 
E9 COURTAULDS 0.78 272 1,500 
E9 COURTAULDS 0.07 347 1,528 
E9 COURTAULDS 0.54 367 1,521 
E9 COURTAULDS 0.63 386 1,485 
E9 COURTAULDS 0.12 431 1,484 
12 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 331 
I 2'ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.24 218 332 
12 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.80 215 308 
12 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.13 226 331 
12 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.30 274 386 
12 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.30 273 453 
12 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.16 318 505 
12 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.14 323 471 
12 ENG. CHINA CLAYS 0.30 326 500 
D7 GLAXO HLDGS 265 634 
D7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.29 338 618 
D7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.61 341 634 
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IND. COMPANY TOTAL ANNUAL EQUITY SALES 
CODE INVESTORS RETURN INDEX INDEX (m) 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 1.99 360 713 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.13 433 808 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.59 512 899 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.42 607 998 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS 0.38 748 977 
D 7 GLAXO HLDGS (0.04) 953 1,, 142 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 549 1,306 
* I HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.47 502 1,, 205 
* 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.31 517 1,, 247 
* 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.06 525 irlso 
* 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.09 611 1,, 146 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.25 652 1,199 
B 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.11 576 1,125 
* 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY (0.00) 519 1rogg 
* 1 HAWKER SIDDELEY 0.04 1,144 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 685 559 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.38 736 629 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.03 690 703 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS (0.38) 713 789 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.51 720 804 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.46 709 910 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.12 767 867 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 1.08 712 903 
A 3 PILKINGTON BROS 0.04 585 1,380 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 151 170 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.84 212 263 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.33 237 479 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.38 256 530 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC (0.28) 245 600 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.25 276 611 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC (0.38) 308 782 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.23 296 866 
B 2 RACAL ELECTRONIC 0.16 295 847 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 1,673 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.11 295 lo, 456 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.49 284 lo, 638 
H 5 RANK HOVIS (0.05) 276 1,315 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.53 251 li, 288 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.85 232 922 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.28 229 928 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.69 241 967 
H 5 RANK HOVIS 0.20 164 1,013 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 231 775 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.03 201 720 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.40 812 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.55 200 742 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.21 218 772 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.36 309 843 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.17 269 895 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN 0.36 290 909 
D 7 RECKITT & COLMAN (0.06) 980 
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IND. COMPANY TOTAL ANNUAL EQUITY SALES 
CODE INVESTORS RETURN INDEX INDEX (m) 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 320 3,, 186 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B (0.02) iss 2,475 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.85 208 2#212 
* 6 ROTHMANS INI, B 0.59 253 2j, 277 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.07 347 -1,152 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 0.59 417 2,752 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B (0.23) 325 lo, 134 
* 6 ROTHMANS INI, B 0.40 297 1,003 
* 6 ROTHMANS INL B 1.14 335 981 
* 4 ROWN TREE 266 707 
* 4 ROWN TREE 0.01 243 630 
* 4 ROWN TREE 0.16 286 615 
* 4 ROWN TREE 0.28 284 634 
* 4 ROWN TREE 0.11 272 749 
* 4 ROWN TREE 0.82 292 867 
* 4 ROWN TREE 0.10 263 852 
* 4 ROWN TREE 0.04 266 882 
* 4 ROWN TREE 0.15 266 937 
1 1 SEARS 1,, 040 
I I SEARS 0.47 519 11,258 
1 1 SEARS 0.02 486 1,237 
I I SEARS 0.91 461 1,227 
1 1 SEARS 0.23 558 1,256 
1 1 SEARS 0.15 580 1,384 
1 1 SEARS 0.23 606 1,, 427 
1 1 SEARS 0.15 652 1,557 
I I SEARS 0.09 662 1,, 627 
B 2 THORN EMI 1,326 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.24 548 1,621 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.47 516 lj992 
B 2 THORN EMI (0.02) 500 
2j, 005 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.55 425 
2,137 
B 2 THORN EMI (0.22) 431 2,115 
B 2 THORN EXI (0.14) 395 2,265 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.21 353 2,, 267 
B 2 THORN EMI 0.18 371 2,090 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 838 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.51 347 772 
P 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE (0.01) 360 744 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.40 472 746 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.22 496 758 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.61 610 848 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.11 647 880 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.18 752 11009 
F 2 TRUSTHOUSE FORTE 0.25 1,037 1,167 
H 3 UNILEVER 2r522 12o, 058 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.06 2,160 10t152 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.39 2,296 10,625 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.31 2,388 l0j877 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.20 2j, 436 10,532 
H 3 UNILEVER 0.26 2,510 12j, 123 
IND. COMPANY TOTAL ANNUAL EQUITY SALES 
CODE INVESTORS RETURN INDEX INDEX (m) 
H3 UNILEVER 0.29 2,343 llo, 797 
H3 UNILEVER 0.61 2,538 llo, 716 
H3 UNILEVER 09 10,860 
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IND. COMPANY RETAIL PRICE 
CODE . INDEX YEAR 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 0.85 1979 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1.00 1980 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1.12 1981 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1.22 1982 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1.27 1983 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1.33 1984 
H I ALLIED-LYONS 1.42 1985 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1.46 1986 
H 1 ALLIED-LYONS 1.52 1987 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 A. SSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 5 ASSD. BRIT FOODS 
H 1 BASS 
H 1 BASS 
H 1 BASS 
H I BASS 
H 1 BASS 
H 1 BASS 
H I BASS 
H 1 BASS 
H 1 BASS 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
H 6 BAT INDS. 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
D 7 BEECHAM GROUP 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
A 5 BLUE CIRCLE IND 
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